Law and Culture

Zagreb
 Culture
Edward B Taylor

"That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law,
custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member
of society. According to Kroeber the consensus of most social scientists is
that culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behavior
acquired and transmitted by symbols constituting the distinctive
achievements of human groups including their embodiments in artifacts ;
the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and
especially their attached values. Some sociologists exclude material
objects from their definition of culture. They include technical knowledge
about the artifacts.
 Europe as an product of will
PAUL VALÉRY,‘L’EUROPÉEN’], PAUL VALÉRY, ‘THE EUROPEAN’

“Partout où les noms de César, de
Gaius, de Trajan et de Virgile, partout
où les noms de Moïse et de St Paul,
partout où les noms d’Aristote, de
Platon et d’Euclide ont eu une
signification et une autorité
simultanées, Là est l’Europe.” .” : “Il
est remarquable que l’homme
d’Europe n’est pas défini par la race,
ni par la langue, ni par les coutumes
mais par les désirs et par l’amplitude
de la volonté (…).
“Wherever the names Caesar, Gaius,
Trajan and Virgil, wherever the
names Moses and St. Paul,
wherever the names Aristotle,
Plato and Euclid have a
sgnificance and carry weight, that
is where Europe is
“It is remarkable that the people of
Europe are not defined by race,
nor by language or customs, but
by desires and breadth of will
(…)”.
 Choice: Barbarism or Europe
A HUSSERL LECTURE OF MAY 1935 ‘PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN
HUMANITY
One can also see that it’s the starting point
 “Es ist nun auch ersichtlich, dass von hier
aus eine Übernationalität völlig neuer Art
entspringen konnte. Ich meine natürlich die
geistige Gestalt Europas. Es ist nicht mehr
ein Nebeneinander verschiedener Nationen,
die sich nur durch Handel- und
Machtkämpfe beeinflussen, sondern: Es ist
ein neuer Geist, von Philosophie und ihren
Sonderwissenschaften herstammend; ein
Geist, freier Kritik und Normierung auf
unendliche Aufgaben hin, er durchherrscht
das Menschentum, schafft neue, unendliche
Ideale!”
of a new kind of community, one which
extends beyond nations. I am referring,
of course, to Europe in a spiritual form.
It is now no longer a number of
different nations living alongside each
other and only influencing each other
through commercial competition or
power struggles, but it is: a new spirit –
stemming from philosophy and the
sciences based on it – a spirit of free
criticism, providing norms for infinite
tasks, and it dominates mankind,
creating new, infinite ideals.”
 Barbarism or Europe
: “Europe’s existential crisis can end in only one of two ways: in its demise, alienated from its own
rational sense of life, and lapsing into a hatred of the spirit and into barbarism; or in its rebirth from
the spirit of philosophy, through a heroism of reason (…)”.  national
cultures
themselves and of the close and complex relationships between
these highly diverse cultures which ensure the cultural unity
of Europe.
Cultural identity and unity amid the diversity of national cultures does not amount to the simple
indefinite expansion of an original cultural core. I see Europe’s cultural identity as a tightly
woven fabric. This fabric consists on the one hand of a warp thread carefully
stretched, which corresponds to the many strong national cultures, which
themselves have their own identity and find their origins in a distant past; on the
other hand, there is the weft thread, which represents the interwoven transnational
bedazzlement and admiration, the reciprocal influences crossing the frontiers
between cultures and between languages. I imagine this literary, artistic, linguistic,
European cultural fabric as drawing its beauty, its unity and its solidity from the sheer number and
diversity of its threads.
 Insitutions and Society
Law and legal systems are cultural products like
language, music, and marriage arrangements. They
form a structure of meaning that guides and organizes
individuals and groups in everyday interactions and
conflict situations. This structure is passed on through
socially transmitted norms of conduct and rules of
decisions that influence the construction of intentional
systems, including cognitive processes and individual
dispositions. The latter manifest themselves as
attitudes, values, beliefs, and expectations.
 Political Culture
According to their level and type of political participation and the nature of people's attitudes toward politics , Gabriel
Almond and Sidny Verba outlined three pure types of political culture:
Parochial - Where citizens are only remotely aware of the presence of central government,
and live their lives near enough regardless of the decisions taken by the state. Distant and
unaware of political phenomena. He has neither knowledge or interest in politics. In general
congruent with a traditional political structure.
Subject - Where citizens are aware of central government, and are heavily subjected to its
decisions with little scope for dissent. The individual is aware of politics, its actors and
institutions. It is affectively oriented towards politics, yet he is on the "downward flow" side of
the politics. In general congruent with a centralized authoritarian structure.
Participant - Citizens are able to influence the government in various ways and they are affected
by it. The individual is oriented toward the system as a whole, to both the political and
administrative structures and processes (to both the input and output aspects). In general
congruent with a democratic political structure.
These three 'pure' types of political culture can combine to create the ‘civic culture', which mixes
the best elements of each
Almond, Gabriel A., Verba, Sidney The Civic Culture. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1965.
 Legal Culture
The concept "legal culture" figures often and prominently in the
scholarship of the diverse disciplines of socio/legal studies.
Political scientists, for example, use the concept to account for
variation in the permissible legal delay in trials and in the
behavior of judges and lawyers, as well as to explain
differences in rates of litigation.
Sociologists have found the concept useful for analyses of the
ethics and practices of legal organizations. And anthropologists,
using a more holistic approach, have characterized the legal
cultures of entire societies. Indeed, this notion "legal culture" is
one of the most general and ubiquitous concepts in the study of
law and society.
 Legal Culture: Practical Importance
And as more and more nations from Central and Eastern Europe (and
perhaps even to the east­ern outskirts of Europe (e.g., Poland, Turkey) seek
to join the European Union, the question of the diversity of
legal values be­comes all the more important for
transnational legal policy. Fur­thermore, the structures
of formal European legal systems vary; for example, the
system is common law in Britain and Ireland, civil law in France and most
of the Continent, with important (even if subtle) differences among those
systems stemming from civil law traditions. Thus, it seems quite likely
that the cultural values underpinning these systems differ as well.
Although ours is only an initial foray into the structure of legal values in
Europe, the importance of the issue may well justify the tentative nature of
our efforts.
 Mesaurable Dimensions
JAMES GIBSON LEGAL CULTURES IN
GREGORY CALDEIRA EUROPE Law&Society Rewiew
HTTP://WWW.JSTOR.ORG/PSS/3054034 30, 1, 1966

1. Support for Rule of Law

2. Perceptions of the Neutrality

of Law

3. Valuation of Individual

Liberty
 What is legal culture? Dimensions of Legal
Values
(1) legal consciousness, which refers to specific
attitudes toward legal issues and institutions;
(2) legal cultural values, by which we mean
more general values relevant to the legal
system but not necessar­ily closely connected to
it; and
(3) more general cultural values, such as a
preference for individualism over collectivism,
trust in people,
 Support for Rule of Law
Willingness to tolerate exceptions to the law is an attitude of some
importance in the operation of a legal system. At the extreme, of course,
nearly everyone agrees that there are some circumstances under which
law must be put aside in favor of justice or self-interest or the need to
craft immediate solutions to press­ing political and legal problems. At the
opposite end of the continuum, nearly everyone also believes that, in
general, laws ought to be followed, that citizens and rulers have a
normative obliga­tion to abide by the rule of law, and that under most
circum­stances the universal and equal application of the law should pre­
vail. But between these two extremes, there is a great deal of latitude, and
it is this variability that is of most interest to us. The extent to which
citizens believe that they ought to adhere rigidly to law is one aspect of
legal values, and it is quite likely that nations differ significantly on this
dimension.
 Rule of Law
The best indicator of attitudes toward the rule of law is the third item: "If
you don't particularly agree with law, it is all right to break it if you are
careful not to get caught." This is a cynical statement that in essence
cedes no moral authority to law. According to this item, the most law-
abiding people are clearly the British—nearly 93% of the respondents
disagree or disagree strongly with the statement. Similarly, in Italy,
The Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, West Germany, Spain, and East
Germany, we find widespread disapproval of the idea that it is
legitimate to break laws Conversely, respect for law is lowest in
France, Luxembourg, and Belgium, where roughly one-quarter of the
respondents agree or agree strongly with the statement (Portugal
follows closely be­hind). There is certainly considerable cross-national
variation within the EU in attitudes toward the rule of law
 Neutrality of Law
There are comparable differences in perceptions of the neutrality of
law. In West Germany and The Netherlands, more than 60% of the
respondents reject the proposition that "My interests are rarely
represented in the law; usually law reflects the views of those who
want to control me." In Denmark, a majority of the respondents also
rejects the statement; near majorities disagree with it in Great Britain,
Ireland, and France. On the other hand, a majority of the respondents
in Greece (and a near majority in Belgium) view law as a repressive
force. In all our countries, sizable minorities, at least, assert that law
reflects the interests of those who would control them. Thus, these
perhaps surprising results suggest that belief in the neutrality of law
is not necessarily widespread in Europe and illustrate significant
cross-national variability.
 Perceptions of the Neutrality of Law
Various people may well perceive the role of law in society in quite
different lights. This view of law as consensual and neutral is
common within a variety of types of legal scholarship . Others,
however, may perceive law as an external, repressive, and coercive
force. Instead of embodying a broad social consensus to which
nearly all citizens subscribe, law may be seen as an instrument of
social control, as a means by which others advance their contrary
political interests. This view of law as an instrument of political
struggle, of political conflict, stands in sharp contrast to the
perception that law represents the consensual interests of society. In
the view that law in general represents the interests of the entire
society and that few will express a fundamental alienation toward law
and legal institutions.
 Valuation of Individual Liberty
Earlier research has argued that a basic distinction among
people is in their willingness to tolerate disorder for the
benefit of individual liberty. This seems to be a basic
social attitude, one stable over time and closely associated
with a variety of other political beliefs. Moreover,
struggles over the extent of individual liberty constitute
the very heart of most legal systems. Those who value
liberty are more likely to favor the universalistic
application of the rule of law and are less likely to view
law as an instrument of repression and social control.
 Individual Liberty
the subdimension of legal values, we find much more consensus.
The best indicator of these attitudes—responses to the
statement "It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow
people so much freedom that they can become disruptive"—
does not so clearly divide the countries of Europe as do the
other items. In fact, the citizens of most of the countries
endorse social order over potentially disruptive liberty. More
than three-quarters of the respondents favor order in Portugal,
Great Britain, and Ireland (and perhaps Luxembourg and East
Germany as well). Only in The Netherlands, Italy, and Spain do
we find at least 20% of the respondents expressing support for
liberty on this item.
 Problematic definition of Corruption
 The change of social rules: time and space
 Inseparable from modern state and rational-
legal bureaucratic authority
 Aberation or rule?
 Necessary for functioning
 New forms and areas of regulation: conflict of
interests, plutocracy, nepotism
 Understanding the Situation
 [Sociology is ] ... the science whose object is to interpret the meaning of
social action and thereby give a causal explanation of the way in which the
action proceeds and the effects which it produces. By 'action' in this
definition is meant the human behaviour when and to the extent the agent
or agents see it as subjectively meaningful
 In neither case is the 'meaning' thought of as somehow objectively 'correct'
or 'true' by some metaphysical criterion. This is the difference between the
empirical sciences of action, such as sociology and history, and any kind of
priori discipline, such as jurisprudence, logic, ethics, or aesthetics whose
aim is to extract from their subject-matter 'correct' or 'valid' meaning.
 – Max Weber The Nature of Social Action 1922, [5]
File meanscores
 Conclusion
The summary indicator of legal values suggests three major clusters of countries within the
EU. At one extreme we find Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, and East Germany.
These countries, regard for the rule of law is not strong, support for individual liberty is
weak, and alienation from law is fairly common. Then, at the opposite end of the
continuum lie Denmark, The Netherlands, West Germany, and Great Britain. The peoples
of these countries tend to value individual liberty, to support the rule of law, and to reject
the proposition that law is an external, repressive force. In the center, the cluster of Spain,
Italy, France, and Ireland, somewhat mixed views prevail. Although there are important
differences within these three clus­ters, we have some confidence that beliefs about law
differ across these three major groupings of countries*
The differences between the halves of the united Germany deserve special attention. West
Germans seem to look favorably on law, and are at least somewhat positively oriented
toward indi­vidual liberty. The East Germans, contrariwise, tend not to view law as
neutral, value liberty less, and are not strong supporters of the rule of law. Like virtually
all elements of the "unified" German system, there are substantial differences between
East and West.
 Implications
One of the biggest issues in any legal system is compliance. Do
citizens, organizations, and officials obey the law? Do they obey
in conflictual situations? We do not have measures of the
compliance or noncompliance of individuals. But we do have
data on the compliance of European governments with the
treaties of the European Union. The transnational character of
the EU makes compliance an especially salient issue; and,
accordingly, the EU relies on a number of procedures to bring
about obedience to European law. Together with the Court of
Justice, the European Commission serves as a bulwark of the
integrity of the treaties, working to ensure compliance with the
various forms of European law.
 Crime is Relative?
Durkheim's believed that crime is "bound up with the fundamental conditions
of all social life" and serves a social function.

He stated that crime implies, "not only that the way remains open to necessary
changes but that in certain cases it directly prepares these changes.“

He saw crime as being able to release certain social tensions and so have a
cleansing or purging effect in society”

"the authority which the moral conscience enjoys must not be excessive;
otherwise, no-one would dare to criticize it, and it would too easily congeal
into an immutable form. To make progress, individual originality must be
able to express itself...[even] the originality of the criminal... shall also be
possible".
 The Normality of Crime
There is no society that is not confronted with the
problem of criminality.Its forms changes; the acts
thuse characterized are not the same everywhere;
What is normal simply, is the existence of criminality,
provided that it attaines and does not exceed…
Crime is normal because a society exempt from it is
utterly impossible
Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of
exemplary individual …It is impossible for all to be
alike…
 Legal definitions
Legal definitions are not contradictory to each
other. They are existing in pure world of
logical dependencies and institutiond
developed to overcome possibble disharmony.

Real society is as living area of diaslectical

change
 Law and Culture
IS religion about ultimate reality?
Is economy retional calculation means to an
end?
Is law an aplication to the fact to the legal
proposition with acts of state as a
consequence?
 Links
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AV4-D-eT
ULY
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjTHLi_k
YVs&feature=related