Causes of Mughal Rebellion-

Richards v. Aligarh School

 Bigotry, Economy, or, the State as
“victim of its own success”?
• Early 20th C. historians and popular history
still identify religious discrimination as the
primary motivator of rebellions under
Aurganzeb
• More recently the economic arguments put
forward by Richards and historians of the
Aligarh school (Marxist) have gained
ground (look for refs. to Habib in text)
• More nuanced analysis of peasant mobility
 Rajputs and Aurangzeb
• Religious policy inconsistent in the case of
the Rajputs
– Jaswant Singh’s conduct in 1658-59 and later
as an ally of Shivaji put him under suspicion:
poor relations w/ his clan has political roots
– Rajput officers were exempted from the Jizya
– Aurangzeb continued to patronize and
support other Rajputs during the war with
Mewar/Marwar. Raja Jai Singh was entrusted
with the Deccan Campaign until 1666.
 The Marwar-Mewar Rebellion
• Has longer subtext—Jaswant Singh was a younger son
who gained the throne of Marwar due to Shah Jahan’s
patronage
• His behavior during 1658-59 aroused Aurangzeb’s
suspicions, upon his death in 1678, Aurangzeb tried to
manipulate succession and failed.
• The Marwar and Mewar clans rallied around the infant
Ajit Singh, Jaswant Singh’s son, guerilla warfare begins
• Mughal army subdues urban areas, dynastic temples are
destroyed, tensions are aggravated
• Prince Akbar joins Rajputs, criticizes policies
• Rebellion contained, but trust of two major clans broken
 Pressure from Marathas
The Emperor’s growing frustrations with the Maratha
insurgency had an impact on both administrative and
religious policies
• During suc. Struggle of 1658-59 Shivaji and allies
capture forts on the Konkan coast
• Raid Deccani and Mughal territory demanding revenue
• 1664 Shivaji raids Surat
• Captured by Jai Singh in 1665, escapes in 1666
• 1667 raids Surat again
• 1680 Shivaji dies, sons and wives fight over succession
 Maratha Advantages
• Clan-based confederacy,
with tight links to local
peasants, Bijapur
• Bases in remote
fortresses in Western
Ghat hills
• Use guerilla tactics, not
conventional warfare
• Use money from raids
and piracy to create
revenue
How are we to assess Aurangzeb’s
early rule?
• Keep in mind that despite dramatic political events the
revenue system in fact continued to expand and be
reformed under Aurangzeb
• Greater urban expansion necessitated a change in
taxation and administrative systems—merchants had
been lightly taxed till now, maj. of merchants Hindu
• Despite battles the bulk of the peasantry—especially
khud kasht peasants and pioneering zamindars
continued to profit from economic expansion
• Their success, in fact, was both beneficial and
problematic for the empire—Why?
• Emperor needed greater cooperation from administrative
officials to capitalize on these expansions—yet ran into
political problems due to clumsy policies
 How did Aurangzeb fail to build
support?
• It is not clear if Aurangzeb always understood the
complicated power-sharing between Hindus and Muslims
– Bijapur Sultanate and Marathas
– Arrangement between Hindu financiers and Muslim pioneer
farmers in Bengal, an example also found elsewhere
– Attitudes of a mixed nobility towards an increasingly hybridized
culture
• Reactions to Imperial policy were unexpected—many
Muslim mansabdars critical of these shifts
• Hindus continue to join system, largest numbers by end
of Aurangzeb’s rule
Questions Framing this Lecture
• How did the Emperor and nobles harness
taxes from the new economy?
• Who did this new prosperity benefit the
most?
• Did it have a role in rebellions?
• Do the changes in religious policy have
anything to do with the above?
 The Emperor’s Finances
• The succession struggle had been costly for all
those involved—nobles and princes
• Shortly after coming to the throne Aurangzeb
announces austerity measures
– Islamic asceticism or personal finances?
• These problems appear to have been
temporarily resolved. The productivity of the
empire helped recoup costs—however financial
strains re-appear by the end of Aurangzeb’s
reign
– The strains are not on the Emperor, who has large
reserves, gets revenues from most fertile lands
 Mansabdars
• The personal fortunes of mansabdars did
not recover as quickly
• Inflation of Mansabdari rank and salaries
increase in the latter half of the period
• While some mansabdars were not
impacted, those with jagirs in the
rebellious areas of the Deccan and the
North-west had problems
 Sikhs

Rebellions

Rajputs

Jats

Marathas
Areas of Rebellion in late 17 . C th

• All are contained and except for marathas

fairly small during Aurangzeb’s liftime
– Sikhs under 10th Guru, Guru Gobind Singh in
the Punjab hills
– Jats and Satnamis in the north
– Rajputs of Marwar (supporting Ajit Singh)
– Marthas under various chiefs after Shivaji’s
death
• After his death they will proliferate
 Zamindars
• The financial picture for Zamindars is mixed. As
the hereditary chiefs of lineage groups they had
an ambiguous position.
• Some start becoming Taluqdars—revenue
contractors for Jagirdars who have trouble
collecting revenue in rebellious areas.
• Some remain unabsorbed into the system
• Those in newly-settled areas of expanding
agriculture (ex. Bengal) were most likely to profit.
 Peasants
• Many groups show signs of prosperity,
particularly in areas of commercial
agriculture—cotton, indigo, silk
• Increased diversification of income—
revenue collection, military labor, textile
production under the “putting out” system
• Considerable stratification—peasants in
less productive areas less likely to profit
Who benefits from this system
in rural areas?
--what about urban areas?
 Post-1681 developments
• Aurangzeb moves to the Deccan to
personally supervise
– Complete subjugation of Bijapur and
Golconda (by 1689)
– Suppression of Marathas (never happens)
– Neutralize the rebellion by Prince Akbar

(Un?)expected problems occur in the north

 Peasant rebellions
• By the end of Aurangzeb’s reign peasant
and zamindari groups are already showing
signs of rebellion:
– Increased collusion with Marathas in Deccan
– Jats in central area of Agra/Delhi rebel
– Sikh Jats under Guru Gobind Singh in Panjab
– Afghan and other zamindars in Bengal
What does the economy have to do
with Rebellion?
• The situation is different in the Deccan
(discuss next week)
• In the north Jats and Afghans had
benefited from rural agrarian expansion
• More appear as Khud Kasht peasants in
Aurangzeb’s time
• While religious motivations are sometimes
also present, economic/political ones have
to be considered
 Revenue Collection in the North
after 1681
• Increased signs of taluqdari and other forms of
privitization of state functions
• Incidents of corruption (though these increase
more quickly after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707)
• Peasants appear less willing to hand over
income when imperial supervision is weak
• Lineage zamindars appear to be leaders in this
—groups quickly claim warrior caste status
Geographical/Economic Factors
• Production of muskets becomes cheap in this
period—rural zamindars and peasants can
easily afford them
• Some areas, the Lakhi Jungle in Punjab,
Kathiawar, Maratha territories have local breeds
of horses (good for guerilla war)
• Groups with pastoral/nomadic backgrounds
have raiding/cavalry background, some
peasants (Marathas/jats/afghans) have military
experience under mughals
Pasturage
 Case Study Bengal
• Revenue rights and tax concessions for newly-settled
land auctioned
• In most cases bids purchased by Hindu trading groups in
cities
• Depute Afghans as pioneer settlers/supervisors
• More land cleared for rice cultivation and sericulture
• Complex Hindu patronage of cultural Islamiciation of
tribes on the agrarian frontier
• When rebellion occurs involves Afghan/Hindu Khatri
collusion against Imperial officials
– Source Richard Eaton, “The Rise of Islam and the Bengal
Frontier”
Shifting zone
Of cultivation
Case Study: Punjab Sikh Rebellion
• Jats in Panjab benefit from agricultural boom, Khatris
from trade (though these also impacted by afghan
rebellions)
• Hostility of Mughal Faujdar against both Sikh Guru,
Gobind Singh and Jats appears to be partially involved
• Aurangzeb does not address their repeated petitions
• Rebellion occurs after other means of redressing
problems did not work—Jats in particular had the
economic resources and local support to continue
rebellion long after the Guru’s Assassination in 1708
 Did the Economy have a role in
Rebellion?
• A partial case can be made—keep in mind past rebellion
had been managed through a carrot and stick approach
• Peasants have greater resources and lax imperial
supervision--a perception of unfair treatment does
appear to tilt the scale in favor of rebellion
• Mansabdars whose Jagirs were in rebellious territories
were squeezed from two sides—had to decided between
Imperial loyalty and rebellion (until 1707 the first is
favored). However the loyalties are being strained.
• In the Deccan the twin issues of Maratha raids and
Mughal retaliation squeezed peasants—fanning their
own resentment of taxes in insecure times