Against Determinable

Universals

University of Durham, November 24, 2009

Dr Markku Keinänen
University of Turku
markku.keinanen@utu.fi
 Introduction
• In this presentation, I argue against the existence of
determinable universals.
• Properties and relations are assumed to be tropes.
• Both determinate and determinable properties (if
considered as universals) are identified with sortal
notions applying to tropes that are in certain formal
relations to each other.
• I take up certain recent arguments for determinable
universals (Armstrong 1997; Johansson 2000; Ellis
2001) and attempt to formulate a trope theorist answer to
them.
 General motivation
• Several recent advocates of determinate universals (e.g.,
Armstrong (1997), Johansson (2000), Ellis (2001) and
Keller (2007)) defend the existence of determinable
universals.
• Why to argue against determinable universals?

[1]: Assume that properties and relations are tropes (the claim
which I will not defend). The postulation of determinable
universals contradicts the trope nominalist claim that all
properties and relations are particulars.
[2]: Second, if we need not introduce determinable universals
and can account for the same facts by means of tropes, we
gain qualitative economy.
 General motivation
[3]: Determinable universals are prima facie
redundant postulations: property tropes already
suffice to determine the determinable
characteristics of objects. We need not introduce
separate determinable properties.
[4]: Property tropes seem to fall under a certain
(highest) determinable because of their very
nature and we need not introduce determinable
universals to explain this.
 Examples of determinates of
determinables
Monadic natural properties

• Qualities: shapes, colours

• Quantities: masses, lengths, charges

Natural relations

• Quantitative relations: distances, durations, space-time

intervals

• Since quantities are best a posteriori candidates for

natural properties, I will concentrate on quantities.
 Conventions
• Let us stipulate that two objects share a
determinate feature falling under determinable D
(e.g., a specific mass) iff they are exactly similar
in respect of D (mass).
• Moreover, we can say that object i has
determinable characteristics D if the attribution
of determinable D to i is true of i.
• In continuation, I will concentrate on the highest
determinables (mass, charge) and on the lowest
determinates (specific masses, charges).
 General characteristics of the
determinate determinable relation

• Downward entailment: If object i possesses a

determinable characteristics D, i must possess some
determinate feature F falling under D. For instance, an
object having a mass must have some determinate
mass.
• Upward entailment: If object i possesses some
determinate feature F, i must possess the
determinable under which F falls. For instance, a
circular object must have a shape.
 Relations between determinates of
a determinable
• Exclusiveness: The determinate features falling under
a common determinable D are exclusive of each other.
For instance, a 1 kg object cannot have any other
mass.
• Resemblance: The different objects possessing a
determinate feature falling under determinable D
resemble each other in respect of D. For instance,
objects having specific masses resemble in respect of
mass more or less closely.
Assume that the determinate features are determined
by the determinate properties of objects. The
corresponding determinate properties falling under the
determinable resemble more or less closely.
 Different categorizations
• Determinate properties are commonly considered as
first-order properties (universals or tropes).
• By contrast, determinable universals (if postulated) can
be categorized in three alternative ways:
1) (Russellian) first-order universals, i.e., universal
properties of objects.
2) (Russellian) second-order universals, i.e., properties of
determinate properties (Armstrong 1997; Johansson
2000 (?)).
3) Neo-Aristotelian property kind universals, i.e.,
determinable kinds of tropes (Ellis 2001). According to
this approach, determinate universals are determinate
kinds of tropes (or, modes).
 Different categorizations
• In what follows, I will take the third Neo-Aristotelian
approach as granted for three reasons:

1) It is suitable for a theorist who assumes that properties

of objects are tropes.
2) Gillett & Rives (2005) have already argued against the
first approach fairly convincingly (redundancy
argument).
3) We can construct all main arguments for determinable
universals by assuming that determinable universals
are kinds of property and relation tropes. Including the
arguments Johansson (2000) presents.
 The Neo-Aristotelian approach to
determinable universals
• An important recent representative: Brian Ellis (2001,
2002).
• Properties of objects are particulars: tropes (or modes).
• The distinct tropes (1 kg tropes) are exactly similar
because of being instances of the same determinate
kind universal (of being a 1 kg trope).
• The distinct tropes (mass tropes) belong to the same
determinable kind because of being instances of a
determinable kind universal (of being a mass trope).
• The determinate kinds of tropes are sub-kinds of the
determinable kinds.
 Arguments for determinable
universals
[1]: The Argument from Resemblance (Ellis 2001:
sec.2.3; cf. also Johansson 2000: sec.3)
The distinct tropes belonging to the same determinate
kind (e.g., two 1 kg tropes) are exactly similar to each
other. Moreover, the tropes belonging to the same
determinable kind (two mass tropes) resemble each
other (are connected by quantitative distance), while the
tropes falling under distinct determinables do not
resemble (are not connected by quantitative distance).
Property tropes resemble exactly because they are
instances of the same determinate kind universal.
Similarly, the best explanation of why the tropes
belonging to a determinable kind resemble is that they
are instances of a determinable kind universal.
 Arguments for determinable
universals
[2]: The Argument from the Hierarchy of Natural Kinds
(Ellis 2001: 70ff.)
The natural kinds of tropes form a hierarchy: the
determinate kinds (e.g., such as the mass of 1 kg) are
sub-kinds of the determinable kinds (such as mass). In
turn, determinable kinds are sub-kinds of still higher
natural kinds (such as the kind of causal powers).
The best explanation of the objective and mind-
independent division of tropes into determinate and
determinable kinds (mass, electric charge, distance) is
that tropes are instances of the corresponding property
kind universals. This accounts for the hierarchy of the
natural kinds of tropes existing in the world.
 Arguments for determinable
universals
[3]: The Argument from the Physical Magnitudes (cf.
Johansson 2000: sec.4)
The physical quantities falling under the same
determinable and related by quantitative distance form a
physical dimension: we can add the determinate quantities
in the same dimension and obtain new determinates falling
under the same determinable.
Secondly, many determinate quantities belonging to certain
distinct dimensions can be multiplied by each other and we
obtain determinates falling under a new determinable.
The best explanation of these facts is that (many) physical
dimensions correspond to determinable universals,
ontological determinables having the determinate quantities
in question as their instances.
 Arguments for determinable
universals
[4]: The Argument from the Laws 0n Determinables
(Johansson 2000: sec. 7)
The determinable kinds of tropes are subjected to laws
constraining the inter-determinable (e.g., determinable
dependences) or intra-determinable relationships (e.g.,
determinate exclusions). These laws are made true by
the determinable kind universals determining the
essential nature of each determinable kind. Determinable
kind universals must not be replaced with nominalist
constructions.
 Arguments for Determinable
Universals
[5]: The argument from spectral kinds (Ellis 2001: 65-66,
79).
Some of the determinable kinds of tropes (e.g., mass,
distance) are spectral kinds. Spectral kinds allow for a
continuous (or, a dense) variation among the intrinsic
values of their instances. Spectral kinds cannot be
constituted by their instantiated values: it is probable that
every quantity which is a spectral kind has uninstantiated
values (i.e., gappy instances). Thus, the quantity tropes
belonging to a spectral kind do not suffice to constitute it.
Hence, we need to introduce determinable quantity
universals to act as spectral kinds having uninstantiated
values.
 Arguments for Determinable
universals
• For instance, it can be argued that masses form a
spectral kind.
1) It is consistent with physics that masses get arbitrarily
small values (or, that there are infinitely many masses
between any two distinct masses).
2) It is conceivable that there are arbitrarily small masses.
3) Arbitrarily small instantiated masses are possible.
4) Hence, the quantity mass gets arbitrarily small values,
many of which are uninstantiated.
5) Consequently, the quantity mass cannot be construed
by means of property tropes in formal relations to each
other.
 Arguments for determinable
universals
[6]: The Argument from Functional Laws (Armstrong
1997)
Functional laws (such as Newton’s inverse square law of
gravitation) establish necessary connections between
determinate quantities falling under some distinct
determinables (e.g., masses, distances and gravitational
attractions by some force). In establishing the necessary
connections, they are completely undiscriminative
between determinates (they do not contain exceptions).
Since (some of) these quantities have uninstantiated
values, we cannot build the truthmakers of functional
laws solely by of means of the instantiated determinate
quantities. We must introduce determinable universals to
act as the parts of the truthmakers of functional laws.
 The trope nominalist account of
determinables
• Tropes are particular properties. A trope is:

1) Categorially simple, i.e., it is either simple or all of its

proper parts are further tropes (entities of the same
category).
2) A concrete, i.e., spatio-temporal entity.
3) Countable and identifiable (has identity of its own
indepedent of the identity any other entity).
4) Has a thin particular nature to determine a single
feature of the object possessing the trope (e.g., the
mass of 1 kg).
 The trope nominalist account of
determinables
• According to trope nominalism, two distinct tropes t1 and
t2 (e.g., two distinct 1 kg tropes) are exactly similar
simply because of being particular properties they are.
Thus, exact similarity is an ungrounded internal relation
(“strict internal relation”) between tropes t1 and t2.
• Consequently, we need not introduce any further entities
to ground their exact similarity.
• We must not introduce such entities: since determinate
1kg tropes t1 and t2 are exactly similar because of their
existence, any further entity (e.g., relational trope of
similarity) that would ground their exact similarity would
be a redundant postulation.
 The trope nominalist account of
determinables
• The exactly similar tropes (e.g., all 1 kg tropes) are all
certain kinds of tropes (1 kg tropes). They belong to the
same determinate kind because they are exactly similar to
each other.
• The property tropes t1 and t2 are the truthmakers of the
claim of their belonging to a determinate kind:

[1]: t1 and t2 are 1 kg tropes.

• The trope nominalist can identify the determinate kind of

tropes (the kind of 1 kg tropes) with a kind term applying to
a group of tropes exactly similar trope to each other.
Consequently, she can reject the existence of determinate
property kind universals
 The trope nominalist account of
determinables
• We obtain the trope nominalist account of determinables
as a generalisation of the trope nominalist account of
determinates (tropes belonging to a determinate kind).
• Prima facie, all quantity tropes belonging determinable
kind D are connected by quantitative distance and
(usually) ordered by greater than relation.
• However, we cannot express quantitative distances
between tropes without recourse to the determinable
kind itself (the specifications of quantitative distance
such as trope t is 1kg greater than trope u contain
reference to the determinable kind via the unit).
 Trope nominalist account of
determinables
• Proposal (inspired by Bigelow & Pargetter (1990)): all
quantity tropes belonging to determinable kind bear the
different formal relations of proportion to each other.
Each relation of proportion can be expressed by a (real)
number divided by another, for instance:

[3]: Two kilogram trope t3 is in the 2 : 1 relation to one

kilogram trope t2.

• It is easy to observe that all mass tropes and distance

tropes are connected by different formal relations of
proportion. It seems that the idea can be genaralized to
apply the other quantities.
 The Trope Nominalist account of
determinables
• Some quantities (such as electric charge) take positive
and negative values and we must introduce both positive
and negative relations of proportion.
• If the relations of proportion between determinate
quantities falling under D are given, we can determine
order between them and specify quantitative distances
between them (given some conventionally chosen unit of
the quantity).
• The formal relation relation of exact similarity is a special
case of the proportion relations (1 : 1 proportion).
 The trope nominalist account of
determinables
• Thus, tropes t1 and t2 are truthmakers of claim [5]:

[5]: t1 and t2 are mass tropes

• The trope nominalist can identify each determinable kind

of tropes (the kind of mass tropes) with a kind term
applying to a group of tropes connected by the formal
relations of proportion and (possibly) combinatorial
exclusion, i.e., with a formal kind of tropes.
• Consequently, the trope nominalist can reject the
existence of determinable kind universals.
 The trope nominalist answer
• [A1]: According to the trope nominalist, certain property
tropes are exactly similar to each other simply because
of their existence. The introduction any further entity
(e.g., a determinate kind universal) to account for the
exact similarity of tropes leads to redundancy.
• Similarly, the quantity tropes falling under highest
determinable D are connected by the relations of
proportion because of their existence. Therefore, they
resemble each other (i.e., are connected by quantitative
distance). The tropes belonging to distinct determinable
kinds are not connected by the relations of proportion.
Again, the introduction of any further entities (e.g.,
determinable kind universals) to account for these facts
leads to redundancy.
 The trope nominalist answer
• [A2]: The division of tropes into determinate and
determinable kinds is objective and mind-independent
because tropes are in the required formal relations
independent of us and our classifications. Hence, we
need not introduce determinate or determinable kind
universals to make true the attributions of natural kind to
tropes.
• Determinate kinds are sub-kinds of determinable kinds
because the formal relation determining the membership
of trope in a determinate kind (i.e., exact similarity) is a
special case of the formal relations that determine the
membership of tropes in a determinable kind (i.e., the
relations of proportion).
 The trope nominalist answer
• [A3]: The present approach does not directly explain the
(alleged) truth of certain existence claims concerning
determinates of determinables (Johansson (2000).
• Since certain monadic determinate quantities (such as
masses and charges) are additive, the determinate
tropes falling under D possessed by two objects a and b
determine the quantitative feature falling under D
possessed by the object composed by a and b. (Those
who like complex properties, can introduce a complex
trope corresponding this feature.)
• Second, we can either postulate tropes belonging to a
further determinable kind that form a physical dimension
of some derived physical quantity or try to explain that
dimension away as a determinable kind of tropes.
 The trope nominalist answer
• [A4]: Johansson’s examples of laws concerning
determinables fail to show that we need to postulate
determinable universals.
• First, determinate tropes falling under a determinable are
in the relations of proportion to each other, we can give
them certain quantized values (given some chosen unit).
These values can be added and (in some cases)
subtracted.
• Secondly, the determinate tropes falling under a
determinable are exclusive of each other because they are
connected by formal relation of combinatorial exclusion.
• Thirdly, the tropes acting as properties of a certain kind of
object can be generically dependent on the tropes
belonging to another determinable kind.
 The trope nominalist answer
• [A5]: Spectral kinds cannot be constructed by means of
the present approach. However, some proposed examples
can be explained away:
1) Masses: the argument that masses form a spectral kind
was rather weak based on the considerations of
conceivability (understood as consistency with physics).
Counter-proposal: The fundamental values of quantity
(rest) mass are given by the rest masses of the
fundamental particles. Although the quantity mass does
not come in natural units, it does not get arbitrarily small
values. All masses of objects are multiples of the
fundamental masses.
2) Distances (durations and space-time intervals): if space is
infinitely divisible, distances have a stronger claim for a
spectral kind.
 The Trope Nominalist answer
• [A6]: Pace Armstrong, we need not identify instances of
functional laws (i.e., determinate laws) with relations
between universals. According to dispositionalist
approach, the statements of determinate law are made
true by the property tropes possessed by objects.
• However, many determinate laws seem to describe how
the objects possessing these property tropes would
behave in counterfactual situations.
 Conclusion
• The Trope Nominalism identifies the determinable kinds
of tropes with kind terms applying to groups of tropes
connected by the formal relations of 1) proportion, and
(usually) 2) combinatorial exclusion.
• The existence of property kind universals is rejected.
• Tropes are in the formal relations of proportion because
of being the tropes they are (as formal relations
proportions are not relational entities).
• Burden: spectral kinds must be explained away.
• Benefit: similarities between the determinates of a
determinable are given by means of the relations of
proportion. This helps us to give a more unified list of
formal relations.
 References
• Armstrong, D. M. (1978): A Theory of Universals, Vol. 2 of Universals and Scientific Realism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
• Armstrong, D. M. (1997): A World of States of Affairs, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
• Bigelow, J. & Pargetter, R. (1990): Science and Necessity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
• Campbell, K. K. (1990): Abstract Particulars. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
• Fales, E. (1990): Causation and Universals. (London & New York: Routledge).
• Gillett, C. & Rives, B. (2005): “The Non-existence of Determinables: Or, a world of Absolute
Determinates as a Default Hypothesis”, Nous 39:3, 483-504.
• Ellis, B. (2001): Scientific Essentialism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
• Ellis, B. (2002): Philosophy of Nature, (Chesham: Acumen).
• Johansson, I. (2000): ”Determinables as Universals”, The Monist 1, 101-121.
• Maurin, A-S. (2002): If Tropes, (Dordrecht: Reidel).
• Russell, B. (1912): The Problems of Philosophy,(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
• Sanford, D. (2006): “Determinates and Determinables”, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Shoemaker, S. (1980): “Causality and Properties”, in van Inwagen (ed.): Time and Cause,
(Dordrecht: Reidel).
• Simons, P. (2003): ”Tropes, Relational”, Conceptus.
Thank You!