Persons Criminally Liable

Persons Criminally Liable
for Felonies
DAN PERUELO CALICA
Corpus delicti
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime
and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually
committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus
delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of
a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the
existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. [People
v. Roluna, G.R. No. 101797, 24 March 1994]
Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Two things to prove to convict the accused
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things: (1)
the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which
the accused stands charged, and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of
the crime. When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove
the identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can
be no conviction even if the commission of the crime is established.
Apart from showing the existence and commission of a crime, the State has
the burden to correctly identify the author of such crime. Both facts must be
proved by the State beyond cavil of a doubt on the strength of its evidence and
without solace from the weakness of the defense. [People v. Vidal, Jr., G.R. No.
229678, 20 June 2018]

PERSONS CRIMINALLY
LIABLE FOR FELONIES

Persons criminally liable for grave and
less grave felonies
1. Principals
2. Accomplices
3. Accessories [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 16]

Persons criminally liable for light felonies
1. Principals
2. Accomplices [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 16]

PRINCIPALS

Persons considered as principals
1. Principals by direct participation or those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act
2. Principals by inducement or those who directly force or induce others to

commit it
3. Principals by indispensable cooperation or those who cooperate in the

commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 17]

People v. Ong Chiat Lay
60 Phil. 788 (1934)
Ong Chiat Lay, together with two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were charged
with having burned a building in which was located a store belonging to Ong Chiat Lay.
Ong Chiat Lay was not present at the scene of the crime. After trial, Ong Ban Hua and
Kua Sing were acquitted, while Ong Chiat Lay was convicted of the crime of arson.
In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it must be
shown either (1) that he took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that he
directly forced or induced another or others to commit it; or (3) that he cooperated in the
commission of the offense by an act without which it would not have been accomplished
[Article 17, RPC]. They take direct part in the execution of a criminal act who,
participating in the criminal design, proceed to carry out their plan and personally take
part in its execution by acts which directly tend to the same end.

In the instant case, it is not claimed that Ong Chiat Lay had taken a direct
part in the burning of the building. In fact, the prosecution lays stress on his
absence from the scene of the fire as one of the suspicious circumstances
indicating his guilt. Ong Chiat Lay was prosecuted on the theory that he
induced his co-defendants to set fire to the building. Hence, the three were
charged jointly on an information alleging conspiracy among them. This
allegation of conspiracy, however, has been negatived by the acquittal of Ong
Chiat Lay’s co-defendants. The same may be said with regard to the theory that
Ong Chiat Lay induced his co-defendants to perpetrate the unlawful deed; for it
seems clear that one cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission
of a crime without it first being shown that the crime has been actually
committed by another.

In one American case, it was stated that where more than two persons are
charged with conspiracy, the acquittal of all but one of those charged amounts
to the acquittal of that one, since there can be no conspiracy unless at least two
unite.

While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a distinct
offense, it is clear from the nature of the evidence presented that Ong Chiat Lay
alone could not have committed the unlawful act. As already stated, the theory
of the prosecution was that he conspired with or induced his co-defendants to
commit the crime. The gravamen of the charge was conspiracy, and the
acquittal of his co-defendants is clearly inconsistent with Ong Chiat Lay’s guilt.

PRINCIPALS
1. BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION
2. BY INDUCEMENT
3. BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION

Principal by direct participation
A person who takes a direct part in the execution of a felonious act is
considered as a principal. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 17]
They take direct part in the execution of a criminal act who, participating in
the criminal design, proceed to carry out their plan and personally take part in
its execution by acts which directly tend to the same end. [People v. Ong Chiat Lay,
60 Phil. 788 (1934)]

Two or more offenders as principals by
direct participation
Two or more persons may take direct part in the execution of the act, in
which case they may be principals by direct participation. [Luis B. Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, Book One, Nineteenth Edition, 2017, p. 507]

Two or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime are
principals by direct participation when the following requisites are present:
1. That they participated in the criminal resolution; and

2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its
execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. [Luis B.
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, Nineteenth Edition, 2017, p. 507,
citing People v. Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil. 788 (1934)]

United States v. Diris
26 Phil. 133 (1913)
Three persons, Anselmo Diris, Eustaquio Siaga and Tomas Olea, decided to rob the
house of Olea’s uncle who just received P400.00 from the railroad company as payment
for expropriated land. While Diris and Olea went upstairs to get the money in the trunk,
one of the accused engaged the victim’s wife in conversation to distract her from
discovering the ongoing robbery. All three were convicted as principals. The accused
who engaged the wife in conversation while the other accused robbed the house is also
a principal. Siaga acted concurrently with the other accused, and must be held to have
been present with them aiding and abetting them in the commission of the crime in
order to distract the wife’s attention from what was going on upstairs. In doing so, he
was evidently serving as a guard to warn his companions in case there should arise any
necessity for giving an alarm. When the other accused came down and out of the house,
he went away with them.

The SC reiterated that it has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty
purpose and aids and abets the commission of a crime by his presence at the
time of its perpetration, even though he may not have taken an active part in its
material execution, is guilty as a principal. SC has also held that one who stands
as guard near the place where a crime is committed to keep others away or to
warn his companions and fellow conspirators of danger of discovery, takes a
direct part in the commission of the crime and is therefore guilty as a principal
under the Penal Code. Under the circumstances, SC held that Siaga was
properly convicted as a principal. [SC may have considered them as acting in
conspiracy]

PRINCIPALS
2. BY INDUCEMENT
3. BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION

Principal by inducement
A person who directly force or induce others to commit a felonious act is a
principal. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 17]
Those who directly induce others to commit the act are called “principals by
inducement” or “principals by induction”. [Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book
One, Nineteenth Edition, 2017, p. 537]
The principal by induction becomes liable only when the principal by direct
participation committed the act induced. As held in People v. Ong Chiat Lay [60
Phil. 788 (1934)], one cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission
of a crime without it first being shown that the crime has been actually
committed by another.

Two ways of becoming a principal by
inducement
There are two ways of becoming a principal by induction,
namely:
1. By directly forcing another to commit a crime; and
2. By directly inducing another to commit a crime. [Luis B.

Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, Nineteenth
Edition, 2017, p. 537]

Forcing another to commit a crime
They force another to commit a crime who physically, by actual force or
grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening
means, oblige another to commit the crime. The Supreme Court had earlier said
that he who suffers violence acts without will and against his will, and is no
more than an instrument, and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits
in such a case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those
who force the other to commit the crime. [United States v. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 (1913)]

Inducing another to commit a crime
One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a
consideration, or by any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving
cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act
and was sufficient for that purpose. One who physically commits the crime may
escape criminal responsibility by showing that he acted with due obedience to an
order and, in such a case, the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the one who
orders, that is, upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to
commit the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior is not due to the superior
and therefore not necessary, and does not, therefore exempt him from criminal
responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command,
directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by law also as a principal in
the crime. [United States v. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 (1913)]

The pacto (consideration) by virtue of which one purchases for a
consideration the hand which commits the crime makes him who gives,
promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime by direct
inducement, because without such offer or promise the criminal act would
never have been committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually
commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is
exempted from criminal responsibility; on the contrary, such circumstance
constitutes an aggravation of his crime. [United States v. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 (1913)]

For advice or words to constitute direct inducement, it is necessary that
such advice or words have a great dominance and great influence over the
person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as
powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. [United States v. Indanan,
24 Phil. 203 (1913)]

Requisites for inducement
1. The inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring
the commission of the crime
2. Such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of
the crime [United States v. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 (1913) and People v.
Kiichi Omine, 61 Phil. 609 (1935)]

United States v. Indanan
24 Phil. 203 (1913)
Panglima Indanan is the headman of Parang. He ordered the killing of the
victim, representing that he also had orders from the Governor to do so. The
Supreme Court convicted him as principal by inducement. The evidence
demonstrates that Indanan was the recognized headman of Parang and it
appears from the testimony of the witnesses that he had a very powerful
influence over them; hence, his power over them was such that any order issued
by him had the force and efficacy of physical coercion. The Supreme Court was
of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons who, at his
orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him responsible for whatever
they did in obedience to such orders.

In this case, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command.
And even if they were not, Indanan falsely represented to the persons who
actually committed the crime that he had an order from the Governor requiring
the death of the victim and that they were under obligation to carry out that
order. It is clear from the evidence that their inducement was offered by the
accused directly to the persons interested with the intention of moving them to
do his bidding, and that such representation was the moving cause of the fatal
act.

People v. Omine
61 Phil 609 (1935)
Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor were fighting. Pulido’s father helped.
Pulido’s father, Angel, was wounded. During the confrontation between Angel
Pulido and Autor, Omine allegedly shouted words of inducement to Autor
(“pegale y matale”). The Supreme Court held that Omine was not guilty as
principal by inducement.
According to the witnesses for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Autor
had already struck each other in the face with their fists, and Autor had received
a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario with his bolo. Angel Pulido
would naturally intervene in the fight between his son and Autor, and if he did
so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him without the need
of any inducement from Omine.
Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, even if it were
satisfactorily proved that Omine uttered the words in question, the Supreme
Court was of the opinion that they would not be sufficient to make him
principal by induction, because it does not appear that the words uttered by
Omine caused Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the first place, Autor had already
other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have uttered
the words of inducement. In the second place, the words in question were not,
in this particular case, sufficient to cause Autor to strike the offended party with
his bolo. Although Autor was working under the direction of Omine, he was
being paid by Angel Pulido. It does not appear that Omine had any particular
influence over Autor.

PRINCIPALS
2. BY INDUCEMENT
3. BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION

Principal by indispensable cooperation
A person who cooperates in the commission of the

offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished is a principal. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 17]

Requisites to be held liable as a principal by
indispensable cooperation
The requisites of Article 17(3) are: (1) participating in the
criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or
unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the
commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which
it would not have been accomplished. [People v. Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700
(1988)]

People v. Montealegre
161 SCRA 700 (1988)
Police officer Renato Camantigue was trying to arrest the accused Napoleon
Montealegre and Vicente Capalad who were smoking marijuana inside a restaurant.
However, Capalad pulled out a knife and Montealegre held Camantigue’s hand and
restrained him, thus, enabling Capalad to stab Camantigue. Camantigue died due to
the stab wounds inflicted by Capalad.
Montealegre was correctly considered by the trial court as a co-principal for

having collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in
concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and Montealegre
holding on to the victim’s hand to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending
himself.

While it is true that Montealegre did not himself commit the act of stabbing,
he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue
from resisting the attack against him. Montealegre was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The requisites of Article 17(3) are: (1) participating in the criminal

resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged;
and (2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.

People v. Simbra
117 SCRA 242 (1982)
While complainant Gresilda Gonzales was fetching water from the artesian
well located in the public market in the evening, she was grabbed by accused
Berto Simbra. She shouted for help but co-accused Sergio Tolibas covered her
mouth with a handkerchief. Helping each other, Simbra and Tolibas dragged
Gonzales to a secluded place. Simbra then threw Gonzales to the ground, while
Tolibas held her arms and covered her mouth. Simbra succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of Gonzales twice. Thereafter, Tolibas had carnal knowledge
of Gonzales thrice, with Simbra helping him by holding the arms of Gonzales.


Simbra escaped and only Tolibas was charged and convicted of rape. SC
modified the conviction, by sentencing Tolibas not only to one rape but to two
counts of rape of Gonzales, one for the rape committed by Simbra and another
for the rape committed by him.

Considering that Tolibas had sexual intercourse with Gonzales against her
will by employing force and intimidation, the crime committed is rape through
direct participation. And when Tolibas aided Simbra and made it possible for
the latter to have carnal knowledge of Gonzales, also against her will, Tolibas
committed another crime of rape through indispensable cooperation. Thus,
Tolibas is guilty of two crimes of consummated rape.

ACCOMPLICE
S

Accomplices
Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in

Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code (e.g. principals), cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. [REV.
PEN. CODE, art. 18]

Requisites in order that a person may be
considered an accomplice
1. That there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose
2. That he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way
3. That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice [People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 (1922)]

People v. Nierra
96 Phil 1 (1980)
Spouses Paciano and Gaudencia Nierra planned and decided to have their
business rival and relative, Juliana Cadugdug Nierra, killed. They hired and
paid Gaspar Misa to kill Juliana, who consummated the act. Felicisimo Doblen
introduced Misa to the Spouses Nierra and gave the firearm to Misa, which the
latter used for killing the victim. Misa, on the other hand, asked Vicente Rojas
to serve as lookout during the killing. The Spouses Nierra also served as
lookouts during the actual shooting.
The Spouses Nierra are liable as principals by inducement and as co-

conspirators. Misa is the principal by direct participation and also part of the
conspiracy.

Doblen and Rojas were held liable only as accomplices. It is true, strictly
speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished as co-principals.
However, since their participation was not absolutely indispensable to the
consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder
form of liability may be applied to them.

People v. Doble
114 SCRA 131 (1982)
Ten men robbed the Prudential Bank in Navotas, Rizal. They rode banca from Manila to
Navotas. Cresencio Doble looked for the banca to deliver the robbers from Manila to Navotas,
Rizal, while Romaquin was the owner of the banca and was the one who brought the robbers from
Manila to Navotas, Rizal and vice-versa. However, the Supreme Court held that they were not
principals in the crime. At most, their liability would be that of mere accomplices. They joined the
criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when
asked by the gang leader, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite
knowledge of the evil purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that brought
the malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to
prevent their apprehension. Cresencio and Romaquin thus cooperated, but not in an indispensable
manner. Even without them providing the banca, the robbery could have been committed,
specially with the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in committing the crime.

People v. Doctolero
193 SCRA 632 (1991)
Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, were
charged and convicted of the crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical
injuries. Ludovico was convicted as principal, while Conrado and Virgilio were
convicted merely as accomplices.

It appears that Ludovico entered the house of Marcial Sagun (it was not
indubitably established whether Conrado and Virgilio also went up the house or
just stayed downstairs) and killed Epifania Escosia and Lolita de Guzman and
injured minor Jonathan Oviedo. Thereafter, he killed Marcelo Doctolero
downstairs.

On appeal, Ludovico eventually withdrew his appeal and Virgilio died. Thus, the
case proceeded only as to Conrado.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly convicted Virgilio and
Conrado as accomplices in the slaying of the two women and infliction of injuries on
the minor. The Supreme Court also stated that, where one goes with the principals, and
in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim,
the former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him
guilty as an accomplice.
Conrado and Virgilio contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a
sudden thought or impulse, thus, negativing a common criminal design in their minds.
This pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not
know of the actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was
an illicit act. This is a doctrine which dates back to the ruling in United States v. De
Jesus, 2 Phil. 514 (1903), that where the accomplice therein consented to help in the
commission of forcible abduction, they were responsible for the resulting homicide
even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the
accomplices.
Conspirator vs Accomplice
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it." To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the
following three requisites: "(1) that two or more persons came to an agreement,
(2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the
execution of the felony (was) decided upon." Except in the case of the
mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the accused performed an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court has held that in most
instances, direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for
conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint
purpose, concerted action and community of interest.

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those
persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts." The Court has held that an
accomplice is "one who knows the criminal design of the principal and
cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not
rendered, the crime would be committed just the same." To hold a person liable
as an accomplice, two elements must be present:
(1) the "community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;"
and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.

The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its
effect on appellant’s penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective
and not individual. The act of one of them is deemed the act of all. In the case of an
accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than that of a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree
with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention
because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices
come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then
do they agree to cooperate in its execution.

Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed;
they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are
the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts
not essential to the perpetration of the offense. [People v. De Vera, 312 SCRA 640 (1999)]

When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when
a conspirator? What is the distinction between the
two?

People v. De Vera
312 SCRA 640 (1999)
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove
conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1)
that two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement
concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) that the execution of the felony
[was] decided upon. Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must
also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a previous
agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the
acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community
of interest.

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who, not
being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. The Court has held that an accomplice is one who knows the criminal design
of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if
not rendered, the crime would be committed just the same. To hold a person liable as an
accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the community of criminal design; that is,
knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter
in his purpose; and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves
have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution.
Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the
plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices
are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.

In the present case, De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to
kill Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did
not participate in the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by
Florendo and the others. He joined them that afternoon after the decision to kill
had already been agreed upon; he was there because nagkahiyaan na.
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It
should be noted further that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and
Garcia had guns, and Castro had a baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant
was part of the conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from
his own Statement, was made, after the decision to kill was already a fait
accompli.

Accomplice vs principal by indispensable
cooperation
The participation of the offender in a case of complicity, although
necessary, is not indispensable as in the case of a co-principal by cooperation.
For example, if one lends his dagger or pistol to a murderer fully knowing that
the latter will commit murder, he undoubtedly cooperates in the commission of
the crime of murder with a previous act which, however, cannot be considered
indispensable for the reason that even though the offender did not lend his
dagger or pistol, the murderer could have obtained it somewhere else or from
some other person. In such a case, the participation of the offender is that of an
accomplice by virtue of the provisions of this article. [Luis B. Reyes, The Revised
Penal Code, Book One, Nineteenth Edition, 2017, p. 573, citing 1 Viada, Cod. Pen., 370]

ACCESSORIES

Accessories
Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following
manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects
of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; or

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 19]

Accessories who are exempt
from criminal liability
The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those
who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the
same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 19 (e.g. those who profit themselves or
assist the offender to profit by the effects of the crime). [Rev. Pen. Code, art. 20]

People v. Talingdan
84 SCRA 19 (1978)
Bernardo Bagabag and Teresa were married (although latter was not
charged with parricide as no evidence of such marriage was presented) and had
a daughter, Corazon. However, Teresa had illicit relations with Nemesio
Talingdan, a policeman. Talingdan and his co-accused, including Teresa, were
seen by Corazon meeting, apparently to kill Bagabag. Talingdan, et.al., in fact,
carried out their plan to kill Bagabag. When the killing occurred, Teresa was
inside a room in the conjugal home and did not actually participate in the
criminal act. However, Corazon, who was able to identify the assailants, told
Teresa who the suspects were when confronted by Teresa. Teresa warned
Corazon not to tell anyone about her knowledge of the suspect’s identity and
threatened to kill her if she did. When asked during the investigation if Teresa
had any knowledge on the identity of the assailants, she answered in the
negative.
Thus, while the Supreme Court held that there was no evidence proving that
Teresa actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no
showing of “actual cooperation” on her part with her co-accused in their
culpable acts that led to the death of her husband, she is guilty as an accessory.
If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is mere “cognizance, acquiescence or
approval” thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for
her conviction as a co-conspirator.


True, it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not
beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, she cannot have the same liability
as her co-accused. But she is not entirely free from criminal liability. She was
guilty as an accessory. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As
she came out after the shooting, she inquired from her daughter Corazon if she
was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon identified
Talingdan, etl.a., Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she
knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, “Don’t tell it to anyone.
I will kill you if you tell this to somebody.” Later, when the peace officers went
to her house to investigate, instead of helping them with the information given
to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind.

In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was
more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-accused’s conspiracy,
known to her, to do away with her husband, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her
constitute “concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime,”
which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.

Vino v. People
178 SCRA 626 (1989)
Roberto Tejada was shot on the street. His father, Ernesto, went out of the
house, along with another eyewitness, when they heard the gun shots and
subsequently saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle. Vino was
driving it while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching the house of
Tejada’s father, Ernesto, Vino and Salazar stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar
pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. But then, they just left.

Vino and Salazar, who turned out to be a military man, were charged with
murder. However, Vino’s case proceeded first and separately from that of
Salazar and he was convicted only as an accessory to the crime of murder.
While Vino filed his appeal and such was pending, Salazar’s case proceeded
and was completed, which resulted in his acquittal because his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt (specifically his identity) was not proved.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as Vino was charged in the
information as a principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be
convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.

Vino was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder.
Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the
persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice
and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been
committed and that the evidence tended to show that Salazar was the assailant.
That Vino was present during its commission or must have known its
commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately
thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and
they were together when they left shortly thereafter. It is thus clear that Vino
actively assisted Salazar in his escape and his liability is that of an accessory.

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information.
The commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. The
variance is in the participation or complicity of Vino. While Vino was being
held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced
however showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly
convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as
a principal.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an
accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against
the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from
each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in
evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can
proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is, considering that the alleged principal in this case was
acquitted, can the conviction of Vino as an accessory be maintained? Yes. In
several cases, SC have ruled that even as principal was exempted criminally,
the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact
established.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory was established. By the same token, there
is no doubt that the commission of the same offense had been proven in the
separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, Salazar
was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt which held that the identity of
the assailant was not clearly established.

The identity of the assailant, however, is of no material significance for the
purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant cannot be
identified, the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

Presidential Decree No. 1612 (1979)
"Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
"Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership or

other organization who/which commits the act of fencing.

If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation or association, the president or
the manager or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the
commission of the offense shall be liable.
Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object,

or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing.

Presidential Decree No. 1829 (1979)
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension
of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by
committing any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from

reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by
means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record,
document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility,
availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official
proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he

knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and
conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime,
evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, ore concealing his true name
and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;

(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of
process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with
knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration

of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal
offender;

(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any
wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or
members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from
appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law

enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the
life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered
in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background
information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to
mislead the investigator or to the court.

CONSPIRACY AND
PROPOSAL
TO COMMIT A FELONY

When conspiracy and proposal
punishable
Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony are

punishable only in the cases in which the law
specially provides a penalty therefor. [REV. PEN.
CODE, art. 8]

Conspiracy
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons

come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. [REV. PEN.
CODE, art. 8]

Conspiracy as an offense and as a rule
Conspiracy may be a separate indictable offense or a
rule for collectivizing criminal liability. [People v. Peralta, 25
SCRA 759 (1968)]

Conspiracy as a separate
indictable offense
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law
provides a penalty therefore as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
[REV. PEN. CODE, art. 8 and People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968)]

Conspiracies punished in the
Revised Penal Code
1. Conspiracy to commit treason [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 115]
2. Conspiracy to commit coup d’etat, rebellion and insurrection

[REV. PEN. CODE, art. 136]
3. Conspiracy to commit sedition [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 141]
4. Brigandage [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 306]

Some conspiracies punished in
special penal laws
1. Conspiracy to commit arson [PRES. DECREE NO. 1613 (1979), SEC. 7]
2. Conspiracy to commit (a) importation of any dangerous drug and/or

controlled precursor and essential chemical, (b) sale, trading, dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical, (c) maintenance of a den, dive or
resort where any dangerous drug is used in any form, (d) manufacture of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical; and (e)
cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs [REP.
ACT NO. 9165 (2002), sec. 26]

3. Anti-competitive agreements [REP. ACT NO. 10667 (2015), sec. 14 & 30]
4. Conspiracy to commit terrorism [REP. ACT NO. 11479 (2019), sec. 7]
5. Conspiracy to commit the crime of financing of terrorism and dealing with

property or funds of designated persons [REP. ACT NO. 10168 (2011), sec.
5]

Conspiracy as a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission
of the crime or crimes perpetrated in the furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act
of all. [People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968)]

The convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming
and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of
them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is
generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but as a rule
for collectivizing criminal liability. [People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759
(1968)]

Proof of conspiracy
Conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence, as
clearly and convincingly as the crime itself. [People v. Listerio, 335 SCRA 40 (2000)]
While conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive

evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. Since by its nature,
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct
evidence. Consequently, competent and circumstantial evidence will suffice to
establish conspiracy. [People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968)]

Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative
of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. [People v.
Listerio, 335 SCRA 40 (2000)]

Liability of conspirators
Once conspiracy is proved, all of the co-conspirators who acted in
furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals.
However, in order to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal, it must be

established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by
lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of
the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as
to move them to executing the conspiracy. [People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968)]

Chain conspiracy v. Wheel conspiracy
Wheel or circle conspiracy exists when there is a single person or
group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the “spokes”).
The chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of

narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer. [Estada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, 26 February 2002]

People v. Peralta
25 SCRA 759 (1968)
Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog,
Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna, convicts confined in the New Bilibi Prison
and members of the Oxo gang, attacked and killed three members of the Sigue
Sigue gang. They came from Building 4-A and went to Building 4-B and later
4-C where they killed the three victims.
The trial court convicted them of the three murders and sentenced them to
three death penalties. The Supreme Court affirmed their convictions. More
importantly, the Syupreme Court held that the accused acted in conspiracy with
each other.

The Supreme Court clarified the doctrine on conspiracy, with particular
emphasis on the facets relating to its nature, the quantum of proof required, the
scope and extent of the criminal liability of the conspirators, and the penalties
imposable by mandate of applicable law.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally,
conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to
the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are

liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective
active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is
the act of all.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of
any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
While conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive

evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. Since by it nature,
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct
evidence. Consequently, competent and convincing circumstantial evidence
will suffice to establish conspiracy.
A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once

conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the
common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal
liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy.

However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of
the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest
of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy.
The difference between an accused who is a principal under any of the three
categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code and a co-
conspirator who is also a principal is that while the former's criminal liability is
limited to his own acts, as a general rule, the latter's responsibility includes the
acts of his fellow conspirators.

Since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, then, perforce, each of
the conspirators is liable for all of the crimes committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Consequently, if the conspirators commit three separate and distinct
crimes of murder in effecting their common design and purpose, each of them
is guilty of three murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each
offense.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are two distinct,

though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is
determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and, proved,
whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the
penalty or penalties imposed.

In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not
concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence,
since actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like successful
escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the
prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to
reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved
and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have
to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that
there are only two modes of serving two or more (multiple)
penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more
penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so
permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal
sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148965, 26 February 2002
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five
criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family,
his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of
the Ombudsman.
Petitioner Estrada contended that the Sandiganbayan erred in "sustaining
the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators,
with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected – contrary to the
dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of
substantive due process.”

The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the
crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how
plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe
in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former
President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs
correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate
act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the
offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention
petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts
- that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to
purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the
Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These
two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by
the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate
act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John
Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank.
This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.

From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that
all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts,
conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not
certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each
other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In
light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy
entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs
(b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate
acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President
whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.

We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate
acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate
Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief and
folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where
charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government
prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed
by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate
case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation
of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were
filed against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was
enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733,
viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal
enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons,
here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of
malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard
against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting
influence of power."

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in
material damage to the national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold
network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be
united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their
different criminal acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended
Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The
gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to
receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of
the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares
of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of
them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.

In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple
conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or
"circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub")
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes");
and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or
other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation
in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar
to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes
are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in
the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth.

Difference between a principal under Article
17 of the Revised Penal Code and a co-
conspirator
The difference between an accused who is a principal under any
of the three categories enumerated in Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code and a co-conspirator who is also a principal is that while the
former’s criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a general
rule, the latter’s responsibility includes the acts of his fellow
conspirators. [People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968)]

Proposal
There is a proposal when the person who has

decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to
some other person or persons. [REV. PEN. CODE,
art. 8]

Proposals punished in the
Revised Penal Code
1. Proposal to commit treason [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 115]
2. Proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion and

insurrection [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 136]
3. Proposal to commit sedition [REV. PEN. CODE, art.

141]

MULTIPLE OR
REPEAT
OFFENDERS

Multiple or Repeat Offenders
1. Recidivism
2. Habituality
3. Quasi-recividism
4. Habitual Delinquency

Recidivist
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of
the Revised Penal Code. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 14(9)]

Effect of recidivism
Recidivism is a generic aggravating circumstance which
would result of the imposition of the penalty in its maximum
period if there is no mitigating circumstance. [REV. PEN.
CODE, art. 64]
However, as a generic aggravating circumstance, it can be

offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

People v. Lagarto
196 SCRA 611 (1991)
Eugenio Lagarto fatally stabbed the victim who was buying fish in the
market. An Information was filed against Lagarto for murder which also alleged
that he is a recidivist for having been previously convicted of murder. Lagarto
pleaded guilty during arraignment but the prosecution still presented its
evidence.
The trial court convicted Lagarto of murder and appreciated in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which was offset by the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. He was sentenced to the
death penalty. Recidivism and treachery was also found by the trial court
against Lagarto.

The Supreme Court affirmed the finding that Lagarto was a recidivist. A
recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of the Revised Penal Code. Lagarto had been convicted of the crime of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of the present Criminal
Case No. 1566.
Lagarto’s counsel alleged that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was
rendered on September 15, 1983, hence when the accused was arraigned on
October 11, 1983 for Criminal Case No. 1566, he was not a recidivist.
He was of the opinion that "the time of trial" is to be reckoned with the date
of the arraignment.

The Supreme Court held that the phrase "at the time of his trial" should not
be restrictively construed as to mean the date of arraignment.
The phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is employed in its general
sense, including the rendering of the judgment. The phrase "at the trial" is
meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from
arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court. In the
case at bar, the accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473
on September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the judgment therein became
final on October 11, 1983. The second conviction was rendered on October 26,
1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist: the
accused had been convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the
judgment for the second offense.

People v. Tolentino
G.R. No. L-48740, 5 August 1942
Appelant questioned the correctness of the additional penalty of six years

and one day of prision mayor imposed by the court because of his habitual
delinquency. It was alleged that accused Faustino Tolentino y de Dios is a
habitual delinquent, he having been convicted of the crimes of theft and estafa
by final judgments rendered by competent court, as follows:

Date of Date of Crime Sentence Date of release
commission sentence
10-13-25 Qualified theft, 6 months and P3 indemnity 3-18-26
MCDE-16887
10-29-26 10-30-26 Theft, NCDE - 3 months and 1 day 1-20-27
42165
8-1-27 8-1-27 Qualified theft, 6 months 1 day and P15 indemnity 8-10-30
NCDE-57895
9-14-35 9-30-35 Estafa, CFID- 2 months 1 day arresto mayor, to
50973 return the bicycle stolen or its
value P40, and additional penalty
of 2 years 4 months 21 days of
prision correccional, and costs.

Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the
last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods:chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium period; andchanrobles virtual law library
(c) Upon fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided
for the last crime of which he be found guilty a guilty to the additional penalty of prision mayor
in its maximum period to the reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the penalties to be imposed upon the
offender in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent if within a
period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto,
estafa, or falsificacion, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.

A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, and in imposing the
principal penalty upon him the aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to
be taken into account. In fixing the penalty provided by law for the last crime as
required in paragraph 5 ( a) ( b), and ( c) of article 62 of the Revised Penal
Code, the court cannot disregard articles 14 (9) and Revised Penal Code, which
respectively define recidivism as an aggravating circumstance and lay down the
rule for the application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However,
for the purpose of fixing the additional penalty, recidivism cannot be taken as
an aggravating circumstance for the reason it is inherent in habitual
delinquency.
It results that this is appellant's fifth conviction, and accordingly, he must be
sentenced under paragraph 5 ( c) of article 62 to the additional penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period. This penalty must be imposed in its minimum degree because of the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
Habituality
The offender has previously been punished for an
offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 14(10)]

Effect of habituality
Habituality is a generic aggravating circumstance which
would result of the imposition of the penalty in its maximum
period if there is no mitigating circumstance. [REV. PEN.
CODE, art. 64]
However, as a generic aggravating circumstance, it can be

offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

People v. Real
G.R. No. 93436, 24 March 1995
Accused Real appeals from a judgment convicting him of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 and costs.
The information against appellant read as follows:
“That on or about March 11, 1978, in the morning thereof, at the Poblacion of the Municipality of Aroroy, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and criminally attack, assault and hack with a sharp bolo
one Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing, hitting the latter on the nape, causing an injury which caused the death of the said
Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing several days thereafter.
That the accused is a recidivist having been convicted by the Municipal Court of Aroroy, in the following cases:
Crime Date of Conviction
1. Ill treatment by Deed — July 6, 1965
2. Grave Threats — November 25, 1968”

The Supreme Court held that the accused was only guilty of homicide and
that the attending circumstance was reiteracion and NOT reincidencia as
alleged in the information.
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously

convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the
Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion, the
offender shall have been punished previously for an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it
attaches a lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]). Unlike in
reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime different in kind from
that for which he was previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences
and Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).

Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 266, Title Eight) and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He
was convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249,
Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the
aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against him is recidivism under Article
14[g] rather than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous
offenses should not be embraced in the same title of the Code. While grave threats fall
in title (Title Nine) different from homicide (Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be
appreciated because such aggravating circumstance requires that if there is only one
prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the
one for which the accused has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove
that the offender has been punished for the previous offense. There is no evidence
presented by the prosecution to that effect.

Quasi-recidivist
A quasi-recidivist is any person who shall commit a
felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving
the same. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 160]

Quasi-recidivism
Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance
where a person, after having been convicted by final
judgment, shall commit a felony before beginning to serve
such sentence or while serving the same. He shall be
punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony. [Luis B. Reyes,
Revised Penal Code, Book Two, Nineteenth Edition, 2017,
p. 183]

Effect of quasi-recidivism
Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of
the accused with the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony, and it cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. [People v.
Layson, G.R. No. L-25177, 31 October 1969]

People v. Layson
G.R. No. L-25177, 31 October 1969
On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to
death, they were inmates of the Davao Penal Colony serving sentences of
conviction for the following crimes:
Nicolas — kidnapping with robbery, homicide,
Layson homicide and theft;
Cezar Ragub — frustrated murder and homicide;
Cezar Fugoso — robbery in an inhabited house and theft;
Joventino — robbery hold-up and robbery in an

Garces uninhabited house.

Gasang died shortly due to severe internal and external hemorrhage and
shock, all secondary to multiple stab wounds.
Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the
latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he
killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a week before. The four plotted to
kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying.
On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder.
Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de officio, freely
and spontaneously pleaded guilty.
On September 30, 1965 the court rendered its decision convicting them of
murder.

The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was
correctly considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the
offense, were undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous convictions.
Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the accused with the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the material
facts and circumstances alleged in the information. The crime of murder is punished with
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Because of the attendance of the special
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to affirming
the death penalty imposed by the court a quo.
It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance
of having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches lighter
penalties because the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender
against whom it is considered shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here
all the accused were yet serving their respective sentences at the time of the commission of the
murder.

Habitual delinquent
A person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if
within a period of ten (10) years from the date of his
release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robo (robbery), hurto (theft),
estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said
crimes a third time or oftener. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 62(5)]

Requisites of habitual delinquency
1. That the offender has been convicted of any of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa or falsification
2. That after that conviction or after serving his sentence,
he again committed, and, within ten (10) years from his
release or first conviction, he was again convicted of
any of the said crimes for the second time

3. That after his conviction of, or after serving sentence
for, the second offense, he again committed, and, within
10 years from his last release or last conviction, he was
again convicted of any of said offense, the third time or
oftener [Luis B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book One,
Nineteenth Edition, 2017, p. 729]

Effects of habitual delinquency
Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by
law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
(b) Upon a fourth conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for
the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum and medium period; and
(c) Upon fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty a guilty to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to the reclusion temporal in its
minimum period. [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 62(5)]

People v. Bernal
G.R. No. L-44988, 31 October 1936
Canuto Bernal was charged with theft of roosters with the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and habitual delinquency since he has been
convicted thrice of the same crime of theft before this last crime.
In the evening of October 11, 1935, Bernal, without the owner's consent,
took six gamecocks belonging to two different owners. It has equally been
established that the accused had been thrice convicted of the crime of theft; the
first time on April 25, 1935 by the justice of the peace court of San Pablo,
Laguna; the second time on June 24, 1935 by the justice of the peace court of
San Pablo, Laguna; and third time on October 19, 1935, by the justice of the
peace court of Tanauan, Batangas.

Bernal argued that he the conviction on October 19, 1935 for the crime of
theft should not be counted against him because it took place after the
commission of the offense at bar on the 11th of the said month and year. Thus,
it was only his third conviction and not fourth conviction.
The Supreme Court agreed. It held that the third conviction, having taken
place after the commission of the last offense with which Bernal is now
charged, should not be reckoned with in determining habitual delinquency and
the additional penalty to be imposed. It was thus only his third conviction.
The Supreme Court also appreciated recidivism against Bernal.

The question arose whether or not in instances where the accused turns out
to be an habitual delinquent the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, when
alleged and proved, should be taken into account in fixing the penalty
applicable for the commission of the principal offense, independently of the
additional penalty provided by law for habitual delinquency. It has been urged
that said aggravating should not be considered, otherwise it would be twice
held against the accused inasmuch as it is necessarily taken into account in
ascertaining whether he is a habitual delinquent or not. The majority of the
court held to the contrary view, namely, that recidivism should be reckoned
with.

It is not correct to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account when
the accused is declared an habitual delinquent and when it is deemed to
aggravate the crime in fixing the principal penalty to be imposed, because
recidivism as an aggravating circumstance modifying criminal liability is not an
inherent or integral element of habitual delinquency which the Revised Penal
Code considers as an extraordinary and special aggravating circumstance.
For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the date of his
trial, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title. For the existence of habitual delinquency, it is not
enough that the accused shall have been convicted of any of the crimes
specified, and that the last conviction shall have taken place ten (10) years
before the commission of the last offense. It is necessary that the crimes
previously committed be prior to the commission of the offense with which the
accused is charged a third time or oftener.
CORPORATE
CRIMINAL
LIABILITY

Can a corporation be held criminally liable?
In West Coast Insurance Co. v. Hurd, G.R. No. L-8527, 30 March 1914 , the
Supreme Court acknowledged that defendant’s counsel cited many cases which
show that corporations have been proceeded against criminally by indictment
and otherwise and have been punished as malefactors by the courts. Of this, of
course, there can be no doubt; but it is clear that, in those cases, the statute, by
express words or by necessary intendment, included corporations within the
persons who could offend against the criminal laws; and the legislature, at the
same time established a procedure applicable to corporations. These crimes
should not require a willful purpose or malicious intent.

In Ching v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.164317, 6 February 2006 , the
Supreme Court stated that a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for a
crime if the imposable penalty is fine. Even if the statute prescribes both fine
and imprisonment as penalty, a corporation may be prosecuted and, if found
guilty, may be fined.

Some special penal laws make corporations criminally liable
1. Republic Act No. 8282 (1997) or the Social Security Law provides that,
when the act or omission it penalizes is committed by an association,
partnership or corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors
or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided therein [Rep. Act No. 8282
(1997), sec. 28(f)]
2. Republic Act No. 10173 (2012) or the Data Privacy Act of 2012
provides that, if the offender is a corporation, partnership or any juridical
person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the responsible officers, as the case
may be, who participated in, or by their gross negligence, allowed the
commission of the crime. If the offender is a juridical person, the court may
suspend or revoke any of its rights under the law [Rep. Act No. 10173 (2012),
sec. 34]
3. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10175 (2012) or the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 provides for Corporate Liability. When any of the
punishable acts in the law are knowingly committed on behalf of or for the
benefit of a juridical person, by a natural person acting either individually or as
part of an organ of the juridical person, the juridical person shall be held liable
for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7 up to a
maximum of Ten million pesos (PhP10,000,000.00). The liability imposed on
the juridical person shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the
natural person who has committed the offense.
4. Republic Act No. 11232 (2018) or the Revised Corporation Code

punishes a corporation with fines for certain acts, including fraudulent conduct
of business, a corporation used for fraud or for committing or concealing graft
and corrupt practices, engaging intermediaries for graft anfd corrupt practices,
or other violations of the Code [Rep. Act No. 11232 (2018), sec. 165-167, 170]

Section 171 of the Revised Corporation Code states that, if the offender is a
corporation, the penalty may, at the discretion of the court, be imposed upon
such corporation and/or upon its directors, trustees, stockholders. members,
officers, or employees responsible for the violation or indispensable to its
commission

West Coast Insurance Co. v. Geo Hurd
G.R. No. L-8527, 30 March 1914
An Information for libel was filed against West Coast Insurance Co., John
Northcott and Manuel Gray before the Court of First Instance of Manila, which
issued a process ordering accused to appear before the court. A Petition for
Prohibition was filed by West Coast Insurance Co. before the Supreme Court to
enjoin the CFI from proceeding with the criminal prosecution of the
corporation. This was granted by the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the CFI has no power or authority, under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, to proceed against a corporation, as such, criminally, to bring it into
court for the purpose of making it amenable to the criminal laws. The Supreme
Court held that, under the then Code of Criminal Procedure, there was no
intention or expectation that corporations would be included among those who
would fall within the provisions thereof.
However, corporations have been proceeded against criminally, if so
provided by law. Corporations cannot commit a crime where willful purpose or
malicious intent is required. The criminal liability is usually restricted to its
officers and not to corporations.
There are many cases cited by counsel for the defendant which show that
corporations have been proceeded against criminally by indictment and
otherwise and have been punished as malefactors by the courts. Of this, of
course, there can be no doubt; but it is clear that, in those cases, the statute, by
express words or by necessary intendment, included corporations within the
persons who could offend against the criminal laws; and the legislature, at the
same time established a procedure applicable to corporations. No case has been
cited to us where a corporation has been proceeded against under a criminal
statute where the court did not exercise its common law powers or where there
was not in force a special procedure applicable to corporations.
The courts of the Philippine Islands are creatures of statute and, as we have
said, have only those powers conferred upon them by statute and those which are
required to exercise that authority fully and adequately. The courts here have no
common law jurisdiction or powers. If they have any powers not conferred by
statute, expressly or impliedly, they would naturally come from Spanish and not
from common law sources. It is undoubted that, under the Spanish criminal law
and procedure, a corporation could not have been proceeded against criminally, as
such, if such an entity as a corporation in fact existed under the Spanish law, and as
such it could not have committed a crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious
intent was required. Criminal actions would have been restricted or limited, under
that system, to the officials of such corporations and never would have been
directed against the corporation itself. This was the rule with relation to
associations or combinations of persons approaching, more or less, the corporation
as it is now understood, and it would undoubtedly have been the rue with
corporations. From this source, then, the courts derive no authority to bring
corporations before them in criminal actions, nor to issue processes for that
purpose.
Ching v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No.164317, 6 February 2006
RCBC filed estafa complaint against Alfredo Ching, Senior Vice President
of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc., for 13 trust receipts issued in favor of
PBMI which were not paid and/or returned.
The Supreme Court upheld the filing of the criminal case against Ching
pursuant to Section 13 of Pres. Decree No. 115 or the Trust Receipts Law.,
which provides that , if the violation or offense is committed by a corporation,
partnership, association or other judicial entities, the penalty provided for in
this Decree shall be imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other
officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the
civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense.

Since a corporation cannot be proceeded against criminally because it
cannot commit crime in which personal violence or malicious intent is required,
criminal action is limited to the corporate agents guilty of an act amounting to a
crime and never against the corporation itself.
The crime defined in P.D. No. 115 is malum prohibitum but is classified as
estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, or estafa
with abuse of confidence. It may be committed by a corporation or other
juridical entity or by natural persons. However, the penalty for the crime is
imprisonment for the periods provided in said Article 315 x x x.

Though the entrustee is a corporation, nevertheless, the law specifically
makes the officers, employees or other officers or persons responsible for the
offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities of such corporation and/or
board of directors, officers, or other officials or employees responsible for the
offense. The rationale is that such officers or employees are vested with the
authority and responsibility to devise means necessary to ensure compliance
with the law and, if they fail to do so, are held criminally accountable; thus,
they have a responsible share in the violations of the law.

If the crime is committed by a corporation or other juridical entity, the
directors, officers, employees or other officers thereof responsible for the
offense shall be charged and penalized for the crime, precisely because of the
nature of the crime and the penalty therefor. A corporation cannot be arrested
and imprisoned; hence, cannot be penalized for a crime punishable by
imprisonment. However, a corporation may be charged and prosecuted for
a crime if the imposable penalty is fine. Even if the statute prescribes both
fine and imprisonment as penalty, a corporation may be prosecuted and, if
found guilty, may be fined.

A crime is the doing of that which the penal code forbids to be done, or
omitting to do what it commands. A necessary part of the definition of every
crime is the designation of the author of the crime upon whom the penalty is to
be inflicted. When a criminal statute designates an act of a corporation or a
crime and prescribes punishment therefor, it creates a criminal offense which,
otherwise, would not exist and such can be committed only by the corporation.
But when a penal statute does not expressly apply to corporations, it does not
create an offense for which a corporation may be punished. On the other hand,
if the State, by statute, defines a crime that may be committed by a corporation
but prescribes the penalty therefor to be suffered by the officers, directors, or
employees of such corporation or other persons responsible for the offense,
only such individuals will suffer such penalty. Corporate officers or employees,
through whose act, default or omission the corporation commits a crime, are
themselves individually guilty of the crime.

The principle applies whether or not the crime requires the consciousness of
wrongdoing. It applies to those corporate agents who themselves commit the
crime and to those, who, by virtue of their managerial positions or other similar
relation to the corporation, could be deemed responsible for its commission, if
by virtue of their relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent
the act. Moreover, all parties active in promoting a crime, whether agents or
not, are principals. Whether such officers or employees are benefited by their
delictual acts is not a touchstone of their criminal liability. Benefit is not an
operative fact.

Persons Criminally Liable

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Persons Criminally Liable

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

3. Accessories [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 16]

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

2. Accomplices [REV. PEN. CODE, art. 16]

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

2. Principals by inducement or those who directly force or induce others to

3. Principals by indispensable cooperation or those who cooperate in the

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

1. That they participated in the criminal resolution; and

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

1. By directly forcing another to commit a crime; and

2. By directly inducing another to commit a crime. [Luis B.

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

A person who cooperates in the commission of the

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Montealegre was correctly considered by the trial court as a co-principal for

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

The requisites of Article 17(3) are: (1) participating in the criminal

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

The Spouses Nierra are liable as principals by inducement and as co-

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica

Persons Criminally Liable Dan P. Calica