Argumentos ontológicos

contemporáneos II
Clase 20 de marzo
Teodicea
Argumento
ontológico de
Plantinga
Argumento ontológico
de Plantinga
Anselm’s argument begs the
question epistemically. By this I
mean that in order to know that
Anselm’s God (the greatest
possible being) is, in fact, a
possible being, we must know the
very point that Anselm proposes
to prove: that among the beings
that actually exist there is one
than which a greater being not
only doesn’t exist, but one than
which a greater being is
impossible. (Rowe, 2009, 88)
 • However, in discussing ‘the greatest
possible being’ from the perspective of
many possible worlds, Plantinga
uncovers a difficulty in Anselm’s
argument. For a being could be
Argumento maximally great in some possible world,
such that no other being in any world has
ontológico de that degree of greatness, even though
that maximally great being does not exist
Plantinga in the possible world that is actual.
(Rowe, 2009, 88)
• “Maximal greatness”: A being is
maximally great in a given possible world
only if “it has maximal excellence in every
possible world”. (Rowe, 2009, 89).
 1. It is possible that there be a being that
has maximal greatness.
2. So there is a possible being that in
Argumento some world W has maximal greatness.
ontológico de 3. A being has maximal greatness in a
given world only if it has maximal
Plantinga excellence in every world.
4. A being has maximal excellence in a
given world only if it has omniscience,
omnipotence, and moral perfection in
that world. (Plantinga, 1974a, 108).
 1. A being has maximal excellence in a given
possible world W if and only if it is
omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good
in W; and
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has
maximal excellence in every possible world.
Argumento 3. It is possible that there is a being that has
maximal greatness. (Premise)
ontológico de 4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true
Plantinga that an omniscient, omnipotent, and
perfectly good being exists.
5. Therefore, (by axiom S5: ) it is
necessarily true that an omniscient,
omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and
perfectly good being exists. (Plantinga,
1974b, 208)
 Objeción: argumento paralelo
1. There is a possible world W in
which there is no being with
maximal greatness.
Argumento 2. A being has maximal greatness
in a possible world only if it
ontológico de has maximal greatness in every
Plantinga world.
3. Therefore, there is no being
with maximal greatness in the
actual world. (Rasmussen,
2018, 181).
 La objeción de Dawkins

1. The creation of the world is the most marvelous achievement imaginable.

2. The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its
creator.
3. The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.
4. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence.
5. Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator we can conceive a
greater being namely, one who created everything while not existing.
6. An existing God therefore would not be a being greater than which a greater cannot be conceived
because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist.
7. Therefore, God does not exist. (Dawkins, 2006, 107)
 Bibliografía

• Dawkins, R. (2006). The God Delusion, London: Bantam Press.

• Plantinga, A. (1974a). God, Freedom and Evil. New York: Harper and Row Publishers,
Inc.
• Plantinga, A. (1974b). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rasmussen, J. (2018), “Plantinga” in Oppy, G. (Ed.). Ontological Arguments. Cambridge:
CUP.
• Rowe, W. L. (2009). Alvin Plantinga on the ontological argument. International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion, 65(2), 87-92.