Area Hazard Analysis:

example of possible approach

 Goal
• To develop a set of documents that enable
system designers to specify the optimal set of
technical requirements for equipment that
satisfy the defined requirements

– There currently exists the potential for dogmatic

application of design norms that could be over or
under engineered
 Scope and perspectives
• Selected safety function: Confinement
• Equipment associated to safety function: piping
penetration B11-B74 B2
• Protection requirements and guidelines for
implementation identified through Area Hazard
Analysis methodology
• Example to be extended to all families of penetrations
considering the confinement boundaries as one area
 compile a “Handbook of Protection Requirements
for Penetrations”
 Penetration 6211B2-TW-0145 / 0001
TKC SW Corner
Isolation
Valve
B74

HVAC
duct
above
Isolation
Penetration Valve
B11
 Methodology
• Functions identified for system or area to be studied
• Equipment contributing to these functions identified
• Initiating events (RPrS) assumed to occur and impact onto functions determined
• Specific mitigation requirements were identified and then generic guidelines
developed

ti on
a
pe netr
p i ng
pi
74 B2
11- B
to B
pli e d
ap
f A HA
pl e o
Exam
 Notable guidelines extracted from AHA
• For non-combustible pipes, without open ends, below the size that pipes
are considered to behave as ducts, isolation valves are not automatically
required. The drivers for isolation valves are related to the ability to
common pipe rupture on both sides of a penetration due to a postulated
event or combination

• Passive fire protection shall always extend to from the penetration to

those design features that ensure the absence of excessive movement of
the penetration pipe that could potentially damage the sealing system
(infilling, bellows, etc.). It is expected that calculations will be required to
demonstrate the suitability of the design for each penetration

• The extent of fire protection depends upon the presence or absence of

valves, whether those valves are on one side or both sides and whether
the pipe could be considered to be large enough to propagate the fire
 Requirements Identification
HCC Non- Highest seismic System No valves Valve(s) Valves DUCT Below FL + FP3
System HCC rating not Above or Valves on one one side #2 flooding
propagated on both side and not level
Feature throughout sides fail closed
system
FP0 or
Requirement SL3 SL2 V LD FP1 FP2 FP3 FL U
V+FP2

Code Protection Requirement

SL3 Penetration pipe between isolation valves shall be designed or verified to withstand 1.5 x SL2

SL2 Penetration pipe between isolation valves shall be designed to withstand SL2

LD Systems above shall have same seismic rating, or be demonstrated not to collapse in seismic event (but may fail to
function) or sufficient dropped load protection provided between penetration and first isolation valve (note that if
no isolation valves exist then the whole line shall be protected) #1

FP0 Complete fire protection of system

FP1 Fire protection between penetration and first support #3

FP2 FP1 plus fire protection of isolation valves body and any pipe between valve and first support #3

FP3 FP1 or FP2 plus fire protection of valve actuators and the full chain #3

FL Demonstration that static pressure associated with flooding level can be withstood by infilling

V Isolation valves required around penetration

U Valve, actuator and full chain below flooding level to be functional underwater
 Notes and Schema
#1 Does this criteria conflict with implemented design for compressed air tubing
#2 What are the factors (materials, size, fluid, etc.) that specify that a pipe behaves as
a duct and hence enables fire propagation across penetration
#3 schema of possible configurations for protection against fire:

FP0: Fire protection extended to the whole system

FC FC

FP1:

FC FC FC FC

FP2:

FP3:
 Worked Example
HCC Non- Highest seismic System No valves Valve(s) Valves DUCT Below FL+FP3
HCC rating not Above or Valves on one one side flooding
propagated on both side and not level
throughout sides fail closed
system
FP0 or
SL3 SL2 V LD FP1 FP2 FP3 FL U
V+FP2
X X X
6211B2-TW- SL3 for HVAC
0145 / 0001 X penetration, SL2 above one Valves on
both sides
rest of system side

• Penetration requires fire protection from penetration to first support only, the valves,
which are distant from the penetration do not require fire protection

• HVAC duct crosses above the penetration on one side only hence failure of HVAC
cannot cause bypass of penetration through the pipe. HVAC must be demonstrated not
to cause excessive action on penetration infilling in the event of failure onto
penetration pipe
 Next Steps
• Agreement on approach
• Other penetrations
– Cables, busbars
– Ducts
– Transmission lines
– Special cases (NBI penetrations, etc..)
• Comparison with what has been implemented
in the PBS
• Commence with L2
 Next Steps
• Kick off meeting to be organised mid-Jan for L2. MOE
• Identify the penetrations and the related equipment on
L2
– Emmanuel Carlier to be contacted. CHL
• System engineers to perform high level analysis of the
relevant safety functions. ZWG/RRA
– documentation identification + critical analysis. SCI
– Clarification of the relevant functions
• Discuss with PBS 31 regarding the PC penetrations. CHL