Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Administrative Law
Administrative Law
Administrative Law
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
What is administrative law?
Example
There is a legal presumption that the rates fixed by the National
Telecommunications Commission are reasonable. It must be
conceded that the fixing of the rates by the government through its
authorized agent involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and
unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not
interfere. Courts do not interfere with administrative action prior to
its completion or finality. (Radio Communications of the Philippines
vs NTC, G.R. No. 66683, April 23, 1990)
5. In the resolution of cases or issues presented to
administrative bodies and offices, they are not
bound by the technical rules of evidence. Strict
observance of the same is not indispensable in
administrative cases. (Daduvo vs CSC, 42 SCAD
750, 223 SCRA 747)
6. An administrative decision may properly be amended or set
aside only upon clear showing that the administrative official
or tribunal has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. There is an abuse of discretion
when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, such as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion of personal hostility. (Heirs of Tanjuan vs Office of the
President, et al., G.R. No. 126847, December 4, 1996)
7. Factual findings of administrative bodies should be
accorded not only respect but also finality if they are
supported by substantial evidence even if not
overwhelming or preponderant. (Casa Filipino Realty
Corporation vs Office of the President, 241 SCRA 165)
Example:
The Board of Energy was created by Presidential Decree
No. 1208, dated October 6, 1977.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) took over the functions of the Overseas
Employment Development Board (OEDB). It was created by
Executive Order No. 797 dated May 1, 1972.
The Workmen’s Compensation Commission was
abolished on March 31, 1976, and it was replaced by the
Employees Compensation Commission as provided by
Article 176 of the New Labor Code of the Philippines,
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended.
3. Court decisions – interpreting the charters of
administrative agencies and defining their
powers and responsibilities.
Example:
Jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court
containing interpretations involving the principle of
primary jurisdiction; exhaustion of administrative
remedies; due process in administrative
proceedings, etc.
4. The body of rules, regulations and orders issued
by administrative agencies
Example:
Rules, regulations, circulars issued by the different
administrative agencies of the government.
Decisions and orders of administrative bodies in
cases submitted to them (i.e. decisions of the
National Labor Relations Commission n complaints
filed by employees against their employers).
What are the administrative bodies or
agencies in the Philippines?
Example:
a) Commission on Immigration and Deportation
b) Securities and Exchange Commission
c) Professional Regulation Commission
d) Bureau of Food and Drug
e) Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
f) Board of Food Inspectors
g) Monetary Board
h) Land Transportation Office
2) Administrative bodies for regulation of public utilities.
Example:
a) Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
b) National Telecommunications Commission
c) Board of Energy
d) National Water and Resources Council
e) Civil Aeronautics Board
f) Board of Marine Inquiry
3) Administrative bodies to carry on governmental
functions.
Example:
a) Bureau of Internal Revenue
b) Bureau of Customs
c) Civil Service Commission
d) Board of Special Inquiry
e) Bureau of Lands
f) Land Registration Authority
4) Administrative bodies that adjudicates and
decides industrial controversies.
Example:
a) National Labor Relations Commission
b) Philippine Overseas Employment Adjudication
Office
c) Human Settlement Regulatory Commission or
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
5) Administrative bodies making the government
a private party.
Example:
a) Commission on Audit
b) Social Security System Adjudication Office
6) Administrative bodies that grant privileges.
Example:
a) Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
b) Board of Pardons and Parole
c) Bureau of Lands
d) Land Transportation and Franchising Regulatory
Board
ADMINISTRATION POLITICS
Administration has something to do Politics has something to do with
with the execution of the policies of policies or expressions of the State’s
the State. will
ADMINISTRATION LAW
Administration achieves public It operates by redress or punishment
security by preventive measures. It rather than by prevention. It
selects a hierarchy of officials to each formulates general rules of action and
of whom definite work is assigned, and visits infraction of these rules with
it is governed by ends rather than penalties. It does not supervise action.
rules. It is personal. Hence, it is often It leaves individuals free to act, but
arbitrary and is subject to the abuse imposes pains on those who do not act
incident to personal as contrasted with in accordance with the rules
impersonal or law-regulated action. prescribed. (Roscoe Pound in
Proclamation, Pol. Sci. Association,
pp. 232-233)
(c) Administration of government and
administration of justice
ADMINISTRATION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
GOVERNMENT
The administrative officers who are The judicial officers who are charged
charged with the administration of with the administration of justice
government determine what is the law decides controversies between
to find out whether they are individuals and government officers as
competent to act and if so, whether it to the applicability in the cases in a
is wise for them to act question of a particular rule of law.
Hence, they determine what law is
applicable to the facts brought before
them
(d) Administration as an organization and
government
ADMINISTRATION AS AN ADMINISTRATION AS A
ORGANIZATION GOVERNMENT
Administration refers to that group of As an element of the State, a
aggregate of persons in whose hands government is defined as “that
the reigns of government are for the institution or aggregate of institutions
time being (U.S. vs Dorr, 2 Phil. 332). by which an independent society
It indicates the entire administrative makes and carries out those rules of
organization extending down from the action which are necessary to enable
Chief Executive to the most humble of men to live in a social state, or which
his subordinates. It is thus the totality are imposed upon the people forming
of the executive and administrative that society by those who possess the
authorities. (Goodnow, op. cit., p. 5 ) power or authority of prescribing
them.” (U.S. vs Dorr, 2 Phil. 332;
Bacani vs National Coconut
Corporation, 53 O.G. 2798)
What are the weaknesses of
administrative action?
Administration suffers from the following weaknesses:
Example:
Authority of the Governor General to lift the prohibition against
the importation of foreign cattle upon determination that there
was no longer a threat of contagion caused by ruinderpest
epidemic, was sustained by the Supreme Court in Cruz vs.
Youngberg (56 Phil. 234).
2. REQUISITES OF A VALID ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE OR REGULATION
HELD:
1. There is no syllable in Republic Act No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power.
ISSUE:
Is the said Letter of Instruction arbitrary?
HELD:
It is not arbitrary and not repugnant to the due process clause. There
is nothing in Letter of Instruction No. 229 which compels car owners
to purchase the prescribed early warning device. Vehicle owners can
produce the device themselves with a little ingenuity.
BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO
127 SCRA 329
FACTS:
Letter of Instruction No. 869 is an energy conservation
measure which prohibits the use of heavy and extra-heavy
private vehicles from using public streets on weekends and
holidays. Pursuant thereto, Memorandum Circular No. 39
was issued, imposing penalties of “fine, confiscation of
vehicle, and cancellation of registration”.
Petitioner contends that: (1) said letter of instruction is a
violation of his right to use and enjoy private property and of
his right to travel, hence, a violation of due process; and (2)
that said memorandum circular was likewise unconstitutional
for it violates the doctrine of undue delegation of power.
ISSUE:
Is the said letter of instruction and memorandum circular
constitutional is the confiscation or impounding of the vehicle
under Memorandum Circular ultra vires or not?
HELD:
The said Letter of Instruction was sustained but the confiscation
or impounding of the vehicle was ultra vires because a penalty
can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required
by law. While the imposition of a fine or the suspension of
registration is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the impounding of the vehicle finds no statutory
justification.
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ
152 SCRA 730
FACTS:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2382 or the Medical Act of
1959, MECS Order No. 52, Series of 1985, was issued. It
mandates the taking and passing of the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of said law and
MECS Order No. 52, and sought to be admitted to the
College of Medicine for 1987-1988, without successfully
taking the NMAT.
ISSUE:
Are the said law and regulation constitutional? Whether there is
some reasonable relation between requirement of passing
NMAT as a condition for admission to the medical school on the
one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the
general community, on the other hand.
HELD:
The Medical Act of 1959, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52,
Series of 1985, are constitutional. They constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the State as it is intended to
promote the public order, the health and physical safety and
well being of the population.
Likewise, the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks
of those authorized to practice medicine.
There is a violation between the requirement of
passing the NMAT and the securing of the health
and safety of the general community because the
regulation of the practice of medicine is a
reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public.
The said requirement is the protection of the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance in those who would undertake to
treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
3. REQUISITES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS WITH A PENALTY
The requisites for the validity of administrative
regulations with penal sanctions are the following:
FACTS:
Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits “the use of any
obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing”. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources subsequently promulgated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 prohibiting electro-fishing
in all Philippine waters. Said order was amended by A.O. 841, by
instructing the ban against electro-fishing to fresh water fishes.
The respondents were charged for having violated A.O. 841. The
complaint alleged that the five accused used an electro-cutting
device locally known as “senso” to catch fish through electric
current, in the waters of Barrio San Pablo, Sta, Cruz. The criminal
complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the CFI.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether A.O. 84 and 841, penalizing electro-fishing, are devoid of
any legal basis, and hence, invalid?
HELD:
Yes. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded its
authority in issuing F.A.O. Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are
not warranted by R.A. No. 8512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law
does not expressly prohibit electro-fishing. Since electro-fishing is
not banned under the law, and the Secretary is powerless to penalize
it, hence A.O. Nos. 84 and 84-1 are devoid of any legal basis.
HELD:
The Supreme Court sustained the defense and held that before the
public is bound by its contents, a law, regulation or circular must
first be published so the people will be officially informed of the
same, particularly the penalties for violating thereof.
GIL BALBUENA VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
110 PHIL. 150, G.R. NO. L-14283
NOVEMBER 21, 1960
FACTS:
Petitioners, members of the religious sect “Jehovah’s Witnesses”,
challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1265, by virtue of
which the Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8,
prescribing compulsory flag ceremony in all schools as an undue
delegation of legislative power. Section 1 of the Act requires all
educational institutions to observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be
simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the
Philippine National Anthem. Section 2 thereof authorizes the Secretary of
Education to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag
ceremony.
HELD:
Example:
a) The Land Transportation Office or LTO, is the one
entrusted with the function of registering all motor vehicles
including driver’s license.
b) The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is the one
entrusted with the function of approving application of
subdivision developers
c) The Commission on Higher Education or CHED is the one
entrusted with the function of issuing accreditation of
colleges in the Philippines.
2) Summary Powers – They are those powers exercised by
administrative authorities to perform coercive measures upon
persons or things without the need of securing judicial warrant.
Example:
a) An order issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
not to allow a Fil-Am player from playing in the PBA on the
ground of citizenship
Example:
a) The Bureau of Internal Revenue or BIR, can lawfully examine the
financial statements and books of accounts of persons and
companies
b) The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation or BID, can examine
the citizenship papers of any Fil-Am player whose citizenship is
under question
c) The Bureau of Labor Standard can inspect business
establishments to determine whether they comply or not with
occupational help and safety standards as provided for by the Labor
Code of the Philippines
4) Dispensing Power – This is the power of an
administrative officer to grant exemption from the
performance of a general duty.
Example:
a) The Bureau of Internal Revenue can exempt some
business establishments from compliance with some laws
or rules which are entrusted to it for enforcement.
b) The Movie and Television Regulatory and Classification
Board or MTRCB, can grant exemption or relax a rule or
rules regarding the showing of a film.
5) NOTICE AND HEARING
RULING:
No. Petitioners were not denied due process.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases instituted
by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its
officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1,
Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, Paragraph 11 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which states:
The legislature should lay down (1) A policy and a (2) definite
standard by which the executive or administrative officer or
board may be guided in the exercise of his discretionary
authority. If this is observed, there is a valid delegation of
legislative power (Cervantes vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-
4043, May 26, 1952). If, on the other hand, the statute
furnishes no standard and the officer or board is granted
uncontrolled or unlimited discretion, such a statute is an
unconstitutional delegation of power.
1. POLICY – The determination of legislative policy is
vested in the legislature and this cannot be delegated to
the administrative agencies. It must be clearly declared
in the language of the statute and should not be left to
the discretion of the said administrative agencies.
The rules they adopt to implement the law and the said
policy are called legislative rules or regulations.
“Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judge’s and
court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Public respondent Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to
the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme
Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of
the judiciary”
12. SOURCE OF AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARDS, BUREAUS AND OFFICES.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that once the Commissioner of
Customs has acquired jurisdiction over the case, the
expiration of Republic Act No. 650 did not divest said
Commissioner of his jurisdiction duly acquired while said
law was in force.
RCPI VS. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS
80 SCRA 471
FACTS:
There were two separate complaints for damages that were
filed against petitioner RCPI, one is BC Case No. 75-01-C
where a certain Diego Morales alleged that he failed to receive
a telegram sent by his daughter to him through RCPI on
October 15, 1974, informing him about the death of his wife.
He prayed for damages. Another case is BC Case No. 75-08-
0c where a certain Pacifico Inocencio alleged that he also
failed to receive a telegram sent by Lourdes Inocencio to him
through RCPI on July 13, 1975. As a result, he was not
allowed to attend the internment of his father at Moncada,
Tarlac. He also prayed for damages.
The Board of Communications imposed a disciplinary fine of P200.00 against RCPI
pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended and held that
RCPI’s service was inadequate and unsatisfactory. RCPI filed two petitions to review by
certiorari which were consolidated.
ISSUE:
Does the Board of Communications have jurisdiction over the said claims for damages
arising from the failure to receive telegrams through RCPI’s facilities?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the complaints that were filed do not involve RCPI’s
failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or
regulation of the respondent Board of Communications.
The claim for damages should be ventilated in the proper courts and not in the Board
of Communications. The only power of the latter is to fix rates. It could not take to task
a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such
authority.
Hence, the decisions of the Board of Communications in both cases were set aside and
nullified for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of both cases.
MONTEMAYOR VS. ARANETA
UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION
77 SCRA 321
FACTS:
On two separate occasions in 1974, a complaint was filed against
petitioner, a full time professor of Araneta University and was serving as
head of the Department of Humanities and Psychology. The first is a
complaint of immorality filed on April 17, 1974. The second is a complaint
for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member which was filed on November
8, 1974.
On the first complaint, an investigation was conducted by a committee
created by the President. Petitioner was able to cross-examine the
witnesses against him and he filed an affidavit to explain his defenses. The
committee’s recommendation was to demote petitioner’s ranking by one
degree. This was digested by the President and later was referred to the
Board of Trustees.
On the second complaint, another committee was created. After
investigation, the committee recommended his separation from
the university the charges against him having been established.
Subsequently, his dismissal was ordered on December 10, 1974,
effective on November 15, 1974. On December 12, 1974, an
application for clearance to terminate him was filed.
Petitioner filed a complaint for reinstatement in the NLRC on
November 21, 1974, with a prayer for payment of back salaries
and all the benefits payable to him.
The NLRC granted the petition but the University appealed to
the Secretary of Labor. The latter ruled that the dismissal was
justified. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed in the
Supreme Court on the ground that there was a denial of due
process.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner’s contention tenable?
HELD:
There was compliance with procedural due process regarding the
first complaint but it appears that the hearing of the committee on
the second complaint proceeded despite the absence of petitioner
who, in fact filed a motion for postponement of the hearing o
November 18 and 19, 1974. This deficiency, however, was cured
because petitioner was able to present his case as well as his evidence
before the NLRC. More than this, the entire record of the
proceedings were elevated to NLRC for review. He was therefore
afforded his day in court. Montemayor’s petition for certiorari was
dismissed.
IV. IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
What are the important principles in
administrative law?
Already answered.
Already answered.
2.DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and
provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts for
reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given opportunity to act and correct errors committed in the administrative
forum. (Teotico vs. Ageda, Jr., G.R. No. 87437, May 29, 1991)
The doctrine of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.
(Sunville Timber Products, Inc. vs. Judge Abad, G.R. No. 85502, February 24, 1991)
What is the consequence of the non-observance of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
2) When the issue involved is purely legal; (see also Duenas vs.
SSHA, G.R. No. 14917, June 4, 2004)
10) When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy adequate
remedy; (see also National Development Co. vs. Collector of
Customs, 9 SCRA 429; National Food Authority vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 115121-25, 68 SCAD 246, February 9, 1996)
and
4. When the issue is rendered moot and academic. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Celada, G.R. No. 164876, January 23, 2006)
OLD CASES:
1. Pascual vs. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466
2. Dimaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237
3. Mangubat vs. Osmeña, 105 Phil. 1308
4. Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
5. Tapales vs. President, 7 SCRA 553
SUBSEQUENT CASES:
1. Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga
Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntinlupa, et al. vs. Dominguez, G.R. No.
85439, January 13, 1992
2. Bunye, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
91927, January 13, 1992
3. Heirs of Tanjuan vs. Office of the President, et
al., G.R. No. 126847, December 4, 1996
SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. VS. JUDGE ABAD
G.R. No. 85502, FEBRUARY 24, 1992
FACTS:
A Timber License Agreement (TLA) was granted to
Sunville Timber Products, Inc. for a period of ten (10)
years expiring on September 31, 1992. On July 31, 1987,
Gilbolingco filed a petition with the DENR praying for
the cancellation of the said TLA on the ground of
serious violations of its conditions, and forestry laws
and regulations. The same charges were later made in
complaint for injunction with damages against Sunville.
Sunville moved for the dismissal of the case on the following
grounds: (1) The court had no jurisdiction over the complaint;
(2) The plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative
remedies; and (3) The injunction was expressly prohibited by
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 605.
The said motion to dismiss was denied by the trial judge and
this was sustained by the Court of Appeals on the ground that
administrative remedies need not be exhausted if there is an
urgent need for judicial intervention. The Court of Appeals
also declared invalid Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 605
as this is an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the
Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article VII, Section 1
of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Does the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action justify the court’s
intervention without giving the DENR the opportunity to rule first on the
alleged unlawful logging activities of Sunville?
HELD:
No. The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of
supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the
administrative authorities employing their specialized knowledge of the
agreement and the rules allegedly violated before the courts may step in to
exercise their powers of review.
There is no need to declare the unconstitutionality of Section 1, PD No. 605.
The rule is that a question of unconstitutionality of Section 1, PD No. 605. The
rule is that a question of unconstitutionality must be avoided where the cases
can be decided on some other available ground. The resolution of this question
must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of judicial
inquiry into a constitutional question are satisfactorily established. In such an
event, it will be time for the Court to make the hammer fall, and heavily.
MORCOSO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 96605, MAY 8, 1992
FACTS:
Tirol claims to be the owner of a 4.5 hectares of
land by way of inheritance from his father in 1930.
On December 28, 1979, she entered into a lease
agreement with Morcoso, allowing the latter
without paying rental and for a period of six years,
to develop a fishpond in a 85,880 sq. meters of
land within the 4.5 hectares of land, with
usufructuary rights.
While working on the fishpond, Morcoso was informed by the
personnel of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources that
said portion of land which Tirol leased to Morcoso is within the
alienable and public land.
Records show that Morcoso applied for a fishpond permit with
BFAR in 1973, and that Morcoso refused to surrender possession
of the fishpond to Tirol in 1976 when the term of the lease
required. It is for this reason that Tirol filed an unlawful detainer
case against Morcoso but the same was dismissed for not having
been filed on time.
The trial court ruled that the fishpond belongs to Tirol, and this
was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Morcoso questioned the
said decision on the ground that the trial court erred in taking
cognizance of a conflict of claims involving a parcel of land under
the administration and control of another government agency.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of Morcoso correct?
HELD:
No. The technical descriptions of the fishpond stated in the lease
contract and in the sketch plan of the BFAR personnel who
conducted an ocular inspection of the fishpond areas applied for
by Morcoso explicitly show that the latter was the subject of the
lease contract between Tirol and Morcoso.
The fishpond not having been part of the public domain, the trial
court correctly adjudged Tirol as the rightful owner thereof.
Hence, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not applicable, it being clear that the subject of controversy is a
private land.
NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. NOS. 115121-25, 68 SCAD 246
FEBRUARY 9,1996
FACTS:
Private respondent’s contacts were terminated in the midst of
bidding preparation and their replacements were hired barely
five days after the termination. Masada, another respondent,
is a pre-qualified bidder who submitted all requirements and
was preparing for the public bidding only to find out that
contract had already been awarded by negotiation. Because of
the urgency of the situation, the private respondents were
compelled to go to court to stop the implementation of said
negotiated security contracts.
ISSUE:
Should there still be an exhaustion of administrative
remedies before going to court to stop implementation of the
negotiated security contracts?
HELD:
The case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. An appeal to the NFA Board of
Council of Trustees and to the Secretary of Agriculture
pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987
was not plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
ESPIRITU VS. MELGAR
G.R. NO. 100874, FEBRUARY 13, 1992
FACTS:
Ramir Garing filed three complaints against Mayor Melgar of
Narjan, Oriental Mindoro. The first is a letter-complaint for
grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, culpable
violation of the Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of public service, filed with the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government. The same letter-
complaint was filed with the Provincial Governor of Mindoro
requesting that the Mayor be placed under preventive
suspension pending investigation. The third complaint was filed
with the President Action Center, Office of the President, which
forwarded the same to the Governor.
After Mayor Melgar submitted his answer to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, the latter recommended to the Provincial
Governor that the Mayor be preventively suspended for forty-
five (45) days pending the investigation of the complaint.
Mayor Melgar moved to dismiss the complaint but the same
was denied by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Meanwhile,
Governor Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar under preventive
suspension on May 28,1991.
Upon receipt of the order of suspension, Mayor Melgar filed a
petition for certiorari with Preliminary Inspection with prayer
for a restraining order in the Regional Trial Court which was
granted.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
to stop the governor from placing a municipal mayor under
preventive suspension pending the investigation of
administrative charges against the latter? Can Mayor Melgar go
to court without exhausting administrative remedies?
HELD:
The Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the special
civil action and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the case. There is nothing improper in suspending an
officer before the charges against him are heard and before he is
given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive
suspension is allowed so that the respondent may not hamper
the normal course of the investigation through the use of his
influence and authority over possible witnesses. Mayor Melgar’s
direct recourse to the courts without exhausting administrative
remedies was premature.
NEW CASES:
NICANOR T. SANTOS DEV’T. CORP. VS. HON. SEC., DAR
G.R. NO. 159654, FEBRUARY 28, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation which owns a large
tract of land known as the Santos Farm in Tuba,
Benguet. A portion of said farm, according to the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Tuba,
Benguet, would be placed under the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) for
acquisition and distribution to prospective
beneficiaries.
Petitioner wrote to the DAR Secretary and to the MARO that the Santos
Farm should be exempted from the coverage of the CARP program
because the property is untenanted, mountainous and is not planted
with rice and corn.
The DAR Regional Director advised petitioner to pursue the exemption
of the Santos Farm in accordance with the mandates of two DAR
Administrative Orders. Instead, petitioner filed a protest with the DAR
and a protest letter to the DAR Secretary reiterating the grounds for the
exemption of the Santos Farm from the CARP program.
Petitioner also filed a Complaint before DARAB. DARAB ruled that it
has no jurisdiction and referred the Complaint to the DAR Regional
Director. The Complaint was dismissed for being time-barred and for
failure to observe proper formalities.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a Petition for Mandamus with the CA to
compel the DAR, DARAB and MARO to act on its petition for exemption
of the Santos Farm from the CARP coverage. The CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit and for being the improper remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was able to exhaust all the administrative remedies.
RULING:
Petitioner was not able to exhaust all administrative remedies hence the CA
rightfully dismissed the Complaint.
As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of
the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress. In the instant case, it is beyond dispute that
petitioner failed to resort to proper administrative recourse in resisting the
Notice of Coverage issued by respondent MARO. Unsuccessful in its
attempt to oppose the Notice of Coverage when it lodged its protest with the
incorrect administrative offices, petitioner resorted to a judicial remedy.
The petition for mandamus, which it filed, however, was correctly denied
by the CA. Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are
administrative remedies available to petitioner.
There are instances when judicial action may be resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptions are: (1) when the question
raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in
estoppels; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4)
when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the
respondent acted in disregard of due process; (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of
the President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; (7)
when irreparable damage will be suffered; (8) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (9) when strong public interest
is involved; (10) when the subject of the controversy is private land;
and (11) in quo warranto proceedings.
In the case at bar, none of these exceptions are present. Hence,
petitioner should have exhausted all administrative remedies before
he can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice.
LAGUNA CATV NETWORK, INC. VS. MARAAN
G.R. NO. 139492, NOVEMBER 19, 2002
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the Department of Labor and Employment,
Regional Office No. IV (DOLE Region IV), separate complaints for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of other employee benefits
against their employer, Laguna CATV Network, Inc., petitioner herein.
DOLE Regional Director Maraan, after a summary investigation, issued an
Order directing petitioner to pay the concerned employees their unpaid
claims. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner failed to
comply with said Order so DOLE Regional Director issued a writ of
execution. Petitioner filed a motion to quash but the same was denied.
Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review.
Petitioner was of the view that an appeal to the
Secretary of Labor ‘would be an exercise in futility
considering that the said appeal will be filed with
the Regional Office and it will surely be
disapproved.’ The Court of Appeals denied said
motion ruling, among others, that petitioner failed
to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying its motion for
extension and in dismissing the case on the ground that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that petitioner failed
to exhaust all administrative remedies.
As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, an order
issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor
may be appealed to the latter. Thus, petitioner should have first
appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the Court of
Appeals a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review.
This Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such
remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power
can be sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not
merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain
relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking
judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that
the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass
upon the matter will decide the same correctly. Therefore,
petitioner should have completed the administrative process by
appealing the questioned Orders to the Secretary of Labor.
CSC vs. DBP
G.R. NO. 158791, JULY 22, 2005
FACTS:
The CSC (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the
Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to release the balance of its
budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court
of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
According to petitioner, the balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on
the basis of it's "no report, no release” policy whereby allocations for agencies are
withheld pending their submission of documents mentioned in the National Budget
Circular No. 478. Petitioner contends that the application of the "no report, no
release" policy upon independent constitutional bodies (of which it is one) is a
violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds. It contends,
among others, that petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies as it could
have sought clarification from respondent's Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal
autonomy before resorting to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies.
RULING:
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked
by respondent applies only where there is an express legal
provision requiring such administrative step as a condition
precedent to taking action in court. As petitioner is not
mandated by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary of
Budget and Management prior to filing the present action, its
failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP) VS. CELADA
G.R. NO. 164876, JANUARY 23, 2006
FACTS:
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
expropriated 14.19343 hectares of respondent
Celada's land in Bohol. Petitioner LBP valued
respondent's land at P21,106.22 per hectare. DAR
offered said amount to respondent but the latter
rejected it. Nevertheless, LBP deposited said sum
in the name of respondent.
The matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for summary administrative hearing on determination
of just compensation. While the case was pending before the
DARAB, respondent filed a petition for judicial determination of
just compensation against LBP, DAR and the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen, Bohol before the
RTC. Respondent claims that her land is worth at least P15,000
per hectare.
LBP, in its answer, raised non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and forum shopping. It contended that respondent
should first await the outcome of the DARAB case before taking
any judicial recourse.
The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) issued an order
affirming the valuation of LBP. Thereafter, the Special Agrarian
Court (SAC) ruled that recourse to DARAB is only for purposes
of conciliation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is still applicable despite the order issued affirming the
valuation made by LBP.
RULING:
There is no merit to petitioner's contention that respondent failed
to exhaust administrative remedies when she directly filed the
petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC even
before the DARAB case could be resolved. The issue is now moot
considering that the valuation made by petitioner had long been
affirmed by the DARAB in its Order dated April 12, 2000. As held
in LBP vs. Wycoco,(419 SCRA 67 [2004]) the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable when the
issue is rendered moot and academic, as in the instant case.
CORSIGA VS. DEFENSOR
G.R. NO. 139302, OCTOBER 28, 2002
FACTS:
Private respondent Ortizo was the Senior Engineer B in
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Jalaur-
Suague River Irrigation System, Region VI. Petitioner
Corsiga, then Regional Irrigation Manager of NIA,
Region VI, reassigned private respondent to Aganan-Sta.
Barbara River Irrigation System. Aggrieved, private
respondent wrote petitioner requesting exemption from
the policy of rotation. When petitioner denied the said
request, private respondent filed with the RTC of Iloilo
City a complaint for prohibition and injunction.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition for
lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies but the motion was
denied. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision saying that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply where the controverted act is patently
illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent has a cause of action despite his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
RULING:
Being a NIA employee covered by the Civil Service Law, in our view, private
respondent should have first complained to the NIA Administrator, and if
necessary, then appeal to the Civil Service Commission. As ruled in Abe-Abe
vs. Manila, 90 SCRA 524 (1979), if a litigant goes to court without first
pursuing his administrative remedies, his action is premature, and he has no
cause of action to ventilate in court. Hence, petitioner asserts that private
respondent's case is not ripe for judicial determination.
There is no convincing evidence of grave abuse of discretion on petitioner's
part. Private respondent's arguments are mere allegation which he failed to
substantiate. Official functions are presumed to be regular unless proven
otherwise.
Therefore, the instant case is not an exception to the general rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3. DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION OR PRIOR RESORT
In Nasipit Lumber Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, (Section 5, Rule XIII, Books of
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code) for instance, the
Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to labor
relations proceedings “considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such
proceedings are non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in courts of law.” Said pronouncement, added the
Court, is in consonance with the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
exercise of administrative powers.
Neither does the doctrine apply to judgments based on prohibited or void
contracts. (B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 159 SCRA 355)
NEW CASE:
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint addressed to the Philippine Consulate General
in San Francisco, California, USA, private respondent accused
petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of RA No.
3019. The letter was indorsed to the Philippine Commission Against
Graft and Corruption (PGAGC) for investigation.
Petitioner pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of
similar cases filed before the Ombudsman. He attached to his
counter-affidavit the Consolidated report of the Ombudsman
dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.
Nevertheless, the PGAGC conducted its own
investigation. Based on its findings, PGAGC
recommended petitioner’s dismissal for service.
The Office of the President, concurring with the
findings and adopting the recommendation of the
PGAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12,
ordering petitioner’s dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all government benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the
Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC
moot and academic.
RULING:
No. The earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman
does not render the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and
academic.
The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata
in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the
Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of
the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.
For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as
a presidential appointee, was investigated by the
PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and
control of the President over him. As the PCAGC's
investigation of petitioner was administrative in
nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application in the case at bar.
6. DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision;
"Sec. 1. Scope - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy
Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.”
"Sec. 2. Cases not covered - This Rule shall
not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines.”
HELD:
No. The prior conviction should have been considered by the Commission
in imposing the proper penalty on Malbun, although it was presented only
in the bank's motion for reconsideration or for new trial.
Malbun's prior conviction in 1979 is not a newly discovered evidence but
"forgotten evidence.” It already existed or was already available before or
during the trial which was known and obtainable by the bank and could
have been presented were it not for the oversight or forgetfulness of
Malbun. Therefore, applying rigid technical rules, such document is not
admissible as evidence against Malbun.
However, administrative agencies like the Civil Service Commission
exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements. Therefore, the Commission should have admitted
the document showing the prior conviction of Malbun, considering that it is
a public document and within the judicial notice of the Commission.
2. THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES ARE BINDING TO THE COURTS IF THEY
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 99357, January 27, 1992),
the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies
to the same level or rank of the Regional Trial Court except those
specifically provided for under the law. As the Bureau of Immigration is
not of equal rank as the Regional Trial Court, its decisions may be
appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for
certiorari by the Regional Trial Court. (Sec. 2[1], Batas Pambansa Blg.
129).
4. REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS
New Cases:
a) MMDA vs. Dante Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005
VI. IS THERE A RELIEF FROM WITHIN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ITSELF?
Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an
action or decision of lower administrative authorities may be
appealed to, or reviewed by, higher administrative
authorities or superiors like the Department Head (EO 292,
Book VII, Chapter 4, Section 19), or to the Commission or
Board en banc (e.g. National Labor Relations Commission,
Securities and Exchange Commission, National
Telecommunications Commission). In fact, an appeal need
not be filed at once. A motion for reconsideration may suffice
to obtain desired changes in the decision so long as no rights
have vested in the meantime and so long as they have not
passed beyond the control of the administrative authorities.
A resolution therefore of a labor arbiter, is
reviewable by any of the divisions of the National
Labor Relations Commission, and thereafter,
whoever is the aggrieved party may appeal the
decision to the Commission En Banc. The
hierarchy of authorities within the framework of
the National Labor Relations Commission ends
here. The decision of the Commission En Banc is
now appealable to the Court of Appeals, not to the
Supreme Court, unlike before.
EXAMPLE:
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT/DECISION
GREETINGS:
You are hereby notified that on ___________,
JUDGMENT/DECISION, copy attached, was rendered in the
above-entitled case.
Under Article 232 of the Labor Code (as amended by R.A.
No. 6715) and pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of
the NLRC, no motion for reconsideration from said
judgment shall be entertained, but only an appeal, a notice of
memorandum thereof, in 5 typewritten copies must be filed
before the Labor Arbiter or the Executive Labor Arbiter of
this Office within 10 calendar days upon receipt thereof.
An appeal shall be deemed perfected only upon the
payment of an appeal fee. PROVIDED, that in case of judgment
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable and duly accredited bonding company, an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
The decision of the Labor Arbiters reinstating a dismissed
employee, in so far as the reinstatement is concerned shall
immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in
the payroll.
Quezon City, Philippines, ______________.
_______________________
Labor Arbitration Officer
VII. RELIEF AFTER RESOLUTION OF THE
HIGHEST LEVEL OF AUTHORITY IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONCERNED
What relief is available as against an action or decision
of an administrative bureau, agency, or office?
FACTS:
Philippine Airlines questioned the provisional permit to operate four
aircrafts on the following grounds: (1) alleged violation of due process
for failure to hear its evidence; (2) alleged absence of factual basis for
granting said provisional permit; (3) there is no public need; (4)
documents to support legality of the grant were not disclosed to it.
CAB countered that petitioner was notified about the hearing and it
was represented during the hearing when the proposed service and
feasibility of operations were subject of discussion and debate. CAB
and private respondent claimed that the promised grant is
interlocutory.
ISSUE:
Is PAL's petition for certiorari tenable? Is there abuse of discretion
in granting the said provisional permit to operate four aircrafts?
HELD:
PAL's petition for certiorari was sustained as a special civil action
which allows an aggrieved party to complain against any tribunal,
board or officer exercising functions judicial in character without or
in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion.
The claim, however, that there was violation of due process was not
sustained for there was notice and hearing. Besides, CAB has the
power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend
or revoke, in whole or in part the temporary permit it has issued.
VIII. APPEAL FROM, OR REVIEW OF
ORDERS, ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE
DIFFERENT EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS,
BUREAUS AND OFFICES
OLD CASES
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 112844, JUNE 2, 1995
61 SCAD 720
HELD:
Before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner was duly
notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and
to comply with pertinent orders and regulations. Petitioner has gone all the way
up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure
orders. There is thus no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its
side as well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies (Board of Medical
Education vs. Alfonso, 176 SCRA 304 (1989]). As long as the parties were given
opportunity to be heard before the judgment was rendered, the demands of due
process were sufficiently met (Lindo vs. COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should
also be noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of the
various orders of respondent DECS and its motion were duly considered by
respondent DECS to the extent of allowing and granting its request for re-
inspection of its premises.
The phase-out and closure orders were based not only on
petitioner's deficiencies as a maritime institution but also on its
continued operation without the requisite authorization for the DECS
and acceptance of freshman students in blatant violation of the latter's
order and/or persistent warnings not to do so. Verily, there are
sufficient grounds to uphold the phase-out and closure orders of the
DECS which were issued conformably with Sec. 28 of the Education
Act of 1982.
In the case at bench, it is not the function of this Court nor any
other court for that matter - X X X to review the decisions and order of
the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution
meets the standards required for permission to operate and to
continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power
or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary.
Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any court would have the
competence to do so.
ILOCOS SUR ELECTRIC CORPORATION, INC. VS. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 106161, FEBRUARY 1, 1995
58 SCAD 679
HELD:
Under Section 10 of P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645 only
the power of supervisions and control over electric cooperatives and
other borrowers, supervised or controlled, is given to the NEA. There
is nothing in said law which provides that the NEA administration
has the power to hear and decide termination of employees in
electric cooperatives. That authority is vested in the Labor Arbiter.
The dismissal arose from a purely labor dispute which falls within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC.
CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS SYSTEM (MWSS) VS. VASQUEZ, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 109113, JANUARY 25, 1995,
58 SCAD 409
HELD:
The MWSS, a government-owned and controlled corporation created by
law through R.A. No. 6234, is charged with the construction, maintenance
and operation of waterworks system to insure an uninterrupted and
adequate supply and distribution of potable water. It is the agency that
should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projection of
the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its development
plans. The exercise of this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates,
among other things, prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation,
and deliberation - matters that can best be discharged by it. MWSS has
passed Resolution No. 32-93 to likewise show its approval of the technical
specification for fiberglass. All these should deserve weight.
NOTE: This affirms the decision of the Supreme
Court in Razon, Inc. vs. PPA (151 SCRA 233), thus:
HELD:
No. At the time of the commencement of the administrative action, the
operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order
No. 119. Under the said laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control,
direction and supervision over his subordinates, which include private
respondent. Consequently, since jurisdiction has been acquired by the
Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it
continues until the final DISPOSITION of the administrative case.
Jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case remains with it until
the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary.
Respondent, a civil servant, cannot use the courts of justice as a shield to
prevent the implementation of administrative sanctions of executive
agencies against erring public servants.
NEW CASES
RULING:
A second motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Office of the President may only be allowed in exceptionally
meritorious cases. Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987,
prescribes the rules and regulations governing appeals to the
Office of the President of the Philippines. Section 7 and 9 read
as follows:
Sec. 7. Decision/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by
special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless
a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party
shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
Sec. 9. The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
It is clear from Sec. 7 of Administrative Order No. 18
that only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to
be filed from a decision, resolution or order of the Office
of the President. A second motion for reconsideration is
allowed only in exceptionally meritorious cases.
In the case of petitioner, he, together with a co-
respondent, filed a second motion for reconsideration
claiming he will be presenting evidence that he was not
able to present during the hearings, which, if admitted,
will probably change the judgment.
SGMC REALTY CORPORATION VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
G.R. NO. 126999, AUGUST 30, 2000
RULING:
Direct resort to the SC from a resolution or order of the Ombudsman is not
sanctioned by any rule of procedure.
Clearly, this is an appeal from the questioned issuances of the Ombudsman.
However, such direct resort to this Court from a resolution or order of the
Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.
Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989. The provision allowed direct appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The
right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases. The provision does not cover resolutions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. The provision does not cover resolutions of
the Ombudsman in criminal cases. More importantly, Sec 27 of RA No. 6770
insofar as it allowed a direct appeal to this Court was declared unconstitutional in
Fabian vs. Hon. Desierto (356 SCRA 787).
However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not
without any recourse. Where grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the
existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The
remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in
preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
But in this case, petitioner has taken the position that the
Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary to
law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That
is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading
of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not
impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in
issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely
questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier,
direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review
on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By
availing of a wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed
outright.
Should an order of preventive suspension be nullified because the
Secretary of Health lost his disciplinary power and authority when
the new Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992?
Both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, any decision, order or ruling of
the Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The same is true with respect to any decision, order or ruling of the
Commission on Elections and the Civil Service Commission. (Orocio vs.
Commission on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992; Manalansang
vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 93500, February 5, 1991; Villanueva
vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 97071, February 27, 1992)
What is the relief available against
awards of ale lots issued by NHA?
An action to annul awards of sale of its lots should
first be filed in the National Housing Authority.
Thereafter, an appeal may be filed in the Office of
the President within thirty three (33) days from
receipt of the NHA decision awarding the lot to
another party. After which step, the aggrieved party
can go to the Courts under Rule 65. (Swan, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97319; Swan, et al. vs.
Abesamis, G.R. No. 101054, August 4, 1992)
The old case of Raymundo vs. PHHC (114
SCRA 717)had this ruling:
“The power to dispose of the lands placed under the
administration of Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation
is lodged in said body. There is no provision of law authorizing
courts to review decisions of respondent PHHC and to take
cognizance of actions to annul awards of sale or any other actions
made by it pursuant to the authority granted it by law. If the courts
are to take cognizance of cases involving errors or abuse of power
exercised by the respondent PHHC, the remedy would be by
means of an action for certiorari or prohibition to set aside the
orders of decisions of the respondent PHHC, and not a direct
action for specific performance as the one instituted in this case.
But this special civil action would not lie unless there is an
allegation of abuse of discretion of lack of jurisdiction.
Can the courts interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
discretion to determine whether or not to file an information against
an accused?
GENERAL RULE
The Ombudsman having authorized the Special Prosecutor to
investigate the charges, and we cannot assume that the former
acted without any justifiable cause, the latter is and should, at
this stage, be the proper adjudicator of the question as to the
existence of a case warranting the filing of an information in
court. To deny said functionary of the opportunity to discharge
such duty through this prohibitory recourse, under the obtaining
circumstances herein before explained, would be violative of
settled rules of criminal procedure and would, in effect grant an
immunity against even an investigative proceeding. (Sesbreno
vs. Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 97289, March 21, 1991;
Tabaa-Candang vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 97127, March 21, 1991)
EXCEPTION
Except if there is a misapprehension of justice
and the courts have to step in to prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to
harass, oppress, and persecute a member of the
democratic opposition in the Philippines against
whom an information for subversion had been
filed. The petitioners, Fernando and Mison, are by
no means, opposition men who need to be rescued
from the “iron arm" of the law.
IX. METHODS OF REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
What are the methods of review of
administrative action?
1. In San Juan vs. Cuento (G.R. No. 45063, April 15, 1988, 160
SCRA 277), it was held that an interval of 2 years is too long.
2. In Allied Leasing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA
71 [1991]).
3. In Claridad vs. Santos (120 SCRA 148), 99 days in filing
certiorari after receipt of denial of the motion for
reconsideration was considered as barred laches.
4. In People vs. Magallanes (G.R. No. 118013, 64 SCAD 968,
October 11. 1995, citing Philec Workers Union vs. Young,
January 22, 1992), 3 months in filing certiorari after receipt
of the denial for the Motion for Reconsideration was accepted.
5. The period has now been settled to 60 days.
NON-STATUTORY METHODS (If there is no specific law granting review, relief is obtained by means of the
common law remedies, or by the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo-warranto or
prohibition)
Example:
1. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
Section 1 of the New Rules of Court.
2. A petition for prohibition may also be filed under
Section 2, Rule 65 of the New Rules of Court.
3. A petition for mandamus may also be filed under
Rule 65, Section 3 of the New Rules of Court.
4. A quo-warranto proceeding may also be filed
under Section 1, Rule 66 of the New Rules of Court.
5. Petition for habeas corpus may also be filed under
Section 1, Rule 102 of the New Rules of Court.
DIRECT PROCEEDING (Administrative action is being questioned in a subsequent proceeding on account of
lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This also includes a
petition for review or a relief from judgment.)
Example:
1. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court
2. Appeal under Rule 43, Section 1 of the New
Rules of Court.
COLLATERAL ATTACK (The conclusiveness or
validity of a prior administrative decision is
being questioned on the ground that the
decision is invalid for lack of jurisdiction over
the person, or over the subject matter, or
because the decision attacked was not the act
of the administrative body concerned which is
vested with the power to make the said
determination).
Can the citizenship of an individual be attacked in a collateral proceeding?
FACTS:
Commissioner Haydee Yorac, then an Associate
Commissioner of the Commission on Elections, was
designated by President Corazon C. Aquino as Acting
Chairperson of the Commission because the regular
chairman was appointed to another position in the
government. The petitioner challenged the designation
invoking the prohibition that "no member may be
appointed or designated in a temporary capacity."
ISSUE:
Is the said designation valid?
HELD:
The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Commission
on Elections must be extended permanent appointments by
the President but such appointments shall have the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. The President has no
power to designate a temporary Chairman. This prerogative
may be exercised by the members of the Commission on
Elections for they may, by a majority vote, designate one of
them as temporary chairman pending the appointment of a
permanent chairman by the President.
Within what period must a case or matter
be decided by each commission?
The aggrieved party has to file a petition for certiorari within thirty
(30) days from receipt of said decision, order or ruling. This
petition is actually a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
and, therefore, the ground or the issue to be brought to the
Supreme Court for decision is limited to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.
There is lack of jurisdiction if the grave abuse of discretion was
done in a capricious or whimsical manner. Excess of jurisdiction
presupposes that the court has jurisdiction but it has overstepped
the permissible bounds in the exercise thereof. (Galido vs. Comelec,
93 SCRA 78 [1991]); Rivera vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 178 [1991])
It is now settled that in providing that the decisions,
orders or rulings of Comelec "may be brought the
Supreme Court on certiorari," the Constitution in
its Article IX[A], Section 7, means the special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1.
For this reason, the aggrieved party must first file a
motion for reconsideration before the petition for
certiorari is brought to the Supreme Court. (Reyes
vs. Regional Trial Court, et al., G.R. No. 108886, 61
SCAD 44, May 5, 1995)
REYES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 108886, MAY 5, 1995
61 SCAD 44
FACTS:
After the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Aquiles U. Reyes as the 8th
winning candidate for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nauja, Oriental Mindoro.
Thereafter, Adolfo G. Comia, a candidate for the same
position, filed before the trial court an election protest alleging
that the Board of Canvassers had committed a mistake in the
mathematical computation of the total number of votes
garnered by petitioner.
After the mistake was admitted and rectified, the trial court
annulled the proclamation of Reyes and declared Comia as the
duly elected winner.
Reyes filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC and also a
petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
Appeals.
The COMELEC's First Division dismissed Reyes' appeal on the
ground that he failed to pay the appeal fee within the
prescribed period and the Court of Appeals dismissed his
petition in view of his pending appeal in the COMELEC citing
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 which prohibits the filing of
multiple petitions involving the same issues.
Reyes then brought the present action. Reyes contends that
both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed
a grave abuse discretion, the first, by assuming jurisdiction over
the election contest filed by Comia despite the fact that the case
was filed more than ten days after Reyes' proclamation, and the
second, i.e., the COMELEC's First Division, by dismissing Reyes'
appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the
appeal fee.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Reyes failed to first
file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc
before filing his petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
contrary to Article IX(A), Section 7 of the Constitution. It likewise
held that the COMELEC's First Division properly dismissed Reyes'
appeal from the decision of the trial court for his failure to pay the
appeal fee within the time for perfecting an appeal.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the COMELEC,
raises a fundamental question. He contends that the filing
of the present petition, without Reyes first filing a motion
for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates
Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution because under this
provision only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
HELD: