SEVESO DISAATER

 GROUP MEMBER
1. AHMED SUFYAN 2020-MS-EN-518
2. TASMAI IHSAN 2018-MS-EN-07

3. MARIA SAMI 2020-MS-EN-506

4. ANEEBA SHOUKAT 2020-MS-EN-510
5. FATIMA KHAN 2020-MS-EN-08
6. FARHAN KHALID 2017-MS-EN-08
 A CASE STUDY
OF
SEVESO DISASTER
 Overview

 Occurred on July 10th 1976

 Location: Seveso, Lombardy, Italy
 ICMESA (Industrie Chimiche Meda Società Azionaria)
 Byproduct: Resulted in the highest known exposure to 2,3,7,8-
tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD)
 Product: 2, 4, 5 Trichlorophenol sodium salt (TCP); a toxic substance
used in herbicides and for the preparation of cosmetics, soaps and
shampoos
 Stopping of uncompleted process and occurrence of undesired
reaction/leakage of contents
 1800 hectares of land
 Ranked 8th in worst man-made environmental disasters by Time
 magazine in 2010
 Location of Disaster
ICME
SA

Unexpected
rise in Map of Seveso
Temperature Disaster area
and Pressure in showing the TCP
a 2,4,5 – Plant, ICMESA,
Trichloropheno where the TCCD
l (TCP) Reactor
exposure occurred,
the three
contamination zones
EXPLOSION
A, B and R and the
surrounding non-
contaminated area
adopted as a
reference zone.
OCCURENCE OF SEVESO
ITALY
 Chemical Reaction
 The accident occurred in the chemical plant's building B.
 The chemical 2,4,5-trichlorophenol was being produced
there from 1,2,4,5-tetrachlorobenzene by the nucleophilic
aromatic substitution reaction with sodium hydroxide.
The 2,4,5-trichlorophenol was intended as an
intermediate for hexachlorophene.
 Reaction Conditions
 This reaction must be carried out at a temperature above
what was achievable using the normal process utilities
available at the plant, so it was decided to use the exhaust
steam from the onsite electricity generation turbine, and
pass that around an external heating coil installed on the
chemical reactor vessel.
 The exhaust steam pressure was normally 12 bar and
temperature 190 °C, which resulted in a reaction mixture
temperature of 158 °C, very close to its boiling point of
160 °C.
 Safety testing showed the onset of an exothermic side
reaction if the reaction mixture temperature reached 230 °C.
Crucially, no steam temperature reading was made available
to plant operators responsible for the reactor.
 Occurrence Of Accident:
 The chemical-release accident occurred when a batch
process was interrupted prior to the completion of the final
step – removal of ethylene glycol from the reaction mixture
by distillation, due to conformance with an Italian law
requiring shutdown of plant operations over the weekend.
 Other parts of the site had already started to close down as
the processing of other batches finished, which reduced
power consumption across the plant, causing a dramatic
drop in the load on the turbine and a consequent increase in
the temperature of the exhaust steam to around 300 °C.
 This much hotter steam then proceeded to heat the portion of
the metal wall of the accident reactor above the level of the
liquid within it to the same temperature.
Occurrence Of Accident Continued:

 Not having a steam temperature reading among their

instruments, operators of the reactor were unaware of the
presence of this additional heating, and they stopped the
batch as they normally would – by isolating the steam and
turning off the stirrer in the reactor vessel.
 The abnormally-hot upper region of the reactor jacket then
heated the adjacent reaction mixture. With the stirrer not
running, the heating was highly localized – confined to just
the portion of the upper layers of reaction mixture adjacent to
the reactor wall, and increased the local temperature to the
critical temperature for the exothermic side reaction seen in
testing.
 Indeed, the critical temperature proved to be only 180°C,
50°C lower than believed.
Occurrence Of Accident Continued:
 At that lower critical temperature, a slow runaway
decomposition began, releasing more heat and leading to
the onset of a rapid runaway reaction when the temperature
reached 230 °C seven hours later.
 The reactor relief valve eventually opened, causing the
aerial release of 6 tons of chemicals, which settled over
18 km2 (6.9 sq. mi) of the surrounding area. 
 Among the substances released was 1 kg of TCDD. At the
nominal reaction temperature, TCDD is normally seen only
in trace amounts of less than 1 ppm (parts per
million). However, in the higher-temperature conditions
associated with the runaway reaction, TCDD production
apparently reached 166 ppm or more.
 DAMAGES CAUSED
BY SEVESO DISASTER
 EXPLOSION

RELEASE TOXIC
CLOUDS

2,3,7,8
TRICHLOR ETHYLE
ODIBENZE
NO-P-
NE
DIOXIN9T GLYCOL
SODIUM SODIUM
CDD)(in kg)
HYDROX TRICHLOR
IDE OPHENATE
 2,3,7,8 Highl
TRICHLORO Highl
y
DIBENZENO- y
P- toxic
toxic
DIOXIN9TCD
D)(in kg)
SODIUM
HYDROXIDE

SODIUM
TRICHLOROP
HENATE

ETHYLENE
GLYCOL
 Immediate
Immediateeffects
effects
 Vegetation , birds and courtyard animals were
 Vegetation , birds and courtyard animals were
seriously effected
seriously effected
 People who happened to be on depopsition path
 People who happened to be on depopsition path
of the cloud developed nausea, headache, eye
of the cloud developed nausea, headache, eye
irritation
irritation
 Many children were admitted to hospitals for
 Many children were admitted to hospitals for
skin lesions on exposed parts of body.
skin lesions on exposed parts of body.
 Effects on animals
According to Time:
According to Time:
"One farmer saw his cat keel over, and
"One farmer saw his cat keel over, and
when he went to pick up the body, the tail
when he went to pick up the body, the tail
fell off. When authorities dug the cat up for
fell off. When authorities dug the cat up for
examination two days later, said the farmer,
examination two days later, said the farmer,
all that was left was its skull.”
all that was left was its skull.”
Animal slaughtering
Animal slaughtering
By 1978, an estimated 80,000 animals were
By 1978, an estimated 80,000 animals were
slaughtered to prevent people from eating
slaughtered to prevent people from eating
them. (Dioxin accumulates in fatty tissue,
them. (Dioxin accumulates in fatty tissue,
and can be ingested by eating plants or
and can be ingested by eating plants or
animals that have been exposed to it.)
animals that have been exposed to it.)
Effects on humans
Effects Of The Seveso Disaster
Effects Of The Seveso Disaster
On Thyroid Function In Babies
On Thyroid Function In Babies
Three decades after an accident,
Three decades after an accident,
which resulted in exposure of a
which resulted in exposure of a
residential population to the most
residential population to the most
dangerous type of dioxin,
dangerous type of dioxin,
newborn babies born to mothers
newborn babies born to mothers
living in the contaminated area at
living in the contaminated area at
the time of the accident are over
the time of the accident are over
six times more likely to have
six times more likely to have
altered thyroid function than
altered thyroid function than
those born to mothers in a non-
those born to mothers in a non-
contaminated area.
contaminated area.
Chloracne (193 cases)
 Peripheral neuropathy

Lliver enzyme induction.

Excess mortality rate from
cardiovascular and respiratory
diseases 
Excess of diabetes cases

Lower-than-average sperm
counts in male children
A 2001 study confirmed in
victims of the disaster, that
dioxin is carcinogenic to
humans and corroborate its
association with 
cardiovascular and endocrine
In 2009,related
an update including 5
effects. 
more years (up to 1996) found
an increase in "lymphatic and
hematopoietic tissue neoplasms"
and increased breast cancer
 Compensation and Criminal Court Case

 On 17th December 1980, Italian Republic and Givaudan/ICMESA signed a

compensation agreement in the presence of the prime minister of Italy,
Arnaldo Forlani. The total amount would reach 20 billion lire (approx 24
million USD)

 On September 1983, the Criminal Court of Monza sentenced five

employees of ICMESA or its parent company, Givaudan, to prison
sentences ranging from 2.5 years to 5 years. They all appealed.

 In May 1985, the Court of Appeal in Milan found three of the five accused
not guilty; the two was still facing prosecution appealed to the Supreme
Court in Rome.

 On May 23, 1986, the Supreme Court in Rome confirmed the judgment
against the two remaining defendants, even though the prosecuting
attorney had called for their acquittal.
 Aftermath/Consequences/Results/Effects

Definition:

The period that follows an unpleasant

event or accident, and the effects that
it causes. Due to loss of dear
ones, disaster‐related starvation,
being wounded, morbidity, hardship,
stress, and feelings of helplessness
and humiliation, the accustomed
sense of security disappears. In
the disaster aftermath, a new image of
the community emerges
 Aftermath/Consequences/Results/Effects
 The safety operations handled by the company's
directors and local government were well
coordinated, but the ICMESA refused to admit
immediately the incident.
 None of the 20,000 people who lived in Seveso died,
but the poison killed 3,000 farm animals and Pets.
 Another 70,000 animals had to be killed to stop the
Dioxin from entering into the food chain.
 Scientific studies have shown that babies born in that
area are six times more likely to have thyroid problems.
 Aftermath/Consequences/Results/Effects

fear of teratogenicity of TCDD exposure, health authorities advised women to avoid

conception.

general concern among the population about

the health of unborn children.
Italy legalized abortion in May 1978 and
women were able to receive one for
psychological and/or social reasons.
 Aftermath/Consequences/Results/Effects
 ICMESA initially refused to admit that
the dioxin release had occurred. At
least a week passed before a public
statement was issued that dioxin had
been emitted, and another week
passed before an evacuation began.
Even then, the government was
saddled with the responsibility of
determining the boundaries of the
evacuation area, and thereafter to
organize the evacuation. This
constituted a major imposition on the
community as well as on government
resources.
 Environmental protection had not
been considered.
 It was soon recognized that the
factory's very rudimentary safety
systems had been designed with little
more than simple explosion prevention
in mind.
 Nor had any consideration been given
as to setting up any type of warning
system or health-protection protocols
for the local community.
 As a result, the local population was
caught unaware when the accident
happened, and thus was unprepared
to cope with the danger of an invisible
poison.
 Aftermath/Consequences/Results/Effects

Seveso became a microcosm (a small subset of a whole that

is generally considered to be representative of the whole)
where all the existing conflicts within society (political,
institutional, religious, industrial) were reflected.
However, within a relatively short time, such conflicts
abated and the recovery of the community proceeded.
The responsible party was known from the outset and soon offered
reparation.
Moreover, the eventual disappearance of the offending factory itself
and the physical exportation of the toxic substances and polluted
soil enabled the community to feel cleansed.
The resolution of the emotional after-effects of the trauma, so
necessary for the recovery of a community, was facilitated by these
favorable circumstances.
 Aftermath/Consequences/Results/Effects

Seveso became a microcosm (a small subset of a whole that

is generally considered to be representative of the whole)
where all the existing conflicts within society (political,
institutional, religious, industrial) were reflected.
However, within a relatively short time, such conflicts
abated and the recovery of the community proceeded.
The responsible party was known from the outset and soon offered
reparation.
Moreover, the eventual disappearance of the offending factory itself
and the physical exportation of the toxic substances and polluted
soil enabled the community to feel cleansed.
The resolution of the emotional after-effects of the trauma, so
necessary for the recovery of a community, was facilitated by
these favorable circumstances.
 What Could be done to
Stop Seveso Accident
Proper hazard evaluation was not originally
completed by ICMESA (Industrie Chimiche Meda
Società Azionaria)
Following measures have to be taken by ICMESA
for prevention of the accident named Seveso
disaster
 Engineering design of Reactor:
 Standard Operating Procedure:
The original method of distillation patent
specified that the charge was acidified before
distillation
 Cont..
 Reaction / Product Testi
ng
: calorimetry methods,
thermal stability
 Relief Systems / Vent Sy
stems
: venting of excessive
pressures, sizing of vents
for exothermic reactions
 The bursting disc
proper useage
 Detection System:
Monitor the reactions
Temperature and the
Reaction Stages
 Cont..
 Pollution control devices: Emission
control filters
 Cooling system: automatic dosing
and quality control equipment
 Safety Alarm: Install alarm bell
 Modernization of the factory:
Manufacturing was rationalised,
quality control strengthened,
equipment modernized, sewerage
treatment
 Firefighting equipment working: On-
site firefighters, such as water sources
and hoses
 Cleanliness is Next to Safety: Keep
safety gear insight
 Cont..
Offer Training and Resources:
Educate employees

Label Everything Clearly:

Potentially save a life by properly
labeling all chemical
Choice of Location: Away from
residents, and storing chemical at
proper place
Create a Chain of Responsibility:
Have a clearly outlined chain of
command to respond in the event of
an emergency
Practice: Practice safety
procedures for emergencies.
chemical spill drills
Measures That Must Be
Adopted By Any
Chemical Industry
 Chemical Safety Guide
 Exposure to harmful chemicals is the fifth
leading cause of death in the workplace
 United Nations established the Globally
Harmonized System of Classification and
Labeling of Chemicals (GHS)
 Use of a Safety Data Sheet (SDS) for each
chemical, employees can look up
important information about a chemical,
including
 What it is,
 The types of hazards that can occur
from it,
 First aid measures,
 Personal protection requirements
Steps for
Safety in
Chemical
Industry
 Cont..
STEP 1: IDENTIFY THE CHEMICAL STEP 2: ASSESS THE RISK OF
HAZARDS CHEMICAL INCIDENTS

• The Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) • What chemical incidents could

• Where they are being used and stored occur? 
• How they are being used and stored • How frequently could they occur? 
• The toxicity and health hazards • What the consequences of each
• The physiochemical hazards chemical incident could be? 
• Any environmental concerns
• PPE, safety cabinets, emergency
planning
 Cont..
STEP 3: PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENT
CONTROL MEASURES STEP 4: REVIEW THE PROGRAM AND
SUSTAIN SAFETY COMPLIANCE
First, engineering a safe workplace, job
 Ensure that hazard identification
and risk assessment is reviewed
design, storage areas, and safety cabinets  periodically
And secondly, ensuring site personnel are
alert, trained, and ready for accidents and
emergencies
Control measures include eliminating the
hazard completely, substituting the chemical
implemented control measures - conduct
another risk assessment
 NOTE
Don’t forget that sometimes
control measures introduce
new hazards to the
workplace, so always
conduct a new risk
assessment on each of the
control measures.
LESSON FROM SEVESO
ITALY
 The lessons of Seveso
 A model for managing uncertainty
 Better communication of substances
 Improved emergency planning
 Clearer procedures
 Better mitigation requirements
 Modelling the Seveso disaster
 Modelling the Seveso Directive
 Modelling the Karin B incident
 Modelling the Karin B incident
 A scientific paradox
 Industrial accidents, industrial society, and recovery
 A model for managing uncertainty

 Our study of Seveso and other disasters

suggests that there are six basic types of
uncertainty and eight distinctive strategies for
managing the communication of uncertainty.
 Types of uncertainty
TYPE DISCRIPTION

a. Inadequacy of available information in relation

a) Situational to necessary decisions
b. Possibility of future liability or guilt for actions
b) Legal/moral or inactions
c. Absence or scarcity of integration of publics
c) Societal and institutions
d. Withholding of information by agencies for
d) Institutional bureaucratic reasons
e. Contested rights to know, to warn, or to conceal
e) Proprietary f. Difficulty of risk assessment or of forecasts of
emergencies
 Modelling the Seveso disaster

 Ten days passed before the firm confirmed that dioxin had been
released .Only then did the governmental authorities and the public learn
that there was a grave risk. Even so, it was impossible to assess the
danger with any precision. There was an onset of genuine dread, about
illness in general and about malformed babies in particular. The
widespread illness and deaths of animals of many species was an
ominous sign. The authorities had their own severe problems of decision-
making under uncertainty, including the definition of different polluted
zones, programs of evacuation of endangered residents, and disposal of
contaminated material.
 Scientific uncertainty was salient, as shown by the fact that local
investigating magistrates closed off the site within eight days of the
accident. Societal uncertainty was severe because there had been no
previous institutional preparation or consultation for the accident.
Legal/moral uncertainty was also severe. 
 Modelling the Seveso Directive

 The main concern here is with communication:

Member States shall ensure that information on safety measures and on the
correct behavior to adopt in the case of an accident is supplied in an appropriate
manner, and without their having to request it, to persons liable to be affected by
the major accident originating in a notified industrial activity within the meaning of
Article 5. The information should be repeated and updated at appropriate intervals.
It shall also be made publicly available. Such information shall contain that laid
down in Annex VII. (Article 8 of Directive 88/610/EEC, amending Directive
82/501/EEC).

The contrast between European and American practice is noteworthy. In the United
States, provision is often made for the inclusion of alternative expertise via
environmental legislation that permits the use of public funds for the incorporation of
local citizens' knowledge into the policy discourse on the grounds of due process or
fairness.
 Modelling the Karin B incident

 Finally, the model can also be applied to the Karin B incident. Some 12

years after the Seveso gas release, a shipload of Italian industrial toxic
wastes was first dumped in Nigeria and then reloaded after protests. In
the full glare of publicity and widespread public dread, the regions of
Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany undertook the final task of disposal, in the
process showing how a large quantity of mixed toxic wastes could be
managed, with full satisfaction of technical requirements and local
concerns.
 when the regional authorities of Emilia Romagna and Tuscany together
with several local authorities - finally took physical possession of the
wastes, the change was dramatic. Acting in cooperation with each other
and with the media, and creating opportunities for the participation of
interested communities, they were able to reduce salient uncertainties,
starting with the scientific ones and then proceeding to others, such as
institutional uncertainties.
 A moral paradox

  we encounter a moral paradox illuminated by Seveso: more effective

prior safety regulation could conceivably have prevented the achievement
of the best path to the subsequent recovery of a community. Once an
accident has occurred, the cleansing of resentment and guilt, which are
experienced by agents and victims each in their own way, could be
inhibited by a denial of moral liability. The paradox can be expressed as
an ill effect of a good principle: prior regulation, with openness of
information, could lead to a confusion concerning responsibility after the
event. Such paradoxes are familiar to those managing hazards of various
sorts in the insurance field; thus "moral hazard" refers to the tendency of
people to take chances once they know that the insurers will pay; and the
"no fault" principle for common accidents, while seeming to exculpate the
responsible persons, is promoted as being useful in preventing the
expenses and injustices of litigation.
 A scientific paradox

 Toxicology necessarily makes inferential leaps - from animals to humans, from

large doses to small, and from acute to chronic doses. In turn, these inferences
underlie the dose-response models that are used to define "safe limits.

" Thus, toxicological models have large inherent uncertainties, and large-scale
accidents with good subsequent monitoring can provide less unrealistic sources of
data .The very classic status of Seveso as a dioxin disaster could possibly lead to
the use of its data in a paradoxical way. As we have seen, Seveso was an
immediately perceived disaster, but one where the long-term health consequences
have up to now been accepted as far from disastrous. We may be tempted to make
a simple inference: Seveso was a harmless dioxin disaster; therefore, other dioxin
releases need not be harmful. Such an argument was recently made in Arkansas,
where the evidence of Seveso has been used in arguments supporting the safety
of a proposed toxic waste incinerator that would emit dioxin in a similar quantity to
that estimated for Seveso .Thus, we have the scientific paradox of Seveso: an
event at first accepted as a disaster (with great consequences for regulatory policy)
is now being used as evidence for safety.
 A scientific paradox
The symbol of Seveso may now be becoming increasingly complex:
its original connotation of dread is challenged by one of reassurance.
Paradoxically, the excellence of the recovery of Seveso could be
used for the assertion of limited liability, with possible consequences
for litigation and impeded recovery elsewhere.
However, as scientists know, it needs only a single long-delayed
pathological condition to appear in the monitoring process for the
original negative resonance of Seveso to be restored. And then the
recovery of Seveso, apparently so complete at this time, could
suddenly be thrown into question. Even the complete absence of
conclusive evidence of cancer among chloracne victims and others
in the most exposed zone A might be explained in terms of "the small
population size, youth of the subjects, and short follow-up period“.
ANY QUESTION?
THANK YOU