Zhuangzi’s ethics: relativism or

virtue ethics

Tingyu XIE
2021.06.09
• Content:
▫ Introduction
▫ Part 1: Zhuangzi as a relativist
▫ Part 2: Virtue ethics: a competitive interpretation
▫ Part 3: Drawbacks of the virtue ethics interpretation
▫ Conclusion
Introduction
• Introduction:
▫ It is very common to interpret Zhuangzi’s ethics as a r
elativism one. In this essay, I will discuss whether thi
s interpretation is true, and are there any alternatives
to it. In the first part, I will present a typical version o
f the relativism interpretation made by Chad Hansen,
and put forward an objection to it. Then, in the secon
d part, I will discuss Yong Huang’s article, in which h
e regards Zhuangzi’s ethics as a kind of virtue ethics i
nstead of relativism. However, in the final part, I will
point out that Yong Huang’s interpretation is still def
ective.
Part 1: Zhuangzi as a relativist
Interpretation: Zhuangzi as a relativist
• Chad Hansen:
▫ Zhuangzi's relativism does not allow us to say that H
itler's perspective is just as good as our own. All it sa
ys is "Hitler happened." It was a consequence of nat
ural laws that it happened. One cannot get any partic
ular evaluation from the hinge of daos, the cosmic pe
rspective. (Hansen, 290)
▫ Robert Eno and Arthur Danto also have similar argu
ments.
• Why Hansen and other scholars reaches this concl
usion, is it accurate?
Why Zhuangzi is a relativist
• Local justifications for having shì-fēi that or kě are delivered i
n accordance our chéng commitment momentum along the d
àos that guided us to this point.
▫ Will the eventual result be there is both 是  shìthis:right and 彼 bǐth
at?  Will the eventual result be there is neither shì nor bǐ ? We ca
n call the situation of neither shì nor fēi finding its opposite the
“pivot of 道  dàoguides.” The pivot sets the start of the center of a s
phere from which there are inexhaustible responses—inexhausti
ble shì and inexhaustible fēi.  Hence the saying “nothing matche
s 明  míngdiscernment.”
▫ 是亦彼也，彼亦是也。彼亦一是非，此亦一是非，果且有彼是乎
哉？果且无彼是乎哉？彼是莫得其偶，谓之道枢。枢始得其环中
，以应无穷。是亦一无穷，非亦一无穷也。故曰：莫若以明。
 Hansen’s reasoning
• P1: If someone reject the judgment of “shi” and “fei”
, then he/she reject to make any moral judgment on
a certain situation or action.
• P2: Zhuangzi reject the judgment of “shi” and “fei”
• C1: Zhuangzi reject to make any moral judgment on
a certain situation or action.
• P3: If someone reject to make any moral judgment o
n a certain situation or action, then he can only say:
“It happens.”
• C2: Zhuangzi can only say: “It happens.” to Hitler.
However…
• It seems that Zhuangzi also made judgments among
various kinds of life styles:
▫ For those who are intelligent enough to take a minor o
ffice, well-behaved enough to impress a district, virtuo
us enough to please a lord and to win the confidence
of a state, their complacency is like that of the cicada,
the turtle-dove or the quail. Song Rongzi is a philosop
her who mocks at them, for he himself does not feel fl
attered when the whole world praises him and does n
ot feel discouraged when the whole world blames him.
 Objection to Hansen’s reasoning
• Zhuangzi reject the judgment of “shi” and “fei”
▫ Zhuangzi reject people can make judgment of “shi” and
“fei” from an objective perspective.
 One cannot get any particular evaluation from the hinge o
f daos, the cosmic perspective.
▫ Zhuangzi neither thinks we should conclude that we m
ust not issue shì-fēi judgments nor that we must reject
or deny our natural, situational inclinations to shì-fēi.
 Therefore, Zhuangzi can make judgment about various lif
e styles including Nazi, while he does not think these judg
ments are from an objective perspective.
 Part 2: Virtue ethics:
a competitive interpretation
Zhuangzi’s virtue ethics
• While there are varieties of virtue ethics, one thing that is co
mmon to them all and distinguishes them from other types o
f ethics is its emphasis on virtuous persons acting naturally,
effortlessly, gracefully, joyfully, and with ease.
▫ Daniel Statman claims that “the virtuous person does the right
thing ‘naturally’, without having to fight with emotions, inclina
tions. (Daniel, 1997: 172)
• As these stories (knack stories) tell us so much about sponta
neity, naturalness, gracefulness, effortlessness, and joyfulne
ss, characteristic of all these Daoist sages
▫ Cook Ding, Wheelwright Pian, Carpenter Ziqing, swimmers, bo
atmen, cicada-catchers
• Is Zhuangzi’s ethics a kind of virtue ethics?
Objection: means without goals
• Christian Helmut Wenzel:
• They “Only teach us how to reach a certain goal once th
e goal is set. They do not show us which goal we should
accept and set for ourselves” (Wenzel 2003: 119)
• Aristotle:
• Bernard Williams:
▫ Virtues are always more than mere skills, since the
y involve characteristic patterns of desire and moti
vation. (p.9)
Reply: ethics respecting differences
• The Zhuangzi puts a great emphasis on the importance of re
cognizing and respecting relevant differences between moral
agents and moral patients as well as difference among differ
ent moral patients. There are lots of difference stories:
（ Yong Huang 2010: 87 ）
▫ Shu, Hu and Hundun
▫ Marquis of Lu and sea bird
▫ Bo Le and horses
▫ ……
▫ Zhuangzi can avoid endorsing or tolerating actions by thieves a
nd professional killers as Wenzel worries……thieves, profession
al killers, samurai butchers, and Hitler do not respect the differ
ences of the patients or recipients of their respective actions.
Zhuangzi’s virtue ethics is justified
• Difference stories tell us what constitutes an ethi
cally appropriate action; knack stories tell us ho
w to perform the ethically appropriate action.
▫ Theory of normativity: what we should do
▫ Theory of value: what is good
▫ Difference stories construct the part of value, whil
e knack stories construct the part of normativity.
 Part 3: Drawbacks of the
virtue ethics interpretation
Objection on its theory of normativity
• According to the principle: “should” implies “ca
n”, we should do something only when we are ca
pable of doing it. However, it is difficult to imagi
ne actions in knack stories can be performed in d
aily life.
▫ According to commonsense
▫ Zhuangzi’s Rhetoric and exaggerate
Objection on its theory of value
• Difference stories only give us some negative dir
ections about our goals:
• Egoism without harming others:
▫ What sorts of considerations bear on action but ar
e not ethical considerations? There is one very obv
ious candidate, the considerations of egoism, thos
e that relate merely to the comfort, excitement, sel
f-esteem, power, or other advantage of the agent.
(Williams: p.11)
Conclusion
• Hansen’s version of relativist interpretation is
a very popular one, and this essay puts forwar
d an objection to it. However, there are other p
ossible relativist interpretations remain unme
ntioned in this essay.

• Yong Huang regards Zhuangzi’s ethics as a kin

d of virtue ethics, which is insightful and inter
esting. However, this interpretation is also def
ective, which needs revision.
• Reference:

▫ Hansen, Chad. 1992. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. Oxford
& New York: Oxford University Press.

▫ Statman, Daniel. 1997. “Introduction to Virtue Ethics.” In Daniel Statman, ed, Virtue Ethics. Wash
ington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

▫ Yong Huang. 2010. “The Ethics of Difference in the Zhuangzi.” Journal of American Academy of
Religion 78.1: 65–99.

▫ Williams B. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophylml. Routledge, 2006

▫ Wenzel, Christian Helmut. 2003. “Ethics and Zhuangzi: Awareness, Freedom, and Autonomy.” Jo
urnal of Chinese Philosophy 30.1: 115–126.

▫ Eno, Robert. 1996. “Cook Ding’s Dao and the Limits of Philosophy.” In Paul Kjellberg and P. J. Iva
nhoe, eds., Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany: SUNY Press.
谢谢大家

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