Mutah University

Sociolinguistics
{
Social identity
Submitted to: Dr. Hamid Al-Jaradat
Presented by: Ruba Al-Rawashdeh
 Textbook

Modern Arabic Sociolinguistics Diglossia, Variation,

Codeswitching, Attitudes and Identity
by
Abdulkafi Albirini
‘

What’s identity?
Identity is a dynamic construct that is negotiated among social
actors within immediate situational elements such as time, place,
event, and occasion as well as in larger social norms, power
relationships, cultural traditions, ideological concepts, and
discursive practices (Bourdieu, 1999; Eckert, 2000; Fairclough, 1989;
Fowler, 1985; Goodwin, 2003; Hall, 1996; Rampton, 1995).

What’s social identity ?

Social Identity can be defined across national, ethnic, racial,
religious, linguistic, geographical, historical, and ideological lines, it
often involves “self-definition as a group member in terms of
ingroup–outgroup differentiations” (Simon, 2004, p. 37).
‘

What’s personal identity?

personal identities are “based on one-on-one relationships with
others” (Holmes, 2006, p. 167). Diverse disciplines, such as
sociology, anthropology, social psychology, history,
communication studies, political science, and linguistics have
contributed to the growing body of literature detailing.

The relationship between language and identity :

It is complex and multifaceted, and it has been approached from
different perspectives. The bulk of research on identity dynamics in
the Arab region has focused on historical narratives; much less has
investigated identity statements and identity acts in diverse Arabic-
speaking communities
INTERPLAY OF IDENTITY AND ARABIC LANGUAGE:
A BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH
ARAB IDENTITY BEFORE ISLAM
 The situation of the Arab tribes before Islam indicates their

awareness of their common ethnic or cultural background, given

the occurrence of the term “Arab” in pre-Islamic poetry, its
frequent use in the early Islamic writings, and its contrast to
‘Ajam “non-Arabic-speaking people”, even before Islam, Arabs
shared a range of customs and traditions, such as tribal structure,
blood relationships, and literary traditions.
 Arabness as a form of ethnic identity was independent of

religious and national identity before Islam. Arabic language was

possibly one of the main shared resources linking the various
Arab tribes.
 The language of the Meccan Quraysh tribe in particular was

significant because Mecca was a meeting place for many Arab

tribes due to its religious, commercial, and literary position
‘ THE RISE OF ISLAM & ARAB IDENTITY:
 The increase of Arabs’ consciousness of their unique identity, mainly

because Arabic was the conspicuous language of the Qur’an and the
language of Prophet Muhammad.
 The Arabs’ sense of collective identity as a group ethnically distinct

from the ‘Ajam started to take clearer shape after the Islamic
conquests, many years after the death of the Prophet.
 The Arabic language was not simply a container of the Islamic

message or a means of communication, but an identity marker of a

group of people who saw in their eloquent language a point of an
identity difference from the non-Arabic-speaking communities.

UMAYYAD ERA & ARAB IDENTITY:

 They initiated the first attempt to draw identity lines between Arabs

and non-Arabs based on language factors. Identity politics at this

stage focused on the implementation of the Arabic language in
administration, the policy of assigning key administrative posts to
the Arabs, and the institutionalization of Arabic in official circles.
‘
ABBASID & ARAB IDENTITY:
 They favored the Persians and the Turks in most military and

administrative positions.
 A notable cultural, intellectual, and political tensions between

Arabs and non-Arabs (particularly Persians and Turks) started to

transpire.
 The term “Arab nation” recurred during this period, but always

in connection with the Arabic language. For example, in his Al-

Imtaa’ wa l-Mu’aanasa “Entertainment and Sociability,” Al-
Tawhiidi distinguished the Arabs from other nations, such as the
Persians.
 Toward the end of the Abbasid period, however, the Arabs’ sense

of pride in their identity started to fade away as they were

overpowered by the Mongols, Crusaders, and a number of Turkic
and Persian dynasties.
 THE OTTOMAN & ARAB IDENTITY:
 Despite the relegation of Arabic mainly to the religious domain,

many Arabs felt no threat to their identity because the Ottomans

implemented no anti-Arabic policies, as they recognized the value
of the language to the Arab people and Muslims.
 Despite Muslim Arabs considered the Turks as their associates in

faith and beause Ottomans moved to a European-style nation-state

and their implementation of the Turkification policy, the Arabs’
contact with the European civilization, and the active role of many
Arab intellectuals in rebuilding relationships between the Arabs
based on shared ethnic heritage and language.
 Arabs’ revolt against the Turks was mainly a reaction to the

Turkification policy, which raised their sense of their ethnic (not

religious) disconnection from the Turks. In response to the
Turkification move, a number of Arab intellectuals,3 especially in
Greater Syria and Egypt, invoked the Arabs’ glorious history and
language to assert the Arabs’ unique identity.
‘ ARAB REVOLT & ARAB IDENTITY:
 The Arabic language was brought to the scene again when the

leaders of the Arab revolt were negotiating with the British and
the French governments concerning the prospective Arab nation.
 However, the Arab nationalist movement, the Arabs’ sense of

collective identity, and the prospect of building a “nation” for

Arabic speakers soon evaporated when the British and the French
divided among themselves much of the land that was under the
Ottoman control.
 This started a new chapter in Arabs’ quest for a frame of identity –

a quest in which language played a critical role in mobilizing

social and political movements against the new colonizers.
 The Arabs have different experiences with Western colonialism

with some barely affected by it (e.g., current Saudi Arabia) and

others falling under its direct control for longer (e.g., Algeria) or
shorter (e.g., Iraq) periods of time and under colonizers who
followed diverse approaches to Arabic language and Arab
identity.
NATIONAL IDENTITIES: PAN-ARAB AND REGIONAL
IDENTITIES
 National identity, in its modern sociopolitical sense, is a relatively
new concept in the Arab history. It evolved under the influence of
the European nationalist movements, particularly in the nineteenth
century.
 The European concept of nationalism was transferred to the Arab
region through three main channels: (1) students who studied in
Europe; (2) colonialism, and 1801; and (3) the European missionary
and religious schools in Lebanon.
 Smith (1981, p. 187) defines the nation, in
 its modern meaning, as “a sense of historic community associated
with a unique ‘homeland.’ ” He differentiates nation from state,
which refers to “a set of autonomous and abstract institutions
within a given territory.”
 Although the denotation of national identity has been changing in
the Arab region relative to global and local sociohistorical and
political circumstances, it has often involved a linguistic dimension.
 The concept of qawmiyya, which is derived from the Arabs’
identification with their tribe as qawm “folk,” has been widely
used in the literature to reflect the Arabs’ increasing sense of their
common ethnic and linguistic heritage.
 The revival of Arab nationalism in the nineteenth century was
accompanied by the restoration of ‘uluum al-lugha al-‘arabiyya wa
’aadaabuha “sciences and literatures of Arabic.” Thus, this period
witnessed the development of the so-called neoclassical tradition,
which focused on Classical Arabic and its literary uses, and the
production of many important Arabic-language-related works,
such as Muħiiṭ Al-Muħiiṭ dictionary.
 the pan-Arab nationalist movement, there developed a number of
state-based nationalist movements, particularly in Egypt and
Greater Syriy suchas Al-Ṭahṭaawi who maintained that loyalty
should not be directed to ethnic background or religion, but to the
“homeland.”
 Al-Ṭahṭaawi, Taha Hussein, and Mohammad Abdu, maintained
their support to standard Arabic because it was still part of the
“culture,” even when they called for modernizing it along with
other aspects of the Egyptian society.
 The Egyptian nationalist movement lost much of its momentum
after Egypt’s independence and the reemergence of pan-Arab
identity, especially after the ascendance of Jamal Abdulnasser to
power. However, the failure of Nasser’s pan-Arab agenda after the
collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic and the loss
of the 1967 war to Israel, brought to surface a new form of
Egyptian nationalism.
 Another notable case of state-based nationalism is that of Greater
Syria, which included Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. The
idea of the “Syrian nation” was first proposed by Butrus Bustaani
as a response to the 1860 violent conflict between the Christian
Maronites and the Druze in Mount Lebanon
 The pan-Arab and state-based types of nationalism wax or wane
depending on different sociopolitical circumstances, and the
fluctuation typically moves from politics to language.
 The various setbacks that pan-Arab nationalism has suffered since
the 1948 Arab–Israeli war and the contradiction between the rhetoric
of pan-Arabism and the reality of the fragmented Arabic polities led
to an identity crisis in the region and the emergence of neoteric
forms of nationalism.
 Since the 1990s, particularly after the first Gulf War, Arab
nationalism has become basically a historical subject that Arab
students learn at school rather than a social reality that they live.
While the politically charged term al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya “Arab
nationalism” has become a taboo among various groups in the Arab
societies (e.g., some religious groups), the more culturally oriented
concept of al-’umma al-‘arabiyya “Arab nation” has been used
fluidly to refer to the common cultural and historical heritage of the
Arab people.
ETHNIC IDENTITIES: ARABS AND NON-ARAB MINORITIES

 Ethnicity refers to “a collectivity or community that makes

assumptions about common attributes related to cultural practices
and shared history”
 Ethnic identity refers to “a person’s knowledge of belonging to an
ethni group and pride in that group”
 Ethnic identity is not only the result of interaction between different
groups, but also a feeling of “otherness” or “opposition” with
respect to cultural details”
 The notable decline in the Arab nationalist rhetoric since the 1990s
has given way to greater emphasis on ethnic and religious identities.
 The term Arab identity has recently been used to denote cultural or
ethnic identity, which has become the focus of many new
conferences and studies across the Arab region.
 The bond between the Arabic language and Arab identity has
been reviewed along external and internal dimensions. The
external dimension concerns globalization and the dominance
of English in critical social spheres, such as higher education,
technology, and sciences. The cultural-linguistic incursions
into the Arab region are manifest, for example, in (1) the
widespread use of English names for shops, companies, and
people, (2) the use of English words on clothes and
decorations, (3) the proliferation of English language centers,
schools, and universities, (4) the reliance on English in tourism
and commerce, and (5) the use of common English
expressions
 The internal dimension has to do with the deployment of QA varieties
in domains that were mostly allocated to SA, such as poetry, radio,
television, and the internet. The dwindling presence of SA in these
domains threatens to weaken the position of SA, diminishes common
ties between its speakers, and creates local identities that do not realize
the common Arab history and heritage.
 Arabs are not the only ethnic group whose sense of unique ethnic
identity has been marked by language; the Berbers and Kurds
have drawn the boundaries of their ethnic identities through
language. From linguistic and historical perspectives, both
groups possess distinct ethnicities. The majority of Berbers and
Kurds are Muslims, and, therefore, they share with the Arab
majority their general religious membership. They also share a
wide range of cultural practices and traditions. The Arab national
states, like other states in the world, have strived to erase
“ethnic” differences within their geopolitical borders and to
reinforce these differences outside their geopolitical borders.
 Members of the Berber communities speak numerous distinct
language/dialects that are often mutually unintelligible.
 Many Berber speakers became Arabized due to the prestige of SA
and its use in education and religious preaching, the migration of
Arab tribes to the region
‘
 The politicization of the Berber ethnolinguistic identity became
visible in the light of the Arabicization policies that aimed to
promote the “Arab identity” of the post-independence North
African countries and to build connections with the Arab east.
 The tenacity of the Berbers’ activism and the internationalization
of their “cause,” however, have forced the Moroccan and
Algerian governments to recognize the Berber language as an
official language in Morocco and as a national language in
Algeria. Along with the recognition of the Berber language came
the recognition of Amazighity as the identity of the Berber
community in Morocco and Algeria.
 The Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement emulates its Berber
counterpart in various respects. For example, the Kurdish
identity is founded mainly on ethnolinguistic grounds, which
include languages, heritage, and history.
 RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES: MUSLIMS AND NON-MUSLIM
MINORITIES

 Religious identity refers to “belonging based on beliefs held in common”

 Religion becomes a main marker of identity when it incorporates spiritual
beliefs and religious practices that influence a person’s perceptions of
him/herself in relation to others who have similar or different spiritual
beliefs and religious practices.
 within the Arab context, different languages were relevant for different
religious groups long before Islam. For example, the Jewish communities
in Yemen used the Hebrew language in their rituals. With the rise of Islam
in the seventh century ad, religious affiliation became intricately related
to language because Arabic was the language of the Qur’an, the Prophet,
and Islamic liturgy and scholarship. The main Muslim sources (the
Qur’an and the Hadith) lack clear indication of the relationship between
language and the Islamic faith.7 However, the dominant voices of Islamic
scholarship during the Umayyad and Abbasid reigns emphasized the
superiority of Arabic, its unique aptness to encode God’s last message to
humanity, and its importance for understanding Islamic teachings.
 One of the key social transformations that Islam introduced was
the concept of ummah, which joined all Muslims in a single
community. This concept remains vague till our present day,
mainly because the Qur’an does not specify the boundaries and
the parameters of this community.
 Under the Ottoman rule, the Muslim Arabs’ religious identity
was couched within the caliphate, which, for many Muslim
Arabs, then represented the Muslim ummah (Dawisha, 2002;
Patel, 2013). The Ottomans presented no threat to the Muslim
Arabs’ sense of religious identity because, besides being Muslims
themselves, they (1) recognized the status of the Arabic language
at least in the religious domain, (2) used the Arabic script in
writing the Turkish language, and (3) permitted the teaching of
Arabic in the Turkish religious schools as a school subject.
 During Western colonialism, localized nationalist, anti-occupation
sentiments were the main umbrella under which different religious
(Muslims, Christians, Druze, etc.) and ethnic (Arabs, Berbers,
Kurds, etc.) groups operated against the occupying forces.
 Since the second Gulf War, sectarianism has become the dominant
mode of identity expression in the Arab region. According to
Makdisi (1996, p. 24), sectarianism is “antithesis of nation” because
it is “constructed against a territorially-bounded liberal nation-
state.” Sectarianism erases language-based identity borders and
recreates new boundaries based on religious–political commitments
to the sect. For example, the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah party
has occasionally announced his loyalty to the Iranian religious
authority.
 In most of the conferences, meetings, and intellectual productions
mentioned in the previous section, the link between SA, Islamic
identity, and the concept of ummah is often stated as a side topic
because of the negative implications of the concept of ummah on
the authority of Arab statisms. There is often an emphasis on the
need to maintain SA for its religious value.
 IDENTIFY POLITICS AND LANGUAGE PLANNING

 Language planning has often been used interchangeably with

language policy, both of which refer to “deliberate efforts to
influence the behavior of others with respect to the acquisition,
structure, or functional allocation of their language codes”
 Fishman (1974, p. 79) argues that “language planning refers to
conscious governmental efforts to affect the structure and
function of language varieties.” However, Tollefson (2000, p.
13) suggests that language planning is “a wide range of
governmental and non-governmental actions designed to
influence language acquisition and language use.” Eastman
(1983, p. iv) combines the two definitions by suggesting that
“language planning is done through the cooperative efforts of
political, educational, economic, and linguistic authorities.”
 Language planning involves a wide range of political, social,
economic, and educational considerations because it is
generally embedded within national development plans.
 Language planning in the post-independence Arab states sought to
undo the culturally hegemonic policies of the colonial powers, to
turn back the tides of French and English, and to assert the unique
identity of the Arab people. These post-independence language
policies were largely a reaction to colonial language policies that
sought to exclude Arabic from the public domain in general and
from official, political, and educational domains in particular.
 In addition to privileging their own languages, the British and
French led the initiative of promoting QA in education and Arab
societies in general. The call to adopt QA in education and other
formal spheres under the British and French occupations was
inspired by three developments: (1) the establishment of various
QA-focused programs across Europe starting from the eighteenth
century (e.g., in Naples, Vienna, London, etc.), (2) linguistic studies
on the structure of QA (e.g., those carried out by Wilhelm Spitta,
Carl Vollers, Selden Willmore), and (3) publications explicating the
advantages of adopting QA in reading and writing in the early
twentieth century (e.g., Salama Musa, Qasim Amin, William
Willcocks)
 LANGUAGE ATTITUDES, IDENTITY STATEMENTS, AND
IDENTITY ACTS

 Attitudes, however, have been defined as comprising three main

constituents: cognitive, affective and behavioural .The first refers to
the influence of attitudes on an individual’s views of the world and
particular incidents; the second involves emotions in relation to the
attitude item; and the third refers to the interference of attitudes in
behaviour (Garrett, 2010).
 Cummins (2000) argues that social actors may enact their identity
through “identity statements,” which often articulate their language
attitudes and at the same time establish their identities in relation to
other speakers and social groups. Le Page and Tabouret-Keller
(1985) describes speakers’ use of language to mark their identities as
“acts of identity,” through which they enact their identities rather
than describe them.
 Identity statements and identity acts are important tools for
identity construction because they may index one’s belonging to a
given social group and reveal the pragmatic and sociolinguistic
dynamics involved in identity creation and indexation.
 It should be noted that, when they employ identity statements or
identity acts to construct their preferred identities, social actors are
usually attentive to the dominant historical narratives running in
their societies. Identity statements and acts often reproduce the
grand narratives at a given historical moment and reflect the
ambient political atmosphere. This pattern applies more to
dominant groups than to minority groups. Members of the
minority groups often use language to counteract the dominant
narratives (Heller, 1988).
 CASE STUDY
OBJECTIVE
 This case study focuses on identity sentiments as reported,

conceptualized, and practiced in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi

Arabia. In addition, the section examines the relationship between
identity sentiments, on one hand, and, on the other, language
attitudes, ethnic membership, religious membership, and other
demographic variables.
SIGNIFICANCE
 These relationships may provide insights into whether Arabs see

themselves as one group, whether they see language as part of their

shared Arabness, and which language variety is associated with
their Arab identity.
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the Arab context, multiple languages, ethnicities, religions,

nationalities, and affiliations exist. Therefore, it is impossible to
speak of identity as a monolithic concept. Arabic speakers have
different forms of identity that converge, diverge, or even clash
based on various factors. However, language has always been at the
center of identity dynamics in the Arab region for three main
reasons. First, the Arabic language is the single main denominator
of the Arab people’s ethnic identity, and thus it largely defines who
an Arab is. Shared language(s) also index the ethnic identities of
other speech communities in the Arab region, such as the Berbers
and the Kurds. Second, Arabic is one of the foundations upon
which claims of Arab political unity are based. This may explain the
mobilization of the Arabic language as a mark of Arab unity by
Arab nationalists and pan-Arab movements. Not only does the
Arabic language geographically demarcate the
distribution of Arabic speakers on the political map of the Arab World, but it
also relates these speakers to a shared heritage and history. Last, the Arabic
language is a main symbol of Islam, and therefore it is often invoked for
constructing or reaffirming Muslim identity.
 The ethnic, national, and religious forms of identity are constructed through

discursive narratives that seek to naturalize historical accounts explaining a

group’s shared ethnic, national, and religious backgrounds. These historical
narratives may become socially accepted, circulated, and shared to the extent
that they eventually become axiomatic within the social group. In the case of
minority groups, historical narratives also work through a dynamic of
“othering” where the discursive construction of the self necessarily
implicates the creation of the “other” (Said, 1978). These historical narratives
may eventually translate into identity statements and identity acts by which
social actors aver, display, and enact their shared social identities. Social
actors’ identity statements and acts may simply be byproducts of historical
narratives; they transpire when the historical narratives succeed in creating a
sense of shared social identity in a given speech community. However,
identity relationships become complicated when the historical narratives are
not supported by sociopolitical realities on the ground. For example, the
current state of Arab disunity, political squabbles, and state-based
nationalisms runs counter to the historically based pan-Arab narratives.
The End