L.

CHANDRA
KUMAR VS UNION
OF INDIA
PARTIES OF THE CASE

Petitioner : L.Chandra kumar

Respondent: union of India and others

NATURE OF THE
CASE :
Civil case
Bench of judges
1. A.M. Ahmadi CJI
2. M.M. Punchhi
3. K. Ramaswamy
4. S.P. Bharucha
5. S. Saghir Ahmad
6. K. Venkataswami
7. K.T. Thomas
INTRODUCTION
• The issues that were dealt with in this case emanated generally from the
controversy that was generated by the constitutional amendments that inserted
Articles 323A and 323B.  These provisions essentially did away with the jurisdiction
of High Courts in service matters. In various cases which included kesvanandan
bharti and Sampat Kumar, the Courts tried to put an end to various questions that
arose in this respect. However, these judgements had the exact opposite effect
because instead of answering these questions they gave rise to various other
questions and controversies in this regard. The issue was finally laid to rest in the
landmark case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India.
• After Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution came into effect, the 
Central Administrative Tribunal was established with five different Benches with
effect from November 1, 1985. However, even before the establishment of these
benches, several petitions were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutional validity of the articles in question. The petitioners raised various
contentions in this regard but the main contention was that the provisions were
unconstitutional because they exclude the jurisdiction of the high courts which
went against the basic structure of the Constitution
BAckROUND
• There is a problem in the Indian Judiciary that the judicial mechanism is very
slow which led to a pile-up of cases in the courts. It becomes a huge burden
on the Courts to solve a large number of cases that’s why for a long time a
mechanism was being searched to relieve all the courts from the burden
especially from that of service litigation as it formed a substantial portion of
pending litigation. So in 1958, the Law Commission submitted a report
 recommending to set up tribunals consisting of administrative and judicial
members to decide service matters. Similarly in 1969, Administrative Reform
Commission, under the chairmanship of Justice J.C Shah of the Supreme
Court, also recommended to set up civil service tribunals both for the State
and Central civil servants. Again, in 1975 it was recommended for setting up
of service tribunals by Swaran Singh Committee. The idea of establishing
service tribunals to save the courts from an avalanche of writ petitions and
appeals also found in the decision given by the Supreme Court of India in 
KK.Dutta v. Union of India (1980).
FACTS OF THE CASE
• A number of Special Leave Petitions (SLP), Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions were
filed which formed a batch of matters, bought before the Supreme Court in his case,
owing their origin to separate decisions of different HCs and several different
provisions and enactments- thereby raising several distinct questions of law, which
were grouped together in this case for the purpose of adjudication upon them.
• These matters were broadly pertaining to- the constitutional validity of sub-clause
(d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A and sub-clause (d) of clause (3) of Article 323-B of the
Constitution of India, 1950; and also in regards to the constitutional validity of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
• Moreover what was also the subject of challenge was whether the Tribunals
constituted under Part XIV- A of the Constitution of India can be effective substitutes
for the High-Courts in discharging the power of judicial review
Issues of the case
1.Whether the power conferred upon the Parliament by Article
323-A (2) (d) or upon the State Legislature by Article 323-B (3) (d)
of the Constitution of India, to totally exclude the jurisdiction of
‘all courts’, except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136 ?
2.Whether the Tribunals constituted either under Article 323A or
under Article 323B of the Constitution, possess the competence
to test the constitutional validity of a statutory provision or rule?
3.Whether the Tribunals, as they are functioning at present, can
be said to be the effective substitutes for the High Court in
discharging the power of judicial review? If not, what are the
changes required to make them conform to their founding
objectives?
ARGUMENT FROM PETITIONER
• They argued about the constitutionality of the Tribunals created under the
Act and the provisions such as Article 323-A(2)(d) and Article 324-B(3)(d)
under the Constitution of India. The exclusive power provided to the
tribunals to exercise the jurisdiction vested in Articles 226 and 227 for the
High Courts and the power to interpret the provisions of the constitution on
which only constitutional courts have sole right are susceptible as these
rights cannot be bestowed to the quasi-judicial bodies on which executive
have its influences.  
• Articles 323A and 324B under Part XIV-A of the Indian Constitution allow the
Parliament to affect the sacrosanct jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as per
given in Article 32 of the Constitution and therefore liable to be struck down.
• It was argued that the impugned provisions are unconstitutional as they
exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts ( under Article 226 of the
Constitution) and the Supreme Court (under Articles 32 of the Constitution)
ARGUMENT FROM RESPONDENT
• The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Article 32 of the Constitution) is sacrosanct
and is indisputably a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. This
position had been clearly enunciated by the Parliament well before the 42nd
Amendment and Administrative Tribunal Act was conceived. Therefore the position
of the Supreme Court jurisdiction is not affected in any way. However, the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 was sought to be removed
by creating an alternative institution.
• Articles 323A and 323B of the Indian Constitution do not exclude the supervisory
jurisdiction of the High Courts on all the Tribunals established within its territorial
jurisdiction. Therefore the High Court still has the power as a supervisory jurisdiction
and corrective mechanism body.
• It was argued that the Tribunal should allow exercising the jurisdiction under Article
226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution.
• It was said that the theory enunciated by the petitioner from the case of 
Sampath Kumar v. UOI (2016) is not valid, it is based on sound considerations and
doesn’t require any reconsideration.   
JUDGEMENT of the case
• The power of judicial review vested in the Supreme Court and High Courts by Articles 32 and 226
respectively is a part of the Basic structure of the constitution.
• That there is the supervision of the Supreme Court and High Court over these Tribunals was also
part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
• Judicial review of legislative action in exercise of power by subordinate judiciary or Tribunals
created under ordinary legislation cannot be to the exclusion of the High Courts and the Supreme
Court. However, they can perform supplemental – as opposed to substitution – role in this respect.
• Tribunals constituted under Articles 323A and 323B have the authority to test vires of subordinate
legislation, but they cannot test vires of their parent statutes. All the decisions of tribunals would
be under scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts under Articles 226/227.
An appeal cannot lie directly to the SC under Article 136. This direction would be operative
prospectively.
• Appointing administrative members to the Tribunals need not be ceased.
• Until a fully independent agency for the administration of all such Tribunals can be set-up, it is
desirable that all such Tribunals should be, as far as possible, under a single nodal ministry which
will be in a position to oversee the working of these Tribunals. For a number of reasons that
ministry should appropriately be the Ministry of Law.
PURPOSE OF THE CASE
•The reason behind the initiation of this case was to understand the disturbances in the views on
the issue regarding the tribunals and their need and functioning
• the exclusion of judicial review under Article 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution was questioned
as violative of the basic structure of the Constitution in the case of Sampath Kumar. The case
was preceded by many cases that had put out different views on the matter of tribunals from
every different angle they could find, to either to prove that the Act was unconstitutional or prove
that the jurisdiction given is wrong and affects the basic structure of the constitution.
•The Act was enacted to provide relief to the overburdened courts and relieve them of this
situation all the while also decreasing the time, Indian Judiciary takes to dispose of a case.
•The purpose and intention of the Parliament were justified, with some disturbances in the making
and implementation. The major problem was the jurisdiction.
•The Act was written in a way that made it seem that the power of the High Court and Supreme
Court was being taken away and given to the tribunals being set up.
•It lightens up the the judgement in the case of the Supreme Court decided that the case needed
to be ‘comprehensively reconsidered and a fresh look by the larger bench was necessary.’ This
way the case was referred to a larger bench who decided that as Article 226, 227 and 32 of the
Constitution provide the power for judicial review and the independence to judiciary
RATIO DECENDI
• Power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts and the Supreme
Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively is the basic structure of the Constitution.
• Power of judicial superintendence over decisions of all courts and Tribunals within their
jurisdiction is the basic structure of the Constitution
• Judicial review of legislative action in exercise of power by subordinate judiciary or
Tribunals created under ordinary legislation cannot be to the exclusion of the High Courts
and the Supreme Court. However they can perform supplemental – as opposed to
substitutional – role in this respect.
• Tribunals constituted under Articles 323A and 323B have the power to test vires of
subordinate legislation except vires of their parent statutes. All its decisions would be
subject to scrutiny before Division Bench of their respective High Courts under Articles
226/227. No appeal would lie directly to the Supreme Court under Article 136. The said
direction would operative prospectively.
• Appointment of Administrative members need not be stopped.
• Till a wholly independent body is set for the purpose of overseeing the working of the
Tribunals, all such Tribunals will be under single nodal ministry whose members would be
appropriately be a Ministry of Law.
CONCLUSION
• the basic structure of the Indian Constitution cannot be violated and all
the legislation, acts, and regulations violating it will be considered null
and void. It is settled provision that the High courts are the
constitutional courts and ousting its jurisdiction and excluding its power
of judicial review is against the doctrine of the basic structure. If a new
quasi-judicial body is established by the executive for speedy justice of
some matters to reduce the burden on the High Courts and the
Supreme Court then the decision should be subject to judicial review as
even the judicial body’s decision is subjected to judicial review.
However, it is established by the zeal of providing time-effective and
cost-effective justice but nothing can be said about the quality of justice
dispensed by it, so the decision by the Supreme Court, in this case, is
highly remarkable considering the sacrosanct Constitutional provisions. 
THANK YOU
• Anushree karol
• Kashish Gaur
• Neha bhardwaj
• Simran
• Varsha Bhargava