Safety Considerations In Design &

Operation of a Chemical Process Plant

R.K. Sharma
SM (Fire & Safety)
BSc, BE(FIRE), PDIS, NEBOSH (IGC), MBA(HR)
“I am a student of whoever I can learn from. I don’t see
myself in position like I’ M above anybody else and I can
never learn or no one can ever teach me anything ……’’

"The only thing that interferes with my learning is my

education."

“The illiterates of 21st century will not be those who can’t

read, write or express but those who can not learn,
unlearn and relearn ……’’

R.K.SHARMA
• leak in LPG Storage facility
• 11000 M3 Of LPG Consumed
• BLEVE occurred 500 deaths, 6000
injured
• Loss US$ 100 millions
What happens then :
Project delay

?
Business interruptions

Investors

Share holders People Management

Employee morale Assets Management
Environment
Community image
Management
Legal issues
Morale Management
Environmental damages

Media image

Bankruptcy
Three essential ingredients in any industry.
Man,

Machine

Material

These form three angle of a triangle with Management at

center to control them.

It is essential that this triangle is an equilateral triangle,

maintaining the essential equilibrium.
R.K.SHARMA
 MAN

MANAGEMENT
MACHINE MATERIAL
A Machine can be programmed, Material
flow can be controlled but Man can not be
programmed or controlled in democracy like
us. R.K.SHARMA
Developing nature of industry and economy

Produce more at faster rate

Create more Hazards and danger to life & Properties

Needs for Social justice and ensure that process of

production does not harm society and that fruits
of production proves beneficial to the country as a
whole.

Needs Safety management system and Disaster

Prevention plan in any industry
R.K.SHARMA
RISK CONCEPTS

Understanding
Risk

What can How What are

go likely the
wrong? is it? impacts?
 L People
Liasoning with
O Environment
different S Production
authorities –
Share
Time and cost S Assets / Finance
management
holders

Government
Action C Non adaptation of standard
( Permits &
A
Inventory
Enforcements practices
U
Management
S
conditions
E quality
Risks
S design
Enforcement
Risks
People C
Management Shifting of focus from crisis
O
N management to risk management
Project
Delays
T Formulation of Policy
Financial
Pressure R Training / education
O
Attitude to implementation
L

Reducing risks PROACTIVELY is better than dealing

with the impact and losses REACTIVELY
 WHAT IS SAFETY ?
IS IT FREEDOM FROM ACCIDENTS ??

IS IT REDUCTION OF ACCIDENTS ??

IS IT ALL ABOUT COMPLIANCE OF LEGAL

REQUIREMENTS ??

R.K.SHARMA
 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY MEANS

Control Of Hazards By Abidance To Best

Practices.

Degree Of Protection Of Hazards.

Can It Be 100% ??

Answer To This Depends Upon The Definition

Of The Term Hazard
R.K.SHARMA
 Concept Definitions
Hazard –
 An intrinsic chemical, physical, societal, economic or political condition
that has the potential for causing damage to a risk receptor (people,
property or the environment).
This property being intrinsic, can not be changed.

Our knowledge is limited by experience.

 Examples of intrinsic hazards:
Toxicity and flammability – H2S in sour natural gas
High pressure and temperature – steam drum
Potential energy – walking a tight rope

14
 HAZARD
As our knowledge increases with experience we try to apply
better controls as well.

Due to our limited knowledge we are constrained from using

the term 100% safe.
Hence we can say:

 Complete freedom from accidents is not possible.

 Ind. Safety does not mean Zero Accident.

R.K.SHARMA
 Concept Definitions
Risk
A measure of human injury, environmental damage or
economic loss in terms of both the frequency and the
magnitude of the loss or injury.

Risk = Consequence x Frequency

16
 Concept Definitions

Risk

Intrinsic Undesirable
Consequences
Hazards Event
Likelihood Likelihood of
of Event Consequences

Example

Loss of life/ property,

Storage Spill and Environmental
tank with Fire damage,
flammable Damage to reputation
material of facility

17
 Concept Definitions

Layers of Protection are used to

enhance the safe operation.
Layers of Protection Analysis
(LOPA) is used to determine if
Layers of Layers of there are sufficient layers of
Risk
Protection Protection protection for a predicted accident
scenario. Can the risk of this
scenario be tolerated?
Intrinsic Undesirable
Consequences
Hazards Event
Likelihood Likelihood of
Causes of Event Consequences
Causes are
also known as
Initiating
Events. Prevention Preparedness,
Mitigation,
Land Use Planning,
Response, Recovery

18
 SAFETY
is
Nothing but a way of life where
HAZARDS
(Inherent potential to cause the harm / damage)
To
Life and Property are Identified,
RISKS
(Chance for the occurrence of Hazard)
are Controlled and
Accidents are Reduced / Prevented
or their
Consequences are Minimized
Recognized And Generally Accepted Good Engineering
Practices (RAGAGEP)

 NATIONAL STANDARDS : BIS, OISD, TAC,PNGRB

 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS :
ILO,API,UL,NFPA,EN,OSHA,NIOSH,ASME,ANSI

 MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:
ISO,OHSAS,DUPONT,BSC 5 STAR

 STATUTES –VARIOUS ACTS & RULES

 BENCHMARKING
R.K.SHARMA
 HAZARD CONTROL HIERARCHY

 ELIMINATION

 SUBSTITUTION

 ENGINEERING CONTROL

 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

 PPE’S
R.K.SHARMA
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGN AND OPERATION OF
A CHEMICAL PROCESS PLANT
Safety in a process plant is a concept covering
 Hazard identification,
 Risk assessment and
 Accident prevention.

Good design and forethought can often bring increased

safety at less cost.

R.K.SHARMA
"Process" means any activity involving a highly
hazardous chemical including any use, storage,
manufacturing, handling, or the on-site movement of such
chemicals, or combination of these activities.
US OSHA 1910.119 Process Safety Management Rule,
definitions.
“Process safety” is the operation of facilities that
handle, use, process or store hazardous materials in a
manner free from episodic or catastrophic incidents.
(CCPS: Guidelines for Technical Management of Chemical
Process Safety)
R.K.SHARMA
 What is Process Safety Management (PSM) ?

Application of -
Management Systems & Controls (Programs,
Procedures, Audits, Evaluations) to a Manufacturing
Process In a way that Process Hazards are
Identified, Understood, and Controlled, so
that Process related Injuries and Incidents are
prevented.
R.K.SHARMA
 PSM is a Proactive Risk Based Approach

PROACTIVE REACTIVE
• Implementing • Implementing
countermeasures to countermeasures after an
prevent an incident incident has occurred
• Perform hazard analysis • Perform incident
and risk assessment investigation and determine
root cause
• Practice inherently safer • Design & install additional
design layers of protection after an
incident
25
Recognizing Operational Risk

It is the first step in design as well as operation

of a safe process and associated facilities.

HOW..??

• Process Safety Information (PSI)

• Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

• Task-based risk identification

R.K.SHARMA
PSI/PT
It provides foundation for identifying and understanding the
hazards involved, the first step in the Process Safety Management
effort.

Process Technology consists of ;

Hazards of materials
Process Design Basis
Equipment Design Basis
Identifying PSM critical
PT interaction with other PSM Elements
R.K.SHARMA
Process Technology

Hazard of Material
• List of chemicals / MSDS
• Chemical Interaction Matrix
• Chemical-Material interaction matrix

Process Design Basis

• Process chemistry / Process description
• PFDs / Material & energy balance
• Maximum intended inventory of hazardous substances
• Minimum required inventory of critical chemicals
R.K.SHARMA
Equipment Design Basis

• Identification of PSM Critical

• Applicable codes & standards
• Engineering drawings
• Equipment sizing
• Equipment design data
• Vendor blueprints
• P & ID’s
R.K.SHARMA
PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA)
1.Identify hazardous materials and process conditions
2.Identify hazardous events
3.Analyse the consequences and frequency of events using:

Qualitative Risk Assessment

- SLRA (screening level risk assessment)
- What-if
- HAZOP (Hazard & Operability study)
- FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis)

R.K.SHARMA
Semi-Quantitative Risk Assessment

- Fault trees/ Event trees/ Bow- tie

iii. Quantitative Risk Assessment

- Mathematical models for hazard effects include explosion

overpressure levels, thermal radiation levels

- The consequences are determined from the hazardous effects

R.K.SHARMA
 Risk Assessment Risk assessment
further answers :
Define the System
What can go wrong?
Hazard
Identification
How? Why?
How often can these go
wrong?
Consequence Frequency What are the
Analysis Analysis consequences?
How likely are these
Risk consequences?
Estimation
What is the risk?

32
Inherent safety
An inherently safer design is one that avoids hazards instead of controlling them,
particularly by reducing the amount of hazardous material and the number of
hazardous operations in the plant.

The major principle in Inherent Safety is to remove the hazard altogether. The
best method to achieve this is to reduce the inventory of hazardous substances
such that a major hazard is no longer presented. methods to achieve an
Inherently Safer design are:

•Intensification to reduce inventories;

•Substitution of hazardous substances by less hazardous alternatives;
•Attenuation to reduce hazardous process conditions i.e. temperature, pressure;
•Simpler systems/processes to reduce potential loss of containment or possibility
of errors causing a hazardous event;
R.K.SHARMA
 Plant layout considerations to achieve Inherent Safety
 Locating all high-volume storage of flammable / toxic material well outside
process areas;
 Locating hazardous plant away from main roadways through the site;
 Fitting remote-actuated isolation valves where high inventories of hazardous
materials may be released into vulnerable areas;
 Provision of ditches, dykes, embankments, sloping terrain to contain and
control releases and limit the safety and environmental effects;
 Siting of plants within buildings as secondary containment;
 Siting of plants in the open air to ensure rapid dispersion of minor releases of
flammable gases and vapours and thus prevent concentrations building up
which may lead to flash fires and explosions;
 Hazardous area classification for flammable gases, vapours and dusts

R.K.SHARMA
 Managing Operational Risk
•Manage Operations (Standard Operating Procedures and Safe Work
Practices)
•Manage Maintenance (Mechanical Integrity and Quality Assurance)
•Manage People (Management of Change, Personnel, Contractor Safety
Management)
• Manage Change (Management of Change, Technology and Facilities)
• Manage Incidents (Incident Investigation)
• Manage Emergencies (Emergency Response & Control Planning)
• Manage Compliance ( Audit)
• Manage Continuous Improvement (Operational Discipline)
R.K.SHARMA
 LOPA

LAYERS OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS

BEST PRACTICES contd…..

 Always look for

a. minimum risk
b. safer chemicals
c. proven technologies
d. proven / credible SOP’s.
e. internationally available standards
and practices
f. transfer of complete technology whenever
imported / exported.
g. qualified / skilled human resources
h. investments made in risk reduction process
as not a burden but a value addition.
 HSE Management System & Procedures

Hazard Avoid
Identification Philosophy (elimination of
Risk Assessment Hazard/Risk)
Objectives Policy

Procedures Programs Prevent

(Engineering &
Administrative
Monitoring Audit control)

Corrective / Preventive Action

Mitigate ( EP, Protection
Review measures/systems &
PPES)
PLAN
Methodology Health & Approach
ACT Safety DO

CHECK
 ELEMENTS OF HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

HIRA
PSSR
SOP
Employee Participation
MOC
Incident Investigation
Proactive approach for Safety Review
managing OH&S through
Management Procedure Mechanical Integrity
Work Permit System
Hazard Communication
Training
Contractors
Compliance Audit
Emergency Planning and Response
 Release from Containment

There are a number of possible release points from a chemical vessel.

Relief Valve
Crack Hole
Crack
Valve
Severed or
Ruptured Pipe

Pump seal
Pipe Connection Flange
Hole

42
 CASE STUDY

“It should not be necessary for each generation to

rediscover principles of process safety which the
generation before discovers. We must learn from the
experience of others rather than learn the hard way. We
must pass on to the next generation a record of what we
have learned.”
Jesse C. Ducommun
CASE STUDY- “PROCESS SAFETY INCIDENT”
Flixborough Disaster

“ We must learn from the

experience of others rather
then learning the things
hard way.
It is our responsibility to
pass on our experiences
to the coming generation.”
 Flixborough Explosion
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

Raw material was cyclohexane (basically the alkane hexane with its ends joined
up!)

Formula C6H12 Molecular Weight M = 84

 
Boiling Point at Patm = 81 °C
 
i.e. Cyclohexane is a volatile liquid with a low boiling point at ambient conditions
(something like petrol!)
 
Liquid Density 780 kg/m3 Vapour Density (at Patm) 2.4 kg/m3

Hence the liquid is lighter than water while the vapour is heavier than air (in
common with many hydrocarbons).
 
 About Plant & Process 
 The plant was built for the production of Caprolactam, which is
a basic raw material for the production of Nylon 6.
 The process involves the oxidation of cyclohexane with air to
produce a mixture of cyclohexanol and cyclohexanone.
 The process of oxidation is slow and it was decided to use six
stirred reactors in series. The reactors were mounted on a
platform arranged in a series of steps each 0.355 m higher than
the one following.
 Good reaction kinetics dictated that the cyclohexane in the
reactors be maintained at the elevated temperature of 155°C.
This temperature is above its BP at atm. pressure so to hold it a
liquid state, the reactors had to be operated at 9 bar pressure.
 The Incident…
• Two months prior to the
explosion, cyclohexane was
discovered to be leaking from
Reactor No. 5.

• It was decided that Reactor

No 5 to be removed for
inspection and a temporary
bypass assembly to be
constructed to connect
Reactor No. 4 to No. 6, while
repairs were made.
Cyclohexane Oxidation Plant Flow diagram
 The Disaster
• At 4:53 pm on 1st June 1974,
the temporary bypass pipe
ruptured.

• Within a minute, about 40

tonnes of the cyclohexane
leaked from the pipe and
formed a vapour cloud, that
when coming in contact with
an ignition source, exploded
and completely destroying the
plant. (35 T, TNT Equivalent)
Scale of Accident
• Casualties: 28 people were killed
and 36 peoples were seriously
injured.
• All the records and charts for the
start up were destroyed.
• The fire were remained burning in
the area for over 10 days.
• The blast could be heard 30 miles
away.
• Property damage extended over
wide area. More than 1,800
buildings within three miles radius
of the site were damaged.
• Property damage was $425 MN in
US funds.
View of the Scene after the Incident

“ Learning from experience is foolish,

not learning from the experience is disastrous. ”
IMPACT OF VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS ON
PEOPLE
PEAK OVERPRESSURE, psi EFFECTS

1 Knock personnel down

5 Rupture eardrums

15 Damage lungs

35 Threshold fatalities

50 50% fatalities

65 99% fatalities
DAMAGE FROM VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS

Peak Overpressure Typical Damage

(psi)

3-4 Self-framed steel panel buildings

collapse.

Oil storage tanks rupture.

5 Utility poles snap

7 Loaded rail cars overturn

7-8 Unreinforced brick walls fail

IMPACT OF VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS
Equivalent Overpressure Wind Velocities

Peak Overpressure, psi Wind Velocity, mph

2 70

5 160

10 290

20 470

30 670

50 940
 THERMAL EFFECTS
 Equivalent to Solar radiation - 0.7kW/m2
 No discomfort for long time - 1.6kW/m2
 Pain in 20 sec
Pain threshold after 8 sec - 4.0kW/m2
 Second degree burn after 20sec
Ignition of wood
Fatalities within minutes -12.5 kW/m2
 Instantaneous death & Heavy
 Damage to equipment - 37.5kW/m2
 Root Cause Analysis
 There was no experienced Works Manager, available on
site at the time of the removal of R-5.

 As there was no experienced mechanical engineer on

site, those remaining decided to “fast track” or “scratch
pad” a solution for the intended by-pass.

 They sketched a full-scale by-pass line in chalk on the

maintenance floor.

 No stress analysis calculations were performed on the

by-pass connection.
 Lessons learned
 Poor mechanical design of the by-pass pipe was the
reason for the disaster.
 Lack of Understanding of Mechanical Loading of Process
Equipment.
 Plant was too congested at the design stage.
 Poor location and poor construction of the control
room.
 Process hazard review required at regular intervals.
 Plant must adhere to pressure vessel regulations.
 Conclusion
 Changes to a design should be overseen and
authorized by properly qualified personnel.
 Carry out systematic search for possible cause of
problem before any modification process being done.
HIRA & MOC Procedure.
 Plant – where possible – should be designed so that
failure does not lead to disaster on a timescale too
short to permit corrective action.
 Modifications should be designed, constructed,
tested and maintained to the same standards as the
original plant.
 Conclusion cont.

 All engineers should learn at least the elements

of other branches of engineering than their own.
 "there was no overall control or planning of the
design, construction, testing or fitting of the
assembly nor was any check made that the
operations had been properly carried out."
 The disaster was caused wholly by the
coincidence of a number of unlikely errors in the
design and installation of a modification.

“ There is only one thing more painful than learning from

experience; i.e. not learning from experience.”
“There’s an old saying that if you think safety is
expensive, try an accident. Accidents cost a lot of
money. And, not only in damage to plant and in claims
for injury, but also in the loss of the company’s
reputation.” 

“For a long time, people were saying that most

accidents were due to human error and this is true in a
sense but it’s not very helpful. It’s a bit like saying that
falls are due to gravity.” 

– Dr Trevor Kletz

R.K.SHARMA
Thank you…