RISK terminologies

T C V R
 RISK

THE PROBABILITY OF AN AUI BEING SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT ON A

SPECIFIC TARGET BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF

THREAT

CONSEQUENCE and

VULNERABILITY
 (A) RISK ASSESSMENT
COMPONENTS:

RISK IDENTIFICATION – INTERNAL / EXTERNAL SOURCES (Istanbul –

2016, Brussels – 2016)

RISK ANALYSIS – THREAT, CONSEQUENCES, VULNERABILITY

ASSESSMENTS AND SCORING

RISK EVALUATION – CLASSIFY RISK, PRIORITIZE RISK

 (B) RISK MITIGATION
• TRANSLATE RISK INTO DECISIONS AND MITIGATION ACTIONS

• PREPARE MITIGATION PLANS

• DISSEMINATE TO APPROPRIATE ENTITIES

• IMPLEMENT SECURITY PROCEDURES

 THREAT SCENARIO
IDENTIFICATION OF A CREDIBLE AUI COMPRISING OF:

• A TARGET – pax, staff, infrastructure (fuel farm, ATC, NAV Aids,

Aircraft, cyber systems)

• AN ADVERSARY – terrorist org, radicalized lone actor, mentally ill,

disruptive pax, disgruntled staff, insider)

• METHOD OF ATTACK (MODUS OPERANDI) – IED, CBRN, Armed attack,

RPAS, physical sabotage, Hijacking, MANPADS)
 RISK

THE PROBABILITY OF AN AUI BEING SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT ON A

SPECIFIC TARGET BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF

(I) THREAT
(II) CONSEQUENCE AND
(III) VULNERABILITY
 THREAT
THE PROBABILITY/LIKELIHOOD THAT AN AUI IS ATTEMPTED, BASED ON
AN ADVERSARY’S - INTENTION AND CAPABILITIES

BUT NOT TAKING IN ACCOUNT CURRENT SECURITY MEASURES

I Cp
 INTENT
ADVERSARY’S INTENTION

• MOTIVATIONS: religious, political, economic

• OBJECTIVES: destruction and casualties, disruption, financial gain

• WILLING TO CONDUCT OPERATION

OPEN / CLASSIFIED / INTEL SOURCES OF DATA

 CAPABILITY
ADVERSARY’S CAPABILITIES:

• TRAINING AND SKILL

• MATERIALS – weapons, bomb making equipment

• KNOWLEDGE OF TARGET

OPEN / CLASSIFIED / INTEL SOURCES OF DATA

 CAPABILITY
ADVERSARY’S CAPABILITIES:

• LEADERSHIP & OBJECTIVE

• LOCAL SUPPORTS

• MATERIALS – weapons, bomb making equipment

• KNOWLEDGE OF TARGET

• TREND ANALYSIS (previous patterns of incidents)

OPEN / CLASSIFIED / INTEL SOURCES OF DATA

 THREAT SCORING
HIGH – a very plausible scenario with an actual attack of this kind
occurred in the past few years or strong evidence of capability, intent
and planning.

MEDIUM – an essentially plausible scenario with some evidence of

intent and capability and possibly some examples but no evidence of
current attack planning.

LOW - a theoretically plausible scenario but with no examples or signs

of attack or attack planning and a theoretical intent but no apparent
capability.
 Risk register

Threat Threat Consequence Vulnerability score Risk

Scenario Score score Current Mitigation Score
Target: plane H/M/L

Adversary: Pax With

rationale
Modus: non-
metallic IED on
the body via
pax checkpoint
 RISK

THE PROBABILITY OF AN AUI BEING SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT ON A

SPECIFIC TARGET BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF

(I) THREAT
(II) CONSEQUENCE AND
(III) VULNERABILITY
 Consequences assessment
• Worst case consequences of the successful attack scenario – short
term, long term.
• In terms of: Human, Psychological, Reputational, Disruptive (airspace,
confidence), Economic

Contributors:
• Asset owners (airport, airline)
• Subject matter experts
 Consequences scoring
Rating Human Economic Other

HIGH Hundreds of death Billions of rupees Severe disruption to

services and confidence in
the aviation system

MEDIUM Tenths of death Hundreds of million of Substantial disruption to

rupees services and confidence in
the aviation system

LOW Possibly some death and Some economic impact Some disruption to
injuries services and confidence in
the aviation system
 Risk register

Threat Threat Consequence Vulnerability score Risk

Scenario Score score Current Mitigation Score
Target: plane H/M/L H/M/L

Adversary: Pax With With rationale

rationale
Modus: non-
metallic IED on
the body via
pax checkpoint H
 RISK

THE PROBABILITY OF AN AUI BEING SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT ON A

SPECIFIC TARGET BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF

(I) THREAT
(II) CONSEQUENCE AND
(III) VULNERABILITY
 vulnerability assessment
Identify and assess the effectiveness of all existing mitigations
• Physical
• Procedural
• Personnel
• Equipment (lack or malfunctioning)
• IT
• Analysis of NCASP and other programmes
• Analysis of QC programmes
 vulnerability assessment
Identify and assess the effectiveness of all existing mitigations
• Review of technological capabilities
• Info from other sources
• Pre-airport
• At airport
• Inflight
• Incident response

Contributors: industry, security coys, AVSEC Authority, LEAs

 vulnerability scoring
Rating

HIGH No mitigating measures are in general effect – no realistic effective measures are
available

MEDIUM Mitigation has a limited scope or are immature or partially effective – capability of
further development or implementation in practice

LOW Mitigation measures generally regarded as effective and are in widespread use
 Risk register

Threat Threat Consequence Vulnerability score Risk

Scenario Score score Current Mitigation Score
Target: plane H/M/L H/M/L What mitigation H / M/ L
measures are currently
Adversary: Pax With With rationale in place? With
rationale rationale
Modus: non-
metallic IED on
the body via
pax checkpoint H H
 Risk scoring

Threat Threat Consequence Vulnerability score Risk

Scenario Score score Current Mitigation Score
Target: plane H/M/L H/M/L What mitigation H / M/ L
measures are currently
Adversary: Pax With With rationale in place? With
rationale rationale
Modus: non-
metallic IED on
the body via
pax checkpoint H H H
 Risk analysis matrix
Rating

HIGH May require immediate action in the form of countermeasures and emergency
procedures – tolerance to this level of risk is unlikely

MEDIUM Typically requires implementation of specific countermeasures on a case to case

basis

LOW Typically does not require the implementation of specific countermeasures

 RISK EVALUATION
• Evaluate Risk Register

• Determine risk tolerance, acceptable v/s unacceptable risk

• Justify priorities

• Identify root causes of risks

 EVALUATION OF RISK REGISTER
Risk Evaluation uses the understanding of risk obtained during risk
analysis to make decisions about future actions.

Decisions:
• Whether further research on a risk assessment component is
necessary
• Whether a risk needs mitigation
• The priorities for mitigation
• Whether an activity should be undertaken
• Which of the mitigations should be followed
 RISK TOLERANCE

Risk

Acceptable Unacceptabl
Level e Level
 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

• To uncover the underlying causes of problems

• Understanding why a vulnerability exists is the key to developing

effective mitigation measures
 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

• Inconsistent alarm resolution for pax screening. Why?

• No Audits conducted resulting in inconsistency. Why?
• No QC programme in place to govern implementation of
audits/inspection. Why?
• Due to lack of knowledge on how to develop a QC programme? Why

• Root cause –Lack of knowledge

 Possible ROOT CAUSEs

• Lack of Knowledge
• Lack of resources
• Lack of infrastructure
• Lack of will
 RISK MITIGATION

• AIM: Reducing the probability of a scenario occurring or to reduce

adverse consequences if it occurs.
• Reduce vulnerabilities (ineffective mitigating measures)- Reduce
consequences
• A range of mitigating options – assess these options – implement
selected mitigating measure
• Mitigating a risk – is to reduce it with security measures to an
acceptable level ( new, enhanced or modified measure)
 RISK MITIGATION

Mitigation options:

• Prevent (fence)

• Detect (CCTV)

• Respond (response teams)

• Deter (penalties / fines)

 RISK MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

• Cost Benefit analysis

• Individual or combined application

• Legal or social impacts

• Values and perceptions of stakeholders