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ADCC – 1 May 07

Implications for AFM Vol 1 Part 10


-COIN
“No-one has told me we are
engaged in a COIN campaign”
CO bound for Helmand
Current Work
• Research and POR comments
• Current principles accepted by most comds
• Vol I, Part 10 re-issued – but:
– Hasty rewrite
– Imperfect
• Complete re-write in train:
– Examining issues contained in JDN- CIA
– Reflecting current global circumstances
– Reflecting current campaigns
COIN Principles
• Have a political solution
• Intelligence and Information
• Separate the insurgent from the population
• Create an integrated government
machinery
• Attrition of the insurgent
• Plan for the long term
Principles
• ….are principles, not templates.
• Guide and give a framework
• Rely on commanders to analyse against
specifics of each theatre
• But…
– Are undeniably based on colonial withdrawal
campaigns
– Do need to be reviewed
Afghanistan
• In the south and west – an insurgency
• No history of strong central government
• Elsewhere in-country, regionalism and a
resistance to centralised government – the
pursuit of personal regional power
• Narco-economy and organised armed
criminal gangs
Iraq
• The fundamental conflict is the struggle for the political
and economic power between the three factions – Shia,
Sunni and Kurd
• No history of effective regional/provincial government
• In the south – the same struggle but between differing
Shia factions
• An insurgency in the Sunni areas – fuelled by AQI aims,
objectives and actions
• Gulf-Regional issues contribute
• Not an insurgency in the south, but armed political
factions using insurgent tactics target coalition forces
and each other in order to gain political and economic
power – organised oil crime.
Principles
• Coordinated Government • Comprehensive approach
Machinery – SSR, DDR, reconstruction,
economy
• Political solution • Democracy in Iraq and
Afghanistan
• Separate insurgent from • Consent – the C of G
people
• Where applicable, necessary
• Attrition and proportionate – but ideally
by indigenous SF

• Comprehensive Approach –
indigenous solutions
• Plan for the long-term
COIN Principles
• Have a political solution
• Intelligence and Information
– In the widest sense inwards
– Information Ops outwards?
• Separate the insurgent from the population -
= Consent – the Centre of Gravity
• Create an integrated government machinery
• Attrition of the insurgent
• Plan for the long term
• (Work within the law)
Consent

For Insurgents For Us

On the Fence
Consent

For Insurgents For Us

Good Enough

On the Fence
Consent

For Insurgents For Us

Good Enough

On the Fence
Countering CIA
• “Coordinated measures, incorporating military activity
with other disciplines within a CA that deal with the
threats to security from irregular activity, while building
authority and addressing the underlying causes.”
CIA and Implications for COIN
• Not circulated to Field Army for comment.
• Principles do need to be re-examined:
– But 11 may be too much
– Beware connecting practices with principles
– Information
• JDN certainly helpful in getting people to think
• Global and 21st Century factors a must
– Information
• Politics and context?
• Consideration of the comprehensive approach?:
– Campaign Cs of G and other campaign planning
– Acknowledgement of “sum of the parts”
– Acknowledgment of economy and reconstruction, SSR, DDR
– “deliver physical security, then if necessary build
indigenous SF.”
– Structures and processes?
Summary
• Support need for review
• Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan
supports diverse and differing actors as
described by CIA
• Principles sound but need review – do not
over-complicate
• COIN re-write by end of 07
• JDN is a good step – but not the whole
journey

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