ADIS: P-4 [@1-03.

8]

Explosion
At Amuay Refinery, Venezuela
August 25, 2012 (Saturday)
Time: Around 1:10 a.m.

Disclaimer: RMG has developed the following material based on

detailed analysis of information freely available on the Internet, our data
bases, and from our industry contacts. We believe that an accurate
event simulation and fact sheet has been developed, describing to the
best of our knowledge the facts and consequences without warranties or
judgments of any kind .

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 At Amuay Refinery, olefins are produced in
the cat cracking and in the coking operations

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Olefins are used to produce alkylate, a
motor gasoline component,
for Octane Number improvement

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Olefins are stored in spherical tanks.

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If this product is released into the atmosphere,
a flammable vapour cloud will form.
(The vapour is about 50% heavier than air.)

Once released, it will flow on the floor

like a “river of fog.”

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 It was reported
that an olefins
pump was leaking.
(A pump seal
failure perhaps?)

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Wind
Olefins pump leak
not fixed for several
days

In Amuay, strong winds

blow there most of the year.
(This is a key design
and operational factor.)

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Wind
Olefins pump leak
not fixed for several
days

Randomly, during August and September,

and before a downpour,
prevalent winds may slow down and
sometimes change direction,
from its regular eastward direction.

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 ind
W
Olefins pump leak
not fixed for several
days

In the preceding days, atmospheric conditions

caused showers in the area,
the wind erratically slowed down and
changed direction.

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 Olefins pump leak
not fixed for several
days

An operational decision seems to have been made

to let the leaky equipment remain in
operation and keep the production on,
relying on the wind
to disperse the leaking vapours.

[Vapour concentrations below 2%v in air (LEL)

are not flammable.]

Click to continue 10
W
in
d

Leak
source
The day before leaking vapour had
reached the facility perimeter:

• Amounts exceeding the LEL (explosivity)

were detected in the environment.

• On Friday (24.8.2012), a neighbouring

lube oil manufacturing plant had to be
evacuated due to poor air quality.

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W
in
d

Leak
source

• Weather situation seems to

improve later in the day.

• The workers at the Lube Oil Plant

return, and try to catch up with
production on Friday night shift.

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Win
d

Leak
source
• Around Friday midnight, the wind
becomes slow.

• Still wind is unable to disperse

the olefins vapours, which now
begin to accumulate on the plant
floor.

• In a tragic coincidence, the leak

suddenly increases.

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Wi n
d

Leak
source

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Wi n
d

Leak
Vapour cloud path
source

Vapour cloud path

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Wi n
d

Leak
Vapour cloud path
source

Vapour cloud path

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Wi n
d

Leak
source

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Wind

Leak
source

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Wind

Leak
source

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Wind

Leak
source

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Wind

Leak
source

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 National Guards live
Wind
here with their families
Leak
source

A worker is on the
pedestrian overpass,
walking to escape.

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Wind

One southbound vehicle

Leak approaches the area
source covered with vapour cloud.

The worker is still on the

pedestrian overpass,
trying to escape.

Lube oil plant team is

still at work

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Wind

The vehicle now enters

Leak the vapor cloud
source

The worker is still on the

pedestrian overpass,
trying to escape.

Lube oil plant team is

still at work

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 Wind
• Probably, the vehicle
ignites the cloud here.
• The explosion force
Leak
source, now pushes it towards the
ignited, can opposite curb as seen
be seen in in the next picture.
the next
photograph.
s
The worker on the
pedestrian overpass dies.

Many people and houses

are affected by the strong
shockwave.

Many people and

houses are Five Lube Oil Plant workers
affected by the perish at workplace.
strong shockwave.
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 Olefins
pump site

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 Olefins
pump site 27
28
Wi n Houses damaged (Pic. 1)
d

Office damaged (Pic. 2)

Overpass damaged
(Pic. 3)

Lube oil plant

damaged (Pic. 5) Office damaged
(Pic . 4)

Lube oil plant damaged

(Pic. 6)

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1

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2

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3

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4

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5

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6

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 Consequences
• Fifty-one lives lost and many people
were badly burned.

• There was extensive damage to plants

and other assets.

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 Lessons Learned
1) The operational decision to continue to keep
the leaking pump in operation and
depending on the wind to disperse the
leaked vapours was a tragically poor one.

(Contd.)

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 Lessons Learned

2) Maintain mechanical integrity of plant and

equipment by performing timely inspection
and maintenance.

== == ==

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 Experience of a Survivor
• "I am living miracle… it was not my time," said Edino
Rafael Muñoz Lambertino (35), a man of Libertad de
Barinas, survivor of the blast, who was held prisoner that
night in the 44 National Guard depot located next to the
Amuay Refinery.
• After being arrested on allegedly “soliciting” charges, he
was to be released the next day.
• “Why were you not sleeping then?...
• He was talking with the national guards. "We were then
telling tales and the next day they were dead".

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 Experience of a Survivor
• He said that about 1 a.m. on Saturday, they began to leave
the facility since “the smoke was thick.”
• "Let's go there, need to make several ‘rounds’, the guards
told us."
• Edino was led to the jeep first with 7 guards.
• The jeep stuttered half way and stalled. When they tried
restarting the vehicle, there was an explosion. "It seemed
like that the jeep had lifted up. My mind was blank as if it
was a nightmare.”

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 Experience of a Survivor
• Edino jumped from the car and ran down the street stopped
at a corner to rest.
• “When I looked over there, it came as a wave of fire. I laid
down and prayed. It went over me and then returned
again."
• After that flash, Edino looked back at the jeep: it was
burning with all its passengers as well as another vehicle
with military guards and a lady with a 5-month-old girl.
• "All died. I saw them the next day in the newspaper. It is
strange that they stayed put in the vehicle and did not run
away."

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 Experience of a Survivor
• Scared, Edino resumed his escape and met a family which
was evacuating.
• As he was hardly able to walk, Edino yelled to them, "Lord,
help me.”
• They then took him to a hospital. He had glass fragments
piercing his body.
• On Saturday night, Edino had asked the guards why there
is a strong smell of gas.
• The guards replied that these are valves that open at times
and that it was “normal." "That's to “regulate” the tanks.”
• But the that day the gas began spreading across the street
"as fog,” according to him.
Link: http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/Noticias/Actualidad/Sucesos/Testimonio-en-Amuay---Estoy-vivo-de-milagro--no-me.aspx
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== == ==
Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion

(UVCE)

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 UVCE
 The results seen in the prior pictures suggest a gas-phase
explosion event, which generated a large overpressure without
the presence of confining walls.
 This is referred to as Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion
(UVCE).
 When a flame travels through the unconfined gas cloud with
high velocity, the gas/air mixture ahead of the flame is unable
to move away quickly enough to allow free expansion of the
combustion products formed by the flame.
 As a result pressure wave is formed ahead of the flame front
with the destructive forces seen.
 Edino was a lucky witness to this.

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 UVCE
• The presence of obstacles (called congestion,
observed where buildings may be in the path) within
the flow field of the gas cloud produces turbulence
which enhances the burning velocity, accelerates the
production of combustion products and increases the
flame speed.

• The higher the velocity of the flame, the higher the

pressure generated ahead of it.

• If very high flame speeds are produced, a Deflagration

to Detonation Transition (DDT) can occur.
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 UVCE
• A detonation involves a very high pressure shock-wave
that further auto-ignites the gas/air mixture.
• The combustion of this mixture then provides the
energy to sustain the shock wave, which may extend
further than the vapor cloud.
• As a result, a detonation is self-sustaining as long as
the concentration of gas is within certain limits.
• This can be observed in the effects caused on the
mostly brick and concrete buildings, which even
outside of the cloud, can be seen badly damaged, on
support of our modeling of the vapor cloud boundaries.

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 Update
• More detailed aerial pictures, later available, tend
to confirm the modeling results.
• From these, it can be observed a clear delineation
resulting from high temperature gradients (as seen
in burned vegetation) which results to be different
from the shock wave front effects, which is mostly
observed by the affected structures and how these
are geographically distributed.
• A more detailed simulation of dynamic type can be
derived from these results.
• Please see the picture on the next slide.
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 a ve Pr o p agation Path
Shock-W

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Thank you for your interest

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