TCC – College of Law

A/Y 2021 – 2022

Basic Legal and Judicial Ethics

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE

JUDICIARY
Case Review
 PROSECUTOR LEO T. CAHANAP
vs.
JUDGE LEONOR S. QUIÑONES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 6, ILIGAN CITY, LANAO DEL NORTE

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3987-RTJ),

January 10, 2018

Ponente: CAGUIOA, J.

Facts:
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint charging respondent with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross
Misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for the following alleged acts of respondent Judge:

First, Complainant alleged that in his last two (2) years as a prosecutor, he suffered unbearable and intolerable
oppression in the hands of respondent Judge.

In the case of People v. Inot, respondent got angry and objected to the leading questions asked during complainant's
re-direct examination, notwithstanding the fact that no objections were raised by the defense counsel.
 In the case of People v. Badelles, respondent issued an order blaming complainant for the failure of the forensic chemist
to bring the chemistry reports because complainant did not sufficiently specify the chemistry reports due to the court. In the
same case, respondent gave complainant a lecture on the proper demeanor and conduct in court while he was making a formal
offer of a testimony.

Complainant asserted that the prosecutors, who previously appeared before respondent, opted to be assigned to other
courts as they too experienced humiliation and harsh treatment from her. Further, respondent Judge's staff themselves were
subjected to respondent Judge's insolent behavior.

Second, Complainant further accused respondent of habitual tardiness.

Third, in the proceedings for the case of People v. Heck (Heck Case), respondent, in open court and heard by the public,
asked private complainant, Hanna Mamad, to go to her house because she was interested in buying jewelry items from her.

Lastly, complainant averred that respondent Judge also mistreated her court staff. Respondent allegedly shouted at a court
stenographer and called her "bogo" which meant dumb.

Respondent Judge berated another stenographer and shouted at the latter "punyeta ka" and "buwisit ka."

Issue:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable.
Held:
Yes. The Court has time and again reminded the members of the bench to faithfully observe the prescribed official hours
to inspire public respect for the justice system. It has issued Supervisory Circular No. 14 dated October 22, 1985, Circular No.
13 dated July 1, 1987, and Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, to reiterate the trial judges' mandate to
exercise punctuality in the performance of their duties.
The aforesaid circulars are restatements of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which enjoin judges to be punctual in the
performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value, and that if the
judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration of
justice.
The OCA aptly found that the testimonies of the prosecutors and the court staff unquestionably proved that respondent
failed to observe the prescribed official hours as repeatedly enjoined by the Court. Respondent Judge's own branch clerk of
court even testified that court sessions commenced between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. although the Minutes of the Proceedings
reflected the time at 8:30 a.m.
The OCA also correctly observed that respondent Judge failed to show compassion, patience, courtesy and civility to
lawyers who appear before her in contravention of the mandates of the Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets the high standards
of demeanor all judges must observe.
The Court is convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of Oppression as shown in several incidents of misbehavior by
respondent Judge.
The Court has previously ruled that "[a] display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior
incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.“
In view of the foregoing, the Court declared respondent guilty of (1) Oppression (gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct) and (2) Habitual Tardiness.
Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly
provides:

Section 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate

consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers,
court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any
irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
In relation to Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
provides that judges must always be courteous and patient with lawyers,
litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her court, thus:
Rule 3.04- A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to
lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses and others
appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling
into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead
of the courts to the litigants.
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct likewise
states:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the Court hereby finds respondent
Presiding Judge Leonor S. Quiñones, Branch 6,
Regional Trial Court, Iligan City GUILTY of (1)
Oppression (gross misconduct constituting violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct) and FINED in the
amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00); and (2)
Habitual Tardiness and FINED in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
The Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 6, Regional
Trial Court, Iligan City) is hereby DIRECTED to
SUBMIT a status report on the working relationship in
the court within fifteen (15) days from the end of each
semester for two (2) years.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
VALENTIN BARING, JR.

GR No. 137933, Jan 28, 2002

Ponente: BUENA, J.
Facts:
Valentin Baring, Jr. was indicted of statutory rape committed against a seven-year-old girl. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision convicting him of statutory rape and is sentenced to death by lethal injection. Because of the penalty
imposed, it was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

The accused-appellant filed a petition to the Court to dismiss the case which is the subject of automatic review for
reason that the decision of the trial court is bereft of material facts supporting the conviction.

He averred that the lower court erred in promulgating a brief and short decision with material facts that have been
omitted with no allusions to the transcripts of records erroneous of tenses and grammar jotted by the Court Stenographer.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court’s decision is clear and distinct as to the facts and the law on which it is based and
whether the trial court erred in meting out the death penalty upon accused appellant of qualified rape?
Held:
The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are
clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid.
Nonetheless, in order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be
simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to
the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal's assessments and
conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether
the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions
of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision. Compliance with this requirement will sufficiently apprise the
parties of the various issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether the conclusion
arrived at is consistent with the facts and the law.

In the case at bar, the trial court's decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt may
be engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant but by the trial court's failure to fully
explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the evidence presented for or against the accused,
the assessments made from the evidence presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent
law as basis of the decision.
 We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed by the trial court. Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the
Revised Penal Code, imposes death penalty when the victim is a child below seven (7) years old. The allegation in
the information specifically stated that "xxx the victim xxx is only seven years old" which clearly rules out the
application of this specific provision that can justify the imposition of the capital punishment. Paragraph No. 1 of the
same article which warrants the imposition of the death penalty if the crime of rape is committed where the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim, will not
apply for while the victim is under eighteen (18) years old, the accused-appellant is not the common-law husband of
the victim's mother.

The trial court therefore erred in meting out the death penalty upon accused-appellant for qualified rape. Thus,
accused-appellant may only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. 6334-
98, finding accused-appellant Valentin Baring, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
NOLITO BORAS Y DOE

GR No. 127495, Dec 22, 2000

Ponente: BUENA, J.
Facts:
Nolito Boras was convicted of statutory rape by the Regional Trial Court and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He filed this appeal to this honorable court questioning the decision.

He was accused of raping a 6-year-old neighbor. During the trial, the counsel of the accused appellant manifested in
court that he noticed something strange from his client and so he requested for a psychiatric examination be done. He was
then submitted for examination at the mental hospital.

After several examination, report shows that he was “coherent and relevant” and “free of psychotic signs and
symptoms.” The remarks further stated that accused-appellant knows the case filed against him and that his anxiety or
apprehension was due to fears of being incarcerated in jail.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in conviction despite the claim for insanity of the accused appellant?
Held:
No. Initially, to avoid criminal liability, accused-appellant feigned insanity. To bolster such imagined dementia,
accused-appellant offered his father's testimony declaring that accused-appellant was afflicted with a mental defect since
childhood. As observed by the trial court, accused-appellant is normal. In this regard, the trial court's observation of the
demeanor and deportment of witnesses, as a rule, will not be interfered with, considering that the behavior, gesture,
inflection of voice and manner of responding to questions propounded to witnesses are best available to the trial court. It is
not appropriate to calibrate anew such observations on the basis alone of the cold transcript of stenographic notes unless
such findings are clearly shown to be arbitrary. In fact, the trial court was not remiss in its duty in determining the
mental capacity of accused-appellant when it ordered accused-appellant's confinement in a hospital for medical and
psychiatric evaluation which examination revealed that accused-appellant is "sane and coherent." The foregoing
steps clearly demonstrate that the judge had sufficiently and effectively satisfied the two components of "insanity
test" that will effectively guarantee accused-appellant's right to a fair trial, which are: (1) whether the defendant is
sufficiently coherent to provide counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense and (2) whether he
is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment convicting accused-appellant of statutory rape is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages IN ADDITION to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court.
 EXTRA EXCEL INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC.
vs.
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523 (Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 14-4353-RTJ),

June 06, 2018

Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts:
An information for qualified theft was filed against Ike R. Katipunan complainant’s former Inventory Control Service
Assistant. The case was raffled to Branch 96 of the RTC of Quezon City with respondent as the Presiding Judge.
Complainant alleged that, after the filing of the Information, respondent Judge did not set the case for arraignment nor issue
a warrant of arrest; instead, he granted the accused's Motion for Preliminary Investigation and Motion to Defer Further
Proceedings.
The Court of Appeals found grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in granting the accused's motion
for preliminary investigation. Complainant filed a Motion for Issuance of Hold Departure Order, which motion remains
unresolved. Eventually, respondent Judge arraigned the accused on June 9, 2014. However, instead of ordering the
accused's commitment, and despite the offense being nonbailable, respondent Judge allowed the accused to go home. On
June 13, 2014, the accused filed a Petition for Bail. During the June 30, 2014 bail hearing, respondent Judge declared the
Petition for Bail submitted for resolution due to the absence complainant's counsel. On even date, respondent Judge issued
an Order granting the bail petition and denying the motion for inhibition.
According to the complainant, the foregoing events clearly showed respondent Judge's gross inefficiency,
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and evident partiality.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, grave abuse of
authority, and evident partiality?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court says: “We substantially adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA, with the exception of its
finding that respondent Judge acted properly in allowing the accused to go home after arraignment without bail.”
We agree with the OCA that respondent Judge's act of granting the accused's Motion for Preliminary Investigation did
not constitute gross ignorance of the law.
The Order granting the Motion for Preliminary Investigation may not be proper inasmuch as respondent Judge based
the Order on accused's bare allegation of non-receipt of notice from the Office of the Prosecutor, we opine that the same
did not necessarily amount to gross ignorance of the law. There was no showing that respondent Judge issued the Order
because of the promptings of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice, ill-will, bad faith or a deliberate intent to do injustice.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that not all erroneous acts of judges are subject to disciplinary action.
However, we do not concur with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge did not err in allowing the accused
to go home after his arraignment. We are neither persuaded by respondent Judge's claim that there was no reason for him to
detain the accused since there was yet no warrant issued for his arrest or that a petition for bail had been filed. Basic is the
principle that upon setting a case for arraignment, the accused must have either been in the custody of the law or out on
bail. Another basic principle is that the judge must conduct his own personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the indictment, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
 Lastly, the Court held that the respondent Judge was inefficient in failing to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold
departure order despite the lapse of 90 days. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
directs judges to "perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness." Thus, respondent's failure to resolve complainant's motion to issue a hold departure order
constitutes gross inefficiency which warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction.
Suppletorily, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise mandates:
Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the Court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
In sum, we find respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure in failing to make a judicial
determination of probable cause and in failing to conduct a hearing on the accused's application for bail in Criminal Case
No. R-QZN-13-00488-CR, and gross inefficiency in failing to resolve complainant's motion for issuance of a hold
departure order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Afable E. Cajigal is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and procedure
and gross inefficiency and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of P20,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
THANK YOU FOR
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Reporter: Luisa Reves