Applying the Risk Governance

Framework
Institutional Requirements for Dealing
with Nuclear Waste

Managing Radioactive Waste

Gothenburg, Dec. 16, 2009
Ortwin Renn
University of Stuttgart and
DIALOGIK Institute
Part 1

What is special
about nuclear waste risks?
Common risk problems
Three challenges of risk governance

Complexity in assessing causal and temporal

relationships

Uncertainty
variation among individual targets
measurement and inferential errors
genuine stochastic relationships
system boundaries and ignorance

Ambiguity in interpreting results

Nuclear Waste Repository
Complexity
Multitude of causal and intervening factors
Interdisciplinary approach necessary
However – not more complex than other technologies

Uncertainty
Modeling over very large time intervals
No historic precedent for such long time management
High relevance for system boundaries and non-knowledge

Ambiguity
Extremely high mobilization potential
Direct link with debate about future of nuclear power
Nuclear waste
Three major challenges
Dissent among experts on most appropriate
disposal method

High potential for social amplification

Long term threat
Stigma effect of “nuclear”
Typical “creeping danger” risk perception
High potential for social mobilization

Symbolic connotation for large centralized

technologies
Part II

Risk Perception
(Nuclear Waste Repository)
Principles of Risk Perception

Human behavior depends on perceptions,

not on facts
Perceptions are a well-studied subject of
social science research: they differ from
expert assessments, but they follow
consistent patterns and rationales
There are four genuine strategies to cope
with threats: fight, flight, plying dead,
experimentation
Five dominant risk perception
clusters

Emerging danger: randomness as threat

Creeping danger: confidence or zero-risk

Surpressed danger: myth of cycles

Weighing risks: only with betting

Desired risks: personal challenge

Application to nuclear waste
Emerging Danger
Fear of catastrophic potential (large scale contamination)
Randomness of occurrence as source of perceived threat
Inequity of distribution between risks and benefits

Creeping Danger
No possibility to sense and acknowledge exposure
Reliance on third parties (risks is communicated not experienced)
Central factor: trust in information and management
Empirical evidence
Almost all surveys worldwide demonstrate that a large majority of the population
judges risk of nuclear waste repositories as highly serious and threatening while
the majority of experts estimates the risks of being fairly low compared to other
risks of daily life.
Surveys also reveal that opposition and mobilization potentials reach figures of
above 80% when people are asked whether they would accept a nuclear waste
repository in their back yard.

With respect to risk management, communication and siting procedures there are
major differences between countries (Finland, USA, GB, Switzerland), which are
good sources for institutional learning
Part III

Risk Governance
 IRGC’s RISK GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

Getting a Who needs to

broadUnderstanding
picture Deciding
know what,
of the risk Pre-assessment when?

Appraisal Communication Management

Who needs to
The knowledge do what,
needed for when?
Is the risk
Characterisation
judgements and and evaluation
tolerable,
decisions acceptable or
unacceptable
?
Need for different risk management
strategies
dealing with routine, mundane risks
dealing with complex and sophisticated risks
(high degree of modeling necessary)
dealing with highly uncertain risks (high degree
of unresolved uncertainty)
dealing with highly controversial, ambiguous
risks (high degree of ambiguity)
dealing with eminent dangers or crisis
(need for fast responses)
Application to waste repository I
Routine risk management
Determining appropriate safety standards (thresholds)
Meeting technical construction and mining
requirements
Applying classic instruments such as BACT (best
available control technology)

Complex risk modeling

Geological behavior over long time periods
Exposure pathways modeling over long time periods
Modeling of events that are unlikely but still to be
expected given the long time frame
Application to waste repository II
Precautionary and resilience-oriented management
Resilient measures: multi-barrier system, diversity of
safety devices, redundant systems, increase of passive
safety
Higher tolerance with respect to human errors and
ignorance
Institutional safeguarding of long-term monitoring
Application of the deliberation principle
Consensus or arrangement about future nuclear policy
options
Agreement on procedural mechanisms for conflict
resolution and participation
Part VI

Institutional
Arrangements for
Public Involvement
Why is participation necessary?
Increase of uncertainty and ambiguity with the widening of
time horizons
Integration of systematic, analytic, interdisciplinary and
experiential knowledge essential
Loss of trust and confidence in the problem solving
capacity of the political sector, in the fairness and
„common good“ orientation of the economic sector and in
the impartiality of the scientific sector
Prevalence of new Governance structures (including
governments, industry, science, civil society)
Improvement of procedural legitimization
Acceptance surplus with participation
Participatory requirements
Complexity
Knowledge-oriented strategy (epistemic discourse)
State-of-the art characterization of risks (scenarios)
Uncertainty
Reflective discourse (weighing pros and cons)
Balancing too much precaution against too little
precaution
Investment in resilience
Ambiguity
Participatory discourse
Evaluation of different options and locations
Risk-benefit packages (compensation)
Participatory requirement for dealing with
complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity Risk Trade-off
(IRGC Model) Analysis & Delib-
eration necessary
Risk Balancing +Risk Balancing
Necessary +Probabilistic
+Probabilistic Risk Modelling
Risk Modelling
Remedy
Remedy
Cognitive
Probabilistic Risk Cognitive Evaluative
Modelling Evaluative Normative
Remedy Conflict Conflict

Statistical Risk Agency Staff Agency Staff

Cognitive External Experts External Experts
Analysis
Stakeholders Stakeholders
Remedy Conflict – Industry – Industry
– Directly affected – Directly affected
Agency Staff groups groups
Agency Staff
External Experts – General public

Actors Actors Actors Actors

Instrumental Epistemological Reflective Participative

Type of Discourse Type of Discourse Type of Discourse Type of Discourse

Complexity Uncertainty Ambiguity

Simple
induced induced induced
Risk Problem Risk Problem Risk Problem Risk Problem
Function: Allocation of risks to one or several of the four routes
Type of Discourse: Design discourse
Siting Decision Making I
Complexity:
Objective: Scientific-technical agreement about suitability of
potential sites (Technical, geologic, political, economic, social)

Procedures: Consensus-oriented procedures for scientific

characterization of risks

Instruments: Meta-Analysis Consensus-conferences, Delphi,

Group-Delphi

Institutional requirements: neutral platform, delegation right

for stakeholders, professional moderation. Experts from
national and international context
Siting Decision Making II
Uncertainty:
Objective: fair (intra- and intergenerational) and robust solution
of dealing with uncertainties

Procedures: Alternate conflict resolution mechanisms for finding

fair and acceptable solutions

Instruments: Mediation, Round Table, Stakeholder Consensus

Conferences

Institutional requirements: neutral platform, participants from

affected populations, experts as sources of knowledge, then
deliberation about acceptability, professional mediator,
combination of national and regional stakeholders
Siting Decision Making III
Ambiguity:
Objective: Common arrangement about energy future(s) and
fair siting decisions

Procedures: deliberative methods for societal energy policy

making and for site selection incl. risk-benefit packages

Instruments: Citizen juries, panels, public consensus

conferences, Round Tables

Institutional requirements: neutral platforms: two levels: national

(energy policies) and regional (siting, risk-benefit package).
Participants: local populations (organized and not-organized),
input from stakeholders and scientists
Siting Decision Making IV
Integration

Objective: Combination and integration of the three

discourse activities

Procedure: Hybrid constructions

Instruments: Analytic-deliberative approaches, cooperative

discourse (Important: independent supervisory board)

Institutional requirements: Integration requires the

establishment of a board of supervisors with high national
esteem and reputation
Operation and monitoring
Establishment of a public (or private) non-profit
foundation with sufficient funds to live from the interests

The foundation needs: a scientific-technical committee

(complexity), a regional-political committee (uncertainty)
and a citizen advisory committee (ambiguity)

The foundation should supervise , control and monitor

operation and could also be the broker for the benefit
package
Part V

Conclusions
Conclusions I
Nuclear waste repositories are risk sources characterized by
medium complexity, high uncertainty and extreme ambiguity

Worldwide high potential for negative risk perceptions and social

mobilization

The procedures for siting that have been employed until today do
not reflect the explosive situation and will not be able to resolve
the conflicts

One procedure by itself will not be sufficient to deal with the

difficult situation
Conclusions II
New institutional and participatory forms of decision making are needed

Inclusion of a broad governance representation: Political economic,

scientific and civil society actors

Three types of discourse procedures:

Complexity: Scientific modeling (epistemic discourse)
Uncertainty: Balance between precaution and innovativeness (reflective
discourse)
Ambiguity: Building trust and consensus (participatory discourse)
Necessity of a neutral platform for designing, organizing and moderating
these discourses under the umbrella of a impartial and highly esteemed
supervisory board.