Case Analysis

PART 2
Pedrano, Ressie June N.
 Triad Security Waterfront
PTTC vs NLRC Reyes vs NLRC
vs. Ortega GR Cebu vs
GR No. 80600 GR No. 180551
No. 160871 Feb. Ledesma GR No.
March 21, 1990 Feb. 10, 2009
6, 2006 197556 March
25, 2015
Brief Background: PTTC vs NLRC GR No. 80600 March 21,
1990

The instant case is one of illegal dismissal of an employee of Philippine Telegraph

and Telephone Corporation (PTTC). Herein private respondent is a counter-clerk
and long distance operator working for petitioner. On August 24, 1985, he was
terminated by the petitioner-company for tampering with the vodex receipt by
writing the amount of P41.15 as appearing in the duplicate while the original copy
issued to the customer was P113.25. Petitioner-company alleged that the same was
done by the complainant out of his illegal interest and the difference of P72.10 in
the receipt was used for his own personal comfort; that his intention to tamper
(with) and malverse company funds is very glaring to be ignored. It was further
argued that the acts of the complainant reflect that he is morally deprived and,
therefore, could not be trusted considering that he violated the trust and confidence
reposed upon him which constitutes a valid reason for his termination.
The assailed decision of respondent Commission which affirmed with modification
the decision of Labor Arbiter Nicolas S. Sayon, ordered the herein petitioner to: (1)
reinstate complainant to his former position without payment of backwages; (2) pay
complainant his unpaid wages for the month of July, 1985; and (3) pay complainant
his entitlement on holiday pay, rest day pay and incentive leave pay for three years
starting from August 23, 1982 to August 23, 1983. On appeal to respondent
commission, petitioner submitted uncontracted evidence showing payment to
private respondent of his holiday pay and rest day pay, and private respondent's
non-entitlement to incentive leave pay due to his enjoyment of vacation leave
privileges, consistent with Article 95, Chapter III, Title I, Book III of the Labor Code.
The same was however rejected by respondent commission on the justification that
it was not presented at the first opportunity, presumably when the case was
pending with the labor arbiter.
Issues
(1) Whether or not the offense committed by the employee justifies his
outright dismissal. (NO)
(2) Whether or not the submission of uncontradicted evidence by
petitioner on appeal to respondent Commission should have been
allowed by the latter. (YES)
Ruling
(1) Per the findings of the labor arbiter, it was proved that the private respondent was indeed
alone in the office on July 26, 1985. He was busily performing his duties both as a counter-clerk
and long distance operator at the same time. The functions of which dual positions precisely
caused him to commit a mistake in the entry receipt through negligence. It was further found
that private respondent had repeatedly brought to the attention of petitioner-company his
predicament of having to singly perform manifold duties but the same were left unheeded.

The Court found no cogent reason to disturb such findings. It is the well-entrenched rule that
when the conclusions of the labor arbiter are sufficiently corroborated by the evidence on
record, the same should be respected by appellate tribunals since the Labor Arbiter is in a better
position to assess and evaluate the credibility of the contending parties. Even the failure of
petitioner to present witnesses or counter-affidavits will not constitute a fatal error as long as the
parties were given a chance to submit position papers on the basis of which the labor arbiter
rendered a decision.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, even the assumption that there may have been a valid
ground for dismissal of the private respondent, the imposition of a supreme penalty would
certainly be very harsh and disproportionate to the infraction he committed, especially if it
was put into consideration that it was his first offense in his seven (7) years of faithful and
satisfactory service with the company. In addition, the fact that the imputed defalcation
involved only the meager sum of P72.10, the same has bolstered the credibility of the
explanation of private respondent's defense.

The Court said, “While an employer has its own interests to protect and, pursuant thereto, it
may terminate an employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay off an
employee must not be abusively exercised. Such power should be tempered with compassion
and understanding. The employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of said
prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employee's position but his livelihood as well.”
This ruling is only in keeping with the constitutional mandate for the State to afford full
protection to labor such that, when conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed
on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counterbalanced by
the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.”

Even if herein petitioner-company's claim that the offense is of the nature of falsification,
which justifies outright dismissal, was of no moment. It is not for the Court to rule upon in the
present petition if whether or not the infraction committed by private respondent constitutes
a criminal act. Of course, the private respondent cannot be considered faultless entirely so
that he may be absolved from liability. Thus, the modification of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter ordering reinstatement of private respondent to his former position without
backwages is the proper relief, without prejudice and subject to the condition that should he
commit a similar offense, the same will justify his outright dismissal.
(2) Evidence submitted on Appeal to the NLRC
The Court noted that, “On appeal to respondent commission, petitioner
submitted uncontradicted evidence showing payment to private
respondent of his holiday pay and rest day pay, and private
respondent's non-entitlement to incentive leave pay due to his
enjoyment of vacation leave privileges, consistent with Article 95,
Chapter III, Title I, Book III of the Labor Code. Such evidence was,
however, rejected by respondent commission on the erroneous
justification that it was not presented at the first opportunity,
presumably when the case was pending with the labor arbiter.”
It was held, “The belated presentation of the evidence notwithstanding, respondent
commission should have considered them just the same. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, who has impartially taken a contrary view vis-a-vis that portion of said
decision of respondent commission which he is supposed to defend, technical rules of
evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every and reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

Thus, even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly
introduced on appeal to respondent commission is enough basis for the latter to have
been more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere
technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first
course of action would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.”
Pertinent Provisions Triad Security vs. Ortega GR No. 160871
Feb. 6, 2006

Article 229 (223) on Appeal of the Labor Code

Article 294 (279) on Security of Tenure of the Labor Code
 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule XII titled “Extraordinary
Remedies” – allows a party to file a petition to annul or modify an
order of a labor arbiter on the ground of abuse of discretion or serious
errors in findings of facts, fraud, among other grounds. The petition
has to be filed with the Commission within 10 days from receipt of
such order or resolution.
Brief Background
Herein petitioner Triad Security and Allied Services, Inc., (Triad Security) is a duly licensed security
agency owned by co-petitioner Anthony U. Que, while respondents Silvestre Ortega, Jr., Ariel Alvaro,
Richard Sevillano, Martin Callueng, and Isagani Capila were formerly employed by petitioner Triad
Security as security guards., respondents filed a complaint on March 25, 1999 against petitioners and
one Ret. B/Gen. Javier D. Carbonell for underpayment/nonpayment of salaries, overtime pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, and attorney’s fees,
which was amended on April 20, 1999 to include the charges of illegal dismissal, illegal deductions,
underpayment/nonpayment of allowance, separation pay, and claims for 13th month pay, moral and
exemplary damages as well as night shift differential. According to respondents, during the time that
they were receiving compensation which was below the minimum wage fixed by law while being in
the employ of petitioners, they were, and were also made to render services every day for 12 hours
but were not paid the requisite overtime pay, nightshift differential, and holiday pay. They likewise
lamented the fact that petitioners failed to provide them with weekly rest period, service incentive
leave pay, and 13th month pay. As a result of these perceived unfairness, a complaint was filed by
respondents filed before the Labor Standards Enforcement Division of the Department of Labor on
January 6, 1999. Their services were terminated without the benefit of notice and hearing when the
petitioner learned of the complaint.
Petitioners denied respondents’ claim of illegal dismissal for their part
and explained that management policies dictate that the security
guards be rotated to different assignments to avoid fraternization and
that they be required to take refresher courses at their headquarters;
which respondents allegedly refused to comply with, and went on leave
or simply refused to report at their headquarters instead. As for
respondents’ money claims, petitioners insisted that respondents
worked for only eight hours a day, six days a week and that they
received their premium pays for services rendered during holidays and
rest day. The service incentive leave of respondents was allegedly made
payable as soon as respondents applied for said benefit.
The Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered herein
petitioners to reinstate them to their former jobs as security guards,
and to pay jointly and solidarily complainants’ backwages and to such
further backwages accrued until reinstatement order is complied with
by petitioners herein. Petitioners failed to seasonably file an appeal
with the National Labor Relations Commission, the decision of the labor
arbiter became final and executory prompting respondents to file a
motion for the issuance of writ of execution. Several issues were raised
as regard the computation of the awards for the respondents to the
point that the issue was elevated to the Court of Appeals – which led
the appellate court to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the
execution or enforcement of the Labor Arbiter’s order.
The Court of Appeals took note of the "procedural but fatal flaw"
committed by petitioners when they immediately elevated their case
via petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals without first
seeking recourse from the NLRC in violation not only of the Rules of
Procedure of said body but also of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Issues
(1) Whether or not the NLRC may issue a writ of certiorari under Art.
229 of the Labor Code. (YES)
(2) Whether or not the award of either separation pay and/or
backwages preclude that of the other. (NO)
Ruling
(1) Although the petitioners maintain that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute as it accepts of certain exceptions such
as when an appeal would not be an adequate remedy there being an order or
execution already issued and the implementation of said writ loomed as a great
probability.

The Court held that “It is a basic tenet of procedural rules that for a special civil
action for a petition for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
In this case, petitioners insist that the NLRC is bereft of authority to rule on a matter
involving grave abuse of discretion that may be committed by a labor arbiter. Such
conclusion, however, proceeds from a limited understanding of the appellate
jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 223 (now 229) of the Labor Code which states:

“ART. 223 (229). APPEAL

Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter x x x.”
In the case of Air Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, the Court had the occasion
to explain the scope of said article of the Labor Code to mean –

x x x Also, while the title of Article 223 seems to provide only for the remedy of appeal
as that term is understood in procedural law and as distinguished from the office of
certiorari, nonetheless, a closer reading thereof reveals that it is not as limited as
understood by the petitioners x x x.

xxxx

Abuse of discretion is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari and its grant thereof to
the NLRC indicates the lawmakers’ intention to broaden the meaning of appeal as that
term is used in the Code x x x.
Likewise, in the same case, [the] Court quoted with approval the following
observation of the Court of Appeals:

“The Court did not see how appeal would have been inadequate or ineffectual
under the premises. On the other hand, being the administrative agency especially
tasked with the review of labor cases, [the NLRC] is in a far better position to
determine whether petitioners’ grounds for certiorari are meritorious. Neither is
there any cause for worry that appeal to the Commission would not be speedy as
the Labor Code provides that the Commission shall decide cases before it, within
twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the Answer of Appellee x x x.”

Given the foregoing, it was held that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
petition for certiorari brought before it.
(2) Petitioners insist that their monetary obligation, as contained in the
February 28, 2000 decision of the labor arbiter, had already been fully
satisfied, and posit the argument that with respondents’ receipt of
their separation pay, they had opted not to seek reinstatement to their
former jobs and elected instead to sever their employment with
petitioner Triad Security. In fact, according to petitioners, respondents
had already found new employments and to award them further
backwages would be tantamount to unjust enrichment. Thus,
petitioners maintain that there is no more basis to hold them liable
for the accrued backwages stated in the recent computation.

Such argument is untenable.

(2) Petitioners insist that their monetary obligation, as contained in the
February 28, 2000 decision of the labor arbiter, had already been fully
satisfied, and posit the argument that with respondents’ receipt of
their separation pay, they had opted not to seek reinstatement to their
former jobs and elected instead to sever their employment with
petitioner Triad Security. In fact, according to petitioners, respondents
had already found new employments and to award them further
backwages would be tantamount to unjust enrichment. Thus,
petitioners maintain that there is no more basis to hold them liable
for the accrued backwages stated in the recent computation.

Such argument is untenable.

(2) Petitioners insist that their monetary obligation, as contained in the
February 28, 2000 decision of the labor arbiter, had already been fully
satisfied, and posit the argument that with respondents’ receipt of
their separation pay, they had opted not to seek reinstatement to their
former jobs and elected instead to sever their employment with
petitioner Triad Security. In fact, according to petitioners, respondents
had already found new employments and to award them further
backwages would be tantamount to unjust enrichment. Thus,
petitioners maintain that there is no more basis to hold them liable for
the accrued backwages stated in the recent computation.

Such argument is untenable.

The award of either separation pay and/or backwages does not preclude that of the other as [the
Supreme] Court had, in proper cases, ordered the payment of both. The Court held that “Article 279 (now
294) of the Labor Code, as amended, states:

Article 294 (279). Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement.

An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs, namely: backwages and reinstatement. These
are separate and distinct from each other. However, separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no
longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. In effect, an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement
is no longer viable and backwages.

Again, backwages and separation pay are, therefore, distinct reliefs granted to one who was illegally
dismissed from employment. The award of one does not preclude that of the other as the court had, in
proper cases, ordered the payment of both.
In this case, the labor arbiter ordered the reinstatement of respondents and the payment of their backwages until
their actual reinstatement and in case reinstatement is no longer viable, the payment of separation pay. Under Article
223 (now 229) of the Labor Code, "the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall be immediately executory, even pending appeal." The same
provision of the law gives the employer the option of either admitting the employee back to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before his dismissal or separation from employment or the employer may choose to
merely reinstate the employee to the payroll. It bears emphasizing that the law mandates the prompt reinstatement
of the dismissed or separated employee. This, the petitioners failed to heed, insisting that they have fully disposed of
their legal obligation to respondents when they paid the latter’s separation pay. [The Court] do[es] not agree.

It should be pointed out that an order of reinstatement by the labor arbiter is not the same as
actual reinstatement of a dismissed or separated employee. Thus, until the employer
continuously fails to actually implement the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the labor
arbiter, their obligation to respondents, insofar as accrued backwages and other benefits are
concerned, continues to accumulate. It is only when the illegally dismissed employee receives
the separation pay that it could be claimed with certainty that the employer-employee
relationship has formally ceased thereby precluding the possibility of reinstatement. In the
meantime, the illegally dismissed employee’s entitlement to backwages, 13th month pay, and
other benefits subsists. Until the payment of separation pay is carried out, the employer
should not be allowed to remain unpunished for the delay, if not outright refusal, to
immediately execute the reinstatement aspect of the labor arbiter’s decision.”
Pertinent Provisions Waterfront Cebu vs Ledesma GR No.
197556 March 25, 2015

Petition for Certiorari

Sec. 4, Rule 65. (RULES OF COURT). When and where to file the
petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order, or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. x x x
Brief Background
This case is one of illegal dismissal: herein respondent Ildebrando
Ledesma was illegally dismissed from his employment by petitioner
Waterfront Cebu City Casino Hotel, Inc. (Waterfront). Respondent was
employed as a House Detective at Waterfront located at Salinas Drive,
Cebu City. Complaints were filed before Waterfront by Christe Mandal,
a supplier of a concessionaire of Waterfront, and Rosanna Lofranco,
who was seeking a job at the same hotel - from the affidavits and
testimonies of Mandal and Lofranco during the administrative hearings
conducted by Waterfront, the latter found, among others, that
Ledesma performed non-consensual sexual acts and/or overtures to
both Mandal and Lofranco. Hence, Ledesma was terminated from his
job.
Ledesma filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and the LA found that the
allegations leveled against Ledesma are mere concoctions, and
concluded that Ledesma was illegally dismissed. However, the NLRC
reversed the ruling of the LA and held that Ledesma’s acts of sexual
overtures to Mandal and Lofranco constituted grave misconduct which
justified his dismissal from employment. Ledesma filed a MR which was
subsequently denied by NLRC in a Resolution dated February 22, 2010.
A copy of the said Resolution was received by Atty. Gines Abellana
(Atty. Abellana), Ledesma’s counsel of record, on March 15, 2010 and
on May 17, 2010, or sixty-three (63) days after Atty. Abellana received a
copy of the NLRC’s Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
said counsel filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the CA. In its Comment, Waterfront prayed for the
outright dismissal of the petition on the ground that it was belatedly
filed.
Ledesma, now assisted by a new counsel, filed a motion for leave to file
amended petition on August 5, 2010, and sought the admission of his
Amended Petition for Certiorari. Ledesma contended in his amended petition
that his receipt on March 24, 2010 (and not the receipt on March 15, 2010 by
Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning date of the 60-day reglementary period
within which to file the petition. Hence, Ledesma claims that the petition was
timely filed on May 17, 2010. Said leave of court to Ledesma was granted by
the CA, and admitted his amended petition for certiorari. The CA rendered a
Decision dated March 17, 2011, reversing the Decision of the NLRC and
reinstating the ruling of the LA. A motion for reconsideration filed by
Waterfront was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated June 21, 2011. Thus,
the present petition for review on certiorari where Waterfront raised the main
issue of whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA.
Issue
Whether or not the unjustified failure of Ledesma to file his petition for
certiorari before the CA within the 60-day period is a ground for the
outright dismissal of said petition. (YES)
Ruling
The petition for certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the 60-day period

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules,
the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall
be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the case of Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, The Court categorically ruled
that the present rule now mandatorily requires compliance with the reglementary period.
The period can no longer be extended as previously allowed before the amendment, thus:

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to

change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had
been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or
rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under
Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved.
The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section
4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period
within which to file a petition for certiorari.
The Court held that the rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the
paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away
with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari
must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the
order denying a motion for reconsideration.

In the subsequent case of Domdom v. Third & Fifth Divisions of the

Sandiganbayan, the absence of a specific prohibition in Section 4 of Rule 65, as
amended, for the extension of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari
was construed as a discretionary authority of the courts to grant an extension.
Republic v. St. Vincent De Paul Colleges, Inc. clarified the “conflict” between the rulings in
Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom, in that the former is the general rule while the latter
is the exception, thus:

“What seems to be a “conflict” is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the
foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a
strict application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within
sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of
the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court’s sound discretion.”

In relaxing the rules and allowing an extension, the case of Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals reiterated the necessity for the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for the failure to file the petition for certiorari within the
60-day period.
In Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court said: “It is an accepted tenet
that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive and weighting
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure, however,
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by
the rules.”

Among the “recognized exceptions” are: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant
from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice
and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. (see Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals)
“Not a slave to technical Reyes vs NLRC GR No. 180551 Feb. 10,

rules.” 2009

 AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE

Section 11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure – Section 11.
Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a
resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation
why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this
Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. (n)
[Sec. 14, Rule 13, 2019 Amended Rules of Court]
Brief Background
The instant case is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Erwin H. Reyes, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions
dated November 10, 2006 and November 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 96343.

The dismissed employee was ordered reinstated by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
reversed said decision. When the appeal was raised to the CA, the appellate court
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari therein for failure to give an explanation why
copy of the said Petition was not personally served upon the counsel of the respondents,
as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Though the employee did not file a MR of the CA decision – despite this and the earlier
failure to furnish employer personally a copy of the petition, the SC entertained and
granted employee’s petition through the pen of Justice Chico-Nazario.
Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in not excusing
herein petitioner’s procedural lapses. (YES)
Ruling
There is an exception to the general rule of indispensability of technical
rules.

The Court noted that it is evident from a perusal of records that

petitioner indeed failed to provide the CA a written explanation as to
why he did not personally serve a copy of his Petition therein upon the
adverse parties, as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The records also readily reveal that petitioner did not file a
timely Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 November 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals.
However, herein petitioner submits that he raised meritorious arguments in his
Petition before the CA, and the dismissal thereof on a mere technicality defeated the
greater interest of substantial justice. Reyes attributes the technical flaws committed
before the appellate court to his former counsel, and he urged the Court to excuse
him therefrom since compliance with the procedural rules calls for the application of
legal knowledge and expertise which he, as a layman, cannot be expected to know.

While it is true that for petitioner's failure to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court, his petition should be expunged from the records, as in the
case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, where the Court stressed the
mandatory character of Section 11, Rule 13. However, in numerous cases, the Court
has allowed a liberal construction of said rule when doing so would be in the service
of the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the
SC.
The Court held in the case of Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations
Commission the following justification for its non-insistence on a written
explanation as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of
Court: : ”The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively
aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the
norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within
our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
operation.”
The call for a liberal interpretation of the Rules is even more strident in
the instant case which petitioner's former counsel was obviously
negligent in handling his case before the Court of Appeals. It was
petitioner's former counsel who failed to attach the required
explanation to the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 96343. Said counsel did
not bother to inform petitioner, his client, of the 10 November 2006
Resolution of the appellate court dismissing the Petition for lack of the
required explanation. Worse, said counsel totally abandoned
petitioner's case by merely allowing the reglementary period for filing a
Motion for Reconsideration to lapse without taking any remedial steps;
thus, the 10 November 2006 Resolution became final and executory.
The basic general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. Hence, if counsel commits a mistake in the course of litigation,
thereby resulting in his losing the case, his client must perforce suffer
the consequences of the mistake. The reason for the rule is to avoid the
possibility that every losing party would raise the issue of negligence of
his or her counsel to escape an adverse decision of the court, to the
detriment of our justice system, as no party would ever accept a losing
verdict. This general rule, however, pertains only to simple negligence
of the lawyer. Where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross,
palpable, pervasive, reckless and inexcusable, then it does not bind
the client since, in such a case, the client is effectively deprived of his
or her day in court.
The circumstances of this case qualify it under the exception, rather than the general rule. The
negligence of petitioner's former counsel may be considered gross since it invariably resulted to the
foreclosure of remedies otherwise readily available to the petitioner. Not only was petitioner deprived
of the opportunity to bring his case before the Court of Appeals with the outright dismissal of his
Petition on a technicality, but he was also robbed of the chance to seek reconsideration of the dismissal
of his Petition. What further impel this Court to heed the call for substantial justice are the pressing
merits of this case which, if left overshadowed by technicalities, could result in flagrant violations of the
provisions of the Labor Code and of the categorical mandate of the Constitution affording protection to
labor. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner should not be denied his day in
court and made him to suffer for his counsel's indiscretions. To cling to the general rule in this case
would only to condone, rather than rectify, a serious injustice to a party - - whose only fault was to
repose his faith and trust in his previous counsel - - and close our eyes to the glaring grave abuse of
discretion committed by the NLRC.

The Court likewise found, after ruling on the procedural matters in the instant case, remanding the case
to the appellate court for the determination of the substantive matters would only cause further delay,
so in the interest of fairness, it has resolved the substantive issues in the instant case.