Download as pptx, pdf, or txt
Download as pptx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 10

The Biometric Passport

Does it protect or compromise individual privacy?

Mukisa Joshua William


THE AFRICAN PASSPORT
What is it? Features? Who uses it?
Quick Definition

• Privacy: Free from intrusion, capable to reserve matters as private.


• Data protection: Safeguard important info from corruption, loss or compromise.
• Biometric Data: Palm, Finger prints, iris, odour, face, ear.
• Biometric Passport: Machine readable with biometrics and RFID Chip.
• MRZ: Particular area in ID encloses holders personal data.
• International Biometric Symbol: Bottom of Passport
The African (Biometric) Passport Framework

• African Union, Decision on free movement of persons and the African passport, Assembly/au/dec.607 Revised
Draft, AU Guidelines for the Design, Production and Issuance of the African Passport, Africa Free Trade
Agreement.
• ICAO, ISO Standards: Machine Readable, 14443,
• EAC Joint Communique 17th Ordinary Summit by Heads of State, Common Market Protocol,
• The Immigration Sub-Sub Committee & other Experts Consultative Meeting on Free Movement of Persons &
implementation of the African Passport (The SADC Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of Persons of
2005)
• CEMAC/ECCAS, 10th Summit of Heads of State 2010, ECCAS Protocol on Freedom of Movement
• ECOWAS/979 Protocol A/P.1/5/79 relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment
• Arab Maghreb Union Free of Movement Protocol, The Arab Maghreb Union Treaty,
• Muhochi v Attorney General of Uganda;
Data Protection in Africa

• AU Data Convention (Malabo Convention)


• The African Data Convention states in Article 10(4) that: “The following actions shall be undertaken after authorization by the national
protection authority: (d) Processing of personal data involving biometric data.
• Article 11: Independence of DPA’s.
• African Internet Rights Declaration: Article 12 (2) (m) of the African Internet Rights Declaration provides for the cooperation between
African Data Protection Authorities.
• The SADC Model Law on Data Protection: Article 16 SADC Model law provides a specific legal regime for the process of genetic,
biometric and health related data. [HIPSSA Project
• ECOWAS: Supplementary Act A1SA.1F01F10 On Personal Data Protection Within Ecowas,
• EAC: Human and People’s Rights Bill, now Act, Article 19.
• ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States. [Data Protection similar to EU/ITU Model SADC] ECCAS
• ‐
Model Law CEMAC Directives on Cybersecurity (Data protection, e-­transactions, cybercrime)
• The Arab Magreb Union (AMU), founded in 1989, and involving 5 states (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya), Community of Sahel-- ‐Saharan States (CEN-
SAD): Lack data privacy regimes except Tunisia and Morocco.
THREATS TO INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY

• Cloning
• Brute force attacks
• Skimming
• Eavesdropping
• Clandestine Scaning and Tracking
• Data Leakage
• Identity Theft, Jans Krissler made biometrics using public figures photographs. Nigerian passport culprits in the US.
• Weaknesses in the ICAO Standard (Passive authentication and Active Authentication can be breached.)
• Calderoni, Luca & Maio, Dario. (2014). Cloning and tampering threats in e-Passports
EU DEVELOPMENT, CASE LAW.

• EU/ITU involvement in developing Model Laws.


• General Data Protection Regulation [Independent DPAs, Consent, Subject rights]
more than OESCD Guidelines.
• Case law:
• Huber v Germany (deletion of passport records, right to be forgotten.)
• In Commission v Germany, (Independence of DPA, states cannot transpose laws)
• In Schwarz v Bochum, (Passport applicant not deemed to have consented.)
• In Commission v Luxembourg, (Luxembourg was charged for delayed transposition
of a directive. Cited national law, court rejected it. Found in violation.)
The Biometric Passport

• Does it protect or compromise individual privacy?


• It is not a matter of “YES” and “NO”
• Non biometric passports have their failures which are numerous.
• When used in environments with robust protection mechanisms, they
prevent identical theft, illegal immigration, authentication spoofing. [Its
sustainability requires constant update and states should pursue more
protective measures while fulfilling the required minimum standards.]
RECOMMENDATIONS

• Harmonisation
• Cryptography, invest more in technology. (Independent cryptographic
research)
• Independence of DPAs’.
• Demand reciprocity and interoperability from European states.
• Design and manufacture passports within the continent.
END

End…

You might also like