Critical Areas in

Political Law: Concepts,
Principles, Relevant
Provisions and Related
Jurisprudence (Del Castillo
cases)
PROFESSOR VICTORIA V. LOANZON
Calling Out Powers of the President
Lagman et al. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231774, July 4, 2017,
Castillo, J.:
Facts: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60
days, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring
a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on
the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed
out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with
the passing of time.
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute
Group, and other criminals, brought about undue constraints
and difficulties to the military and government personnel,
particularly in the performance of their duties and functions,
and untold hardships to the civilians. After the submission of
the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a
resolution expressing full support to the martial law
proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be
satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In
the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no
compelling reason to revoke the same".
Question: Is the factual basis of the declaration of Martial law a
political question?
Answer: No. The Court said that the factual basis of the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question. Section 18
of Article VII allows judicial review of the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Clearly the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended that the Court will take cognizance of a petition in
keeping with the principle of checks and balances.
Note: Remember Baker v. Carr
Question: What is the nature of the proceeding which looks into
the factual basis of the declaration of Martial Law?
Answer: The unique features of the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui
generis separate and different from those enumerated in
Article VIII. It calls for a different rule on standing as any
citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits
the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
by the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. It looks into
the acts prior to the declaration of Martial Law.
Question: Distinguish between the checking powers of congress and
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the “Calling Out” powers of
the President.
Answer: 1. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of
lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Both are in keeping with the principle
of checks and balances.
2. The Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the
filing of a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen.
Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.
3. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data
available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration;
it is not allowed td "undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings."
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only
data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration.
4. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute
correctness of the factual basis, Congress could probe deeper and
further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before
it.
Conclusion:
The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by
Congress are not only totally different but likewise
independent from each other although concededly, they have
the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the
Court to review can be exercised independently from the
power of revocation of Congress.
Question: What is the distinction in the exercise the
extraordinary powers of the President under paragraph 3 of
Section 18 of Article VII from the 1973 Constitution?
Answer: The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the
scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said presidential
action. In particular, the President's extraordinary powers of
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
imposing martial law are subject to the veto powers of the
Court and Congress.
The duration of the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of habeas corpus is limited to 60 days.
Question: What are the specific powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief?
Answer: The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the
extraordinary powers of:
a) calling out the armed forces;
b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
c) declaring martial law.
These powers may be resorted to only under specified
conditions.
Question: What is the most benign (kindest) of the three
extraordinary powers of the President?
Answer: Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out
power is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The
President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the
President;" the only limitations being that he acts within
permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not
constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact, "the actual use to
which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to
judicial review."
Question: Cite the instances when the President can suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
Answer: The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be
exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public
safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following
limits in the exercise of these powers:
"(1) a time limit of sixty days;
(2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and]
(3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court."
Question: Discuss the scope of the powers to declare martial law and
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
Answer: The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and
suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the
Executive Department has called upon the military to assist in the
maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains, the
citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a
manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce
the law. As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by
the Congress, and review by the Court.
Question: What are the safeguards which the Constitution has put in
place against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial
law?
Answer: The acts that the President may perform do not give him
unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during
martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation
of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees
under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in
such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also
suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged
with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.
Question: What is the scope of the power of judicial review of the
court in the “Calling Out” powers of the President?
Answer: It is beyond doubt that the power of judicial review
does not extend to calibrating the President's decision pertaining
to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into
the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on
the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President. As Commander-in-Chief, the President’s powers are
broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or
threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of
the State.
Question: Is the recommendation of the Secretary of National Defense
necessary in the exercise of the “Calling Out” powers of the
President?
Answer: The recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of
National Defense, or other high-ranking military officials, is not a
condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain reading of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's
power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for
the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the
decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation
of his mere alter ego.
Question: Is the Proclamation of Martial Law by President Duterte
vague?
Answer: No. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially
invalid if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application." "[A] statute or act may be said to
be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. [In such instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
Question: Will the “void for vagueness” apply to penal statutes?
Answer: No. The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is
overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech
that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not
know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or
vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to
avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus
“chills him into silence.”
Question: What is the "sufficiency of factual basis test“?
Answer: Under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the
phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" should be understood as the only
test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial law
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy
itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it only needs to
determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual
bases.
The Court concluded, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the
scope of judicial review by the introduction of the "sufficiency of the
factual basis" test.
Question: What are the factors in determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the declaration of martial law?
Answer: Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for
determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion or
rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such
power.“
Without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President's
declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus must be struck down.
Question: What are the elements of rebellion?
Answer: The elements of rebellion are:
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms
against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to
remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws the
territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of
land, naval or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief
Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives.
Due Process
Question: What is due process?
Answer: DUE PROCESS MEANS:
1. There shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislature;
2. It shall be reasonable in its operation;
3. It shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and
4. It shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the State or to all
of a class (People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939)
Due Process
Question: What is the purpose of due process?
Answer: The due process clause is a shield against any possible intrusion
of the government including any kind of abuse and arbitrariness on the
part of any of the branches of government. The due process clause
serves the following purposes:
1. To prevent undue encroachment against the life, liberty and property
of individuals.
2. To secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of powers of
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private
rights and distributive justice.
3. To protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments from
seizure, forfeiture and destruction without trial and conviction.
Due Process
Question: What are the two types of due process?
Answer: The two types of due process are:
1. Substantial due process; and
2. Procedural due process
Question: What are the essential elements of due process?
Answer: The essential elements of due process:
3. The right to notice; and
4. The right to be heard
Due Process
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON v. PHIL
PHARMA WEALTH (PPW, Inc), INC., G.R. No. 182358,
February 20, 2013, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
PPW, Inc. alleged that it was not accorded due process when the
DOH suspended its accreditation for a two-year period. The
DOH held that it gave PPW, Inc. a copy of the Report on
Violative Products it distributed.
Due Process
Question: Was there denial of due process?
Answer: No. Due process constitutes both substantive and
procedural due process. When DOH supplied PPW,Inc. with
the list under the Report on Violative Products, it was given
sufficient notice. In fact, when it referred the matter to its
counsel, PPW,Inc. was given the opportunity to be heard as
well.
Thus, it was not denied due process.
State Immunity: Concept and Basis
Concept and Basis: The Constitution declares, rather
superfluously, that the State may not be sued without
its consent. This provision is merely recognition of
the sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from
the jurisdiction of the courts of justice (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1993: 29).
Immunity from Suit
Question: What is ‘the royal prerogative of dishonesty’?
Answer: The concept of ‘the royal prerogative of dishonesty’ is a
recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating
it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence
of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Immunity from Suit: Waiver of State Immunity
Question: May the state waive its immunity from suit?
Answer: Yes. The State’s consent may be given either expressly
or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general
law or a special law.
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation,
the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and to have divested itself of its
sovereign immunity.
Immunity from Suit
Facts: Aggrieved by the two-year suspension, PPW, Inc. filed a
suit against DOH seeking reinstatement of its accreditation.
DOH moved for dismissal of the suit invoking immunity from
suit.
Question: Is the legal argument of DOH tenable.
Answer: Yes. The DOH can validly invoke state immunity for the
following reasons: 1. DOH is an unincorporated agency which
performs sovereign or governmental functions; and 2. The
Complaint seeks to hold the DOH solidarily and jointly liable
with the other defendants for damages which constitutes a
charge or financial liability against the state.
Immunity from Suit: Liability under a Contract
Question: Is there a distinction on the liability of the state when
it executes a contract with a third person?
Answer: The rule on liability of the state under a contract, is not,
however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into
by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in
the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done
in its proprietary capacity. The State will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability only if it has entered into a
contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
Question: When may the state be exempt from liability under a
contract?
Answer: When the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity, no such waiver may be implied on the
part of the state. Statutory provisions waiving state immunity
are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in
derogation of sovereignty.
Question: DPWH refused to pay Movertrade Corporation for
breach of its contract. COA sustained the action of DPWH.
Movertrade Corporation filed an action to question the action
of COA which disallowed payment of its claim from DPWH.
Will the action filed by Movertrade Corporation prosper?
ANSWER: No, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of COA in denying Movertrade Corporation’s money claim as
the evidence on record undoubtedly supports the factual
findings of COA. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion,
the decisions
and resolutions of COA are accorded not only with respect but
also with finality, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers, but also of its presumed expertise in the
laws it is entrusted to enforce. (Movertrade Corporation v.
Commission on Audit, September 22, 2015, Del Castillo, J.)
Note: Refer to Sec.29(1) of Article VI on the need to enact a law
to disburse public funds
Money claims must first be filed with the COA
Immunity from Suit: Liability of Public Officers
Question: Can public officers be held liable for damages?
Answer: The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in the performance of
their official functions. The suability of a government official
depends on whether the official concerned was acting within
his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts
done in the performance of official functions will result in a
charge or financial liability against the government.
Immunity from Suit: Liability of Public Officers
Question: What principle will govern the liability of state for
acts performed by public officers?
Answer: The rule is that if the judgment against public officials
will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state. In such a situation, the
state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
has been filed without its consent.
Immunity from Suit: Personal Liability of Public Officers
Question: When may a public official be held personally liable
for his acts?
Answer: A public official can be held personally accountable
for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where he has acted ultra vires or where there is
showing of bad faith.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE
JURISDICTION
Question: What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under
Administrative Law?
Answer: Under the principle of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving question within the jurisdiction of
an administrative body prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal where the:
1. Question demands administrative determination requiring special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal;
2. Question requires determination of technical and intricate issues of a
fact; and
3. Uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with purposes of the
regulatory statute administered.
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE
JURISDICTION
Question: What are the exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
Answer: Exceptions to the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
1. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
2. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction;
3. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
Exceptions to Primary Jurisdiction
4. Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive;
5. Where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
6. Where judicial intervention is urgent;
7. When its application may cause great and irreparable
damage;
8. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
Exceptions to Primary Jurisdiction
9. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot;
10. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
11. When strong public interest is involved; and
12. In quo warranto proceedings (The Province of Aklan v. Jody
King Construction and Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 &
202623, November 27, 2013).
Sovereignty: Concept of Imperium and Dominium
Question: Distinguish between imperium and dominium.
Answer: Imperium is the authority possessed by the state
embraced in the concept of sovereignty while dominium
refers to the capacity of the state to own or acquire
property including those lands held by the state in its
proprietary capacity.
Sovereignty: Jurisdiction over Persons and Things
Question: Cite instances when the state will have no power and
jurisdiction over persons and things within its territory.
Answer: The state cannot exercise power and jurisdiction over the
following persons and things within its territory:
1. Foreign heads of state, diplomatic representatives, and consuls
to a certain degree;
2. Foreign state property, including embassies, consulates and
public vessels in non-commercial activities;
3. Acts of state;
4. Foreign merchant vessels exercising right of innocent
passage or involuntary entry, such as arrival under stress;
5. Foreign armies passing through or stationed in its territory
with its permission; and
6. Such other persons or property, including organizations like
the United Nations, World Health Organization, Asian
Development Bank, over which it may, by agreement, waive
jurisdiction.
Question: What is extraterritorial jurisdiction?
Answer: The extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the
state to exercise power and jurisdiction beyond and outside its
territory under the following circumstances:
1. When it asserts its personal jurisdiction over its nationals
abroad, or the exercise of its rights or punish certain offenses
committed outside its territory against its national interests even
if the offenders are non-resident aliens;
2. When the local state waives its jurisdiction over persons and
things within its territory, such as when a foreign
army is stationed therein remains under the jurisdiction of the
sending state;
3. When it establishes a colonial protectorate, or administers a
trust territory or occupies an enemy territory in the course of
war;
4. When it enjoys easements or servitudes (i.e. easement of
innocent passage, freedom of over flight)
5. When it exercises limited jurisdiction over the contiguous
zone; and
6. When it exercises the principle of extraterrioriality.
Sovereignty: Postwar Occupation
Question: What is the doctrine of juris postlimini?
Answer: The doctrine of juris postlimini is a principle in Public
International Law where a territory which has been occupied
by an enemy state resumes power and jurisdiction during the
progress of war through conquest or otherwise, the legal state
of things existing prior to the hostile occupation is re-
established. (Aruego, International Law)
Findings of Facts of a Constitutional Commission
DARAGA PRESS, INC. (DPI) v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION in AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, G.R. No. 201042, June
16, 2015, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: DBM Secretary Andaya requested COA to ascertain the
liability of the DepED to settle its pending obligation to DPI in
the amount of P63.638M. COA found irregularities in the
transaction which included, among others, ghost delivery of
books and no appropriation for the same in G.A.A. Despite this,
DPI filed its money claim with COA. COA denied payment.
DPI assailed the action of COA.
Question: Will DPI’s claim prosper?
Answer: NO. The respondent COA committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the money claim. Decisions and
resolutions of the respondent COA may be reviewed and
nullified only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Question: When does grave abuse of discretion exist?
Answer: Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the
judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim, and despotism.
Primary Responsibility of COA
Question: What is the primary responsibility of COA?
Answer: The respondent COA, as the duly authorized agency to
adjudicate money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities, pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree
No. 1445, has acquired special knowledge and expertise in
handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction.
Read Sec. 2(1), D, Article IX
General Rule: Post audit Accounting System
Exception to the Rule: Pre-audit (weak internal control)
Separation of Powers: Concept and Principle
The starting point of the principle of separation of powers is
the assumption of the division of the functions of the
government into three distinct classes: the executive, the
legislative and the judicial.
The government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of powers into the
legislative, the executive and the judicial [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936].
Separation of Powers -Primary Jurisdiction of COA
and the Power of Judicial Review
Question: What will impel the Court to scrutinize the findings of
facts of COA?
Answer: It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one that was constitutionally
created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of the doctrine
of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws
they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that
findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Burden of Proof on Money Claims
against the Government
Question: In case of money claims against the government, who
has the burden of proof to hold the latter liable?
Answer: The party who has a money claim against the
government has the burden of proof. In this case, DPI has the
burden to show, by substantial evidence, that it is entitled to the
money claim. It has to prove the actual delivery of the subject
textbooks by presenting substantial evidence or evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support such
conclusion.
Burden of Proof on Money Claims
against the Government
Question: Will the principle of quantum meruit apply in money
claims against the government?
Answer: The principle of quantum meruit allows a party to
recover "as much as he reasonably deserves.” The principle of
quantum meruit presupposes that an actual delivery of the
goods has been made. The party has to present convincing
evidence to prove the actual claim. In contracts which call
delivery of goods, the party must prove delivery of the items
and that the same have been properly acknowledged by the
government agency.
Bill of Rights: The Rule on Chain of Custody
Facts: The RTC found the accused guilty. In her appeal to the
Court of Appeals, she argued that the trial court erred in
finding her guilty despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
the same beyond reasonable doubt and noncompliance with
Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations resulting to a broken chain of custody over the
confiscated drugs.
Question: Will the appeal prosper? Should the accused be
acquitted?
Answer: The appeal will not prosper and her conviction
should be affirmed. Accused capitalizes on the prosecution’s
alleged failure to comply with the requirements of law with
respect to the proper marking, inventory and taking of
photograph of the seized specimen. However, the appellant
failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized
item during trial.
It is settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite
the failure to faithfully observe the
Bill of Rights:The Rule on Chain of Custody
requirements provided under Section 21 of RA 9165, for as
long as the chain of custody remains unbroken.
Note: Instances when objection may be raised to exclude
evidence – custodial investigation, preliminary investigation,
arraignment, trial before promulgation of judgment
Right to counsel: custodial investigation, preliminary
investigation, arraignment, promulgation of judgment
Bill of Rights: The Rule on Extrajudicial Confession
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NIEVES CONSTANCIO y
BACUNGAY, ERNESTO BERRY y BACUNGAY, G.R. No.
206226, April 4, 2016, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO,
J.:
Facts: The RTC found Constancio and Berry guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision finding that Constancio and
Berry conspired to abduct, rape, and kill “AAA.”
The Rule on Extrajudicial Confession
The CA gave credence to Berry’s extrajudicial confession as
contained in the Sinumpaang Salaysay which he executed with
the assistance of Atty. Suarez. Berry’s extrajudicial confession
was admitted as corroborative evidence of facts that likewise
tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused and cousin,
Constancio as shown by the circumstantial evidence extant in
the records.
Berry insisted that when he executed his extrajudicial confession,
he was not provided with a competent and independent counsel
of his own choice in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution.
Question: Can Berry move for the exclusion of his
extrajudicial confession?
Answer: No. Berry’s confession is admissible because it was
voluntarily executed with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel in the person of Atty. Suarez. In default
of proof that Atty. Suarez was remiss in his duties, as in this
case, it must be held that the custodial investigation of Berry
was regularly conducted. For this reason, Berry’s
extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against him.
Question: What is the nature of the response of a suspect in a
broadcast interview?
Answer: It is already settled that statements spontaneously
made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In this
case, there was no ample proof to show that appellant Berry’s
narration of events to ABS-CBN reporter Dindo Amparo was
the product of intimidation or coercion, thus making the same
admissible in evidence.
Question: What is the general rule on admissibility of
extrajudicial confession?
Answer: The general rule on admissibility of extrajudicial
confession states that where the prosecution has sufficiently
established that the respective extrajudicial confession of the
accused was obtained in accordance with the constitutional
guarantees, the confession is admissible, and is evidence of a
high order.
Note: Sec.12(1), Article III- Miranda Rights
Bill of Rights: Promulgation of Judgment in Absentia
Question: May judgment be promulgated in the absence of the
accused?
ANSWER: Yes. There is no reason to postpone the
promulgation because petitioner’s absence was unjustifiable.
Hence, no abuse of discretion could be attributed to the RTC
in promulgating its Decision despite the absence of accused.
(Almuete v. People, Del Castillo, J.)
Bill of Rights: The Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
LUZ S. ALMEDA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
(MINDANAO) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016, SECOND DIVISION, DEL
CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: In 2001, School Superintendent Almeda, and several other
public officers and employees were charged administratively
and criminally before the Ombudsman improper use and
disbursement of the Countrywide Development Fund. The
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer found that
probable cause existed to indict petitioner and her co-accused
for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Almeda sought for the dismissal of OMB-MIN-01-0183 as
against her, with additional prayer for injunctive relief. She
alleged that the Ombudsman’s failure to promptly act on her
case for nine years from the filing of her motion for
reconsideration, or from July 2003 to September 2012, is a
violation of her constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
her case.
Question: Is Almeda’s right to speedy disposition of case
violated?
Answer: YES. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies." This right applies to all cases pending
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies; it is
not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends
to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature,
as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.
Hence, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from
all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
The Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
Question: What is the rationale behind the right to speedy
disposition of cases?
Answer: The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely
hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the
administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of
the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time. This looming unrest as well as the
tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be
weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.
Question: What are the essential factors to consider if there is a
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case?
Answer: The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the
right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
Question: What is the balancing test under the right to speedy
disposition of a case?
Answer: The balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case looks into the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant. Both are weighed, and such
factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.
Question: What is the duty of the state in the prosecution of cases?
Answer: It is the State’s duty to expedite the same "within the
bounds of reasonable timeliness."A defendant has no duty to
bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the
duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. It
is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint,
as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the
accused did not object to the delay or that the delay was with
his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him.
Question: How should prejudice be assessed in prosecuting a
criminal offense?
Answer: Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest
of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to
limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these,
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system.
Question: Why is delay considered a two-edged sword?
Answer: Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that
bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. Not only should the
adjudication of cases be "done in an orderly manner that is in
accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be
promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive
delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people
guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations
inutile."
The Writ of Amparo
EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN DIO and ANDREW BUISING v.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in
representation of BENHUR PARDICO, G.R. No. 184467,
June 19, 2012, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her
husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before
the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in
form and substance, the trial court issued the Writ of Amparo
against the petitioners who are all private persons and in
charge of securing a private subdivision and the production of
the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008.
The Writ of Amparo
Question: Can a writ of amparo be issued when all the accused
are private individuals?
Answer: NO. It is clear that for the protective writ of amparo to
issue, it must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
The Writ of Amparo
Question: May a writ of amparo include a private individual?
Answer: Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that a writ of
amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even
if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an
amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. This hallmark of State participation
differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary
case of a missing person under R.A. No. 9851.
The Writ of Amparo
Question: What are the mandatory allegations to support a
claim for issuance of the writ of amparo?
Answer: In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is
not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.
Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the
government or its agents had a hand in the disappearance or
that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the
government or its agents either as responsible or accountable
persons.
Question: What are the essential elements to prove sale of
illegal drugs in a buy-bust operation?
Answer: In the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper,
the following elements must be proven: “(1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.”
Unreasonable Search and Seizures:
Basis for Issuance of a Search Warrant
PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION and TOTAL GAZ LPG
DEALERS ASSOCIATION v. NENA C. ANG, ALISON C. SY, NELSON
C. ANG, RENATO C. ANG, and/or OCCUPANTS OF NATIONAL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 199371, February 3, 2016,
SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Petitioners requested the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation in the surveillance, investigation, apprehension and
prosecution of respondents for alleged illegal trading of LPG
products and/or under filling, possession and/or sale of underfilled
LPG products in violation of Sections 2(a) and (c), in relation to
Sections 3 and 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1865.
The agents of the NBI conducted several surveillance in the outlets
and warehouses of the respondents. Jemil, one of the NBI agents
assigned to the team conducted a “test-buy” operations. The Barba
Gas employee took De Jemil’s empty cylinder and replaced it with a
filled one. De Jemil paid P510.00 for the filled cylinder and received
a dated receipt for the purchase.
Based on this “test-buy” incident, two applications for search
warrants were given due course by the trial court. The respondents
moved to quash the warrants raising, among others, that the
applicants have no personal knowledge of the charges, as well as the
truthfulness and authenticity of said certifications, among others.
Question: As judge, will uphold the opposition of the respondents?
Answer: No. As judge, I will uphold the validity of the warrant. The
facts discovered during surveillance conducted by De Jemil and
Antonio — on the basis of information and evidence provided by
petitioners — constitute personal knowledge which could form the
basis for the issuance of a search warrant. As declared in Cupcupin
v. People, the surveillance and investigation conducted by an agent
of the NBI obtained from confidential information supplied to him
enabled him to gain personal knowledge of the illegal activities
complained of.
Question: What are the requisites for the valid issuance of a search
warrant?
Answer: The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Question: What is “probable cause” in the issuance of a search warrant?
Answer: Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more
than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction.
Question: What is the basis of the issuance of a search warrant by
the trial judge?
Answer: The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the
totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and
rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard.
Probable cause for purposes of issuing a search warrant refers to “such
facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
Question: What is the nature of “probable cause” in the filing of
information?
Answer: Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal
information refers to “such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information, or any offense included therein, has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.”
Bill of Rights: Basis of the Constitutional Guarantee
of Right to Information
HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v. ABELARDO T. DOMONDON, JOSE
A. GANGAN, and VIOLETA J. JOSEF, G.R. No. 165036, July 5,
2010, FIRST DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Antolin took the CPA licensure examinations in October 1997.
Out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner
did not make it. Convinced that she deserved to pass the
examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon,
Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that
her answer sheets be re-corrected. These consisted merely of shaded
marks, so she requested for (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven
subjects (b) her answer
sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an
explanation of the grading system used in each subject.
Domondon denied petitioner’s request.
Petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the
examination papers because her constitutional right to
information as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employee support her right to demand
access to the Examination Papers.
Question: Can the request of Antolin for her Examination Paper
to include her Answer Sheet and the Questionnaire be
compelled by a Writ of Mandamus?
Answer: NO. Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997
examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. As ruled in
Agustin-Ramos v. Sandoval: The function of reviewing and re-
assessing the petitioners’ answers to the examination questions,
in the light of the facts and arguments presented by them x x x
is a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a
ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of
the writ of mandamus.
Question: What will entitle a party to the issuance of the Writ
of Mandamus?
Answer: For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must
have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing
demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be equally clear. The duty of
the respondent is purely ministerial because the law
specifically commands him to perform a particular act.
Question: Is access to the Examination Paper to an accountancy
professional examination subject to the protection of the right to
information under the Constitution?
Answer: Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is
not absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of
public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited
to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law". The Court conceded that national board
examinations is a matter of public concern. On the other hand, the Court
realized that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers to protect its integrity.
Separation of Powers: Judicial Stability
Question: What is the doctrine of judicial stability?
ANSWER: Under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference, “no
court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept
of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.”(United
Alloy Philippines v. UCPB, November 25, 2015, Del Castillo, J.)
Separation of Powers: President’s Prerogative
Facts: At the end of World War II, the U.S. government and
Imperial government of Japan entered into a Reparations
Agreement to help rehabilitate the Philippines and payment
other forms of damages. After a lapse of more than 50 years,
a group of women known as “comfort lolas” filed an action in
court asking the Philippine government to seek compensation
for each of the individual victims and a public apology from
Japan. Will the action prosper?
Separation of Powers: President’s Prerogative
ANSWER: No, the case must fail.
The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to
espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to
the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive
Department.
The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the
conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department.
Accordingly, the Court cannot direct the Executive Department,
either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign
relations with Japan in a certain manner. (Vinuya vs. Romulo, 732
SCRA 595, G.R. No. 162230 August 12, 2014, Del Castillo, J)
Citizenship: Naturalization thru Judicial Process
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013, SECOND DIVISION,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 of
CA 473 had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to
allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known
lucrative trade. Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence, Azucena’s
counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC
granted. During the November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no
representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice.
Question: Was the decision of the court granting the petition proper
despite the absence of the OSG during the hearing?
Answer: Yes. Azucena is entitled to become a Filipino citizen. An
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of CA 473. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment
he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Question: How may an alien become a Filipino citizen?
Answer: Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473
or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139
(the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third
option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to
alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that “any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines.”
Question: How can one avail of derivative citizenship?
Answer: Under Section 15 of C.A. No. 473, foreign women who
are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto
Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove
that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United
States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature
retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to
confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.
Question: Discuss the steps by which derivative naturalization
may be achieved.
Answer: Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition
for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino
citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband’s citizenship
pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition.
Question: If one’s petition for derivative naturalization is denied by the
Bureau of Immigration, can she avail of another relief?
Answer: Yes. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization
under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from
seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be
remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because
she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband’s citizenship
was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is
proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to
determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine
citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
Question: What is the main objective of granting citizenship to an alien
wife?
Answer: The main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members,
thus: “It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of
family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife
an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from
that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests in
property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not
form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that
she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
partnership, acquire such interests.”
Question: Distinguish between a judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual from a Petition for Judicial
Naturalization.
Answer: In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen
and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine
citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien,
and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming
a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA
473.
Question: What are the assertions that one must make in the
Petition for Naturalization?
Answer: The Petitioner must make the following assertions: that
one is not opposed to organized government nor is affiliated
with any association or group of persons that uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments; that one is not
defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of men’s ideas; that one is neither a polygamist
nor
believes in polygamy; that the nation of which one is a
subject is not at war with the Philippines; that one intends
in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to
renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and
that one will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
time of the filing of the Petition up to the time of
naturalization.
Question: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HUANG TE
FU, a.k.a. ROBERT UY, G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015,
Facts: Respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy — a citizen of
the Republic of China (Taiwan) — filed a sworn Declaration of
Intent to Become [a] Citizen of the Philippines with the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG).
The case was tried by RTC-QC Br.96. In his petition, Robert Uy
stated that his trade or profession is a businessman engaged in
the manufacture of zipper, in which he has been connected since
1992 with a amonthly income of P15,000.00, and that he is
married to a Filipina.
The trial court granted the petition and the C.A. affirmed it.
The OSG appealed the decision. It said that respondent failed to
prove that he is engaged in a lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation; that respondent’s admission during trial that
he is not even in the payroll of his employer belies his claim that
he is the general manager thereof, as well as his claim that he is
engaged in a lucrative trade; that respondent’s declared
monthly income is not even sufficient for his family, much less
could it be considered “lucrative”;
that respondent’s admission that he received allowances from
his parents to answer for the daily expenses of his family
further proves the point that he does not have a lucrative
trade; and that respondent’s act of falsely declaring himself a
Filipino citizen in the August 2001 deed of sale proves lack of
good moral character and defiance of the constitutional
prohibition regarding foreign ownership of land.
Question: Will the opposition of the OSG prosper?
Answer: Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of
citizenship to Robert Uy. The Court said that the alleged
employment in his family’s zipper business was contrived for
the sole purpose of complying with the legal requirements prior
to obtaining Philippine citizenship.
In Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for
naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition
for naturalization will be denied.
Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public
interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant.
Note that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the
courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her
spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG,
G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, DEL
CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a
businessman/business manager since 1989, earning an average
annual income of P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he
said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from
college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the
nature of his business. As proof of his income, Ong presented
four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997.
The trial court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision by including in Ong’s income the income
of his spouse.
The OSG appealed the decision to the S.C. It argued that
naturalization laws being construed against the applicant,
lucrative trade or profession should not include the spouse’s
income. Petitioner must prove sufficient source to funds to
support himself and his family.
Question: Is the legal argument of the OSG tenable?
Answer: Yes. The S.C. reversed the decision. It said that it was
erroneous on the part of the C.A. to include the spouse’s
income to prove that Petitioner has lucrative income. It also
noted that Ong does not own any real property; that his
income was not sufficient to support four children considering
they are enrolled in private schools; and that Ong’s income had
an appreciable margin over his known expenses
Question: May the Supreme Court review the findings of facts
in judicial proceedings for naturalization?
Answer: Yes, the Court may do so. The Court is not precluded
from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant’s
qualifications. A naturalization proceeding is so infused with
public interest that it has been differently categorized and
given special treatment. The grant of a petition for
naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and
giving the government another opportunity to present new
evidence.
A decision or order granting citizenship will not even
constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a
subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of
naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had
been illegally or fraudulently procured.
Eminent Domain and the Agrarian Reform Law
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT,
G.R. No. 175055, June 27, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Gloria and Maximo Puyat, both deceased, are the registered owners
of 46.8731 hectares of riceland in Cabantuan City. Respondents-heirs are
pro-indiviso co-owners of the property. The records do not disclose when
the DAR placed 44.3090 hectares of Puyats land under Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to PD 27. It is, however, clear that the DAR issued
several emancipation patents in favor of various farmer-beneficiaries in
December 1989. All of the said patents were annotated on Puyats
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1773 on March 20, 1990, and
thereby caused the concomitant partial cancellation of Puyat’s title.
The heirs alleged that they did not receive compensation for the
cancellation of their title over the awarded portions of the
property. More than two years after the award of titles to the
beneficiaries, DAR ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines
(“LBP”) to pay just compensation. The heirs questioned the
basis of the just compensation because the same used the
parameters under P.D. 27 when there is a newly-enacted law
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The
heirs demanded that the just compensation be computed based
on the guidelines of the new law.
Question: Is the argument of the heirs tenable?
Answer: YES. When the government takes property pursuant to PD
27, but does not pay the landowner his just compensation until after
RA 6657 has taken effect in 1988, it becomes more equitable to
determine the just compensation using RA 6657. In Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Natividad, the Court explained that it would
certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on
the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s
failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of
time. This is especially imperative considering that just
compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
substantial, full and ample.
Question: Are courts bound by the formulae stipulated under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program?
Answer: The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function; hence, courts cannot be unduly restricted in their
determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of
their judicial prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic
function of inputting data and arriving at the valuation. While
the courts should be mindful of the different formulae created
by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, they are not
strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situations before them do
not warrant it.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO, G.R. No.
170685, September 22, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Livioco was the owner of 30.6329 hectares of sugarland
located in Dapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Livioco offered the
property to DAR for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per
square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The voluntary-offer-
to-sell (VOS) form he submitted to the DAR indicated that his
property is adjacent to residential subdivisions and to an
international paper mill.
Following Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989, the LBP
set the price at P3.21 per square meter or a total of P827,943.48
for 26 hectares. Livioco was not satisfied with the valuation
and filed a suit.
LBP also assailed the Decision of the trial court which valued the
land as of 1997 when the rule is that just compensation must be
valued at the time of taking, which in this case was in 1988. CA
assented to the valuation of Livioco’s property as a residential
land. LBP maintained that it is not the State’s policy to
purchase residential land but only agricultural lands under
CARP.
Question: Is the legal argument of LBP tenable?
Answer: Yes, LBP’s argument is proper. For purposes of just
compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the
time of taking. As to the character of the property, both trial
and appellate courts erred in treating the land as residential
and accepting the change in the character of the property,
without any proof that authorized land conversion had taken
place. In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands
for agrarian reform), the property’s character refers to its
actual use at the time of taking, not its potential uses.
Question: Can the eruption of Mount Pinatubo and other
circumstances necessarily convert the property from
agricultural to residential?
Answer: No. First, there was no conversion order from DAR, or
even an application for conversion with DAR, to justify the
CA’s decision to treat the property as residential. Second,
respondent himself testified that his property was not affected
by the volcanic ashfall, which can only mean that its nature as
an agricultural land was not drastically affected. The Mt.
Pinatubo eruption only served to make his property attractive
to government agencies as a resettlement area
but none of these government plans panned out; hence, his
property remained agricultural. Third, the circumstance that
respondent’s property was surrounded by residential
subdivisions was already in existence when he offered it for sale
sometime between 1987 and 1988. It was not therefore a drastic
change caused by volcanic eruption. All together, these
circumstances negate the CA’s ruling that the subject property
should be treated differently because of the natural calamity.
SPOUSES NILO and ERLINDA MERCADO v. LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 196707, June 17, 2015,
Facts: Spouses Mercado were the registered owners of 9.8940
hectares of agricultural land and 5.2624 hectares of their
aforesaid property was placed under the CARP coverage, for
which petitioners were offered P287,227.16 as just
compensation. Petitioner rejected respondent’s valuation
claiming that the fair market value of their property is
₱250,000.00 per hectare.
Petitioner filed an action in court to determine just
compensation.
The RTC fixed the just compensation of the subject portion at
₱25.00 per square meter or P250,000 per hectare. Respondent
eventually filed a Petition for Review before the CA. The CA
emphasized the mandatory nature of complying with the
formula, as set forth under DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, in
computing just compensation.
Question: Is the trial court strictly bound by the rules set by
DAR?
Answer: Both Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR A.O. No. 5
rules should be used as springboard to determine just
compensation. However, the Court may deviate from these
rules with a clear explanation why it has done so. The rule is
that the RTC must consider the guidelines set forth in Section
17 of RA 6657 and as translated into a formula embodied in
DAR A.O. No. 5. However, it may deviate from these
factors/formula if the circumstances warrant or, as stated in the
case of Sta. Romana, "if the situations before it do not warrant
its application." In such a case, the RTC, must clearly explain
the reason for deviating from the aforesaid factors or formula.
Question: What are basic limitations on the exercise of the power
of eminent domain in CARP cases?
Answer: Eminent domain refers to the inherent power of the
State to take private property for public use. This power has
two basic limitations: (1) the taking must be for public use; and
(2) just compensation must be given to the owner of the
property taken. Notably, in agrarian reform cases, the taking of
private property for distribution to landless farmers is
considered to be one for public use. Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
expropriated.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by
HON. NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN v. SUSIE IRENE
GALLE, G.R. No. 171836, August 11, 2014, SECOND
DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: In August 1992, LBP valued 356.2257 hectares of the
estate of Galle at ₱6,083,545.26. Galle rejected the amount but
LBP deposited the same in the form of cash and bonds. On
November 17, 1993, the Zamboanga City Registry of Deeds
cancelled Galle’s titles and transferred the entire estate to the
State.
On November 25, 1994, new titles were issued in the name of
"Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association"
(PEARA) for 307.5369 hectares.
Galle instituted action against the government for "Cancellation
of of Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconveyance,
Determination and Payment of Just Compensation, and
Damages." The trial court issued an Order, among others,
declaring just compensation for plaintiff’s expropriated
landholdings at an amount not less than ₱345,311,112.00 and
directing LBP to pay plaintiff the said amount.
DAR and LBP assailed the decision since the trial court failed to
consider Section 17 of R.A. 6657 and apply the valuation
formula of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of1992, as
amended. Section 17 is an enumeration of the factors that shall
be considered in the determination of just compensation.DAR
and LBP contend that because the Court did not determine just
compensation using the formula in an administrative issuance,
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, the Court consequently
failed to consider Section 17 of RA 6657.
Question: In determination of just compensation under CARP, is
a need to consider the administrative order of DAR in
computing for just compensation?
Answer: YES. While the Supreme Court acknowledges that
Galle’s estate was expropriated to the extent of 356.8257
hectares as the CA has found, the computation of the exact
amount of just compensation remains an issue that must be
resolved, taking into consideration both Section 17 of RA 6657
and AOs 6 and 11.The need to apply the parameters required
by the law cannot be doubted. The courts must apply them.
Question: In cases involving agrarian reform land, can CARP
restrict the court’s judicial determination of just
compensation?
Answer: In the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial
function of determining just compensation, the trial courts s are
not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply
the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors and the DAR formula
that reflect these factors. These factors and formula provide the
uniform framework or structure for the computation of the just
compensation for a property subject to agrarian reform.
Question: What is the remedy in the event that the trial court did
not consider the factors set forth under CARP and the various
issuances of the DAR?
Answer: There is a need to remand the case to the trial court in
order to properly compute the just compensation that Galle
and her heirs are entitled to, including interest and attorney’s
fees, if any.
This prevents any arbitrariness and ensures uniformity.
Eminent Domain: Easement of Aerial Right of Way
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. SPOUSES
RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON, G.R. No. 173520,
January 30, 2013, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: NAPOCOR instituted expropriation proceedings against
Spouses Zabala and Baylon for aerial easement of right of way
for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission Lines. The RTC
ruled that since the spouses Zabala were deprived of the
beneficial use of their property, they are entitled to the actual or
basic value of their property. Thus, it fixed the just
compensation at ₱150.00 per square meter. NAPOCOR
appealed to the CA.
NAPOCOR imputed error on the part of the RTC in not
applying Section 3A of Republic Act (RA) No. 6395 which
limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the
market value of the property traversed by its transmission
lines.
Question: Is the contention of NAPOCOR that RA 6395 is
controlling as to the determination of just compensation by
the Court?
Answer: NO. Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the
constitutional power of the courts to determine just
compensation. In insisting that the just compensation cannot
exceed 10% of the market value of the affected property,
NAPOCOR relies heavily on Section 3A of RA No. 6395.
No legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the
courts from determining whether the right of the property
owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial
function that cannot "be usurped by any other branch or
official of the government.”
Delay in Payment of Just Compensation
CITY OF ILOILO represented by HON. JERRY P. TREÑAS,
City Mayor v.HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, and
ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010,
Facts: In 1981, the City of Iloilo expropriated the property of
Javellana to be used as a school site for La Paz High School. In
1983, the trial court issued an Writ of Possession and
authorized the petitioner to take immediate possession of the
Javellana Property. Since1984, the expropriation proceedings
remained dormant.
In 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte MotionManifestation,
where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the
₱40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he discovered
that no such deposit was ever made.
Javellana demanded his just compensation as well as interest.
Attempts at an amicable resolution and a negotiated sale were
unsuccessful.
In 2003, Javellana filed a Complaint against petitioner for
Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and
Damages.
Question: Will the case prosper despite the fact that the action
was filed more than 25 years after the Writ of Possession was
issued?
Answer: Yes, the case will prosper. It is arbitrary and capricious
for the government to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize
a person’s property, allow the order of expropriation to
become final, but then fail to justly compensate the owner for
over 25 years. This is government at its most high-handed and
irresponsible, and should be condemned in the strongest
possible terms.
Question: Can the City of Iloilo be held liable for damages for
the delay in the payment of just compensation?
Answer: Yes. For its failure to properly compensate the
landowner, the City of Iloilo is liable for damages. In Manila
International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held that
a government agency’s prolonged occupation of private
property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages: “Such
pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the
form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case
should be the legal interest (6%).
Question: Was is the basis of the award of damages in
expropriation cases?
Answer: The award of damages is based on the principle that
interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of
the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can
accomplish, as of the date of the taking.”
Stages of an Expropriation Case
Question: What are the distinct phases of an expropriation
case?
Answer: Expropriation proceedings have two stages. The first
phase ends with an order of dismissal, or a determination
that the property is to be acquired for a public purpose. The
second phase consists of the determination of just
compensation. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be
paid to the landowner. Both orders, being final, are
appealable.
Finality of Order in Expropriation Cases
Question: When does an order in an expropriation case
become final?
Answer: An order of condemnation or dismissal is final when
the trial court resolves the question of whether or not the
government has properly and legally exercised its power of
eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no
appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its
public use can no longer be questioned. Once it has become
final, and the government’s right to expropriate the property
for a public use is no longer subject to review.
Basis of Computation of Just Compensation
Question: What is the reckoning date to determine just
compensation?
Answer: As to the reckoning date for the determination of just
compensation, the computation should be the date when the
expropriation complaint was filed. Just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the initiation of the expropriation proceedings.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the
property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the
time of the filing of the complaint.
Law on Public Officers: Complainant’s Burden
MICHAELINA RAMOS BALASBAS v. PATRICIA B.
MONAYAO, G.R. No. 190524, February 17, 2014, SECOND
DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner accused respondent Patricia B. Monayao –
then employed by the DSWD – of misrepresentation, fraud,
dishonesty and refusal to implement DENR Order in a land
dispute filed sometime in 1987 by petitioner’s brother against
respondent’s father. It appears that in said case, respondent
appeared in lieu of her father, who she claimed passed away.
Law on Public Officers: Complainant’s Burden
However, she presented a 1992 deed of sale purportedly executed
by her father, which was simulated considering that as early as
1987, respondent’s father was already deceased.
Petitioner pursued her complained before the Mayor of the
municipality of Alfonso Lista in Ifugao Province where
respondent transferred. No action was taken on the complaint
because the CSC said that the subject matter of the complaint
was purely personal. Thus, this appeal.
Law on Public Officers: Act of Dishonesty
The Court dismissed the petition holding that acts and omissions
(dishonesty) of the respondent arising out of her private
transactions do not constitute as administrative offenses.
Question: What is dishonesty?
Answer: Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion
of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected
with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;
lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of
fairness and straight forwardness.
Law on Public Officers: Definition of Misconduct
Question: What is misconduct?
Answer: Misconduct is a transgression of some established or
definite rule of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of
duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgment. More particularly it is an
unlawful behavior by the public officer.
Law on Public Officers: Non-Disclosure of Information
MACARIO CATIPON, JR. v. JEROME JAPSON, G.R. No.
191787, June 22, 2015, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO,
J.:
Facts: Catipon holds a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from the
Baguio Colleges Foundation despite a deficiency of 1.5 units in
Military Science, pursuant to a school policy allowing students
with deficiencies of not more than 12 units to be included in the
list of graduates. However, a restriction came after, which is,
that the deficiency must be cured before the student can be
considered a graduate.
Catipon qualified for a post in the SSS. Catipon took the Career
Service Professional Examination (CSPE) with a rating of
80.52%. Eventually, petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst
and Officer-in-Charge Branch Head of the SSS at Bangued,
Abra.
Catipon was only able to remove his 1.5 deficiency after passing
the CSPE. Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member Services
Representative of SSS Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with
the Civil Service Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging
that petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE
application.
After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with

Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service by the CSC-CAR. Petitioner pleaded good faith,
lack of malice, and honest mistake. He maintained that at the
time of his application to take the CSPE, he was of the honest
belief that the policy of the CSC – that any deficiency in the
applicant’s educational requirement may be substituted by
his length of service – was still subsisting.
The CSC-CAR, through Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S.
Danipog, rendered a Decision, Catipon was exonerated
of the charges of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Grave Misconduct. However, he was
found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service.
Question: Can Caitpon, relying on his knowledge of an old rule
which has already been modified, thereby affecting his
qualifications, be held guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of government service?
Answer: Yes. Catipon was negligent in filling up his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific
requirements for the CSPE examination. His claim of good faith
and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or
disregard the rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as to
exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; under the Philippine legal system, ignorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Law on Public Officers: Role of the CSC
Question: What is the primary responsibility of the Civil Service
Commission?
Answer: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the
removal and separation of all employees of government
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service.
Law on Public Officers: Judicial Intervention
Question: Was recourse to the court proper under the set of facts?
Answer: No. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA
petition premature and thus dismissible. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she
should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. The
administrative agency concerned – in this case the Commission
Proper – is in the "best position to correct any previous error
committed in its forum.”
Law on Public Officers: Equity and Justice
Question: Can Catipon invoke equity and justice and appeal that his
eligibility be not revoked?
Answer: The Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the
interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and
preserves civil service eligibility." The act of using a fake or
spurious civil service eligibility for one's benefit not only amounts
to violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results
in prejudice to the government and the public in general. It is a
transgression of the law which has no place in the public service.“A
person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor, and
faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.”
Public Officers: Suspension and Effect of Acquittal
Question: When may a trial court continue to exercise the power of
judicial review challenging the order of suspension pendente lite
when the petitioner had already been acquitted?
ANSWER: For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there
must be an actual case or controversy.
In Mattel, Inc. v. v. Francisco, the Court has ruled that "Where the
issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical
use or value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging."
Public Officers: Suspension and Effect of Acquittal
In fine, the Court reiterated that the issue on the validity or

invalidity of petitioner's suspension had been mooted
considering his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan in its
November 24, 2009 Decision.
(Abdul v. Sandiganbayan, December 2, 2013, Del Castillo, J.)
Law on Public Officers: Elective Officials
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) v. ATTY.
RICHARD B. RAMBUYONG, G.R. No. 167810, October 4, 2010,
FIRST DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Question: Can an incumbent Vice Mayor (of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay) appear as counsel of a party adverse to the National
Power Corporation?
Answer: NO. A sanggunian member cannot appear as counsel of
a party adverse to the National Power Corporation (NPC),
which is an instrumentality of the government.
Law on Public Officers: Elective Officials
Section 446 of the Local Government Code provides that the
sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the municipality,
shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding
officer. Thus, pursuant to Sec. 90(b) (1) of the Local
Government Code, Atty. Rambuyong, as sanggunian member,
cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which
is an instrumentality of government.
Administrative Law: National Instrumentality
Question: What is a national instrumentality?
Answer: Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is clear
and unambiguous. It categorically provides that the term
“instrumentality” includes government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Law on Public Officers: Citizenship Requirement
ROMMEL C. ARNADO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and FLORANTE CAPITAN, G.R. No. 210164, August 18,
2015, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his
Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the
United States of America (USA). He applied for repatriation under
Republic Act No. 9225 in San Francisco, USA. He took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and he received an
Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition
was issued in his favor. He executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
his foreign citizenship. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for the mayoralty post in 2010.
In 2013, Arnado once again filed his CoC.
Capitan, Amado's lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a
Petition seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the
ruling of the Court in Maquiling. The resolution of said petition
was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where
Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while
Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% ofthe total votes cast) votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning
candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to
nullify Amado's proclamation. He argued that with the April
16, 2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt
that Amado is disqualified from running for any local elective
office. Hence, Arnado's proclamation is void and without any
legal effect. The COMELEC Second Division noted that
Amado failed to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation for
purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections.
Hence, this Petition.
Question: Will a subsequent compliance of the act of
renunciation of a foreign citizenship suffice to qualify a
candidate to run in an election?
Answer: NO. Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements
of Section 5(2) o f RA 9225 at the time he filed his CoC for the
May 13, 2013 elections; subsequent compliance does not
suffice. Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a
person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for
any elective local position.
A candidate must possess the necessary qualifications on that
date of election.
Question: Can popular vote cure the ineligibility of a candidate?
Answer: In Maquiling, the Court emphasized that popular vote
does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while
Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections,
garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same "cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications." If in Velasco, the Court
ruled that popular vote cannot override the required
qualifications under Section 39 of the LGC, a fortiori, there is
no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy
when it comes to
disqualifications enumerated under Section 4064 of the same
law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are
roughly half of the requirements for election to local public
offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section
which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local
candidates."
In short, Arnaldo’s victory cannot cure the defect of his
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not
validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
Question: What is dual citizenship under the Local Government
Code?
Answer: In Mercado v. Manzano, it was clarified that the phrase
"dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance." Subsequently, Congress enacted
RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and
to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law.
They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided
that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and,
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their
CoC.
Law on Public Officers: Standards of Morality
PO2 PATRICK MEJIA GABRIEL v. SHERIFF WILLIAM
JOSE R. RAMOS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 166, Pasig
City, A.M. No. P-06-2256, April 10, 2013, RESOLUTION,
Facts: Sheriff Ramos was charged with Alarms and Scandals
and Violation of Domicile. He destroyed personal belongings
inside the house of Consolacion Dela Cruz Favillar, the
mother of his common-law-wife, Jenelita Dela Cruz and
thereafter indiscriminately fired a gun outside the said house.
Jenelita has been the mistress of Ramos for 15 years.
Complainant alleged that as a public officer, Ramos violated
Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution.
For his defense, Ramos admitted his common-law relationship
with Jenelita but denied living under scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock common decency. He argued that
their relationship having spanned 15 years already and the
fact that they have two children dispel any vestiges of
immorality. He alleged Consolacion resented the fact that he
and Jeneilta were transferring to another place and thus
charged him with Violation of Domicile.
Question: Will the length of an illicit relationship and the
tolerance of the members of society to such relationship be
sufficient to condone the immoral act of Ramos?
Answer: The illicit relationship between a married man and a
woman not his wife will remain illicit notwithstanding the
lapse of considerable number of years they have been living
together. Passage of time does not legitimize illicit
relationship; neither does other people's perceived tolerance
or acquiescence or indifference toward such relationship.
Question: What is immorality?
Answer: Immorality has been defined to include not only
sexual matters but also "conducts inconsistent with rectitude,
or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude
toward good order and public welfare."
Question: What is the appropriate penalty for Ramos for his
behavior?
Answer: Ramos is found GUILTY of immorality and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Accordingly, he
is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for twelve (12) months
without pay, with WARNING that commission of the same or
similar act will merit a more severe penalty. He
is ADMONISHED to terminate his common-law relationship
with Jenelita Dela Cruz Favillar.
Law on Public Officers: Gross Neglect
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) v.
ROGELIO MANALO, G.R. No. 208979, 21 September 2016,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: GSIS and the CSC found Manalo guilty of serious
dishonesty and grave misconduct for his failure to perform his
task of checking the completeness and authenticity of the
application forms and supporting documents submitted and for
deliberately using his access/operator and terminal codes to
process fake membership records and create policy contracts –
which thus led to the granting of anomalous loans to non-
existent GSIS members.
C.A. found Manalo guilty of gross neglect. The CA said that
responsibility of Computer Operator was merely ministerial
and it added that there is no evidence to prove that
respondent directly participated in the approval and grant of
spurious loans to these fake members, or that he benefited
from these loans; his only fault is that fictitious persons and
persons already separated from the service were entered into
the membership database and issued membership records.
GSIS appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Question: What is gross neglect?
Answer: Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. It denotes
a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to
perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross negligence
occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
Law on Public Officers: Misconduct
Answer: Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling.
Law on Public Officers: Dishonesty
Question: What is dishonesty?
Answer: Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive, or
betray.
Law on Public Officers: Gross Neglect of Duty
Question: Given the facts, what is the appropriate charge
against Manalo?
Answer: For failing to perform his duty which thus caused the
creation of 17 anomalous policy records which were in turn
used to defraud GSIS of P621,165.00, respondent is guilty not
of grave misconduct or dishonesty, but gross neglect of duty
which is punished with dismissal under Rule 10, Section 46(A)
(2) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.
Law on Public Officers: Dismissal from Service
Question: What is the proper remedy against Manalo?
Answer: The appropriate penalty is dismissal from
government service for gross neglect of duty, with cancellation
of civil service eligibility; forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government
agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned
and controlled corporation or government financial
institution; and bar from taking civil service examinations.
Law on Public Officers: Fiduciary Duty
GLORIA G. HALLASGO v. COA Region X, et al., G.R. No.
171340, September 11, 2009, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner (Hallasgo) was the Municipal Treasurer of the
Municipality of Damulog, Bukidnon. On 15 June 2001, she
was accused before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao of unauthorized withdrawal of monies of the public
treasury amounting to malversation of public funds by
outgoing and incumbent officials of the municipality.
The salient points of the audit teams findings of the audit team
are summarized as follows: 1. alleged unrecorded withdrawals
of P360,000.00 through three (3) checks made without
supporting vouchers; 2. alleged unliquidated cash advances of
P171,256.00; 3. alleged unrecorded withdrawals of P700,000.00
encashed by petitioner on 16 June 1997 under PNB Check No.
586577-W for P350,000.00 and LBP Check No. 15627907 for
P350,000.00; 4. Petitioner failed to remit intact and promptly
the amounts she received in cash totalling P980,000.00, thus
exposing government funds to probable misuse/misapplication.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Hallasgo guilty of
GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
The Ombudsman imposed the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
Hallasgo.
Hence, this appeal
Question: Is Hallasgo guilty of misconduct?
Answer: Yes. Misconduct in office implies a wrongful intention
and not a mere error of judgment. In the instant case, the
respondent appears to have used her expertise in financial
management to obfuscate the subject transactions for the
purposes of concealing financial anomalies. Her acts cannot
be considered as done in good faith or constituting only errors
of judgment. It is to be emphasized that the tasks and
functions of a treasurer is highly fiduciary in nature. Public
office is a public trust.
Law on Public Officers: Misconduct
Answer: Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. It is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty. Qualified by the term gross, it means conduct that is
"out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful;
such conduct as is not to be excused.“
Law on Public Officers: Penalty for Misconduct
Question: What is the appropriate penalty for Treasurer
Hallasgo?
Answer: There is sufficient evidence on record which
demonstrates a pattern of negligence and gross misconduct on
the part of the petitioner that fully satisfies the standard of
substantial evidence to support the conclusion.
She should be DISMISSED from service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, with prejudice
to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
Law on Public Officers: Substantial Evidence
Question: What is the substantial evidence to support Hallasgo’s
misconduct?
Answer: Hallasgo’s failure to keep current and accurate records,
repeated withdrawal of funds without the appropriate
disbursement vouchers, failure to ensure the timely liquidation
of her cash advances even after the lapse of over a year, and
failure to account for funds in her custody not only constitute
violations of applicable laws, but also reflect poorly on the
government and provide ripe opportunity for fraud and
corruption.
Law on Public Officers: Separation from Service
EFREN M. HERRERA and ESTHER C.GALVEZ, for and on
their behalf and on behalf of OTHER
SEPARATED,UNREHIRED and RETIRED EMPLOYEES OF
THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION,THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGETAND MANAGEMENT and THEOFFICE OF THE
SOLICITORGENERAL, G.R. No. 166570, December 18, 2009,
Facts: Congress enacted RA No. 9136 to provide a framework
for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including
the privatization of NPCs assets and liabilities.
One necessary consequence of the reorganization was the
displacement of employees from the Department of Energy, the
Energy Regulatory Board, the National Electrification
Administration and the NPC. To soften the blow from the
severance of employment, Congress provided in Section 63 of
the EPIRA, for a separation package superior than those
provided under existing laws.
All NPC employees, including the petitioners, were separated
from the service. As a result, all the employees who held
permanent positions at the NPC as
of June 26, 2001 opted for and were paid the corresponding
separation pay equivalent to one and a half months salary per
year of service. Nonetheless, in addition to the separation
package mandated by the EPIRA, a number of NPC employees
also claimed retirement benefits under CA No. 186, as
amended. Under these laws, government employees who have
rendered at least 20 years of service one and a half months
salary for every year of service over 20 but below 30 years, and
two months’ salary for every year of service in excess of 30
years.
The NPC argued that the grant of retirement benefits to
displaced employees in addition to separation pay was
inconsistent with the constitutional proscription on the grant of
a double gratuity.
The Petitioners filed an action for Declaratory Relief before the
RTC of Quezon City. It ruled that the petitioners are not
entitled to receive retirement benefits under Commonwealth
Act No. 186 (CA No. 186),as amended, over and above the
separation benefits they received under Republic Act (RA) No.
9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform
Act of 2001 (EPIRA).
Question: Are the petitioners entitled to separate benefits under
two different laws?
Answer: No. Absent explicit statutory authority, the cannot
provide an imprimatur to the grant of separation pay and
retirement benefits from one single act of involuntary
separation from the service, lest there be duplication of purpose
and depletion of government resources.
Question: What is the nature of separation pay in a
reorganization of a government entity?
Answer: Within the context of government reorganization,
separation pay and retirement benefits arising from the same
cause, are in consideration of the same services and granted for
the same purpose. Whether denominated as separation pay or
retirement benefits, these financial benefits reward government
service and provide monetary assistance to employees
involuntarily separated due to bona fide reorganization.
Thus, absent an express provision of law to the contrary,
separation due to reorganization gives rise to two possible
scenarios: first, when the separated employee is not yet entitled
to retirement benefits, second, when the employee is qualified
to retire.
In the first case, the employees separation pay shall be computed
based on the period of service rendered in the government
prior to the reorganization.
In the second case, where an employee is qualified to retire, he or
she may opt to claim separation or retirement benefits.
Law on Public Officers: Nature of Civil Service
EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 179370, November 19, 2009, EN
BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Capablanca was initially conscripted as PO1 with a
temporary status. He took the PNP Entrance Examination
conducted by the NAPOLCOM and passed the same. Then he
took the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer
Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) and likewise passed the same. Thereafter,
he was given permanent status as PO1.
The CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII (CSC Caraga) through
its Regional Director (Clavite-Vidal) informed PO1
Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the
CSP-CAT because the person in the picture pasted in the
Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose
picture is attached in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)" and that
the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the
signature affixed to the PDS. The CSC further informed
petitioner that such findings of alleged examination
irregularities constituted the offense of dishonesty if prima facie
evidence was established.
CSC-Caraga conceded that NAPOLCOM had the sole authority
to conduct the entrance and promotional examinations of
police officers. However, it took cognizance of case since
Capablanca’s permanent appointment was based on his Civil
Service eligibility.
To enjoin, CSC from conducting its investigation Capablanca
sought relief from the trial court.
The trial court ruled that CSC had no jurisdiction over
Capablanca.
CSC appealed the decision to the C.A. The Court of Appeals
found that PO1 Capablanca prematurely resorted to court
intervention when the remedy of appeal to the CSC Central
Office was still available.
Hence, this petition by Capablanca.
Law on Public Officers: Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
Question: Was Capablanca’s resort to the trial court under the
circumstances proper?
Answer: No. Capablanca failed to exhaust administrative
remedies by appealing before the CSC Central Office instead of
filing a petition before the trial court.
Law on Public Officers: Jurisdiction of the CSC
Question: Did the CSC have the jurisdiction over
Capablanca’s civil service eligibility?
Answer: Yes. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to
strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the
civil service. The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
Law on Public Officers: Jurisdiction of the CSC
Question: Are uniformed men of the PNP subject to CSC laws and
regulations?
Answer: Yes. Uniformed members of the PNP are considered
employees of the National Government, and all personnel of the
PNP are subject to civil service laws and regulations. Petitioner
cannot evade liability under the pretense that another agency has
primary jurisdiction over him. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction
is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. When it clearly
declares that a subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of a
tribunal, the party involved in the controversy must bow and
submit himself to the tribunal on which jurisdiction is conferred.
Law on Public Officers: Midnight Appointment
LEAH M. NAZARENO, et al. v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE,
represented by CITY MAYOR AGUSTIN PERDICES,
DOMINADOR DUMALAG, JR., ERLINDA TUMONGHA,
JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES AND ARACELI CAMPOS,
G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Facts: Former Dumaguete City Mayor Remollo sought re-
election in the May 2001 elections, but lost to respondent Mayor
Perdices. Thereafter, on June 5, 7, and 11, 2001, outgoing
Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized
another 74 city hall employees, including the herein 52 petitioners.
On July 2, 2001, Mayor Perdices publicly announced at the flag
raising ceremony at the Dumaguete City Hall grounds that he
would not honor the appointments made by former Mayor
Remollo. He instructed the City Administrator to direct the
City Assistant Treasurer to refrain from making any cash
disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials
based on their new positions.
Petitioners filed an action seeking the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from taking any
action or issuing any orders nullifying their appointments.
Law on Public Officers: Professionalism in Civil Service
Relative to this main case, the CSC Field Office in Dumaguete
City, revoked and invalidated the appointments of the
petitioners as the same were done in violation of CSC
regulation which prohibits "mass appointments."
Question: What does the term “mass appointments” mean?
Answer: The term refers to those issued in bulk or in large
number after the elections by an outgoing local chief executive
and there is no apparent need for their immediate issuance.
Question: Was the action of the CSC to invalidate the “mass
appointments” proper?
Answer: Yes. The Court finds that the CSC has the authority to
issue CSC questioned regulation and that the invalidation of
petitioners’ appointments was warranted.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government,
has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to
promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service.
Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines
The CSC has been authorized by statutes to "prescribe, amend,
and enforce" rules to cover the civil service. The legislative
standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such
delegated authority are set out in the statutes, to wit: to
promote "economical, efficient, and effective personnel
administration."
Question: Is there a distinction between “mass appointments”
and “midnight appointment” within the perspective of the
prohibition covered by the election ban?
Answer: It is true that there is no constitutional prohibition
against the issuance of "mass appointments" by defeated local
government officials prior to the expiration of their terms.
Clearly, this is not the same as a "midnight appointment,"
proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to those
appointments made within two months immediately prior to
the next
presidential election. This case is a typical example of the
practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue "midnight"
appointments, especially after their successors have been
proclaimed. It does not only cause animosities between the
outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency
in local governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time
and energy in defending their appointments instead of
attending to their functions.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:QUASI-JUDICIAL
(ADJUDICATORY) POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES
SALVA CION VILLANUEVA, TEOFILO TREDEZ, DONALD
BUNDAC, DANNY CABIGUEN, GREGORIO DELGADO,
and BILLY BUNGAR v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, represented by Executive
Director ROMEO DORADO, and PATRICIA LOUISE
MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
represented by Engineer FERNANDO ESGUERRA, G.R. No.
178347, February 25, 2013, SECOND DIVISION, DEL
CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Republic Act (RA) No. 7611called for the establishment
of the Environmentally Critical Areas
AGENCIES
Network (ECAN) by Palawan Council for Sustainable
Development (PCSD). PCSD promulgated the SEP Clearance
Guidelines requiring an SEP Clearance before application for
permits, licenses, patents, grants, or concessions with the
relevant government agencies.
PCSD issued an SEP Clearance to PLMDC in Barangay
Calategas in the Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan.
PCSD denied request of the farmers for the recall of the
subject SEP Clearance.
AGENCIES
Aggrieved, the farmers filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the RTC-Puerto Princesa praying for the issuance of Writ of
Mandamus annulling the SEP Clearance issued to PLMDC.
The trial court denied the petition since PCSD has no
adjudicatory powers.
Thus, this appeal.
AGENCIES
Question: What will be the basis for an administrative agency to
exercise quasi-adjudicatory powers?
Answer: There must be an enabling statute or legislative act
conferring quasi-judicial power upon the administrative body.
Normally, an agency’s power to formulate rules for the proper
discharge of its functions is always circumscribed by the enabling
statute. Otherwise, any agency conferred with rule-making power,
may circumvent legislative intent by creating new powers for itself
through an administrative order.
Rule-making powers may not necessarily in include quasi-
adjudicatory powers.
AGENCIES
Question: What are the factors that will indicate an
administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial functions?
Answer: A government agency performs adjudicatory
functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine
the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards
have the same effect as a judgment of the court. These
decisions are binding, such that when they attain finality, they
have the effect of res judicata that even the courts of justice
have to respect.
AGENCIES
The Court has held in one case, "judicial or quasi-judicial
function involves the determination of what the law is, and what
the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the
matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. In other
words, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function must be clothed with power and
authority to pass judgment or render a decision on the
controversy construing and applying the laws to that end."
AGENCIES
Question: Does ascertainment of facts constitute quasi-judicial
function?
Answer: PCSD’s receipt of documents and ascertainment of
their sufficiency and accuracy are not indicative of a judicial
function. It is, at most, an investigatory function to determine
the truth behind the claims of the project proponent. This
Court has held that the power to investigate is not the same as
adjudication, so long as there is no final determination of the
parties’ respective rights and obligations.
AGENCIES
Question: Does the conduct of public consultation constitute
quasi-judicial function?
Answer: The fact that an administrative agency conducts
public consultations or hearings does not mean that it is
performing quasi-judicial functions. The purpose of public
consultations is not for adversaries to pit their claims against
each other.
Note: Where an administrative body or officer does not exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial power, certiorari does not lie.
POWERS OF COA: DISALLOWANCE OF
DISBURSEMENT
RONNIE H. LUMAYNA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G. R.
No. 185001, September 25, 2009, EN BANC, DEL
CASTILLO, J. :
Facts: On 15 June 2001, DBM issued Local Budget Circular
No. 74 (LBC No. 74), authorizing the grant of a maximum of
5% salary adjustment to personnel in the LGUs effective 1
July 2001, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9137 dated 8 June
2001.
COA affirmed the Notice of Disallowance of the 5% salary
increase of the municipal personnel of the
POWERS OF COA: DISALLOWANCE OF
DISBURSEMENT
Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao covering the period 15
February to 30 September 2002, in the amount
of P895,891.50, and requiring petitioners to refund the
same. Also assailed is the COA Decision No. 2007-
040 dated 25 October 2007 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.
The declaration by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the
Resolution that the 2002 municipal budget was operative did
not include the grant of the 5% salary increase, as the same
was not contained in the said budget but in Resolution No. 66,
s. 2002.
POWER OF COA TO DISALLOW OF DISBURSEMENT OF
FUNDS
Question: Was the disallowance of the salary adjustment
without appropriate compliance with DBM rules proper?
Answer: Yes. The COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of
the amount of P895,891.50. Factual findings of administrative
bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are
afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of
substantial showing that such findings were made from an
erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental
structure, should not be disturbed.
FUNDS
Question: Is there a need for the employees of the municipality
to reimburse the government the amount they received under
the erroneous resolution?
Answer: There is no need for the employees to reimburse the
amount received because they acted in good faith. They should
be held personally liable for the refund, the same cannot be
sustained. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, public
officers are not personally liable for damages resulting from
the performance of official duties. Every public official is
entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of
official duties.
FUNDS
Question: Is there a need for the employees of the municipality
to reimburse the government the amount they received under
the erroneous resolution?
Answer: There is no need for the employees to reimburse the
amount received because they acted in good faith. They should
be held personally liable for the refund, the same cannot be
sustained. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, public
officers are not personally liable for damages resulting from
the performance of official duties. Every public official is
entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of
official duties.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, ELVIRA J. CANLAS,
MARIANITA A. BULANAN, REMEDIOS S. DE JESUS, and
NUNILON J. MABINIvs. SONIA R. LORENZO, in her
capacity as Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija,
CECILIO DE GUZMAN, Vice Mayor, CESARIO LOPEZ,
JR., EMILIO PACSON, BONIFACIO CACERES, JR.,
NAPOLEON OCAMPO, MARIO CRUZ, PRISCILA REYES,
ROLANDO ESQUIVEL, and CRISENCIANO CABLAO in
their capacity as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Isidro, Nueva Ecija, and EDUARDO N. JOSON
Facts: Resolution No. 27 s. 2001 of the Municipality of San
Isidro declared the reorganization of all its offices of the
municipal government. Consequently, the Municipal Mayor
Sonia R. Lorenzo issued a memorandum informing all
employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the
reorganization, all positions were deemed vacant and that all
employees must file their respective applications for the newly
created positions listed in the approved staffing pattern on or
before January 10, 2002. Otherwise, they would not be
considered for any of the newly created positions.
Instead of submitting their respective applications, petitioners,
on January 17, 2002, filed with the CA a Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioners sought to prohibit
respondents from implementing the reorganization. While the
case was pending, respondent Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo issued
a letter terminating the services of those who did not re-apply
as well as those who were not selected for the new positions
effective April 21, 2002.
Question: Was direct resort to the Court of Appeals proper?
• Answer: NO. The CSC which has primary jurisdiction over
the case. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the
removal and separation of all employees of government
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service.
Question: What is the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies?
Answer: The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies
to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the
courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of
exceptions.
Election Law: Remedies and Jurisdiction of Tribunals
ROSE MARIE D. DOROMAL v. HERNAN G. BIRON and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 181809, February
17, 2010, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Question: What are issues involved in an election contest?
Answer: The following are the issues which need to resolved in
an election contest:
1. Election
2. Returns
3. Qualifications
Question: Who may file an election contest?
Answer: Only a losing candidate may file an election contest.
Question: May a registered voter challenge the filing of a
Certificate of Candidacy by an aspirant to a position?
Answer: Yes. A registered voter may question the qualification
of a candidate and move for the cancellation of the COC.
Question: When may an election tribunal take jurisdiction over
an election contest?
Answer: An electoral tribunal may take cognizance of an
election contest provided that the following conditions are met:
1. Valid proclamation;
2. Valid oath-taking; and
3. Assumption to duties
Question: When may COMELEC reject a certficate of votes?
Answer: A certificate of votes has to be rejected if it did not
state (1) the number of votes obtained in words, (2) the
number of the precinct, (3) the total number of voters who
voted in the precinct, and (4) the time of issuance.
Question: When may certificates of votes be considered
defective?
Answer: The certificates of votes are defective if they do not
contain (1) the thumbmarks of the members of the BEI, (2) the
total number of voters who voted in the precinct, and (3) the
time of the issuance of the certificates, among others.
Question: When may a certificate of votes be considered as
tampered?
Answer: Before the certificate of votes may be admitted as
evidence of tampering, Section 17 of the Omnibus Election
Code requires that the certificate be duly authenticated by
testimonial or documentary evidence presented to the board of
canvassers by at least two members of the board of election
inspectors who issued the certificate.
Question: What is the rationale behind compliance with Section
17 of the Omnibus Code?
Answer: By requiring that the certificate of votes be duly
authenticated by at least two members of the BEI who issued
the same, the law seeks to safeguard the integrity of the
certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI to the watcher
after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time
that it is presented to the board of canvassers to prove
tampering.
THEMISTOCLES A. SAÑO, JR. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
OF DULAG, LEYTE, FERDINAND A. SERRANO (Acting
Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Dulag,
Leyte) and MANUEL SIA QUE, G.R. No. 182221, February 3,
2010, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO J.:
Question: What is a pre-proclamation controversy?
Answer: A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, is: any question pertaining to
or affecting the proceeding of
the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate
or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or
any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appearance of the election returns.
Question: What is the nature of a pre-proclamation
controversy?
Answer: It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is
summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law that
pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not
to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers
(BOC) will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not
apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic
and duly accomplished.
The Law on Public Corporations (Local Governments)
DANILO A. DUvs.VENANCIO R. JAYOMA, then Municipal
Mayor of Mabini, Bohol, VICENTE GULLE, JR.,
JOVENIANO MIANO, WILFREDO MENDEZ, AGAPITO
VALLESPIN, RENE BUCIO, JESUS TUTOR, CRESCENCIO
BERNALES, EDGARDO YBANEZ, and REY PAGALAN,
then members of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Mabini,
Bohol, G.R. No. 175042, April 23, 2012, FIRST DIVISION,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini,
Bohol, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988
requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the operation of a
cockpit in the said municipality
every four (4) years. For the period January 1, 1989 to
December 31, 1992, the winning bidder was Carabuena. But
Carabuena failed to comply with the legal requirements. The
Sangguniang Bayan on December 1, 1988 authorized Du to
continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder
complies with the legal requirements.
On July 11, 1997, pursuant to Municipal Resolution No. 065,
series of 1997, Mayor Jayoma ordered petitioner to desist from
holding any cockfighting activity effective immediately due to
irregularities in its operations.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition with
the RTC against respondent mayor and nine members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mabinito prevent respondents from
suspending his cockpit operation. Petitioner claimed that he
has a business permit to operate until December 31, 1997; and
that the Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, was
unlawfully issued as it deprived him of due process.
Question: As judge, how will you rule on the case filed by Du?
Answer: As judge, I will dismiss the case as he has no legal right
to operate a cockpit in the municipality. The latter allowed him
to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning
bidder failed to comply with the legal requirements for
operating a cockpit. Clearly, under the said resolution,
petitioner’s authority to operate the cockpit would end on
December 31, 1992 or upon compliance by the winning bidder
with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, whichever
comes first.
Question: What is the basis for the dismissal of the case?
Answer: Petitioner has no legal right to operate a cockpit and
therefore, he has no cause of action agianst the municipality. A
cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.” Corollarily, the essential
elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to
respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the
defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right with a resulting
injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may file
an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.
Question: What is the nature of a license to operate a cockpit?
Answer: License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege. It is not
property of which the holder may not be deprived without due
process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when
public interests so require.
Public International Law: Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes
Question: Distinguish between jus cogens and erga omnes.
Answer: Jus cogens literally means “compelling law.” As
defined, it means a peremptory (mandatory) norm of general
international law which is recognized and accepted by the
international community of States as a norm that does not
permit of any derogation and which can be replaced or
modified only by a subsequent norm of the same character.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty
that violates a jus cogens norm will have to be invalidated.
•
• Erga omnes literally means “in relation to the whole.” An
Public International Law: Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes
On the other hand, erga omnes literally means “in relation to

the whole.” An erga omnes refers to an obligation of a State
towards the international community of States as a whole.
Between an erga omnes obligation and an obligation of a State
towards another State pursuant to a treaty, an erga omnes is
superior.
Public International Law: UNCLOS
Question: What is UNCLOS?

Answer: The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation
that seeks to balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the
principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The
freedom to use the world’s marine waters is one of the oldest
customary principle of international law (Anne Bardin,
“Coastal State’s Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels” 14 Pace
Int’l. Rev. 27, 28 [2002]). The UNCLOS gives to the coastal
State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different
zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters,
Public International Law: UNCLOS
2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone,
and 5) the high seas.
It also gives coastal states more or less jurisdiction over foreign
vessels depending on where the vessel is located (Id. At 29).
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the
Coastal States exercise sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and
other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the
air apace over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil
(Art. 2, UNCLOS). (Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et al. v. Scott H.
Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, En Banc
[Villarama, Jr.])
PIL: The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
Question: What is the Convention on Biological Diversity?
Answer: The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is a
multilateral treaty recognizing that “modern biotechnology has
great potential for human well-being if developed and used with
adequate safety measures for the environment and human health.”
Its main objectives, as spelled out in Article I, are the “conservation
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the
utilization of genetic resources.” (International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines), et al., GR No. 209271, December 8,
2015, En Banc [Villarama])

Question: What is the precautionary principle?
Answer: The precautionary principle originated in Germany in
the 1960s, expressing the normative idea that governments are
obligated to “foresee and forestall” harm to the environment.
In the following decades, the precautionary principle has
served as the normative guideline for policymaking by many
national governments. The Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, the outcome of the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de
Janeiro, defines the rights of the people to be involved in the
development of
their economies, and the responsibilities of human beings to
safeguard the common environment. It states that the long term
economic progress is only ensured if it s linked with the protection
of the environment. The precautionary approach, which indicates
that lack of scientific certainty is no reason to postpone action to
avoid potentially serious or irreversible harm to the environment.
It has been incorporated in various international legal instruments.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, finalized and adopted in Montreal on January
29, 2000, establishes an international regime primarily aimed at
regulating trade in GMOs intended for release into the
environment, in accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development.
Public International Law: Right to Self-Determination
Question: What is the right to self-determination?
Answer: The right to self-determination of peoples has gone
beyond mere treaty or convention; in fact, it has now been
elevated into the status of a generally accepted of international
law. However, this right to self-determination of peoples may
be understood in two senses, i.e., the right to internal self-
determination (a people’s pursuit of its own political, economic,
social and cultural development within the framework of an
existing State), and the right to external self-determination
(which consists of the assertion of a right to unilateral
secession). (The Province of North Cotabato v. GRPPhilippines
Peace Panel, Oct.14, 2008)
Public International Law: Associated State
Question: What is an associated state?
Answer: An association is formed when two states of unequal
power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model,
one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the
other, the principal, while maintaining its international status
as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence.
Question: What is an associated state in the context of public
international law?
Answer: In international practice, the “associated state”
arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of
former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of
states that have passed through the status of associated states
as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla,
Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since
become independent states.
Question: Is the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity constitutional?
Answer: The 1987 Constitution provides that no province, city,
or municipality, not even the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) is recognized under our laws as having
an“associative” relationship with the national government. The
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted
by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State.
Public International Law: Auto-Limitation
Question: What is the concept of auto-limitation under public
international law?
Answer: While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed
absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law may limit certain aspects of
sovereignty. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda which requires
compliance of obligations in good faith.

Public International Law: Extradition and Asylum
Question: Define the term refugee.
Answer: A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, or owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Art. 1 A[2]) (Magallona, Fundamentals
of Public International Law, 2005 Ed., p. 287)
•

Public International Law: Extradition and Asylum
Question: What is the Non-Refoulement Principle?
Answer: The non-refoulement principle is the right of a refugee
not to be expelled or returned “in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
The prohibition of such expulsion or return becomes an
obligation of States parties to the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees. (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public
International Law, 2005 Ed., p. 289)
Public International Law: State Responsibility to Aliens
Question: What is the doctrine of state responsibility to aliens?

Answer: An important premise for the doctrine of state
responsibility to aliens to be validly invoked is that a State is
under no legal obligation in international law to admit an alien
in its territory. However, the moment it admits an alien, it is
duty-bound to provide protection to that alien so that once the
State is remiss in the performance of this duty and the alien
dies, or suffers injury or loss, this could lead to liability on the
part of the State.
Question: What are the requisites for the doctrine to apply?

Answer: The requisites for the state responsibility to aliens
doctrine to apply are:
• An act or omission in violation of international law;
• The act is attributable to the State; and
• The causes damage or injury to a third State directly, or
indirectly, to a national of the third State.
Question: What are the conditions to enforce the claims under
the doctrine of state responsibility to aliens?
Answer: The conditions for the enforcement of claims under this
doctrine are:
1. The nationality of the claim;
2. Exhaustion of local remedies;
3. No waiver;
4. No unreasonable delay in filing the claim; and
5. No improper conduct on the part of the injured alien.

PIL: International Humanitarian Law
Question: Define International Humanitarian Law.
Answer: International Humanitarian Law is the branch of
public international law which governs armed conflicts to the
end that the use of violence is limited and that human suffering
is mitigated or reduced by regulating or limiting the means of
military operations and by protecting persons who do not or
no longer participate in the hostilities.(Magallona,
Fundamentals of Public International Law, 2005 ed., p. 291)
•
Question: What is the scope of International Humanitarian
Law?
Answer: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) encompasses
both humanitarian principles and international treaties that
seek to save lives and alleviate suffering of combatants and
noncombatants during armed conflict. Its principal legal
documents are the Geneva Conventions of 1949, four treaties
signed by almost every nation in the world. The Conventions
define fundamental rights for combatants removed from the
fighting due to injury, illness, or capture, and for civilians.
The 1977 Additional Protocols, which supplement the Geneva
Conventions, further expand those rights under
• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949
(First Geneva Convention);
• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea
of August 12, 1949 (Second Geneva Convention);
• Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
of August 12, 1949 (Third Geneva Convention);
• Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (Fourth Geneva
Convention);
• Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977; and
• Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) of 8 June 1977.
•
Question: What are the categories of armed conflicts?
Answer: The categories of armed conflicts are:
• International Armed Conflicts
• Internal or Non-international Armed Conflicts
• War of National Liberation

Question: What is the principle of distinction under IHL?
Answer: An important principle to be observed under IHL is the
Principle of Distinction. Under this principle, persons directly
engaged in armed conflict must, at all times, distinguish
between civilians and combatants; between civilian objects and
military objectives, so that only combatants and military
objectives may be subject of attack.
Question: What is the concept of war of national liberation?
Answer: An armed conflict may be of such nature in which
“peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination.”
This conflict involving the right of peoples to self-determination
is an international armed conflict. It is so classified under
Article I, paragraphs 3 and 4 of Protocol I.
Under these provisions, this conflict which may be referred to as
“war of national liberation,” is included in the classification set
out in Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 x x x. (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International
Law, 2005 ed., p. 307)
PIL: International Criminal Court
Question: What is the Rome Statute?
Answer: The Rome Statute established the International
Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions.” (Article I, Rome Statute) Its
jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in
the Statute (Article 5, Rome Statute). The Statute was opened
for signature by all States in Rome on July 17, 1988 and
had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines
signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 x x x. Its provisions,
however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval of the signatory states (Article 25, Rome Statute).
(Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA
622, July 6, 2005, En Banc [Puno])
Question: What is the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court?
Answer: The International Criminal Court (ICC) shall have the
power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern. Its jurisdiction covers the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute (Article 5,
Rome Statute). (Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005, En Banc [Puno])
Question: Explain the principle of complementarity under the
ICC.
Answer: The tenth preambular paragraph of the ICC Statute
emphasizes that “the International Criminal Court x x x shall
be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction.” This
principle becomes operative in Article 1 of the Statute. This,
however, has to be correlated with the sixth preambular
paragraph of the Statute which declares that “it is the duty of
every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those
responsible for international crimes.”
The principle of complementarity produces a correlation of the
ICC jurisdiction with that of every state over international
crimes under the ICC Statute.
The principle of complementarity gives primacy to national
jurisdiction x x x.
The principle of ne bis in idem in Article 20, paragraph 3, of
ICC Statute strengthens complementarity, thus: Unless the
proceedings in the national court is for the purpose of shielding
the person concerned from liability, or not conducted
independently or impartially,
“no person who has been tried by another court for conduct …
[constituting crimes within its jurisdiction] shall be tried by the
Court with respect to the same conduct x x x.” (Magallona,
Fundamentals of Public International Law [2005 ed.])
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Political Law: Concepts,

After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with

In fine, the Court reiterated that the issue on the validity or

On the other hand, erga omnes literally means “in relation to

Question: What is UNCLOS?

Question: What is the doctrine of state responsibility to aliens?

Question: What are the requisites for the doctrine to apply?

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