Are We Prepared For Biological Terror?: Nature and Duality

Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 1
Are we prepared for biological terror?
Nature and Duality
© Karl Simpson 2006

Let us look at biological threats

Since 11 September 2001, 5 persons are thought
to have died from deliberate contamination with
Anthrax - none in Europe.
In the same period over 20 million people died from
AIDS, TB and Malaria.
Altogether natural infections probably killed over
100 million world-wide. Many diseases are
unrecognised infections - cancers caused by
viruses, heart disease caused by Chlamydia
pneumoniae etc.

What use for biological weapons?

Toxins apart, BW are not battlefield weapons.
Living pathogens take time to incubate, but in the
period before engagement, can eliminate combat
readiness, destroy public morale and harm
economies. The “Spanish Influenza” of 1918-19,
which killed perhaps 50 million, probably did
more damage to the global economy than the
First World War!
For economic aggression - food supplies or

strategic capabilities may be targeted. For
example a bacterium might be developed
specifically to attack the lubricating oil used in a
weapons platform.
Duality is fundamental
The desirable biodegradation of petrochemical

spills might lead directly to an agent destroying a
weapons platform lubricant.
Should we ban research into oil-eating microbes?

The European Union and dual use: 1

Council of European Union 10 December 2003



30. A) 3)


30. A) 5)

Vaccine development and weapon

development - one technology
Traditional vaccine technologies frequently use live
attenuated microbes grown in fermenters. These
same fermenters can be used for producing fully
active offensive agents (such as anthrax or smallpox).
Should dual use worries add another layer of difficulty

for vaccine producers? This will hurt children and
developing nations most.
Is this what we want?

Technology moves fast - can we follow?
Technology Generation
Area First Second Third Fourth
chemical testing, urea for genome analysis, linked to
Diagnostics example
Enzyme-linked immuno-assays PCR-based DNA assays
preventive intervention
rationally derived cellular and gene therapies
chemical substances, antibiotics, therapies based on pharmaceuticals, from rDNA directed primarily to the
Therapeutics biologicals isolated from biochemical or physiological and combinatorial chemistry, individual. New therapies
human and animal sources rationale sophisticated peptides and resulting from intermediary
hormones metabolism studies
rDNA rationally attenuated therapeutic vaccines, cancer
live attenuated vaccines,
Protection whole cell killed vaccines
purified antigen vaccines
vaccines, rDNA-derived vaccines, vaccines as
antigens mediators of gene therapy
modulation of immune system
skin grafting, kidney to control rejection.
transplantation between widespread use of xenografting, in-vitro tissue
Human materials blood transfusion relatives, improved tissue transplantation technologies. and organ growth, effective
typing, isolation of plasma- Replacement of human and safe blood substitutes.
derived products materials by recombinant
analogues.
Complete integration of
Related bunsun burners, test tubes, analysis operations in robotic, Full instrumentation package
microprocessor controlled
colorimeters, PC-controlled instrument with on a "chip". RISC PC control.
instrument spectrophotometers, manual
instruments. Sample volumes
individual microprocessor Up to 000s of analyses.
down to less than 1 ml.
development operation controlled modules. Volumes Sample volumes sub microlitre.
down to tens of microlitres.

Biological weapons affect animals, plants

and biodegradable materials
In the First World War the British planned to use
anthrax to damage the German army’s transport
capability - then still dependent on horses.
The 1969-71 Southern Corn Blight outbreak

destroyed 15% of the USA’s maize crop.
The post-reunification German government supported

research to biodegrade the plastic body of East
German Trabant motor vehicles which constituted a
stock of ecologically undesirable organic material.

Concerns about biological weapons -

the up-side of dual use
Fear of deliberately aimed biological weapons

arguably is creating a useful capacity to react to “The
Next Virus”.
New R&D into pathogens, new vaccine production

capability and reinforced epidemiological surveillance
targeted at biological weapons use, have a direct and
positive effect on civil and military readiness for
Bioterror or Mother Nature’s next aberration.

Costs of biological agents - plants
In the opening years of the 21st century crop losses

from diseases and parasites cost the USA up to $5
billion per annum.
This loss is to the benefit of foreign competitors.
When does economic competition step over the line

into economic warfare?

Costs of biological agents - human
In Europe of the 25 EU members health delivery

is about 12% of GDP or about €800 billion. Total
cost of health delivery in the USA is about 15%
of GDP, $4,000 per person or over
$1 trillion!
About 15% of this gigantic total, about €300

billion will represent the overall costs of fighting
infection.
How much do we spend on preparedness?

Infectious agents can ruin the EU economy
Man-made or natural infectious outbreaks could

decimate the global economy.
Randomly taking 20 million workers out of the

EU economy would have catastrophic
consequences. Treating 20 million sick, and
perhaps dying, would be an enormous
(insurmountable?) logistical challenge.

Since 1972 signatories to the Biological

and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
have renounced weapons development
Most have honoured this commitment, but the
USSR and now Russia have been
conspicuously in breach. The USA has been
accused.
All G7 nations have the capacity (i.e. dual-use

potential) to move from vaccine production to
weapons production in days.

New initiatives to prevent weapons

proliferation - are they realistic?
• Restricting access to scientific data for

certain categories of person
• Classification of certain areas of biological

research
• Restricting access to the tools for genetic

manipulation

In my view - NO!
Responsible editorial practice has until now

limited the untoward use of potentially harmful
scientific information. Change is unnecessary.
The new biology has great potential to do good

in the world, yet unfounded scare campaigns in
the rich nations are preventing poor nations’
access to essential technologies.
Look at the EU’s ridiculous stance on food

produced from gene modified organisms.

And NO again!
Why should the rich world have a say in how Iran
or Egypt develop vaccines? Our record is not
good. Where are the vaccines for malaria, AIDS,
or TB? Where are the plans for generating
economic growth in the most needy of nations?
It is easy to recruit poor individuals in poor

societies by telling them that the rich western
world is responsible.
Are we supporting terrorists by failing to address

global health and economic issues?

We create enemies!
Is the theoretical possession, or capability of

deployment, of "weapons of mass destruction"
(and the resulting isolation and sanctions) itself
used as an economic weapon against those
developing nations which dare to defy the
economic hegemony of the rich?
Will dual-use potential be used as an argument to

prevent access to essential technologies?

How is Europe preparing?

Together with the USA, Europe is a major
contributor to the growth of knowledge in life
science.
Overall Europe’s (EU plus Switzerland) public
sector probably spends about €10 billion on life
science research.
Europe’s private sector spends about €28 billion on
life science research (mostly in the pharmaceutical
sector).

Biological research and defence

What basic research has relevance to defence and
preparedness for infectious or toxin agents?
Epidemiologylooks at disease in populations
Microbiology looks at infectious agents
Immunology natural response to infection
Vaccinology vaccine surrogates for agents
Human, animal and plant biology cover the range of

human health and economic consequences of attacking animal and
plant food sources.

Risk and Threat

The tools of modern biology are susceptible to mis-
use. This is also true for motor vehicles,
screwdrivers or kitchen knives. Any heavy object
can be used as a weapon.
So with modern biology a RISK of abuse exists. But
is it true to suggest that this risk translates into
THREAT that is to say a “real and present danger”.
Preparedness should seek to identify the
translation of risk into threat. When does a kitchen
knife become a weapon? When does a fermenter
become a weapon producing tool?

Government/Industrial collaboration
European and US industry lead the world in
vaccine development capability, fermentation
technologies and fast response to challenges.
Together with public health laboratories and
academic research, industry can act quickly to
respond or to anticipate an epidemic disease
manifestation.
Government must catalyse the relevant dialogue
through structured initiatives that offer sensible
incentives to industrial and public sector partners.

Conclusions
• Dual use potential is everywhere
• However, the risk in the area of modern biology
is - I believe - exaggerated
• The naturally emerging Next Virus may be
deadly
• Industry has capability but little incentive to be
prepared - dual-use issues are a constraint!
• Sensible application of a BTWC protocol,
coupled with minor reinforcement of existing
regulatory regimes could avoid dual-abuse.

Karl Simpson
Bénézech - Simpson
Hameau de Bobon
07610 VION
France
Tel: +33-4-75 06 86 30
E-Mail: karl@simpson.nom.fr
http://www.simpson.nom.fr

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Biosecurity--Terror versus Nature 1

Are we prepared for biological terror?

Nature and Duality

© Karl Simpson 2006

Let us look at biological threats

© Karl Simpson 2006

What use for biological weapons?

For economic aggression - food supplies or

The desirable biodegradation of petrochemical

Should we ban research into oil-eating microbes?

© Karl Simpson 2006

The European Union and dual use: 1

© Karl Simpson 2006

The European Union and dual use: 2

© Karl Simpson 2006

The European Union and dual use: 3

© Karl Simpson 2006

The European Union and dual use: 4

© Karl Simpson 2006

Vaccine development and weapon

Should dual use worries add another layer of difficulty

Is this what we want?

© Karl Simpson 2006

Technology moves fast - can we follow?

© Karl Simpson 2006

Biological weapons affect animals, plants

The 1969-71 Southern Corn Blight outbreak

The post-reunification German government supported

© Karl Simpson 2006

Concerns about biological weapons -

Fear of deliberately aimed biological weapons

New R&D into pathogens, new vaccine production

© Karl Simpson 2006

Costs of biological agents - plants

In the opening years of the 21st century crop losses

This loss is to the benefit of foreign competitors.

When does economic competition step over the line

© Karl Simpson 2006

Costs of biological agents - human

In Europe of the 25 EU members health delivery

About 15% of this gigantic total, about €300

How much do we spend on preparedness?

© Karl Simpson 2006

Infectious agents can ruin the EU economy

Man-made or natural infectious outbreaks could

Randomly taking 20 million workers out of the

© Karl Simpson 2006

Since 1972 signatories to the Biological

All G7 nations have the capacity (i.e. dual-use

© Karl Simpson 2006

New initiatives to prevent weapons

• Restricting access to scientific data for

• Classification of certain areas of biological

• Restricting access to the tools for genetic

© Karl Simpson 2006

Responsible editorial practice has until now

The new biology has great potential to do good

Look at the EU’s ridiculous stance on food