EEE381B

Aerospace Systems
& Avionics
Electronic Warfare
Ref: Moir & Seabridge 2006, Chapter 6

Dr Ron Smith
Outline
1. Introduction
2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
3. Electronic Support Measures (ESM)
4. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)
5. Defensive Aids
6. Jam resistant radar design
7. Exercises

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1. Introduction

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1.1 Electronic Warfare Roles

 Electronic warfare (EW) plays both a strategic

and tactical role in any modern military
operation.
 Assets are employed in supportive, protective
and offensive measures.
 Specific capabilities and equipment
specifications are usually highly classified.

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1.2 The EW spectrum

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1.3 The intelligence cycle

 The picture below depicts the typical, continuous

cycle of intelligence gathering and application.

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1.4 EW elements

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2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
 Military intelligence typically involves the
following sources:
 human intelligence (HUMINT)
 image intelligence (IMINT)
 photographic intelligence (PHOTINT)
 signals intelligence (SIGINT)
 SIGINT is further broken down into:
 communications intelligence (COMINT)
 electronic intelligence (ELINT)

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2.1 COMINT

 Communications intelligence operations involve the

collection of:

 the locations and numbers of

specific communication
transmissions,
 their signal characteristics,
 their messages, as well as
 any communication patterns
(including silence).

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2.2 ELINT
 Electronic intelligence operations involve the collection of
the source and direction of arrival (DOA) of a broad range of
radar emitters. Signals are analyzed for such things as:

 frequency,
 pulse and PRF,
 signal strength,
 modulation schemes,
 scan parameters, and
 usage patterns.

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2.3 Airborne intelligence gathering

 A typical airborne intelligence operation involves high-

flying specialized aircraft gathering emissions data on
long patrol flights along national borders and outside
missile engagement range.
 In the 1980s and 1990s Canada
employed CE144 Challengers in
a national ELINT role
 one specially equipped aircraft
commonly referred to as the
“Manitou” was operated by the CF.

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2.4 Typical COMINT/ELINT architecture

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3. Electronic Support Measures
 Similar to an ELINT system, an Electronic Support
Meausres (ESM) system’s role is to detect and classify
received radar emitters. The difference being that an
ESM is generally employed tactically (for use against
immediate threats).
 An effective ESM will identify the location, type of
transmitter, mode of operation (search, track, engaged)
and level of threat of each emitter.
 Real-time signal analysis is performed against received
signals, comparing them with known emitter
characteristics stored in its threat library
 the library having been developed based upon intelligence data

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3.1 ESM employment

 Electronic support measures may be employed in

formation support role aircraft such as that of an AWACs
or a coastal patrol aircraft. Alternatively, it may be
employed tactically in a radar warning mode such as in
an attack aircraft.
 Canada’s CP140 Aurora Incremental Modernization
Program (AIMP) includes the fitment of the AN/ALQ-217
ESM suite in block 3 of the program. This suite will be
used in both formation support and self-defence roles.
 ~$50M (US) for 24 systems

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4. Electronic Countermeasures
 Electronic countermeasures (ECM) involve taking
actions to interfere with or deceive the enemy’s
radar system.
 Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM)
involve taking actions to interfere with or deceive
the countermeasures so as to restore radar use.
 and so on, and so, in a classic “cat and mouse” game.

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4.1 Noise Jamming

 Active noise jamming involves the transmission of high

power “white noise” directed at the enemy radar with the
intent of interference.
 Effectiveness is based upon such parameters as:
 jammer power
 antenna gain
 transmitter bandwidth
 Typical types of noise jamming techniques include:
 barrage jamming
 swept-spot jamming
 multiple-spot jamming

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4.1.1 Effects of noise jamming

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4.1.1.1 Effects of noise jamming [2]

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4.1.2 Burnthrough range

 With any noise jamming technique there is some range

at which the strength of the radar echo becomes stringer
than the jamming noise, this is known as the
burnthrough range.
 The range of the radar return is a function of 1/R4, whereas the
range of the jamming signal is a function 1/R2.
 Therefore the closer the jammer gets to the radar, the more
likely it is that the radar breaks through the noise signal; this is
depicted on the graph in the next slide.
 A radar with low gain and poor sidelobes is susceptible to
jamming, conversely a high power noise jammer becomes a
“target” and is susceptible to home-on-jamming attacks.

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4.1.2.1 Burnthrough depicted

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4.2 Deception Jamming

 Radar deception techniques are more

sophisticated and can often be achieved without
the radar (operator) knowing that jamming is
being used. Typical techniques include:
 falsetarget generation
 range gate stealing
 velocity gate stealing
 angle track breaking

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4.2.1 False targets & range gate stealing

 By knowing the radar pulse parameters, false targets

can be injected into a radar by replicating or repeating
well timed pulses so as to appear as spurious random
targets.
 Range gate stealing (RGS) is a similar deception
jamming technique that begins by transmitting a strong
enough signal to mask the true radar return. Once this is
achieved the pulse is walked off the echo range until the
radar loses accurate range information. Jamming may
then stop and repeat the process making it difficult for
the radar to gain lock.
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4.2.1.1 Range gate pull-off (RGPO)

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4.2.1.2 Range gate pull-off (RGPO)

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4.2.1.3 Range gate pull-off (RGPO)

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4.2.2 Other deception techniques

 Velocity gate stealing (VGS) works much the same as

range gate stealing except that the transmitted jamming
signal contains false Doppler frequency shifts causing
errors in the radars velocity calculations.
 Angle track breaking requires knowledge of the radar
tracking method and scan parameters (perhaps from an
on-board ESM, or previous intelligence). Angle track can
then be affected by appropriate signal modulation (as the
case of conscan). Other techniques include terrain
bouncing, cross-polarization, and sidelobe jamming.

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4.3 Airborne jamming platforms

 Airborne jammers (and their platforms)

are generally employed in one of two
common modes:
 Self-screening mode is provided by on-board
jammer(s) as protection suites. These systems
are generally highly integrated into the mission
suite.
 Escort and stand-off mode is provided by
support aircraft, with stand-off aircraft usually
operating outside “harms way”. These systems
The EA-6B Prowler is
are generally stand-alone and often more being replaced with the
powerful and capable than self-screen ones. EA-18G Growler
(escort / stand-off role)

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4.3.1 Airborne jamming platforms [2]

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5. Defensive Aids
 When operating in a hostile environment an
aircraft must be equipped with appropriate self-
defence measures.
 In Canada these are collectively referred a defensive
electronic warfare (DEW) suite
 Common threats faced by aircraft include:
 Smallarms fire
 Radar guided anti-aircraft missiles (AAA)
 Shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAM)
 SAM from ground sites, vehicles or ships

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5.1 Radar warning receiver (RWR)

 The goal of an RWR is to detect the presence of

a hostile radar prior to the radar detecting you.
 A typical architecture includes 4 sensors located
at the wing tips with each providing up to 90°
conical coverage.
 A typical antenna would be a spiral with ~75°
beamwidth and ~10 dB gain.

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5.1.1 A typical RWR architecture

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5.2 Other warning receivers

 A missile warning receiver (MWR) is designed to

detect the infrared (IR) or ultraviolet (UV)
emissions of a missile.
 This system may employ up to 6 sensors, each with
110° of coverage (providing front and rear protection.
 Similarly a laser warning receiver (LWR)
provides detection against missiles that emit
signals in the laser band.

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5.3 Countermeasure dispensers

 While warning receivers are designed to detect

the presence of a threat, countermeasure
dispensers offer a defence against an imminent
(launched) attack. Typical dispensers include:
 Chaff
 Flares
 Towed Decoys

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5.3.1 Chaff

 Chaff is the oldest form of radar EW, dating back

to WWII, then known as “window”.
 Chaff consists of tiny pieces of reflective metal
foil or plastic. It is cut into ½ wavelength strips
and dispensed in cloud bursts behind the
aircraft, thus forming a brief but large RCS so as
to break the lock of an incoming missile.
 Usually used in conjunction with evasive
manoeuvres.
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5.3.1.1 Chaff

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5.3.2 Flares

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5.3.3 Towed decoys

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5.4 F/A-18E/F Defensive EW

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5.5 Modern active decoys

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6. Jam resistant radar design
 Modern radar designs include features which
make them less vulnerable to traditional EW
techniques including:
 Low antenna sidelobes
 Sidelobe blanking
 Wide dynamic range with fast automatic gain control
 Constant false alarm rate (CFAR) reduction

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6.1 Jam resistant radar design

 Modern radars also include low probability of

detection techniques in order to prevent being
detected (before any EW can begin). Typical
techniques include:
A purposeful reduction in peak power
 Frequency agility along with an increase in receiver
bandwidth (with advanced low loss, low noise floor
receivers)
 Very high gain antennas 55dB above the first sidelobe

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7. In-class exercises

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7.1 Quick response # 1

 How might a frequency agile radar be able to

defend itself against spot noise jamming?
 What noise jamming mode will the jammer have to
resort to and at what cost?

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7.2 Quick response # 2

 Range gate pull-off (RGPO) injects false targets at

ranges beyond that of the jammer. How could false
targets be injected between the jammer and the radar?
 What key radar parameter must be known for this to work?

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7.3 Quick response # 3

 How could knowledge of

a radar’s scan pattern
and antenna
characteristics be used to
effectively jam the radar?

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References
1) Moir & Seabridge, Military Avionics Systems, American Institute of
Aeronautics & Astronautics, 2006. [Sections 2.6 & 2.7]
2) Radar in an Active Target Environment, student laboratory manual,
38542-00, Lab-Volt (Quebec) Ltd, 2006.
3) David Adamy, EW101 - A First Course in Electronic Warfare, Artech
House, 2000. [Chapters 3,4 & 6]
4) George W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar, Second Edition,
SciTch Publishing, 1998.
5) Mark A. Hicks, "Clip art licensed from the Clip Art Gallery on
DiscoverySchool.com"

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