Eidetic Reduction

Subject/ Course Title: Philosophical Foundation of Education

Presented by: Samantha L. Policarpio
Course: Ph.D. – Education Management
 ⪢ Eidetic reduction, is a technique in Husserlian phenomenology, by
which the philosopher moves from the consciousness of individual
and concrete objects to the transempirical realm of pure essences
and thus achieves an intuition of the eidos (Greek: “shape”) of a
thing—i.e., of what it is in its invariable and essential structure,
apart from all that is contingent or accidental to it. The eidos is
thus the principle or necessary structure of the thing.

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 ⪢ Being a science of essences, phenomenology finds this reduction
important for its methodology. For each kind of phenomenon or
experience, phenomenologists ask what the unique and essential
components that make the phenomenon or the experience unique,
distinguishable from all other kinds of phenomena or
experiences. .

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 ⪢ Our experience of time, for example, has unique characteristics.
Eidetic reduction is used to identify those essential components
that uniquely constitute our experience of time. Similarly, the
method is used to identify all other kinds of experiences.

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 ⪢ Because the eidetic reduction uses the method of free variation, it
is not dependent on either mental constructs or concrete factual
objects, although it takes its starting point in the knowledge of
facts. Beginning with a concrete object, the philosopher can
imaginatively vary its different aspects. The limitations of the
fanciful variation are the effectively given—i.e., that which is
given immediately and indubitably—and the eidos itself. The
series of variations overlap, and the aspect in which they overlap is
the essence. .

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 ⪢ Thus, the eidetic reduction is neither a form of induction nor an
abstraction. In accordance with the phenomenological reduction, it
abstains from any sort of positing of the actual existence of its
objects, and it brackets, or holds in suspense, the concrete and
factual content. On the other hand, it is not an empirical
generalization that takes place at the level of man’s natural
attitude..

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 ⪢ Eidetic reduction is used together with another key
phenomenological method, phenomenological reduction. These
techniques are parts of phenomenological researches for those who
follow Husserlian phenomenology. Other phenomenologists do not
necessarily accept Husserlian essentialist orientation and its
methods to find “essences.” .

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 ⪢ Heidegger, for example, whom Husserl expected to be his
successor, challenged and rejected Husserl’s essentialist
orientation and turned phenomenology into hermeneutic
phenomenology. While Husserl, the originator of phenomenology,
defined phenomenology as a presupposition free discipline.

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 ⪢ Heidegger argued that human understanding is always and already
a form of interpretation and there is no interpretation free
knowledge. Since eidetic reduction is a method to find essences,
this method is also rejected if one refuses the existence of
essences.
⪢ .

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 ⪢ Ideas
⪢ Eidetic reduction is a form of imaginative variation by which one
attempts to reduce phenomenon into its necessary essences. This is
done by theoretically changing different elements (while mentally
observing whether or not the phenomenon changes) of a practical
object to learn which characteristics are necessary for it to be it
without being something else. If a characteristic is changed, and
the object remains unchanged, the characteristic is unnecessary to
the essence of the object, and vice versa.
⪢ .

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 ⪢ Eidetic reduction requires that a phenomenologist examine the
essence of a mental object, be it a simple mental act, or the unity
of consciousness itself, with the intention of drawing out the
absolutely necessary and invariable components that make the
mental object what it is. This reduction is done with the intention
of removing what is perceived and leaving only what is required.
⪢ .

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 ⪢ This method can be illustrated by the example of Descartes's piece
of wax (not as a mental object, but as a demonstration of the
concept of reduction; see Descartes article). It appears to be
opaque, flat, hard, extended to certain dimensions in space. It has a
certain feel, smell, taste. Most of these qualities can be negated as
necessary to the piece of wax continuing to be a piece of wax. If
heated, it will continue to be the same piece of wax, the same
molecules. .

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 ⪢ However, the taste may change, the smell may become more
noticeable, the texture will obviously change, it will become clear
if heated to the point of melting etc. The only things that remain
(its extension into space, chemical makeup, and mass) are the
things that are required for the existence of that piece of wax.

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 ⪢ One may, however, object to above identification of the essence of
wax with its spatial extension and chemical components. Smell,
taste, feeling, and texture can also be essential components of our
experience of wax. “Free variation” and “eidetic reduction” in the
above example may be guided by a preconception that spatial
extension is the essence of a physical thing. In fact, Descartes’
discourses were guided by this preconception. Thus, other
phenomenologists can legitimately find and present different
essences of wax through their eidetic reduction..

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 ⪢ Essences, thus, are not discoverable, definitive invariables. They
are tentative claims phenomenlogicists make similar to a
hypothesis that a scientist makes for their studies. What
phenomenologists identify as essences at one point can turn out to
be variables through further studies. Phenomenological
determination is always tentative, and open to revision and
modification. Eidetic reduction is not a method to find absolutely
unchanging essences. In phenomenology, there is no claim for the 
ontological immutability of essences.

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 ⪢ Challenges
⪢ Husserl pursued genuine knowledge by attempting to be free from
all kinds of presuppositions and preconceptions. He realized that
even modern sciences were built upon a number of
presuppositions. Husserl conceived phenomenology as a science
that can disclose all kinds of presumptions built into our
knowledge and can provide philosophical justifications for all
sciences that pursue the objectivity of knowledge. Phenomenology
for Husserl was a “presuppositionless” discipline, which he called
“the science of all sciences.”

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 ⪢ Some phenomenologists, starting with Heidegger, questioned the
possibility of “presuppositionless knowledge.” Heidegger argued
that human understanding is not possible without some sort of pre-
knowledge, and understanding is necessarily interpretive..

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 ⪢ Drawing upon the tradition of hermeneutics of Dilthey and others,
Heidegger re-interpreted phenomenology as a hermeneutic
discipline. With Heidegger, phenomenology was divided into two
streams between those who retained the Husserlian essentialist
orientation and those who pursued hermeneutic phenomenology.
⪢ .

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 ⪢ In addition, Heidegger questioned the concept of essence. He
argued that concepts can be a product of cultural, historical
traditions in the same way that languages that express these
concepts are products of history. What one identifies as an essence
can be merely an idea loaded with concepts of a particular
intellectual tradition. Philosophical discourses in different
traditions may not share the same conceptual distinctions. .

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 ⪢ The difficulty of translating ideas among different linguistic
communities, known as the problem of incommensurability, poses
a challenge to the idea of the existence of universal essences. In
addition, the human experience may be culturally conditioned
without the individual being aware of it. Even the concept of color,
for example, may not be the same between two culturally distinct
communities. The idea of eidetic reduction is thus tied with other
fundamental philosophical questions.

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 THANK YOU

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