an agency problem when an agent pursues goals that conflict with principals’ goals. Principals establish and use governance mechanisms to control this problem.
number of large block shareholders and the percentage of shares they own. Institutional investors are an increasingly powerful force in corporate America and actively use their positions of concentrated ownership to force managers and boards of directors to make decisions that maximize a firm’s value.
Boards of directors In the U.S. and the U.K., a firm’s board of directors (composed of insiders, related outsiders, and outsiders) is a governance mechanism expected to represent shareholders’ collective interests. The percentage of outside directors on many boards now exceeds the percentage of inside directors. The SOX Act requires outsiders to be more independent of a firm’s top-level managers compared with directors selected from inside the firm.
bonuses, and long-term incentives - is a highly visible and often criticized governance mechanism. The firm’s board of directors determines the effectiveness of the firm’s executive compensation system.
Corporate control While shareholders and boards of directors may have become more vigilant in their control of managerial decisions, they are insufficient to govern managerial behavior in many large companies. Therefore, the market for corporate control is an important governance mechanism. Although corporate control is also imperfect, it has been effective in causing corporations to combat inefficient diversification and to implement more effective strategic decisions.
Corporate governances differ globally Corporate governance structures differ in Germany, Japan, and U.S. U.S. historically focused on maximizing shareholder value. Employees in Germany took a prominent role as stakeholders. Japanese shareholders played virtually no role until recently Now Japanese firms are being challenged by “activist” shareholders. Internationally, systems in various countries are becoming increasingly similar.