Fuel Tank Safety (FTS) &

Critical Design Configuration

Control Limitations (CDCCL)
 Overview

• History
• SFAR 88 Ignition Prevention
• Flammability Reduction
• Maintenance & Safety Procedures
 History

• Since 1959 there have been 18 fuel tank explosions on transport category
airplanes. Most notably, on July 17, 1996, a 25-year old Boeing 747-100
series airplane, operating as TWA Flight 800, was involved in an in-flight
breakup after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport in New York,
resulting in 230 fatalities.

• The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the probable

cause of the TWA 800 accident was an explosion of the center wing fuel tank
(CWT) due to ignition of the flammable fuel vapor and air mixture in the
tank. The source of ignition energy for the explosion could not be
determined conclusively, though the NTSB determined the most likely was a
combination of failures involving the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS).
 History
• Although it could not be determined with
certainty, the likely ignition source was a 
short circuit.Problems with the aircraft's
wiring were found, including evidence of
arcing in the Fuel Quantity Indication System
(FQIS) wiring which enters the tank.
 History
• The FQIS on Flight 800 is known to have been
malfunctioning; the captain remarked on what
he called "crazy" readings from the system
approximately two minutes and thirty seconds
before the aircraft exploded. As a result of the
investigation, new requirements were
developed for aircraft to 
prevent future fuel tank explosions.
Lightning Strikes – 2 Key Accidents
(B707 – 1963, B747 – 1976)
 History
• 707 Elkton MD (December 8, 1963)
History
 History
• Pan Am Flight 214 was from San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, to Baltimore, Maryland
and Philadelphia. On December 8, 1963, the 
Boeing 707 crashed near Elkton, Maryland,
while en route from Baltimore to Philadelphia,
after being hit by lightning, killing all 81 on
board.
 History
• While holding at 5,000 feet, left wing struck by
lightning
• Left wing exploded
• In-flight break-up, 81 killed
• Airplane fueled with mixture of Jet A
and JP-4 fuels
 747 Madrid (May 9, 1976)
• Airplane’s left wing was struck by lightning
while descending to 5000 ft
• Left wing exploded
• In-flight break-up, 17 killed
• Airplane fueled with JP-4 fuel
747 Madrid (May 9, 1976)
 Non-Lightning Caused Tank
Explosions – 3 Key Accidents
B737 – 1990, B747 – 1996, B737 - 2001
 Philippine Airlines Flight 143,B 737 Manila
(May 11, 1990)
• While pushing back from gate, empty center
fuel tank exploded
• Airplane destroyed by fire
• 8 killed
• Airplane had been fueled with Jet A fuel
History
History
 747 New York (July 17, 1996)
• While climbing through 13,000 feet, empty
center tank exploded
• In-flight break-up of airplane
• 230 killed
• Airplane had been fueled with Jet A
TWA 800, B747
 737 Bangkok (March 3, 2001)
• While parked at gate, empty center
tank exploded
• Airplane destroyed by fire
• 1 flight attendant killed
• Airplane had been fueled with Jet A fuel
737 Bangkok (March 3, 2001)
 Ignition Sources for Key Accidents
Never Identified
• Massive resources expended during Five
investigations
• Elkton 707 - 1963
• Madrid 747 - 1976
• Manila 737 - 1990
• New York 747 - 1996
• Bangkok 737 - 2001
• Exact source of ignition never determined
• Corrective actions based on most likely scenarios
• All FIVE accidents involved explosions of what
are now being referred to as “High Flammability”
fuel tanks
• >7% flammability exposure on a worldwide basis
• Highlights uncertain nature of ignition source
prevention strategy
• Emphasizes need for an independent layer of
protection
 Regulation
• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
published Special Federal Aviation
Regulation (SFAR) 88, IN 2001
• For TC &STC holders to complied within
18 month
 SFAR 88 Ignition Prevention
• Efforts to resolve TWA 800 led the FAA to
conclude that:
• 1. Many current airplanes had similar short
comings in their ignition prevention
approaches
• 2. An additional independent layer of
protection is needed to “Back-Up” the
ignition prevention strategy
 SFAR 88 Ignition Prevention
• In response to these findings, the FAA
issued Special Federal Aviation Regulation No.
88 in June of 2001.
• Re-examine existing commercial fleet related
to ignition prevention
• Implement safety enhancements related
to the findings of these examinations
 SFAR 88 Lessons Learned
• Goal of SFAR 88 was to preclude ignition sources
• Safety Assessments were very valuable
• Revealed unexpected ignition sources
• Difficulty in identifying all ignition sources
• Number of previously unknown failures found
• Continuing threat from still unknown failures
• Unrealistic to expect we can eliminate all ignition
sources
• Must consider flammability reduction of high
flammability tanks as an integral part of system safety
 SFAR 88 Findings
• External & Internal Wiring
• Fuel Pumps
• Lightning
• Maintenance
• Flight Manual Procedures
• Motor Operated Valves
• FQIS
Service Experience
A 320 Raceway wiring guides Rear wing spar chaffing
• While both ARAC committees concluded that
flammability reduction efforts would be
valuable—existing technology was considered
not practical for
• commercial aviation
• Weight – too heavy
• Cost – too expensive
• Reliability – too low
• FAA continued technology R&D
 Flammability Reduction
• In 1998 and again in 2001, the FAA tasked the
U.S. Aviation Rulemaking and Advisory
Committee (ARAC) to explore ways to reduce
flammability in fuel tank systems
• Direct response to TWA 800
 Flammability Reduction

The Fuel Tank Inerting System (FTIS) is a Flammability

Reduction Means to decrease Fleet Flammability Exposure
to satisfactory levels. The FTIS gives protection to decrease
the risk of fire and explosion in the center fuel tank (fuel
tank). To get this protection, the FTIS causes inert conditions
in the ullage space of the fuel tank
Inerting Systemon A320
AIR SEPERATION MODULE (ASM)
 Fuel tank inerting
The fuel tank is inert when the average oxygen
concentration:
1) is below 12% at sea level up to 3048 m
2) increases linearly from 12% at 3048 m to 14.5%
at 12192 m (40000.73 ft.),
Performance analysis and subsequent testing showed Air Separation Module technology
would work at low pressures, 10 to 40 psig versus 50 to 100 psig used commercially
 Safety Procedures When You Do Work in a
Fuel Tank
• WARNING: YOU MUST WEAR SAFETY BREATHING EQUIPMENT WHEN YOU DO
WORK IN A FUEL TANK. THE TANKS CAN CONTAIN AIR FROM THE TANK
INERTING SYSTEM. AIR FROM THIS SYSTEM HAS A LOW-OXYGEN CONTENT
AND CAN CAUSE INJURY AND DEATH.
• (1) Make sure that the aircraft is grounded correctly.
• (2) Make sure that there is sufficient light in the work area to work safely.
• (3) Use only the recommended safe test equipment for maintenance
procedures.
• (4) Use only the approved LIGHT SOURCE - SPARK-PROOF and FLASHLIGHT
in the fuel tank. Sealed vapour lamps must not be used.
• (5) Make sure that the flow of clean air in the work area is sufficient to work
safely.
• (6) Before you start the maintenance task make sure that these are available:
The correct fire-fighting equipment · Approved persons to use the fire-fighting
equipment.
Safety Procedures When You Do Work in a
Fuel Tank
(7) Be careful when you disconnect fuel pipes and/or remove
components from the fuel system.
(8) Use approved protective clothing made from material .
(9) You must use a respirator if the fuel-gas concentration in
the work area is more than 5% of the lower explosive limit
(LEL).
(10) WARNING NOTICE - NO SMOKING around the work area.
(11) In the work area you must not: use any material which
will cause sparks or flames.
(12) immediately flush away or remove all fuel leakage.
(13)do all maintenance tasks in very clean conditions.
 Safety Procedures When You Do Work in a
Fuel Tank
(14) must not use metallic wire wool in a fuel tank.
(15) Use only approved cleaning materials.
(16) Put CAP - BLANKING on all disconnected pipes and
openings in components and tanks.
(17) If possible, safety all components before you put them
inside the fuel tank.
(18) Make sure that all the fuel system components have
correct electrical bonding.
(19) Do not connect electrical equipment to a power source
less than 30 meters away, unless the power source has spark-
proof connectors.
 Safety Procedures When You Do Work in a
Fuel Tank
(20)AIRBUS recommends that the park brake is set to ON when
possible. You cannot set the PARK BRK to ON if you have hot
brakes. If you cannot set the PARK BRK to ON, it is possible to
continue but you must make sure the chocks are in the correct
position.
(21) Do not use the microphone on the High Frequency (HF)
transmitter during refuel/defuel operations.
(22) During the refuel/defuel procedure do not operate the aircraft
external lighting
ANY QUESTIONS?