Amilcar

P etroleum O perations

Incident Review Panel

September 2021
 Agenda

LFE1:Boiler Feed Water Pump Incident

LFE2:Crack found in weldolet on LP flare header – potential for

LOPC

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 What happened

On the 18th May 2021 at 0823 hrs, while it

was heavily raining, a loud “bang” was
heard from the boiler feedwater pump
area. Concurrently, a fire was observed at
apump location. The security alarm was
activated & CCR triggered emergency
response
protocol. All personnel at site were
accounted for with no injuries, there was
no impact
to Operation since a spare pump kicked-in
as per design. The system was immediately
isolated and made safe

3
 Why it happened

Motor rotor moved out of position at high speed & metal to

metal contact started in

• the bearing housing & temperature started to rise rapidly &

fire ignited

• Rotor & bearing deformed, creating lube oil leaking paths &
aggravated the fire

• Significant heat rose & back cover gave way & fire flames
visible

4
 Underlying causes of the incident

• Process allowed closure of maintenance work orders

without appropriate assurance.

• Unjustified deviations from manufacturer

recommended maintenance requirements.

• Unclear roles and responsibilities in maintenance

tasks.

5
 Lessons learned

• OEM maintenance recommendations need to be aligned with

SAP maintenance tasks. When not, a TA approved justification
needs to be in place to document the deviation.

• Ensure resources are secured for basic maintenance tasks,

upfront of any major events.

• Ensure all maintenance procedures & tasks clearly define

single line accountabilities.

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 What happened

• Whilst measuring stress values on a section of pipework, a

specialist vibration company discovered higher than expected
reading in the vicinity of a metering skid on a weldolet
connected to the LP flare header. After removing pipework
insulation a crack was discovered which was measured at 40% of
the circumference of the header line. The line was downstream
of a relief valve, protecting the flowline.

• No weeps were visually evident and FLIR (thermal imaging

camera)/ Snoop (liquid used to highlight fugitive emissions)
inspection confirmed no gas emissions to be present, both of
which would indicate that the crack is not through wall. The
heavy penetrant bleed out, however, did indicate a crack of
significant depth.
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8
 What happened

A number of years previously subsea flowline had leaked due to

Internal Corrosion (Preferential Weld Corrosion). A new
10”Pipeline (Pipe-in-Pipe) was installed as part of a project to
replace the line and this was connected to an existing 6” Riser. In
2015, the subsea well was drilled as a side-track.

It was reported during this period that production from the field
started slugging and vibration was reported on the topside
during various visits to the platform. A number of modifications
had been undertaken with eMoC’s including additional supports,
replacement pipework and supports.

In addition a number of ORA’s (operational risk assessment)

were raised to monitor the vibration in the line over this period 9
 Why it happened

Immediate causes
• Slugging in the Pipework system leading to higher stress loading.

• The cracking was caused by cyclic loading at the toe of the weld on
the main pipe side of the weldolet.

Underlying causes of the incident

• not suitable for modified operating/flowing conditions leading to
cracking.

• Management of Change process for the modified flowing and

operating conditions considered the steady state conditions, but
not the slugging flow and consequent high stress conditions.
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 Lessons learned

• the multiphase flow meter was undersized for the subsea field post 2013
and could not be used for the continuous monitoring , hence, it was not
clear when design flowing conditions were being exceeded.

• The topside(s) system was designed for specific flow conditions. Any
change in production conditions should be assessed and MOC carried out
if required.

• Known slugging conditions must be fully investigated to minimize the risk

of failure of the pressure system.

• For system with vibration status ‘’caution’’, actual vibration readings must
be taken at the expected highest stress location.

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 Recommendations

• checks.
• 􀂃 Where design assessment in accordance with Energy Institute Avoidance of
Vibration Guidance identifies vibration levels 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀂦􀀦􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀂧􀀃the Mechanical
Static Discipline Engineer responsible for the pressure system on the facility shall,
as part of the eMOC/Design, specify suitable site verification to demonstrate that
the support arrangement is suitable for the conditions.
• 􀂃 A thorough management of change is required to ensure that changes to the
pipework, process conditions and environment is captured.
• 􀂃 For all piping, support and flow modifications, the Mech Stat Discipline Eng shall
verify that the modifications have been checked for potential vibration issues.
• Further information
• For further information please contact Manoj Tripathi (Mechanical Static TA2)
• To help widen the understanding and learning around the potential for cracking,
another published LFI example of process changes/

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Could this happen in our asset?

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 Action Log

Action Responsible Comments Due Date

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