2007 System Dynamics Conference

Albuquerque, New Mexico

Modeling the Cycles of Gang

and Criminal Behavior
Understanding the Economic and Social Influences

Bruce Skarin
Jeanine Skorinko, Khalid Saeed, Oleg Pavlov

bruceskarin@hotmail.com
Dynastic Cycles to Crime Waves

United States-Total
Crime Rates California
New Mexico
1400 New York 3500

1200 District of Columbia 3000

1000 2500

800 2000

600 1500

400 1000

200 500

0 0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year

Data Source: Crime trends from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Resource Competition Archetype
 Three Resource States
– Government
– Civilian
g o ve rnme nt c ivilia n c rimina l
– Criminal c o ntro l c o ntro l
+
c o ntro l

+
taxes Balance Balance
+
Reinforce
social use
+
asocial use
+
social freedom and
- economic prosperity -

 Three Primary Feedback Processes

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Economic Perspective

Gang
Government Civilians
Members

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Economic Perspective

Gang
Government Civilians
Members
- -

Civilians
Income
+ Attraction

Civilian
Produce
R

+
Disposable
Income per
Civilian

Civilian Relative
+ Income

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Economic Perspective

Gang
Government Civilians
Members
- -

+
Civilians Gang
Income
+ Attraction Appropriations

Civilian
+
Produce Gang Income
R Envy
Disposable
Income per Gang
+ Member
R
Disposable
Income per
Civilian
-

Civilian Relative
+ Income

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Economic Perspective
Threat to +
Society

Government
B Reducing
Gang Members

+
State Control
+
-
Gang
Government Civilians
- Members
-

Civilians Gang
Income
Attraction Appropriations

Civilian
Produce Gang Income
R Envy
Disposable
Income per Gang
Member
R
Disposable
Income per
Civilian

Civilian Relative
Income

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Economic Perspective
Threat to +
Society

Government
Reducing
B
Gang Members

State Control
+

Gang
Government Civilians
Members
-

Taxing Civilians
into Crim e Civilians
Income
Gang
Attraction Appropriations
R
Civilian
+ Produce Gang Income
R Envy
Taxes Disposable
Income per Gang
Member
R
Disposable
Income per
- Civilian

Civilian Relative
+ Income

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Social Psychology Perspective
Threat to
Society

Government
Reducing
B
Gang Members
Strength of +
Group Identity
State Control

+ Desensitization A
Gang Act
Government Civilians
Members
Level of R
Violence

+
Taxing Civilians
Sensitivity
into Crim e Civilians Gang Violence
Income -
Attraction Appropriations
R
Civilian
Produce Gang Income
R Envy
Taxes Disposable
Income per Gang
Member
R
Disposable
Income per
Civilian

Civilian Relative
Income

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 Social Psychology Perspective
Threat to
Society

Government
Reducing
-
Gang Members
Strength of
Group Identity
State Control

+ Desensitization Arousing
Gang Activity Level
Civilians
Members
Level of R
Violence Self

+
Awareness
Sensitivity to
Civilians Violence -
Income
Gang
ttraction Appropriations
R
Gang Income Deindividuation
R Envy
Disposable
Perceived
Income per Gang
Member Prevalence of Gang
R Members
Disposable +
Income per
Civilian

Civilian Relative
Income

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 Social Psychology Perspective
Threat to +
Society Sense of
Losing Sense
Accountability of Self
Government R
Reducing
Gang Members
Strength of
Group Identity
State Control
-
Desensitization Arousing
Gang Activity Level
Civilians
Members
Level of R
Violence Self

+
Awareness
Sensitivity to
Civilians Violence -
Income
Gang
ttraction Appropriations
R
Gang Income Deindividuation
R Envy
Disposable
Perceived
Income per Gang
Member Prevalence of Gang
R Members
Disposable +
Income per
Civilian

Civilian Relative
Income

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Real and Simulated Crime Cycles
200
City of Worcester
Incidents per Capita per 10,000

150

100

50

0
1992 1997 Year 2002 2007

Data Source: Crime trends from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Real and Simulated Crime Cycles
City of Worcester
200
Simulated - Economic Influences Only
Incidents per Capita per 10,000

150

100

50

0
1992 1997 Year 2002 2007

Data Source: Crime trends from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Real and Simulated Crime Cycles
City of Worcester
200
Simulated - Economic Influences Only
Simulated - Economic and Social Influences
Incidents per Capita per 10,000

150

100

50

0
1992 1997 Year 2002 2007

Data Source: Crime trends from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/Crime.cfm Worcester Polytechnic Institute
 Measuring Tradeoffs

High Freedom High Freedom

 Civilians  Low &
Freedoms    Legitimacy High Legitimacy
 (Police  Gang Members) 
1

 Experiments:
– Comparison of model structures
Low Freedom Low Freedom
– Crime wave versus increased & High
policing Low Legitimacy Legitimacy
– Changes in civilian and
gang/criminal productivity
1

 Civilian Produce 
Economic Legitimacy   
 Gang Disposable Income 
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Economic, Social, & Combined Comparison
1.1

1.05
Social Only

Economic Only
Freedoms 1
10% Increase in Combined
Gang Members
0.95

0.9
0.900 0.950 1 1.050 1.100
Economic Legitimacy

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Gang vs. Government Infusion
1.1
Government Infusion
Combined

1.05
Gang Infusion
Economic Only

Freedoms
1
10% Increase in Government
Gang Members Infusion
Economic Only
0.95
10% Increase in
Government Gang Infusion
Combined
0.9
0.900 0.950 1 1.050 1.100
Economic Legitimacy

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Gang vs. Civilian Productivity Increase/Decrease
1.8
20% Civilian Civilian Productivity
Increase
Productivity
Increase 1.45
Gang Productivity
Decrease
20% Civilian
Productivity Freedoms
1.1
Decrease
20% Gang Gang Productivity
Productivity 0.75
Increase

Increase
Civilian Productivity
20% Gang Decrease
Productivity 0.4
0.40 0.75 1.10 1.45 1.80
Decrease Economic Legitimacy

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Model Insights and Conclusions
 Crime cycles can be simulated using either
economic or social influences
 A combined model demonstrates how effects
can be amplified
 Expanded policing may have similar negative
social freedom and economic prosperity
outcomes as a crime wave
 Civilian productivity is a strong driver in
determining new equilibriums
 Social amplifying effects should be
considered in crime policy solutions
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