Gallipoli part II

Learning Objectives
•List the 4 phases of the campaign

•explain the operational considerations of where

to make the amphib landings

•explain the conduct of the amphib operation and

subsequent ops ashore
 Gallipoli
Timeline
8 Aug Goeben/Breslau Incident
5-10 Sept 1914 Battle of the Marne
29 October Goeben/Breslau attack Odessa
November Brit Naval force bombards Dardanelles
Feb- 18 March 1915 Allied Naval Assault
March Expeditionary Force departs England
25 March Expeditionary Force diverts to Alexandria
25 April First landings
6-8 August Second landings
15 October Hamilton relieved
23 Nov Decision to withdraw
8-9 Jan 1916 Withdrawal
 Gallipoli part II
Phases of the Campaign
Feb-18 March: Naval Phase; attempt to force
Dardanelles

25 Apr-5 Aug: Initial landings and

stalemate

6 Aug-23 Nov: Follow-on landings

and stalemate

23 Nov 1915-9 Jan 1916: Withdrawal

 Gallipoli
key personalities- Allies
Winston Churchill (1st lord of Admiralty)

Sir John Fisher (1st Sea Lord)

Vice Admiral Carden (Fleet Commander)

Rear Admiral de Robeck (Carden’s replacement)

General Hamilton (Land Commander)

General Hunter-Weston (comdr of Cape Helles asslt)

 Gallipoli
key personalities- Germans/Turks

General Von Sanders (German Commander)

Mustafa Kemal (Turkish division Commander)

 Gallipoli

Allied
•200 ships

•78,000 for initial landing

•120,000 by 6 Aug for follow-on landing

 Gallipoli

German/Turkish
•60,000 troops
2 divisions Bulair
2 divisions Kum Kale
1 division Cape Helles
1 division in reserve
•115 guns in 15 forts from Cape Helles
to Narrows
 Bulair 5th &7th Div
(15,000)

Gaba Tepe
19th Div
7,000

9th Div
7,000 Achi
Baba
Kum
Kale
15,000
3d Div
 Bulair?

Suvla
Bay?

Gaba
Tepe??

Cape
Helles?
 Landing Beaches
Bulair-
Bulair
(-)Lines too Strong (where the Turks had repulsed
the Bulgarians)
(-)possible sub threat
(+)Can cut off the whole peninsula of defenders

Suvla Bay-
Bay
(-)not enough coastal and topo data, beach over
looked by hills
(+)Gaba Tepe puts him in the rear of the Cape
Helles Defenses
 Landing Beaches
Cape Helles
(-) Well defended
(+)a natural salient, can be supported by NSFS
with concentrated fire. “. . To keep in closest
touch w/ the fleet.”- Hamilton

Feints at Bulair and Kum Kale IOT hold reinf.

and distract supporting guns
 Bulair
Feint (10,000)
Suvla
Bay

ANZAC
30,000

Cape
Helles
17,000
Kum
Kale feint
3,000
 Loss of operational surprise
Landing Executed over a month later than
originally intended- D-Day set for 25 April

On 27 March von Sanders said, “if only the English

will leave me alone for eight days.” (he got a month)

Why??
•Hamilton’s Staff not assembled until 1 April
•Ships not combat loaded

Had to go to benign port to reload the ships

 D-Day- 25 April

ANZAC’s land off target at Ariburnu, got

crushed by the 19th Div in Reserve (Mustapha
Kemal) Kemal beat them to the high ground

At Helles, bloody landing at beach V, others

land easily but don’t exploit success. Lack
of real time communications, lack of energy and
initiative of subordinate commanders.
 D+2- 27 April
Hamilton reinforces at Sedd-El Bahr with French
force which conducted the feint at Kum Kale.
(Trying to take Achi Baba)

Turks won the fight to reinforce Helles and Anzac

Cove (had the advantage of interior lines)

Siege warfare continues for months, with poor

supply, health maintenance, and supporting
fire from the fleet
 Underestimates
Quality of the Turkish fighter supported by
German planning and logistical system

Overestimates
Effect of Naval Gunfire on fortifications
(flat trajectory, only AP, no HE, different
system of CFF between Army and Navy)
 Reinforcements!
8 June- Dardanelles Committee agreed to send 3
New Divisions

6 August- Reinforcements land at Anzac, attempt

to take Sari Bair

Hamilton sat in his tent on Imbros Island during

this critical attack

“We have landed and dug another graveyard”

-Ashmead Bartlett
“The cardinal cause, nevertheless, of the
British defeat was the failure to decide
sufficiently soon to give priority to the
Dardanelles as the only theatre which
held out the prospect of quick and decisive
victory in 1915.”
Sir Philip Magnus