Introduction to Philosophy

Lecture XXIV
Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good
— Part III
Dr. Daniel Kaufman
College of Continuing Education & The Extended University
Missouri State University
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

Aristotle’s account of moral virtue:

• Involves excellence in practical reasoning (the ability to identify the right thing to do) and
excellence in volition (choosing to do the right thing).
• This suggests that moral virtue is rational, but the question remains, in what sense of rationality?
• The sense of rationality that Aristotle has in mind, here, is that of prudence or moderation. Moral
virtue is rational in the sense of being prudent or prudential.
• Thus, the morally virtuous person is always the person of moderate temperament.
• The right thing to do will always be the moderate choice. The wrong thing to do will always
represent an extreme choice, either of excess—doing too much of something—or of deficiency—
doing too little of something.
• Aristotle’s account of moral virtue goes beyond mere mortality and includes a certain conception of
mental health. He observes that moderation is good for one’s body. (p. 25)
• Today, we tend to separate the concepts of moral virtue—which belong to religion or ethics—and
mental health—which belongs to psychology. Aristotle viewed such distinctions as artificial. The
mentally healthy person is the morally virtuous person and vice versa.
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

The Doctrine of the Golden Mean:

• Aristotle illustrates his account of moral virtue through a
number of examples. We will discuss the theory in light of
three moral virtues: courage, temperance, and honesty.
• One way of testing the soundness of his theory is to see
whether it gives the right account of things that we already
take to be virtues and vices.
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

The Doctrine of the Golden Mean:

Courage: a virtue that speaks to one’s willingness to take risks.
• The vice of excess: rashness (the vice of being too willing to
take risks)
• The vice of deficiency: cowardice (the vice of being too
unwilling to take risks)
• The virtue of moderation: courage (a moderate—i.e.
reasonable—willingness to take risks)
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

The Doctrine of the Golden Mean:

Temperance: a virtue that speaks to our capacity and willingness to control ourselves in the
pursuit of sensory pleasure
• The vice of excess: insensibility, prudishness with respect to sex (the vice of exercising too
much control over one’s pleasures)
• The vice of deficiency: gluttony [with respect to food] (the vice of exercising too little
control over one’s pleasures)
• The virtue of moderation: temperance (a moderate—i.e. reasonable—limitation of one’s
indulging in pleasures)
• There is an interesting difference between the way Aristotle thinks about moral virtue and
the way we, who belong to the Judeo-Christian tradition, think about it. We tend to think
of moral virtue in terms of extremes, because there are any number of things which our
religious traditions require that we never do or always do. For Aristotle, there is very little
if anything that is absolutely forbidden or always required.
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

The Doctrine of the Golden Mean:

Honesty: a virtue that speaks to our inclination to tell the truth.
• The vice of excess: indiscretion (the vice of telling the truth
too often)
• The vice of deficiency: dishonesty (the vice of telling the truth
too infrequently)
• The virtue of moderation: honesty (the virtue of telling the
truth, when it is appropriate)
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

The Doctrine of the Golden Mean:

Vice of Virtue of Vice of

deficiency moderation excessiveness
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

The Doctrine of the Golden Mean:

• Note that what counts as a virtue or vice is always relative—i.e. dependent on
the circumstances—because what counts as moderate or extreme depends on
the circumstances. For example, what counts as moderate drinking at
someone’s wedding party will be different from what counts as moderate
drinking the night before your final exams. Thus, while there can be a general
account of moral virtue, there can be no general principles or rules of morality.
The circumstances of life are many, varied, and heterogeneous, and thus, are
not amendable to rigid, general principles of action.
• This is why the chief attribute of the morally virtuous person is wisdom, which
means, in part, good judgment. One needs to have good judgment, precisely
because there are no rules or instructions for how to act. (pp. 24–25)
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

The Acquisition of Moral and Civic Virtue:

• Whether moral virtue is a matter of rule-following or a matter of
exercising judgment goes directly to the question of it is acquired.
• If moral virtue is a matter of soundness of judgment, then ethics
cannot be taught by way of explicit instruction.
• Aristotle’s view is that “teaching” moral virtue is a matter of inculcating
a sensitivity to the demands of circumstances; an ability to identify and
choose the right thing, given the situation.
• Aristotle likens the acquisition or moral virtue to the acquiring of a skill
in a trade.
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

The Acquisition of Moral and Civic Virtue:

• Skills in trades are typically acquired through practice, under the
guidance of a master-craftsman, in a system of apprenticeship. For
example, you become a good cabinetmaker by building cabinets, under
the guidance of a master cabinetmaker. You do not become a good
cabinetmaker by sitting in a classroom and having someone giving you
instructions on cabinet-making.
• Aristotle believes that moral and civic virtue is acquired in the same
way. A child—not yet morally virtuous—is under the supervision of
adults—who are already morally virtuous—and the process of his/her
moral development is very much a process of moral and civic
apprenticeship. (pp. 23–24)
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

Aristotle on the Contemplative Life:

• Books 1–9 describe Eudaimonia— the human good—as consisting of
the life of moral and civic virtue, but book 10 describes it as the life of
contemplation. Indeed, Aristotle says that contemplation is the highest
form of the good. He also says that the contemplative life is an amoral
life.
• The highest form of life for man, then, is neither good nor evil, but is a
life spent in the quest for knowledge.
• Aristotle believes that the life of contemplation is essentially the life of
a god, but it is one that certain people, in certain circumstances, may
be capable of living.
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

Aristotle on the Contemplative Life:

• A human being is a combination of both physical and divine elements:
the body is physical, but reason, in its contemplative form, has no
relationship to the body or to bodily life at all. It is concerned solely
with the truth.
• Because moral virtue involves the combination of reason with activity,
it is a prerequisite to being morally virtuous that one be embodied. A
disembodied creature, by definition, cannot engage in activity, and
thus, can be neither morally virtuous nor vicious. The gods, by
definition, then, cannot be morally virtuous or vicious. They are
contemplators and the life of contemplation, in which there is no
activity, but only thought, is by definition an amoral life. (pp. 197–198)
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

Aristotle on the Contemplative Life:

• Because contemplation is the distinctive quality of the Gods and the Gods
are higher in the order of being than human beings, the life of contemplation
must be the highest form of life; higher even than the life of moral virtue.
• The life of contemplation, however, is also a socially parasitic form of life: in
order for a society to support a caste of contemplators, it must be
prosperous and socially and politically stable. It also presupposes a high
level of civilization, in which people appreciate the role that the
contemplators play and are willing to devote resources to them. Thus, the
life of contemplation is simultaneously a luxury—a civilization can exist
without contemplators, but cannot exist without morally virtuous people—
while also being essential—a civilization may be able to exist without
contemplators, but it cannot become a great civilization without
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

Aristotle on the Contemplative Life:

Summary of Aristotle’s overall position on Eudaimonia: The life
of moral and civic virtue is the distinctively human form of
excellence, while the life of contemplation is a divine form or
excellence that some people can share in, under certain social,
political, and economic conditions.
Lecture XXIV Aristotle on Virtue and the Human Good — Part III

Next time: A brief discussion of Ancient Greek

politics.