• Internal 

• - Company Background (history,

when listed, revenue and profit,
P/E)
• - Core quality ( 幕墻技術，經驗，客戶；
光伏一體化 first mover)
• - Weakness (risk ...)
•
 Company Background
• History
•
 Main Business
• Role shifting • Old Business:
– Design,
fabrication and
installation of
conventional
curtain walls
• New Business – Solar business


– Design,fabrication and installation of

thin-film BIPV systems
• Integration of photovoltaic technology
into the architectural design of
buildings and structures
• Conversion of solar energy into
electricity for use
•
– Production and sale
 of solar-power products

Building Integrated Photovoltaic (BIPV)

 Brief History for Solar
Business
• 2005 began our research and development efforts in solar-
power products
• July 2006 We started cooperating with Weihai China in the
research and development of the production of thin film
a-Si PV panels and CIGS PV panels.
• October 2007 Singyes Renewable Energy was established
as a limited liabilitycompany in the PRC.
• October 2007 We completed our first BIPV project in Beijing,
i.e. the National Olympic Sports Center Stadium project.
• February 2008 China Singyes acquired a 13% equity
interest in Weihai China. (US$ 1.3million)
• August 2009 Innofast acquired an additional 20% equity
interest in Weihai China from two independent third
parties at a consideration of US$1.8 million in aggregate.
• March 2010, SYE became the first national model enterprise
of BIPV application
 Core Competencies
• Good reputation on Curtain wall engineering.
– Qualifications:
• Level 1 Contracting for Construction of Curtain Wall
Projects( 建築幕牆工程專業承包一級 )
• Class A Project Design for Curtain Wall Projects( 建築幕
牆專項工程設計甲級 )
– Awards:
• China Construction Luban Award ( 中國建築工程魯班獎 )
• the China Civil Engineering (Zhan Tianyou) Award ( 中
國土木工程（詹天佑）大獎 )
– Extensive experience and good customer
relationships
• undertaken over 80 public work relatedcurtain wall
engineering projects and not less than 400 projects
spanning across the PRC (till 2008)
• strategic cooperation agreement with the
Transportation Committee of the Management
Association of Railway Enterprise of the PRC （「鐵
道企業管理 協會」 ) to promote and introduce Zhuhai
Singyes’ technology and products
 Financial data

P/E ratio = 16.11

Gross Profit Margin
Gross Profit Contribution
 Weaknesses
• New comers to Solar industry, lack of
CIGS technogy
• Heavy rely on supply of thin-film PV
panels from Weihai China(more
than 98.9%)
• Heavy rely on public project
•
Industry background
 电池种类 晶体硅（单晶、多 非晶硅 铜铟硒 其他
• PV industry yearly 晶）

developed 50%
in recent 3 years 最高效率 24% 13% 18%  

and 30% in the

past in decades 商品化效 18-19% 6 - 8% 11-12%  
率
• In order to obtain
high-purity
silicon as raw
material, 市场份额     90% 以上 6 - 7% 很小 很小

technical barriers
is hard to
overcome.
 Mid and Long term Goals
• According to 《可再生能源中长期发展规划》 from NDRC ， Capacity
will reach 0.3m kw in 2010 and 1.8m kw in 2020 .
• (1) 采用户用光伏发电系统或建设小型光伏电站，解决偏远地区无电村和无电
户的供电问题，重点地区是西藏、青海、内蒙古、新疆、宁夏、甘肃、云
南等省 ( 区、市 ) 。建设太阳能光伏发电约 10 万千瓦，解决约 100 万户
偏远地区农牧民生活用电问题。到 2010 年，偏远农村地区光伏发电总容
量达到 15 万千瓦，到 2020 年达到 30 万千瓦。
• (2) 在经济较发达、现代化水平较高的大中城市，建设与建筑物一体化的屋顶
太阳能并网光伏发电设施，首先在公益性建筑物上应用，然后逐渐推广到
其它建筑物，同时在道路、公园、车站等公共设施照明中推广使用光伏电
源。“十一五”时期，重点在北京、上海、江苏、广东、山东等地区开展城
市建筑屋顶光伏发电试点。到 2010 年，全国建成 1000 个屋顶光伏发电
项目，总容量 5 万千瓦。到 2020 年，全国建成 2 万个屋顶光伏发电项
目，总容量 100 万千瓦。
• (3) 建设较大规模的太阳能光伏电站和太阳能热发电电站。“十一五”时期，在
甘肃敦煌和西藏拉萨 ( 或阿里 ) 建设大型并网型太阳能光伏电站示范项
目；在内蒙古、甘肃、新疆等地选择荒漠、戈壁、荒滩等空闲土地，建设
太阳能热发电示范项目。到 2010 年，建成大型并网光伏电站总容量 2 万
千瓦、太阳能热发电总容量 5 万千瓦。到 2020 年，全国太阳能光伏电站
总容量达到 20 万千瓦，太阳能热发电总容量达到 20 万千瓦。
 Challenges
• Technical barriers
• Lack of market
• High cost
•
Technology breakthrough will help to

solve most of the above problems.

Policy
 Events
 In 2006, the policy 《可再生能源法》 and 《可再生能源发电价
格和费用分摊管理试行办法》 are released to provide
environement for the industry. Power generated will be
fully utilized.
 In 2007, 《可再生能源电价附加收入调配暂行办法》 is released
by NDRC to adjust the power price. The concept of quota
system is raised.
 In 2007, 《关于开展大型并网光伏示范电站建设有关要求的通知》
is released by NDRC to confirm that on-grid price is
determined by bid inviting
 In March, 2008, 《可再生能源发展“十一五”规划》 is released
by Power Department of NDRC.
 In 2009, 《太阳能光电建筑应用财政补助资金管理暂行办法》 is
released to provide allowance for industry of PV
construction.
 In July, 2009, Golden Sun Demonstration Project is started
including financial allowance, hi-tech support and market
drive.
 In December, 2010, 财政部、科技部、住房和城乡建设部、国家
 Policy Support is…
•
• Mainly based on technology
development
•
• Includes allowance and capital
injection
 Case on Policy Support
• In 2009, cost of the industry dropped
dramatically. However the main
reason is not the improvement in
technology, but dropped price of
polycrystalline silicon.
Polycrystalline silicon play a great
role in PV industry and takes up
40% of the total cost. So even PV
industry developed rapidly in
recent years, policy support slows
down because technology is more
 Conclusion
• In order to achieve more policy
support, Xingye should spend more
efforts on technology development
to reduce the cost.
• Price should be competitive enough
to capture the market.
 Competitors
• Different from other PV companies,
Xingye start from construction
industry and try to combine
construction with PV.
• BIPV
• In such a new field, few competitors
now.
• Industry’s entry level is low,
technology development is urgent.
 Several Competitors
• 創益太陽能：有生產能力，上市 + 無名小
企業 力诺光伏 银星能源
• Compared with Xingye, Chuangyi
suffer from lack of base in
construction including experience,
technology, fame and relationships.
• On the other hand, Chuangyi has
ability to produce on it own,
however, as Xingye control
WEIHAIZHONGBO, situation will be
improved.
 Bottleneck
• Technology
• Cost
• Demand
 Injection 1 ： Technology &
Automation
lWeakness ： Cost and Technology
innovation
lMethod:
lTechnology import
lEconomy of Scale Automation
lTrading Chips:
lNothing right now
 Step 1: Acquisition of Weihai
China Glass Cor. Ltd
•
•
• The largest BIPV manufacturing base
in China
• Xingye has 33% of ownership
• Target: at least 51% ownership


 the cost of suppliers the discursive hegemony

 bargaining power development direction
 Step 2: Negotiation and Tech-
Transfer
• Find a company with high-end
technology
• Establish long-term relationship, JV or
lisence
• Trading chip: manufacturing with
relative low cost, stable relationship
and supply
•
Attraction: European Market
 Q cells--JV
• Q cells was once the largest solar
photovoltaic (PV) cell manufacturer
• Sold 84,956,767 of its shares in
Norwegian company, Renewable
Energy Corporation ASA (REC), which
was its supplier
• The subsidy for PV decreased by about
33% in Germany
• The ex-CEO resigned because of the
exhausting situation in Germany
•
 Q cells
• Q cells group ：
• Calyxo (CdTe) .
• Flex cell (amorphous silicon), that makes
rollable solar chargers.
• Solaria Corporation (silicon)
• Solibro, CIGS for BIPV and small industrial
and commercial roofs
• market capitalization: €413.4m €4.11
per share ≥10 before
• EPS –0.24(10), -11.81(09) revenue
decreased by 34.9% 2008-2009
• P/E ratio 14.89 in 2008
• Hold reciprocal shares

 3S--Lisence
• 3S Swiss Solar Systems has for years been
the world's technological market leader in
the field of laminating.
• With fully automatic laminating lines from
Lyss, module manufacturers worldwide
today produce photovoltaic modules of
highest quality.
• 3S Swiss Solar Systems has been
integrating various machines into
integrated production lines for the
manufacture of solar modules with greatly
differing degrees of automation.
• The equipment for solar module producers
Step 3: Volume production
• To be always a first mover with more
advanced technology comparing the
other domestic competitors
• Achieve economy of scale
• Improve the automation
• Lower the total cost
 Injection 2: DC and Scale
• The central government’s concern on
countryside. PV goes down to
countryside
• The northwest of China: lack of
electric, rich in silica and solar
energy
• The trend and development
orientation of NDRC
• The limitation of the only assembly
plant
NDRC Planning
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/default.
htm
• 「西部省區無電鄉通電計劃」
•
 Recommendation 3
Form strategic cooperative
relationship with Gov. and its
agencies to obtain projects:
 Infrastructure
ü Railway station: RMB5 trillion will be invested in
40,000-km
railway, at least 400 new stations
ü Civil airport: 97 new airport will be constructed until
2020
 Urban public projects: gov. buildings, exhibition
center, park etc.
This can also help build its image and
 Recommendation 4
China’s accelerated urbanization


 1% increase every year until 2030

 13 million people move into city every year
 10 million houses to be built each year

Sign cooperation agreement with main
real
estate developers to expand BIPV

market
 Vanke
 China Poly
 China Shipping
Relationship Tree
Possible to cooperate?
 (Take Shenzhen as an
example)
 Average electricity price: RMB 0.95/kw.h
 Present cost of solar power (A-Si): RMB 1.2-
1.4/kw.h, higher than average price, which is
why solar power so far haven’t merged into
power grid in a large scale
 However, new technology injected into Singyes
would double the efficiency of solar power
conversion, which means solar power’s price
would decrease in half, to RMB0.6-0.7/km.h,
even lower than the market average price
 Besides, BIPV can reduce 30% power needs of
housing by keeping it cool in the summer
 Singyes can earn (0.95-0.60)/0,60=58.33% profit
 Industrial and commercial buildings:
self-use
-Can afford BIPV financially

-Can benefit most from BIPV(industrial and



commercial electricity consumers pay almost 100% higher

electricity price)

 Residential buildings:
ü Self-use if housing owners can afford
invest in it
ü If cannot, concentrate solar power to
merge