AI Principles, Semester 2, ,

Biological Intelligence II

Recap Biological Intelligence I:

Two ways to think about levels of description

Firstly levels of description correspond to nearly decomposable

systems implemented on top of each other, ANN neural nets
correspond to one level, Production Systems the level above and
Logical (rational) operations the level above. Weakness within this
theory is that the systems may be far removed from being
decomposable.

Secondly levels of description may be either in columns of

implementational systems, or as algorithms that are described in
abstract information processing terms, or at the computational level,
which is the level of observable external behaviour
 Classical connectionism

Artificial Neural Networks

Many use the Back-propagation learning algorithm that is not

considered biologically plausible

Some ANN may be considered to be at an implementational

level, and hence at a lower level of description in Newell’s
(1990) hierarchy.

However, as Rumelhart and Mclelland note - many connectionist

models can be considered as being at the same, algorithmic level
as most Production System models of cognition.
 ACT-R (adaptive control of thought - rational)

AI = algorithms, representations and architectures

ACT-R is a leading cognitive architecture, it supports a number

of subsystems with their own representations within a single
architecture

It explains (predicts) a lot of human behaviour, in experiments, in

naturalistic settings such as using cockpits or computers

Its operation can be seen in imaging experiments

 ACT-R (adaptive control of thought - rational)
Long term declarative
Goal setting
memory

Central Production
System

Sensory
Sensorysubsystems Motor subsystems
Sensorysubsystems
subsystems Motor
Motorsubsystems
subsystems

In between each system are buffers that hold information for a set
amount of time, and then let it decay, like forgetting. So the buffers are
like short-term memory. We can speculate that the contents of buffers
are the mental contents that a human is conscious of.
 ACT-R - what do the productions look like?
(P initialize-addition
=goal>
ISA add
arg1 =num1
arg2 =num2
sum nil
==>
=goal>
sum =num1
count 0
+retrieval>
isa count-order
first =num1
)
 ACT-R and the brain
Neuro-imaging studies of people undertaking cognitive tasks has
allowed different subsystems of the ACT-R architecture to be
localised into specific brain regions

Long term declarative

Goal setting =
memory = across the
prefrontal cortex cortex

Central Production
System = Basal
Ganglia

Sensory
Sensory Motor
Motor
Sensory Motor
subsystems
subsystems subsystems
subsystems
subsystems subsystems
 Newell test for a theory of cognition
1 - Arbitrary function of the environment
2 - Operate in real time
3 - Functional, adaptive, rational behaviour
4 - Possess a vast knowledge base
5 - Success in dynamic environments
6 - Integrate diverse knowledge
7 - Use (natural) language
8 - Self-aware
9 - Able to learn from its environment
10 - Acquire abilities through development
11 - Arise through evolution
12 - Be realisable within the brain
 1 - Behave as an arbitrary function of the
environment
Is it computationally universal?

This is the criteria that Newell (1990) states as the principal

evidence that humans are at least partly symbol systems.

ACT-R is a hybrid system that can accomplish symbolic

computations and so scores highly on this criteria.

Current connectionist models are less convincing, but a key issue

is that connectionist models in future may be able to perform
symbolic type computations in a way that maintains the
advantages of analog, distributed representations (see O’Reilly’s
paper which is discussed in relation to criterion 6)
Classical connectionism: mixed, ACT-R: better
 2 - Operate in real time,
For any of the 12 abilities described in Newell’s test, just
possession of that ability is no good if the agent cannot
demonstrate that ability in a timely fashion.

It is unclear how connectionist models might be assessed in terms

of timing, many are offline models (as opposed to online models
that can interact dynamically with the world)

To capture all the aspects of timing for a task, you need to

capture all the aspects of the task, such as the perceptual and
motor aspects. These peripheral aspects of architecture are much
more strongly developed in ACT-R, but this is probably because
it is a single model. When connectionist modelling gives rise to
large integrated architectures this may change.
Classical connectionism: worse, ACT-R: best
 3 - Exhibit rational i.e. effective adaptive
behaviour
Does the system yield functional behaviour in the real world?

Both systems use statistical methods to capture regularities in the

environment.

Both systems allow for emergence rather than just hard-coding in

arbitrary constraints.

(this criteria arose from Newell’s criticism of some older models

of things like short term memory, which included capacity
limitations as hard coded in so that they could reproduce
empirical observations from real people, even if the models
would perform more adaptively with greater capacity)
Classical connectionism: better, ACT-R: better
4 - Use vast amounts of knowledge about the
environment
How does the size of the knowledge base affect performance?

How well does performance scale up with the size of the

knowledge base increases?

Connectionist systems scale up badly, but ACT-R is limited like

all declarative systems by issues such as the Frame Problem.

Classical connectionism: worse, ACT-R: mixed

 5 - Success in Dynamic environments

ALVINN (a ANN) - good at driving on straight stretches of

highway, bad at dealing with unpredictable situations

The reactive/deliberative (prepared/deliberative) trade-off

Linking perception to action

ACT-R - driving, air traffic control, control of power plants,

game playing, collaborative problem solving with humans

Classical connectionism: mixed, ACT-R: better

 6 - Integrate diverse knowledge
This criteria was originally described by Newell as the need for
symbols and abstraction - but describing a requirement that way is
too loaded. Anderson and Lebiere’s solution is to frame this criteria
in terms of the function that Newell’s test requires of symbols.

For Newell a key function of symbols is distal access, that is getting

information quickly and efficiently between different cognitive
subsystems. Newell (1990) and Anderson and Lebiere (2003) all
conclude that symbols (of the type used in programming languages
such as POP11, LISP or PROLOG) are required to carry out this
function.

It may be that not only does a future form of connectionism come up

with a d istributed form of representation that can act as symbols do
in ACT-R, but that this distributed representation overcomes
problems with current symbolic computation (O’Reilly 2006).
Classical connectionism: worse, ACT-R: mixed
 6 - Integrate diverse knowledge - O’Reilly (2006)
O’Reilly (2006, conclusion on page 94):
“Scientists are always concerned about strongly
differentiating theoretical positions: the long dominance and
current disfavour of the computer metaphor for
understanding the mind has led the new generation of
biological neural network theorists to emphasise the graded,
analog, distributed character of the brain. It is clear that the
brain is much more like a social network than a digital
computer, with learning, memory and processing all being
performed locally through graded communication between
interconnected neurons. These neurons build up strong,
complex ‘relationships’ over a long period of time; a neuron
buried deep in the brain can only function by learning
which of the other neurons it can trust to convey useful
information.
 6 - Integrate diverse knowledge - O’Reilly (2006)
In contrast, a digital computer functions like the post office, routing
arbitrary symbolic packages between passive memory structures,
without consideration for the content of these packages. This affords
arbitrary flexibility (any symbol is as good as any other), but at some
cost: When every thing is arbitrary, then it is difficult to encode the
subktle and complex relationships present in our commonsense
knowledge of the real world. In contrast, the highly social neural
networks of the brain are great at keeping of “who’s who and what’s
what,” but they lack flexibility, treating a new symbol like a stranger
crashing a party.

The digital features of the PFC and associated areas help to broaden
the horizons of naturally parochial neural networks. The dynamic
gating mechanisms work more like a post-office, with the basal
ganglia reading the zip code of which PFC strip to update, whereas
the PFC cares more about the content of the package. Furthermore,
the binary rule-like representations in the PFC are more symbol-like.
Thus, perhaps a fuller understanding of this synthesis of analog and
digital computation will finally unlock the mysteries of human
 7 - Language
At one time, language use was a prime example of a domain thought
difficult for associative theories of cognition such as connectionism.

However, numerous examples of connectionist successes with

language use have now been developed:

Over-generalisations learnt from experience (eg in past-tense

learning)

Syntactic parsing

Classical connectionism: better, ACT-R: worse

 8 - Self awareness - consciousness
Neither framework makes a great impact in this requirements

Recurrent connectionist networks may be a starting point to self

awareness and the buffers in ACT-R may be a starting point to
consciousness, but it is early days for both frameworks

Classical connectionism: worse, ACT-R: worse

 9 - Learning
Learning is a strength of connectionism and ACT-R, and the two
approaches possess complimentary strengths

ACT-R does better on cognitive skills and list learning

Connectionism does better on perceptual and motor learning and

semantic memory (see the model of the hippocampus in criterion 12)

Classical connectionism: better, ACT-R: better

 10 - Development
Connectionism makes a clear stand on the empiricist-nativist debate,
rejecting representational nativism

How do the symbols in ACT-R first come about in the course of

development?

Classical connectionism: better, ACT-R: worse

 11 - Arise through evolution
Neither framework makes a great impact in this requirement

Classical connectionism: worst, ACT-R: worst

 12 - Realisability within the brain
Simulation of the hippocampus demonstrates connectionism’s real
strength in meeting this criterion

Classical connectionism: best, ACT-R: worse

Can you think of any further criteria for the
Newell test?
 Can you think of any further criteria for the
Newell test?
Emotion

Multiple-tasks

Distractability

Meta-cognition

More naturalistic behaviours (rather than psychological experiments)

Perception and action

 Conclusion and the future

ACT-R and other symbolic systems are more mature in their level of
development than many connectionist models

O’Reilly’s work is just one recent example of a large architecture,

what will the future hold?

O’Reilly and the ACT-R group are collaborating, they may not be
exclusive approaches, but capture different sides of the same set of
phenomena