LAW ON

PROPERTY
CASE REPORTING
By: ESPINOSA, VON LESLIE L.
 SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, et al. - G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR. et al - G.R. No. 92047
Guttierez, J.

FACTS:
• These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Japan.
• The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and
listed under the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958.
• In 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan
• In 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan
including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.

• These petitions have been consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the objective is the same - to
stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
 SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, et al. - G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR. et al - G.R. No. 92047

• The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for public service". He
states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State.
They added that it cannot be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it
cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts.

• The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject property is not
governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. The respondents add that
even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to
become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for
public service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code).
 SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, et al. - G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR. et al - G.R. No. 92047

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property (Roponggi and others of its kind) cannot be alienated?

HELD:

• The petition was GRANTED. The Court ruled that the nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service
is expressly spelled out. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that
the property has become patrimonial.

• As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
 SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, et al. - G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR. et al - G.R. No. 92047

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

• ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
• ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth.
• ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
 SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, et al. - G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR. et al - G.R. No. 92047

• The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use.
• A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being
such;
• An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.
• Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the
property.
PHILIPPINE REFINING CO vs FRANCISCO JARQUE, et.al
G.R. No. L-41506 - March 25, 1935
Malcolm, J.

FACTS:

• The Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor
vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon
Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza.

• Thereafter, a petition was filed with the CFI of Cebu praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an
insolvent debtor, said petition was granted and an assignment of all the properties of the insolvent
was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.
PHILIPPINE REFINING CO vs FRANCISCO JARQUE, et.al
G.R. No. L-41506 - March 25, 1935

FACTS:

• Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage
contained such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered until within thirty days prior to the
commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque while the fourth mortgage was entered in
the chattel mortgage registry within the thirty-day period before the institution of insolvency
proceedings.

• Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages and sustained the
special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.
PHILIPPINE REFINING CO vs FRANCISCO JARQUE, et.al
G.R. No. L-41506 - March 25, 1935

ISSUE:
Whether or not vessels are considered as personal property and can be subject of Chattel Mortgage Law?

HELD:

• The Court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE. It was held that Vessels are considered personal property under the
civil law. Since the term "personal property" includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the
provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
Thank you!