ALFAJRI | AZHARI SETIAWAN | HERRY WAHYUDI

Riau Government and

the Haze-Free ASEAN:
CSOs Perspectives
INTRODUCTION
ASEAN has set a roadmap to achieve a
free-haze region in 2020 (Roadmap, 2016).
However, looking at the imminent time
that the ASEAN has set to reach its’ target-
two years from now-it is very necessary to
look closer and deeper at one Province
that has suffered from land and forest fires
in Indonesia in the past few decades.
Haze pollution caused by forest and land
fires in which most of the time followed by
peatland fires in Riau Province has more
than a couple decades issue. The notable
land and forest fires case in Riau Province
prior to a major outbreak in 2015 was the
1997 forest and land fires, affected several
ASEAN countries

2
RENCANA TATA
RUANG DAN
WILAYAH (SPATIAL
PLANS) IN RIAU

Missing links in the case of

peatland expanse can also be
seen in the policies of the Riau
regional government regarding to
10/2018 RTRWP on the allocation
of land space in Riau 2018 –
2038. This policy like there is no
synchronous decision and policies
between demand and support in
political systems which theorized
in Easton’s analysis

3
RENCANA TATA
RUANG DAN
WILAYAH (SPATIAL
PLANS) IN RIAU

Local regulations in Riau do not

reflect environmental conditions for
their own regions, more than 8
million Ha cultivated areas (including
those controlled by concessions),
while protected areas are only 900
Ha. Crucial issue of regulation
10/2018 2018-2038 RTRWP also
describes findings on the outlined
map that land what is provided for
the people (bleached) in the field
has been controlled by the oil palm
barons

4
HAZE-RELATED
PROBLEMS
1. CO2 Emission
2. Peatland
3. Deforestation
4. Palm Oil Companies
5. Pulpwood Concession (HTI)
6. Illegal Plantation on Forbidden and
Protected Areas

5
INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE CO2 EMISSION (KT)

700,000.00
• Haze problems, particularly in Indonesia cannot be separated
with discussions about CO2 Emission, Peatland, Deforestation,
600,000.00 Palm Oil Companies, Pulpwood Concessions (HTI), and illegal
plantation on forbidden and protected areas.
500,000.00 • Indonesia is facing environmental challenges. Fire from
drained-peatland results polluted air and smoke pollution,
causing respiratory diseases. Disruptions to economic activity
400,000.00
brought about $16 billion loss. This amount is twice as large as
the loss and damage caused by the 2004 tsunami in Aceh,
300,000.00 equivalent to 1.8% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
• Since 1970 until now, Indonesia is a country with the highest
200,000.00 number of CO2 emission. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore’s
CO2 emission simultaneously increased. Based in figure 1, the
first above-average number of CO2 emission was in 1985 in the
100,000.00
amount of 121,245.69 kt and the first highest peak was in 1997
in the amount of 278,659.00 kt. Briefly after the Asia economic
- crisis, the CO2 emission of the three raised high to the second
19
70 972 974 976 978 980 982 984 986 988 990 992 994 996 998 000 002 004 006 008 010 012 014 016
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
peak in 2009 in the amount of 446,409.58 kt. The first peak of
CO2 emission evidently occurred in the economic crisis period.
Indonesia Malaysia Singapore

6
 Fire Spots in Indonesia 2016-2018
40000 38078

35000

30000

24061
FIRE SPOTS 25000

2016-2018 20000 17823

15000

10000

5000

0
2016 2017 2018
 8
Source: MODIS Collection 6 NRT Hotspot / Active Fire Detections MCD14DL. Available on-line [https://earthdata.nasa.gov/firms].DOI:
 DEFORESTATION IN SUMATRA 1985-2014

100%
Sumatra was the island with the fastest
90% deforestation rate with Riau as the top
80% deforestation province in Indonesia.
70%
Between 1985 and 2009, Sumatra lost 48%,
almost half of its natural forest cover.
60%
It was 55% loss recorded in 2014. Sumatra's
50%
44 million Ha mainland was covered by 25.4
40% million ha of natural forests in 1985 (58%)
30% and 11.5 million ha (26%) in 2014. Sumatra
20%
lost 55% of its forest over 29 years, cleared
at an average rate of 480,000 hectares per
10%
year (1.9%). Deforestation continues at high
0%
1985 2000 2007 2009 2011 2014
speed (WWF Indonesia, 2010; Eyes of the
Forest Cover (mHa) Forest Loss mHa) since 1985)
Forest, 2017).
Source: Abstracted from Yumiko Uryu et. al, Sumatra's Forests, their Wildlife and the Climate (Jakarta: WWF Indonesia, 2010); Eyes on the Forest, 2018, "Sumatra's
Forests, their Wildlife, and the Climate Online Database", accessed from http://maps.eyesontheforest.or.id/
 DETECTED FIRE SPOTS IN SUMATRA 2001-2018

Source: Eyes on the Forest, "Sumatra's Forests, their Wildlife, and the Climate Online Database", accessed from http://maps.eyesontheforest.or.id/ on October 10, 2018; original data is
available in NASA, Earth Data on Active Fire Data, accessed from https://earthdata.nasa.gov/earth-observation-data/near-real-time/firms/active-fire-data#tab-content-6
PULPWOOD CONCESSIONS (HTI) IN SUMATRA 2017

Sumatra has 4.8 million Ha total of

1,094,051
23% pulpwood concessions. The top
groups on the pulpwood
2,003,513
concessions are Sinar Mas
42%

SMG/APP
Group/Asia Pulp & Paper
433,105
RGE/April
Marubeni
Other
(SMG/APP), Royal Golden Eagle
9%
(RGE), and Marubeni Corporation.

1,219,095
26%

11
CRUDE PALM OIL MILLS IN CENTRAL SUMATRA 2017, INVESTIGATED CPO MILLS ON
ILLEGAL FRESH FRUIT BUNCH (FFB) PURCHASE, AND PLANTATION STATUS

Crude Palm Oil Mills in Central Investigated CPO Mills on Illegal FFB Purchase

20 20

13

PTPN
12
Sinarmas
RGE
Astra
9
Darmex
First Resources
9 Indofood Illegal FFB
Wilmar Not Investigated/Found
Gama
9 Musim Mas
139
TH Plantation Berhard
8 Sime Darby
Sarimas
Other
7

7
6
6
6
4 235

12
PLANTATION STATUS

Based on Eyes on the Forest data publication which is

abstracted in recent figures, it has mapped 256 (or 255)
69
Crude Palm Oil (CPO) mills in Central Sumatra, particularly in
Riau and Jambi Provinces, as the epicentral palm oil
production in the world. Many are connected to some of the
largest palm oil producers in the world. Much of the CPO
produced by the mills is trucked to refineries which deliver
their products to Indonesia's domestic market and around
the world (Eyes on the Forest, 2018).
Own
Independent Many of the CPO mills have no plantations of their own
("independent", see figure 4 above) and rely on third party
deliveries of FFB. No mechanisms appear to be in place to
verify whether that FFB was grown legally. Random
investigations by WWF-Indonesia and Eyes of the Forest
found 20 CPO mills to receive illegal FFB from Tesso Nilo
complex, Bukit Batabuh Tiger Corridor (BBTC) or the
186
adjacent Forest Areas between 2011 and 2017.
Deforestation also occurred on those areas as shown in
figure 5 below.

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DEFORESTATION HISTORY IN FIVE INVESTIGATED AREAS (TESSO NILO NATIONAL PARK, PT. HUTANI SOLA
LESTARI, PT. SIAK RAYA TIMBER, BUKIT BATABUH TIGER CORRIDOR, AND PT. DALEK HUTANI ESA)

70,000

64,358
Figure shows deforestation occurred in
60,000 58,290
several forbidden and protected areas.
These areas have been important
50,000
50,827
remaining natural habitat for critically
endangered Sumatran elephants and
40,000 tigers. Illegal deforestations for oil palm
30,314
have broken the link.
30,000

22,701 22,929

20,000

13,731

10,000

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ILLEGAL PLANTATIONS IN TESSO NILO NATIONAL PARK 2017

• The illegal plantation has forced those

1,033 1,468 protected species to travel through oil palm
12,958
plantations. They even were often threatened
by plantation managers and poachers. These
threats could trigger conflict with local
4,028 Natural Forest societies.
26,989 Pulpwood Plantation
Oil Palm >= 5 Years Old
Oil Palm <= 5 Years Old
• There are at least three compulsory discussions
6,331 Oil Palm Unverified
Mixed Plantation
on Indonesia haze-free agenda especially in
Cleared Area with Vegetation
Cleared Area
Riau Province specifically the governance on
6,662
Other (1) palm oil plantation, (2) peatland, (3)
Licensed Logging Concessions (Hak
4,940 Pengusahaan Hutan; HPH) and Industrial
Timber Estates or Pulpwood (Hutan Tanaman
18,062
Industri; HTI), and (4) fire spots and haze
regarding to disaster management.

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NGOS AND INGOS PERSPECTIVES ON ASEAN HAZE-FREE AGENDA
DISTRIBUTION OF FIRES IN Examining the government's perspective in
PEATLAND V.S. MINERAL AND looking at forest fire disasters from 2015
DISTRIBUTION IN until 2018, the accumulation made by the
CONCESSION government in calculating peatlands is not
appropriate. The government often equates
Mineral Peatland
Distrib the mitigation of this disaster by looking at
ution
of
Total the land in Riau as a land that contains
Fires # % # % HPH HTI HGU Etc minerals rather than peat, whereas
peatlands are different from mineral so that
2010 4,117 1,131 27.47 2,986 72.53 65 1,471 751 699 the orientation of the government is only
2011 6,624 2,020 30.50 4,604 69.50 142 2,476 1,354 632 on blackouts process.
2012 7,840 3,134 39.97 4,706 60.03 224 3,121 1,487 (126)

2013 15,059 4,142 27.51 10,917 72.49 337 5,327 2,974 2,279 WALHI
2014 20,827 1,960 9.41 18,867 90.59 349 9,126 3,668 5,724
WALHI PERSPECTIVES 1. The government is still focusing on the process of "extinguishing fire" not
on disaster mitigation whereas 1.8 million Ha of oil palm land in Riau
province is in the forest area.
2. Conduct audit and revision of all agreements on peatland
3. Law Enforcement (one door policy; lex specialist cases) including the
LICENSING DISTRIBUTION IN administrative checking process by security forces, judges, prosecutors,
PEATLANDS BASED ON DEPTH police in one perspective (environment).
4. Make a One Map Policy; create a transparancy map of recorded forest
fires
Licensing 5. Moratorium on natural forests and peatlands
Distribution in HPH (Ha) HTI (Ha) Sawit (Ha) 6. Palm and mining moratorium
Peatlands 7. Peatland rehabilitation and restoration (Badan Restorasi Gambut clauses)
<50   1,038.12 30,697.48 8. Increasing the allocation of community management space
9. Making preventive control measures; one of the qualified society groups
50-100 172.35 47,613.96 111,901.68 known as “Masyarakat Peduli Api”
10.Making a community evacuation protocol; one of them is Early Warning
System
100-200 31,931.22 206,261.74 244,532.66

200-400 2,319.54 276,625.71 271,176.82

SOLUTIONS
>400 141,388.96 731,053.76 162,109.47

Total 175,812.07 1,262,593.29 820,418.11

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 JIKALAHARI
PERSPECTIV
E

The efforts of the Riau provincial government in

mitigating smoke disasters are still constrained in the law
enforcement process, according to Yaya's view, one of
the representatives of Jikalahari Riau, which is one of the
civil society focusing on environmental issues. There are
49 corporations suspected of burning land in Riau during
2014 – 2016 (Yaya, 2018). As a result of protracted legal
proceedings, post-disaster handling has never been
carried out. Civil violations are given to corporations
involved, while criminal violations are given to individuals
who are responsible for the process of land clearing. Due
to the slowness of the legal process on this issue, some
Riau people who are members of the "Koalisi Rakyat
Riau" also demanded. This demand is based on a missing
link between legal cases experienced by several
corporations in Riau.

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FITRA Riau
• FITRA as a civil society that focuses on observing budget
policy and transparency also headlines that there is a
significant reduction in the budget in efforts to mitigate
smoke disasters in Riau. In 2018, Riau only spent 6.8 billion,
down around 77% from 29 billion in 2017 (Fitra
Representative, 2018).
• In addition, the issue of transparency in the Environmental
Impact Analysis (AMDAL) in Riau is also still very difficult to
access. Some information from the government and
corporations that should be accessible to the public is still
difficult to achieve. This has an impact on people in rural
areas far from the capital city.
• Overlapping is also one of the obstacles to handling smoke
disasters in Riau province. The implementation of smoke
disaster mitigation in Riau is carried out by the provincial
government, but in initiating “Hak Guna Usaha” permited by
the district government, so this overlap results in many
commitments that are only signed on the table, but the
implementation is zero. As a result the provincial government
only focuses on the budget on the blackout process, so that if
the blackout process is lacking then the budget is reduced.
Riau Center for Disaster Studies
• The forest management system according to the rules
was expensive, so burning it became more economical. In
the field, there was also a drama of land ownership,
whether it was private or corporate land, even though the
land was size 100 Ha in the name of ownership on behalf
of individuals (Zailany, 2018).
• The characteristics of peatlands in Riau are also
interesting, the findings in the field show that fires on
peatlands cannot be extinguished by conventional
methods but special efforts must be made such as
injection of burned land. Government efforts to create
programs such as socialization and persuasion efforts are
also constrained by the length of administration and
training for the community. Usually this community
enters into a volunteer program such as, "Masyarakat
Peduli Api". However, in its implementation in the field,
the lack of coordination between the people and related
stakeholders also makes this an overlapping problem,
coupled with the general perspective of developing
countries that the disaster mitigation fund can be used as
a profitable project (Zailany, 2018).
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DISCUSSIONS

• The difference in perspective between the legal

and corporate apparatus that causes no
coordination and synergy and even tends to be
compromised.
• An ineffective policy due to lack of coordination
and transparency so that it causes zero
implmentation.
• The government's attention is only on the focus
of "blackout" so that the budget can be reduced
if the blackout process is also reduced, so that
pre and post disaster mitigation efforts are still
far to be implemented.

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DISCUSSIONS

• The first problem is that there are still fire spots

and illegal plantation.
• Besides environmental and disaster matters,
Indonesia is still facing productivity problems on
the CPO industry.
• Unnecessary legal-political confrontation with
Indonesia President related to Indonesia
Palangkaraya High Court decision which resolve
President Joko Widodo has been found guilty for
Indonesia haze disaster in Central Kalimantan. The
president denied the decision and proposed
cassation, appealed to the Indonesia Supreme
Court (KOMPAS, August 23, 2018)

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 Variables Indonesia Malaysia
Production Capacity (MT) 6,688,788 3,599,780
EXPANSION vs Production Area (Ha) 8,000,000 4,888,756
INTENSIFICATI Production (1k MT) 40,500 21,000
ON Export (1k MT) 29,500 17,900
Domestic Consumption (1k 10,130 3,425
MT)
Indonesia and Malaysia have interesting comparison. Planted Area (Mn Ha) 14.03 5.74
Indonesia oil palm planted area is around 14.03 million
Ha while Malaysia has around 5.74 million Ha. By these National Anuual Yield (T/Ha) 17 21
planted area, Indonesia national annual yield on palm oil
is 17 tons per Ha with 46% matured plantation while Oil Extraction Rate (%) - 20
Malaysia is much bigger around 21 tons per Ha with 86%
matured plantation. In quantity, Indonesia is much World Market Share 46 41
bigger and productive than Malaysia, but, in some
important contexts, Malaysia palm oil production and Mature (%) 75 86
plantation quality is more productive than Indonesia’s.
One of the most important factors is the aspect of Immature (%) 25 14
technology-driven plantation. Therefore, Indonesia
should facilitate and actuate the science and research- Trade Value (US$) 18,513,121,264 9,659,648,524
based policy on palm oil plantation and production.
More focuses on intensification rather than expansion
program is strategic and an exact policy for Indonesia by
these situations and conditions.

22
 There was a political game that could not be politically capitalized by President.
President should accept the citizen lawsuit that was proposed by WALHI
because that was the key solution for Indonesia haze-free agenda and haze-
POLITICAL-LAW related disaster management. All this time, Indonesia always confronted by no
legal protection. The citizen lawsuit that could and would be the legal
protection itself, on the contrary was rejected by President. There was a
CONFRONTATION political game that was lost by the President of Indonesia. If President Joko
Widodo accept the lawsuit, this would be profitable for Indonesia sustainable
development governance and also for the president political achievements. The
political situation which is complicated nowadays made the government23choose
to reject the lawsuit.
CONCLUSION

ABC-GIM Collaboration: Socialization,

NARRATIVES IMBALANCE Empowerment, and Campaign

From Expansion to Intensification: Science

There is an imbalance between demand and Research-based Policy
and support as inputs toward political
system and decision-making process in Riau
Government. The imbalance between these Transboundary Collaboration: Harnessing
two has created complex and complicated the ASEAN Way
relations between environmental NGOs and
Riau Government. The environmental and
haze-free agenda in Riau has relied too
much on demand as the input for decision-
making process. We see that support RECOMMENDATIONS
aspect is also important and compulsory
regarding to it ‘under-discussed’ situation.

24
THANK YOU
ALFAJRI@UNIVRAB.AC.ID

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