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Chapter Thirty-Three: Law and Economics
Chapter Thirty-Three: Law and Economics
First-order condition is
B ( x ) C ( x ).
C(x), low MC
B ( x ) C ( x )
x* x
Crime and Punishment
B(x)
B ( x ) C ( x )
x* x
No change to illegal activity level.
Crime and Punishment
B(x)
C(x), low MC
B ( x ) C ( x )
x* x
Crime and Punishment
B(x)
C(x), high MC
C(x), low MC
B ( x ) C ( x )
x* x
Higher marginal costs deter crime.
Crime and Punishment
Detection of a criminal is uncertain.
e is police effort.
(e) is detection probability;
(e) = 0 if e = 0
(e) as e .
Crime and Punishment
Given e, the criminal’s problem is
max B ( x ) ( e )C ( x ).
x0
Crime and Punishment
Given e, the criminal’s problem is
max B ( x ) ( e )C ( x ).
x0
First-order condition is
B ( x ) ( e )C ( x ).
Crime and Punishment
Given e, the criminal’s problem is
max B ( x ) ( e )C ( x ).
x0
First-order condition is
B ( x ) ( e )C ( x ).
Low e low (e) low marg. cost.
High e high (e) high marg. cost.
Crime and Punishment
el eh
B(x)
MC ( eh )C ( x )
MC ( el )C ( x )
B ( x ) ( e )C ( x )
x* x
Higher police effort deters crime.
Crime and Punishment
Higher fines and larger police effort
both raise marginal production costs
of illegal activity.
Which is better for society -- higher
fines, or more police effort?
Crime and Punishment
Higher fines and larger police effort
both raise marginal production costs
of illegal activity.
Which is better for society -- higher
fines, or more police effort?
Police effort consumes resources;
higher fines do not.
Better to fine heavily.
Liability Law
An injurer, IN, and a victim, V.
x is effort by IN to avoid injuring V.
cIN(x) is IN’s cost of effort x;
cIN(x) as x .
L(x) is V’s loss when IN’s effort is x;
L(x) as x .
Liability Law
Society wishes to minimize total
cost; i.e. min cIN ( x ) L( x ).
x
Liability Law
Society wishes to minimize total cost;
i.e. min c ( x ) L ( x ).
IN
x
Social optimality requires
( x*) L ( x*).
cIN
I.e. IN’s private marginal cost of effort
equals marginal benefit of her extra
effort.
Liability Law
Liability rules:
– no liability rule
– strict liability rule
– negligence rule.
Which is best?
Liability Law
No Liability Rule:
IN faces only private cost, cIN(x).
Hence chooses effort level x 0.
No liability results in suboptimal low
care level and excessive injury.
Liability Law
Full Liability Rule:
IN faces private cost and V’s costs,
cIN(x) + L(x).
Hence chooses the socially optimal
effort level x * where
( x*) L ( x*).
cIN
Liability Law
Negligence Rule: IN is liable for V’s
loss if and only if care effort level
x x~, a legally determined effort
level.
Liability Law
Negligence Rule: IN is liable for V’s
loss if and only if care effort level
x x~, a legally determined effort
level.
What if the court sets x~ x *, the
socially optimal effort level?
Liability Law
So x x * full liability for IN;
hence she chooses x x*.
Liability Law
So x x * full liability for IN;
hence she chooses x x*.
And x x * no liability for IN;
hence she chooses x x*.
Liability Law
So x x * full liability for IN;
hence she chooses x x*.
And x x * no liability for IN;
hence she chooses x x*.
I.e. the negligence rule is socially
optimal when x~ x*.
Liability Law
Both full liability and negligence
rules are socially optimal, but
full liability fully insures V always,
and
the negligence rule fully insures V
only if IN’s care effort level x x *.
Liability Law
Both full liability and negligence
rules are socially optimal, but
full liability fully insures V always,
and
the negligence rule fully insures V
only if IN’s care effort level x x *.
Victims prefer full liability; injurers
prefer the negligence rule.
Bilateral Accidents
V and IN can each exert effort to
avoid a loss.
cV(xV) and cIN(xIN).
Loss is L(xV,xIN).
Society wishes to
min cV ( xV ) cIN ( xIN ) L( xV , xIN ).
xV , xIN
Bilateral Accidents
Society wishes to
min cV ( xV ) cIN ( xIN ) L( xV , xIN ).
xV , xIN
Social optimality requires
V’s MC of effort = MB of his effort
IN’s MC of effort = MB of her effort.
I.e. * * *
( xV ) L( xV , xIN ) / xV
cV
* * *
( xIN ) L ( xV , xIN ) / xIN
cIN
Bilateral Accidents
No Liability: Both V and IN face only
their private effort costs, not the full
social costs of their actions.
Bilateral Accidents
No Liability: Both V and IN face only
their private effort costs, not the full
social costs of their actions.
Hence V and IN both provide too little
effort.
No liability is socially suboptimal.
Bilateral Accidents
Full Liability: V is fully compensated
for all injury costs.
Bilateral Accidents
Full Liability: V is fully compensated
for all injury costs.
Hence V chooses xV 0.
Full liability is socially suboptimal in
bilateral accidents.
Bilateral Accidents
Strict Division of Losses: IN must
pay a fixed fraction, f, of loss caused.
IN minimizes cIN ( xIN ) f L( xV , xIN ).
IN chooses effort xIN satisfying
) f L( xV , xIN ) / xIN .
cIN ( xIN
Bilateral Accidents
IN chooses effort xIN satisfying
) f L( xV , xIN ) / xIN .
cIN ( xIN
Optimality requires
( x*IN ) L ( x*V , x*IN ) / xIN
cIN
Since f < 1, IN chooses less than the
*
optimal effort level; xIN xIN .
Bilateral Accidents
IN chooses effort xIN satisfying
) f L( xV , xIN ) / xIN .
cIN ( xIN
Optimality requires
( x*IN ) L ( x*V , x*IN ) / xIN
cIN
Since f < 1, IN chooses less than the
optimal effort level; xIN *
xIN .
Strict division of losses is a socially
suboptimal liability rule.
Bilateral Accidents
Negligence Rule: IN is fully liable for
loss only if her effort level x x~ , a
legally determined effort level.
Social optimality requires V and IN to
choose effort levels
xV x*V and xIN x*IN , where
* * *
( xV ) L( xV , xIN ) / xV
cV
* * *
( xIN ) L ( xV , xIN ) / xIN .
and cIN
Bilateral Accidents
*
Suppose V chooses xV xV .
Then IN is fully liable and wishes to
*
min cIN ( xIN ) L ( xV , xIN ).
xIN
*
x
I.e. IN chooses IN x IN .
Bilateral Accidents
*
Now suppose IN chooses xIN xIN .
Then V wishes to
*
min cV ( xV ) L ( xV , xIN ).
xV
*
x
I.e. V chooses V x V.
Bilateral Accidents
*
Now suppose IN chooses xIN xIN .
Then V wishes to
*
min cV ( xV ) L ( xV , xIN ).
xV
I.e. V chooses
xV x*V .
The Nash equilibrium of the
negligence rule game is the socially
optimal outcome.
Bilateral Accidents
Strict Liability with Defense of
Contributory Negligence Rule: IN is
fully liable unless V’s care level is
less than a specified level x~ .
Bilateral Accidents
IN is fully liable unless V’s care level
is less than a specified level x~ .
~ *
If society chooses x xV and V
*
chooses V x x V , then IN is fully
*
liable, so her best reply is IN x x IN .
Bilateral Accidents
IN is fully liable unless V’s care level
is less than a specified level x~ .
~ *
If society chooses x xV and V
*
chooses V x x V , then IN is fully
*
liable, so her best reply is IN x x IN .
*
If IN chooses xIN xIN , then V’s best
*
reply is xV xV .
Bilateral Accidents
IN is fully liable unless V’s care level is less
than a specified level x~ .
If society chooses ~ * V chooses
and
x xV
, then IN is fully
* liable, so her best
reply is x V x V
*
If IN chooses
x IN x IN
, then V’s best reply
.
*
is xIN xIN
*
I.e. the rule xV .a socially optimal Nash
xVcauses
equilibrium.
Bilateral Accidents
Notes:
– socially optimal liability rules do
not generally fully compensate the
victim.
– socially optimal accident
deterrence is distinct from optimal
accident compensation.
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
The Sherman and Clayton Acts allow
an agent damaged by price-fixing to
sue and recover treble damages.
How does such a penalty affect the
behavior of a price-fixing cartel?
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Assume firms collude to form a
cartel with a constant marginal
production cost, c.
Market demand is x ( p ).
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Assume firms collude to form a
cartel with a constant marginal
production cost, c.
Market demand is x ( p ).
Cartel’s goal is max ( p ) ( p c ) x ( p ).
p
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Assume firms collude to form a
cartel with a constant marginal
production cost, c.
Market demand is x ( p ).
Cartel’s goal is max ( p c ) x ( p ).
p
m m m
Solution is p p x x ( p ).
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Suppose fixing price at p results in
damages D( p ) to a victim V.
V’s probability of winning suit
against the cartel is .
If V wins, the cartel must pay D( p ).
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Suppose fixing price at p results in
damages D( p ) to a victim V.
V’s probability of winning suit
against the cartel is .
If V wins, the cartel must pay D( p ).
Cartel’s problem is now
max ( p c ) x ( p ) D( p ).
p
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Cartel’s problem is now
max ( p c ) x ( p ) D( p ).
p
Solution is not generally the same as
for the original problem max ( p c ) x ( p ).
p
So generally cartel behavior is
affected by the penalty.
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Special case -- suppose D( p ) is the
cartel’s profit. The cartel’s goal is
max ( p c ) x ( p ) D( p ) (1 )( p c ) x ( p ).
p
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Special case -- suppose D( p ) is the
cartel’s profit. The cartel’s goal is
max ( p c ) x ( p ) D( p ) (1 )( p c ) x ( p ).
p
Maximizing after-penalty profit
requires maximizing before-penalty
profit.
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Special case -- suppose D( pis ) the
cartel’s profit. The cartel’s goal is
max ( p c ) x ( p ) D( p ) (1 )( p c ) x ( p ).
p
Maximizing after-penalty profit requires
maximizing before-penalty profit.
The cartel’s behavior is unaffected by
the penalty.
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
What if consumers can seek to be
damaged?
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
What if consumers can seek to be
damaged?
Suppose consumer utility is quasi-
linear; u( x ) m px .
Consumer can win damages
D ( p c ) x .
So consumer’s goal is
max u( x ) m px ( p c ) x .
x
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Consumer’s goal is
max u( x ) m px ( p c ) x .
x
I.e.
max u( x ) m [ p ( p c ) ]x .
x
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Consumer’s goal is
max u( x ) m px ( p c ) x .
x
I.e.
max u( x ) m [ p ( p c ) ]x .
x
effective price, p
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Consumer’s goal is
max u( x ) m [ p ( p c ) ]x .
x
effective price, p
Since consumer’s action depends
upon the effective price, rewrite the
cartel’s problem as max ( p c ) x ( p ).
p
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Consumer’s goal is
max u( x ) m [ p ( p c ) ]x .
x
effective price, p
Since consumer’s action depends
upon the effective price, rewrite the
cartel’s problem as max ( p c ) x ( p ).
Solution is the same p
as the original problem; p p m .
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Solution is the same as the original
m
problem; p p .
p* is the price paid by buyers. Then
m pm p *
p p * ( p * c ).
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
Solution is the same as the original
m
problem; p p .
p* is the price paid by buyers. Then
m
p p * ( p * c ).
So m m
p c m ( p c ) m
p* p p .
1 1
Treble Damages & Antitrust Law
m m
p c m ( p c ) m
p* p p .
1 1
m
The cartel’s price p* p , the price
set in the absence of damage
penalties.
But the effective price to both
consumers and the cartel is the same
as in the no damages case.