PACO’S CASE

On the rainy night of July 16, 1997, Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, sisters, failed to come home on the expected time. Two
days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar Cebu.

Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered
with masking tape, and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy.

After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the
abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto
Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime.
Rusia provided the following before the trial court: that he met Rowen and Josman at Ayala Mall at 10:30 in the evening of
July 16, 1997, who told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James
Andrew, who were in a red car. Josman stopped in front of the waiting shed where Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing,
and were then forced to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly, that after stopping by
a safehouse at Guadalupe, Cebu City, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and
Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former.
 They traveled towards Tan-awan, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal, that after parking their
vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the
vehicle, and thereafter raped Jacqueline, that Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the
cliff and push her into the ravine, and that they made fun of Jacqueline, who was made to run while being
followed by the group while boarding the van; and was beaten until she passed out.

 In his defense, Larrañaga, through his witnesses, claimed the following:

that on July 16, 1997, he was at Quezon City taking his mid-term examinations at the Center for Culinary
Arts, that he also attended his teacher’s lecture in Applied Mathematics, that in the evening of that day
until 3:00 in the morning of July 17, 1997, he was with his friends at the R & R Bar and Restaurant,
Quezon City,  that representatives of four airline companies plying the route of Manila-Cebu-Manila
presented proofs showing that Larrañaga does not appear in their records from July 15 to July 17, 1997,
and  that his neighbors at Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the security guard saw
him in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997.

 The brothers James Anthony and James Andrew claimed that they were at their home in Cebu City,
celebrating their father’s 50th birthday, which ended at 11:30 in the evening.
 Alberto and Ariel claimed that they had the van’s aircon repaired in the evening of July 16,
1997, accompanied by the former’s wife and the owners of the van. The repair shop was only
able to finish the work at 10:00 the following morning.

 Josman claimed that he was at his house together with his friends about 8:00 in the evening of
July 16, 1997, ate dinner and drank, and thereafter went to BAI Disco, transferred to DTM
Bar, and went home at 3:00 the following morning.

 Rusia was discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline
was never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of
two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that
court erred in finding that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only
16 years old when the crimes were committed.
 Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
 Supreme court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit
Violation of Appellants’ Right to Due Process
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual
freedoms; it is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the
right of the individual and delimits the powers which the State may exercise.
In this case, the appellants claim as having been trampled upon by the trial court
are their: (a) right to be assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b)
right to confront and cross examine the prosecution witnesses; ( c) right to produce
evidence on their behalf; and (d) right to an impartial trial.
 Right to counsel
Anent the right to counsel, appellants fault the trial court: first, for appointing counsel
de oficio despite their insistence to be assisted by counsel of their own choice; and
second for refusing to suspend trial until they shall have secured the services of new
counsel.
1.) Appointment of counsel de oficio
Appellants cannot feign denial of their right to counsel. We have held that there
is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during
the absence of the accused’s counsel de parte, pursuant to the court’s desire to finish
the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system.
It was the strategic machinations of appellants and their counsel de parte which prompted the trial
court to appoint counsel de oficio. The unceremonious withdrawal of appellants’ counsel de parte
during the proceedings of August 24, 1998, as well as their stubborn refusal to return to the court
for trial undermines the continuity of the proceedings.

At any rate, the appointment of counsel de oficio under such circumstances is not proscribed by
the Constitution. An examination of its provisions concerning the right to counsel shows that the
"preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under
investigation rather than an accused in a criminal prosecution. At any rate, the appointment of
counsel de oficio under such circumstances is not proscribed by the Constitution. An examination
of its provisions concerning the right to counsel shows that the "preference in the choice of
counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than an accused
in a criminal prosecution
II. Suspension of trial until they shall have secured the services of new counsel.

There is no violation of appellants; right to counsel just because the trial court did not grant their request for
suspension of the hearing pending their search for new counsel. An application for a continuance in order to secure the
services of counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and the denial thereof is not ordinarily an
infringement of the accused's right to counsel. The right of the accused to select his own counsel must be exercised
in a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner

In the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month or three (3) weeks to look for new counsel. Such periods
are unreasonable. Appellants could have hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they wanted to. They should have
been diligent in procuring new counsel. Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel does not
mean that accused may avoid trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to
participate in his trial
Right to confront and cross examine the
prosecution witnesses.
Appellants also fault the trial court for depriving them of the right to cross-examine
Rusia and the other prosecution witnesses.
Appellants' assertion has no factual and legal anchorage. For one, it is not true that
they were not given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Rusia. All of appellants'
counsel de parte had a fair share of time in grilling Rusia concerning his background
to the kidnapping of Marijoy and Jacqueline.
The records reveal the following dates of his cross-examination:
The trial court imposed limitation on the length of time counsel for appellants may cross-examine
Rusia cannot be labeled as a violation of the latter's constitutional right. Considering that
appellants had several lawyers, it was just imperative for the trial court to impose a time limit on
their cross-examination so as not to waste its time on repetitive and prolix questioning .

It is the right and duty of the trial court to control the cross-examination of witnesses, both for the
purpose of conserving its time and protecting the witnesses from prolonged and needless
examination

In People vs Gorospe, The Supreme Court Ruled that while cross-examination is a right available
to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner could determine for
himself the length and scope of his cross-examination of a witness. The court has always the
discretion to limit the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if it would serve the
ends of justice.
 Right to impartial trial
Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he asked questions and
made comments when the defense witnesses were testifying.
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may properly intervene
during trial to promote expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of time
and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. The test is whether the
intervention of the judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or
the ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he interposes his questions or
comments.
Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo during the hearing was not only
appropriate but was necessary. One good illustration is his explanation on alibi. Seeing that the appellants' counsel
were about to present additional witnesses whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility of appellants'
presence in the scene of the crime, Judge Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel of the requisites of
alibi, thus:

"Well, I'm not saying that there is positive identification. I'm only saying that in proving your alibi you must stick
by what the Supreme Court said that it was impossible if they are telling the truth, di ba? Now with these other
witnesses na hindi naman ganoon to that effect it does not prove that it was impossible, e, what is the relevance on
that? What is the materiality? lyon ang point ko. We are wasting our time with that testimony. Ilang witnesses and
epe-present to that effect. Wala rin namang epekto. It will not prove that it was not impossible for him to go to
Cebu at 10:30 P.M., of July 16, e, papano yan? We are being criticized by the public already for taking so long a
time of the trial of these cases which is supposed to be finished within 60 days. Now from August, September,
October, November, December and January, magse-six months na, wala pa and you want to present so many
immaterial witnesses."
Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to
ensure that there will be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be no
time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which merely
manifest a desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and to expedite
the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel

A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to caution and admonish witnesses when
necessary and he may rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper conduct. This is because he is called
upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy before him.

It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did not at
all prevent the defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases.
 Right to produce evidence
Appellants assail the trial court's exclusion of the testimonies of four (4) airlines
personnel[104] which were intended to prove that Larrañaga did not travel to Cebu
from Manila or from Cebu to Manila on July 16, 1997. The trial court's exclusion of
the testimonies is justified. By an alibi, Larrañaga attempted to prove that he was at a
place (Quezon City) so distant that his participation in the crime was impossible. To
prove that he was not in the pre-flight and post-flight of the four (4) major airlines
flying the route of Cebu to Manila and Manila to Cebu on July 15 and 16, 1997
would not prove the legal requirement of "physical impossibility" because he could
have taken the flight from Manila to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997.
According to Judge Ocampo, it was imperative for appellants' counsel to prove that
Larrañaga did not take a flight to Cebu before July 16, 1997.
In the same way, we cannot fault the trial court for not allowing the defense to continue with the" tedious process
of presenting additional witnesses to prove Larrañaga's enrollment at the Center for Culinary Arts, located at
Quezon City, from June 18, 1997 to July 30, 1997 considering that it would not also prove that he was not in Cebu
on July 16 to 17, 1997. It is a known practice of students who are temporarily residing in Metro Manila to return to
their provinces once in a while to spend time with their families. To prove that Larrañaga was enrolled during a
certain period of time does not negate the possibility that he went home to Cebu City sometime in July 1997 and
stayed there for a while.

Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or
testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain
purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it.
 Paco’s Claim of Human Rights
 alleges a Violation of article 14 of the Covenant because the State party reintroduced the death penalty
after abolishing it. He claims that the death penalty was abolished when the new Constitution came into
force on Feb 2, 1987 then on Dec 13, 1993, Congress adopted the Republic Act. 7659 which allowed the
death penalty to be imposed again for a number for crimes

 The author alleges a Violation of article 6 on the ground that the Supreme Court automatically sentenced
him to capital punishment under article under Art 267 of the RPC. Therefore, it did not take into account
any possible mitigating circumstances which may have benefited him, such as his relative youth. He
argues that mandatory death penalty violates his right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his life
 Violation of article 14, paragraph 5, and that the evaluation of facts and evidence by the Special
Heinous Crimes Court and the Supreme Court were manifestly arbitrary and amounted to a denial of
justice, in Violation of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.
 there was insufficient evidence of homicide or rape. Trial court found that there was
insufficient evidence of homicide or rape. There was forensic pathologist as to the evidence
provided in court. SC found Paco guilty by relying solely on the evidence before the trial
court.
 Prosecution was based on the testimony of one witness who had been charged with the same
crimes. Trial judge accepted that the witness had lied, but considered that his testimony was
not entirely false.
 boththe trial court and the Supreme Court incorrectly shifted the burden of proof on to him to
prove that it was physically impossible” for him to have been at the scene of the crime'
 Violations of article 14 because the convictions and sentences imposed by the Special Heinous
Crimes Court were premised on serious procedural irregularities which either individually or
cumulatively constitute Violations of this provision
 He was prevented from testifying at his own trial in violation of Par 1, 3(d) and 3 (e). He argues that he had
the right to present his case in the best manner possible, which means in practice the right of the accused to
counter the prosecution's allegations and to provide of his own innocence
 no equality to call and examine witnesses in Violation of article 14, paragraph 3(e) The trial judge refused to
hear several defense witnesses and effectively withheld evidence indicating that another person or persons
may have committed the crimes of which the author was accused. Indeed, the author recalls that, on 27
January 1997, the trial court refused to issue a subpoena to hear the testimony of the director of the National
bureau of Investigation for Cebu, because the prosecution had ^questioned the relevance of such testimony'
In fact, the director’s testimony would have established that there were initially twenty-five suspects for the
kidnapping and that Paco was not one of them
 The author alleges Violations of article 6(2) and article 14 because the SC failed to
correct any of the irregularities of the proceedings before the lower court.
 Supreme Court did not hear oral testimony and that he was prevented from
attending his appeal' There was no justification for refusing him an oral hearing, c6
especially since judgement on appeal was given four years and nine months later
and expedition was therefore not a fact
 Supreme Court Violated his right to appeal to a higher tribunal according to law as
required by article 14()5 He notes that he was convicted of homicide and rape and
sentenced to death for the first time at last instance, and could not appeal to a
higher tribunal
 Violations of articles 9(3), 14(c) and 14(5)because there were undue
delays in the proceedings. The proceedings as a whole were
conducted with undue delay, cc as were the individual stages' The
author recalls that information charging him with kidnap and serious
illegal detention was filed on 17 September 1997, that his trial began
eleven months later on 12 August 1998, and that judgement was
delivered one year and eight months after charge, namely on 5 May
1999
Consideration on merits by the Committee

 The death penalty was imposed automatically by the operation of Article 267 of the
RPC. The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that the automatic and mandatory
imposition of the death penalty constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, in violation
of Art 6(1), in circumstances where the death penalty is imposed without any
possibility of taking into account the defendant’s personal circumstances or the
circumstances of the particular offence.
 With regard to the allegation of a violation of the presumption of innocence,
 the trial judge did not show sufficient latitude in permitting the defendant to prove this
defense, and in particular, excluded several witnesses offered in the alibi defense' A
criminal court may convict a person only when there is no reasonable doubt of his or
her guilt, and it is for the prosecution to dispel any such doubt' In the present case, the
trial judge put a number of leading questions to the prosecution which tend to justify
the conclusion that the author was not presumed innocent until proven guilty
 The Committee considers that in a capital case, when counsel for the defendant
requests an adjournment because he was not given enough time to acquaint himself
with the case, the court must ensure that the defendant is given an opportunity to
prepare his defense' In the instant case, both the author’s appointed and chosen
counsel should have been granted an adjournment' In the circumstances, the
Committee finds a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(b) and (d), of the Covenant
 Committee notes that the cross-examination of the main prosecution witness was
repeatedly cut short by the trial judge and prematurely terminated to avoid the
possibility of harm to the witness. The Committee also notes that the trial judge
refused to hear the remaining defense witnesses' The court refused on the ground
that the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial” and because of time constraints'
The Committee reaffirms that it is for the national courts to evaluate facts and
evidence in a particular case.
 The Committee considers that a delay of seven years and ten months from the
author’s arrest in September 3[[2 to the final decision of the Supreme Court
dismissing his motion for reconsideration in July 2005 is incompatible with the
requirements of article 14
 With regard to the alleged violation of article 2, the Committee considers that to
impose a death sentence on a person after an unfair trial is to subject that person
wrongfully to the fear that he will be executed circumstances where there is a real
possibility that the sentence will be enforced, that fear must give rise to
considerable anguish
Francisco Juan “PACO”
Larrañaga
 A man of dual citizenship (Filipino and Spanish)
 Larrañaga is the son of Spanish pelotari Manuel Larrañaga and Filipino Margarita
González, and, through his mother, is a member of the influential Osmeña clan of
Cebu.
 As a dual citizen of the Philippines and Spain, Paco Larrañaga was moved to a
Spanish prison under what is known as the RP-Spain Transfer of Sentenced Persons
Agreement (TSPA).
 RP-Spain Transfer of Sentenced Persons Agreement (TSPA)

Signed on May 18, 2007 and approved by the senates of both countries, this
treaty allows foreign prisoners to be sent to their countries of nationality to
serve out the rest of their sentences.
Ratified by the Philippine Senate via Senate Resolution No. 212
Ratified by the Spanish Senate on November 6, 2007
Purely Consensual; based on cooperation between states
Humanitarian in nature
 Transfer of Sentenced Persons Agreements (TSPA) provide
a
 legal framework for the transfer of a convicted individual to
his home country in order for him to serve the remaining
portion of his penal sentence in a place closer to the support
system of family and friends.

 Allowing Filipino nationals to serve their sentences in

 correctional institutions where members of their families
can visit him or her regularly, will advance the progress of
reformation and rehabilitation.
1. The sentenced person must be a national of the state to which he or
she is being transferred;
2. The committed offense must be criminally punishable both in the
country of offense and the country of nationality;
3. The sentence must be final and without other legal recourse; and
4. The sentenced person must have consented to the transfer, satisfied
any payment of fines and have at least one year left to serve.
 Jurisdiction: The sentencing state shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of
proceedings of any kind.
 Enforcement of the sentence shall be governed by the law of the administering state
 Only sentencing state may grant pardon, amnesty or commutation of the sentences pursuant
to its Constitution and Laws.
 The administering state however may request the sentencing state to grant pardon, amnesty
or commutation of the sentence by submitting an application with sufficient grounds.
 As of 2011, the Philippine government had established prisoner transfer agreements with
five different nations— China, Canada, Cuba, Thailand and Spain. Though Paco’s case is
an exception, the origin of prisoner transfer treaties is largely humanitarian—they are
typically issued to protect nationals who are incarcerated abroad under abusive and
inhumane conditions.
 The sentencing country (in Paco’s case the Philippines) retains sole power over whether or
not the convicted person will be granted amnesty or pardon, but the treaty is dependent on
the cooperation of partner nations and encourages cordial international relations.
 This treaty was ratified by the Senate several years ago, by the Philippine Senate and,
therefore, binding to our country and is enforceable by both parties.
 It must also be emphasized that under Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution, the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the laws
of this country.
 There is a Latin maxim in international law which says: “Pactasuntservanda,” meaning
that a valid treaty must be accepted and observed in good faith. Upon this principle, we
cannot renege on our commitment just because some people are against its implementation.
 As long as the treaty remains and both parties observe it in good faith, we must abide by it
and carry out our obligation under it. The only way by which a valid treaty may be
abrogated is when some developments happen which are inconsistent with it, as when the
parties or any of the parties may refuse to carry it out. This is the so-called doctrine of
“Rebus sic stantivus.” A ratified treaty is a commitment which we must honor, and the test
of such a treaty is in the manner in which we implement the same.