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DD309 Online Tutorial 2020 - TMA02 Game Theory, Econometrics and Essay On Competition Policy 1
DD309 Online Tutorial 2020 - TMA02 Game Theory, Econometrics and Essay On Competition Policy 1
Hedley Stone
Colin Cannon
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DD309 Online Tutorial
16th December 2020
• TMA02
– Part A - Game theory (25 marks)
– Part B – Econometrics (25 marks)
– Part C - Essay on competition policy (50 marks)
John Nash
A simultaneous game without
the dilemma
• Now let’s think about a different set of payoffs for the same game.
Assume both players still have the same dominant strategy, and
construct a matrix in which the Nash equilibrium is the optimal
outcome
• Again, use the numbers 2, 4, 8 and 12 to represent payoffs in
millions of pounds. Again, you’ll need to use each number twice to
construct a symmetrical matrix
Debs
Cut Ad
Cut 8 8 12 2
Marks
Ad 2 12 4 4
What if one player moves first?
Sequential games
• Now let’s go back to the P.D. but change the rules of the
game. This time, Marks makes the first move and Debs
decides how to react. The payoffs are unchanged
Cut
4 4
Cut D
Ad
12 2
M Cut
2 12
Ad D
Ad
8 8
Game theory poll 3: a sequential
game
• Do you think the outcome will be different from the
simultaneous game one?
Cut
4 4
Cut D
Ad
12 2
M Cut
2 12
Ad D
Ad
8 8
Finding the answer: subgames
(DD309, p 279)
Game theory poll 4: how many
subgames?
Cut
4 4
Cut D Subgame I
Ad
12 2
M Cut
2 12
Ad D Subgame II
Ad
8 8
Finding the answer:
backwards induction
What’s the outcome? We need ‘backwards induction’
Cut
4 4
Cut D Subgame I
Ad D prefers
12 2 ‘Cut’ to ‘Ad’
Cut (4>2)
M 2 12
Ad D Subgame II
Ad 8 8 D prefers
‘Cut’ to ‘Ad’
(12>8)
The answer
Debs
Take Don’t
Take 3 3 6 4
Marks
Don’t 4 6 5 5
Solving the simultaneous game
• Actually, there are two Nash equilibria
• Either is a possible outcome, but each prefers another
(non-equilibrium) outcome to their less preferred
equilibrium
• So the outcome is indeterminate
Debs
Take Don’t
Take 3 3 6 4
Marks
Don’t 4 6 5 5
What if we make it sequential?
Let Debs move first
Take
3 3
Take M Subgame I
Don’t M prefers
6 4 ‘Don’t’ to ‘Take’
Take (4>3)
D 6
4
Don’t M Subgame II
Don’t 5 5 M prefers
‘Take’ to ‘Don’t’
(6>5)
So we can see that re-casting a
one-shot game as sequential can
sometimes influence the outcome
Repeated games
• All the above examples, both simultaneous and
sequential, are single, or ‘one-shot’ games, played only
once.
• Concepts included:
– Simultaneous game
– Dominant strategy
– Nash equilibrium
– Sequential game
– Backwards induction
– Repeated games