GERONA VS

SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION
106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959
GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION
FACTS:
• Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from
their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge
during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to
RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The
petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to
reinstate their children. This was denied. 
• As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing
said DO No. 8.
• The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION
ISSUE:
• Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional
GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION
HELD:
• DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a
religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.
• 1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines,
an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty
which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of
church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
• After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest
with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said
group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as
many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are
religious groups or sects or followers.
GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION
HELD:
• 2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and
cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In
enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion
involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag
salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally
prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute
regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at
the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular
expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the
regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.
GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION
HELD:
• 3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of
the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national
unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by
authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate
Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the
Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance
with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline,
including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools;
and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly
excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.
102 PHIL 152

CABANSAG VS
FERNANDEZ
CABANSAG VS FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
• Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint seeing the ejectment of
Germiniaa Fernandez from a parcel of land. He later wrote a letter to
the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC) regarding
the delay in the disposition of his case before the CFI Pangasinan. The
judge ordered Cabansag and his lawyers to show cause why he should
not be held liable for contempt for sending such letter which tended to
degrade the court in the eyes of the President (Magsaysay) and the
people. After due hearing, the court rendered a decision finding
Cabansag and his lawyers guilty of contempt and sentencing them to
pay a fine.
CABANSAG VS FERNANDEZ
ISSUE/S:
• Whether or not Cabansag’s letter created a sufficient danger to a fair
administration of justice?
CABANSAG VS FERNANDEZ
HELD:
• No. The letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help
because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of
action he had taken may not be a wise one for it woud have been proper had
he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court,
such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause
a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer
that such act has “a dangerous tendency” to belittle the court or undermine
the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional
right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance.
• Petition is GRANTED and appealed decision is REVERSED.
339 US 282

American Communications
Association vs Douds
ACA vs DOUDS
Overview
• This case involved the constitutionality of cold war-era anticommunist legislation. The Supreme Court upheld
section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act (1947), which required officers of labor unions to sign affidavits indicating
that they were not Communist party members or supporters and did not believe in unlawful overthrow of the
U.S. government. Unions whose officers did not sign affidavits were unable to seek relief before the National
Labor Relations Board for unfair labor practices.
• The Court did not rest its judgment on a threat to national security, but on a threat to interstate commerce.
The majority found that the statute fell within the broad scope of Congress's commerce power because the
Communist party could reasonably be expected to engage in political strikes that were disruptive of the
national economy. The Court recognized that the statute had a chilling effect on political rights protected by
the First Amendment. Nevertheless, it ruled that the First Amendment was not violated because that statute
protected the public from harmful conduct—political strikes—not harmful ideas. The Court then applied the
clear and present danger test as a simple balancing test and concluded that Congress's interest in protecting
the nation from political strikes outweighed the burden the act placed on the rights of union members.
• Although Douds has not been specifically overturned, it is dubious authority. The statute replacing section
9(h) was struck down by the court in United States v. Brown (1965).