Jose Cangco

vs.
Manila Railroad Co.
G.R. Nos. L-12191 October 14, 1918

Topic: [Common Carriers - In General- Nature and Basis of liability - Article 1733]
[Cruz, Anton]
 FACTS OF THE CASE

🞆 Plaintiff, Jose Cangco was under the employment of herein defendant, Manila
Railroad Co. (MRC) in which the former is a clerk. Being employed under
defendant, it subjects Cangco to take a train in which a pass that entitles him to
a free ride along the train was given to him as his home destination, San Mateo,
was in route.

🞆 That on the night of January 20, 1915 as Cangco was coming home from work
on the train in which he was on, was arriving towards the platform of his
destination. It must be noted that the time of arrival was between 7 to 8pm
where the station itself was dark and lightly lit by one light post.
 FACTS OF THE CASE

🞆 The train was slowly reaching a complete stop but before Cangco stepped off
the train, another person was able to step onto the platform as the speed was at
a pace wherein it would not make any difference. However, as soon as Cangco
stepped onto the platform, he unfortunately stumbled upon a sack of melons
that he did not see. As a result of his stumble, he fell violently along the platform
and rolled down the street wherein a car hit him.

🞆 Due to this accident, Cangco’s arms were then amputated. This then resulted to
an action filed by Cangco against MRC to recover damages. The Court of First
Instance of Manila ruled in favor of MRC wherein Cangco had contributory
negligence as to the misfortune, hence this petition.
ISSUE(S)

🞆WON MRC should be held liable for the

damages sustained by Cangco as a
common carrier.
 ISSUE:

WON MRC should be held liable for the damages sustained by

RULING Cangco as a common carrier.

The Supreme Court held YES and reversed the judgement of the CFI of Manila. The court places emphasis
on the role of the train being a common carrier. That in which has the obligation to observe
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in its services. The sole purpose of being a common carrier is the safe
transport of a person to his/her destination. From the facts of the case, the court stated that the factors
that contributed to Cangco’s fall were not of a negligent individual.

It should be under the MRC’s obligation to ensure everyone safety, the fact that the sack of melons were
placed right in front of a platform where passengers step off is that in itself wrong as it is an obstacle that
should not hinder or bother any normal person in stepping of. Given that it was also dark and the station
was only supplied by one light did not give Cangco much of a choice in seeing properly. A regular individual
should not have to worry about stumbling across a sack of melons when getting of a train and onto the
platform safely. It is MRC’s duty to provide a safe alighting place in which each passenger is catered to.
END OF CASE
 Cesar Isaac
vs.
A.L. AMMEN Transportation
G.R. Nos. L-9671 August 23, 1957

Topic: [Common Carriers - In General- Nature and Basis of liability - Article 1733]
[Cruz, Anton]
 FACTS OF THE CASE

🞆 That on May 31, 1951, plaintiff Cesar Isaac boarded a bus as a passenger that
was destined for Pili Camarines Sur. During the ride, Isaac was relaxed as he was
seated on the left side of the bus and placed his arms just outside the window
leaving it exposed.

🞆 Before reaching the destination, a speeding pick-up motor vehicle was suddenly
seen from the opposite side of the road in which such motor vehicle was out of
position and was in close proximity of the bus. This resulted to the bus driver
immediately swerving to the right side of the road where piles of gravel that had
at least 3 feet high were.
 FACTS OF THE CASE

🞆 Even with the best efforts of the bus driver to evade the accident, a collision
ultimately ensued and thus resulted into the amputation of Isaac’s exposed left
arm.

🞆 Plaintiff then files an action for damages against defendant while the latter sets
up the defense that such incident was that of an unforeseeable event where the
injuries sustained falls upon the negligent acts of the driver of the motor vehicle
and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

🞆 Isaac then contends that defendant should be held liable as they were under a
contract of carriage wherein there was a breach resulting from the injury
sustained during the service.
ISSUE(S)

🞆WON defendant A.L. AMMEN

Transportation should be held liable.
 ISSUE:

WON defendant A.L. AMMEN Transportation should be held

RULING liable.

The Supreme Court held NO. A carrier is presumed to be held liable in cases of death or
injury that has been sustained provided however if it is proven that such carrier had not
exerted extraordinary diligence in the process. In the case at bar, the SC states that the bus
driver has done all that was necessary to avoid a more disastrous and unfortunate
outcome. The bus driver acted in a state of emergency wherein it preserved the safety of
most of the passengers. Isaac, being the only victim in this instance insinuates that another
factor is to be the cause. That being the negligence and unnecessary placement of Isaac’s
arm outside the window and confinements of the bus. It is of no fault of the bus driver that
the external act of Isaac caused the injury as the former’s duty at that point was to evade
the worst possible outcome and protect the entire group within the bus.
END OF CASE
 PAZ FORES
vs.
IRENEO MIRANDA
G.R. Nos. L-12163 MARCH 4, 1959

Topic: [Common Carriers - In General- Nature and Basis of liability - Article 1733]
[Mamuri, Marc ]
 FACTS OF THE CASE

🞆 Eugenio Luga, driver of the jeepney owned by Paz Fores, while descending at
Sta. Mesa with excessive speed lost control of the vehicle and swerved injuring 5
passengers, including respondent;

🞆 Respondent previously prayed for moral damages against petitioner in which the
court granted the same amounting to Php 20,000;

🞆 However, petitioner Paz contested the same claiming that the awarding of moral
damages to respondent is incorrect on the grounds that common carriers
cannot be held accountable since the victim did not die
 FACTS OF THE CASE

🞆 The respondent based their claim under Article 2219 & 2220 of the New Civil
Code stating that “moral damages may be recovered (1) criminal offenses
resulting in physical injuries; and (2) quasi-delicts causing physical injuries...
the same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted in
bad faith”

🞆 The petitioner countered the respondent’s claims citing Article 1764,

specifically the exception to the case relating to the circumstance “where the
injured the did not die, moral damages may not be recoverable unless it is
proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith”
ISSUE(S)

🞆Whether the awarding of moral damages

to respondent was VALID?
 ISSUE:
Whether the awarding of moral damages to respondent was
VALID?
RULING

The court ruled in the negative. The law clearly

differentiates the application of the cited provisions
by both parties. In the case at hand, the party who
was ordered to pay for the moral damages was the
common carrier. Under Article 1764, moral
damages may only be awarded when the victim has
died. However, in this case, the victim only
sustained physical injuries. The court further held
that the lawmakers set a limit for recovery of
damages. Bad faith should not be lightly inferred
from mere finding that contract was breached
through the fault of the carrier’s employees.
 [PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO
PASCUA, ET AL.,
G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990]

Topic: [Common Carriers - In General- Nature and Basis of liability - Article 1733]
[Kuan, Renniel Leslie ]
 FACTS OF THE CASE
🞆 At 11am on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro
Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino
Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas with their families for P 24.00. Upon
reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney detached causing it to run in an unbalanced position.
Driver Manalo stepped on the brake, causing the jeepney to make a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the opposite lane of
the road and its rear faced the north. The jeepney occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way
of vehicles coming from the north.

🞆 Petitioner Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines claims that almost immediately after the sudden U-turn the bus bumped the right rear portion of the
jeep. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the bus stopped a few minutes before hitting the jeepney. Either way, as a result of the
collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney
passengers sustained physical injuries.

🞆 A criminal complaint was filed against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. The case against delos Reyes driver of Phil. Rabbit was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Manalo (jeepney driver), however, was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
 FACTS OF THE CASE
🞆 3 complaints for recovery of damages were then filed by heirs of Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales Adelaida Estomo and before the CFI
of Pangasinan. All three cases impleaded jeepney owners spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes as
defendants. Then plaintiffs heirs of the deceased anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their
contractual liability. As against Rabbit and bus driver delos Reyes, heirs of the deceased based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-
delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as additional defendant in the first case only.

🞆 🞆The trial court ruled in favour of the heirs, finding defendant jeepney drivers negligent and having breached the contract of carriage
with their passengers and ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs damages.
🞆 🞆The IAC reversed the ruling of the trial court applying the doctrine of last clear chance and the substantial factor test, holding that bus
driver delos Reyes, NOT jeepney driver Manalo, was negligent.
ISSUE(S)

🞆 Who is liable for the death and Physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
 ISSUE:

Who is liable for the death and Physical injuries

RULING suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?

❏ After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven

evidence, The Court found that the proximate cause of the accident
Son v. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon.
citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely
Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75. pro hac vice.

❏ In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the

In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against
the carrier for his failure to safely carry his
passenger to his destination, an accident caused
either by defects in the automobile or through the
negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito
which would avoid the carriers liability for
damages
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome
by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code
or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous
event (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
 ISSUE:

Who is liable for the death and Physical injuries

RULING suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?

❏ The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The
rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in
the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due
to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA
742).

❏ In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's
negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's
liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the
driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. 1v
 [LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN,
vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT
SECURITY AGENCY

G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003]

Topic: [Common Carriers - In General- Nature and Basis of liability - Article 1733]
[Kuan, Renniel Leslie ]
 FACTS OF THE CASE

❏ On October 14, 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token”. While Navidad was
standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding between the two apparently ensued that led to a fistfight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate who
delivered the first blow. Navidad fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.

❏ The widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman
filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred
that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
 FACTS OF THE CASE

❏ LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending
that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its
decision in favor of the plaintiff widow and children of the deceased ordering Prudent Security and Escartin to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs for the damages. Complaint against LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.

❏ Prudent security appealed to the Court of Appeals where it Exonerated the appellants from any liability and instead holding LRTA
and Rodolfo Roman liable.

❏ The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage had
already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the
death of Navidad and failing to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim since what is evident is the fact that the
victim died because of the train owned and manufactured by LRTA
ISSUE(S)

🞆 Whether or not Petitioner LRTA is liable for the death of Nicanor Natividad JR

RULING
The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
ISSUE:
🞆 Whether or not Petitioner LRTA is liable for the death
of Nicanor Natividad JR
🞆 YES. The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for
all circumstances.Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for
so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought
to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.
🞆 Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with
the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers.
🞆 The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through
the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.
 ISSUE:

🞆 Whether or not Petitioner LRTA is liable for the death

RULING of Nicanor Natividad JR

🞆 In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved
of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,an exception from the general
rule that negligence must be proved.

🞆 The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach if that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case,
the common IS NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
END OF CASE
 National Development Co.
vs
Court of Appeals

GR L-49407 August 8 1988

TOPIC: LAWS APPLICABLE - ARTICLE 1766,1753

LABADOR, ROMEO JR
 Ynchausti Steamship Co.
vs
Dexter

G.R. No. L-15652 December 14, 1920

TOPIC: [COMMON CARRIAGE OF GOODS- LIABILITY AND PRESUMPTION OF

NEGLIGENCE- ARTS. 1733, 1734, 1735]
LABADOR, ROMEO JR
 AMANDO MIRASOL vs THE ROBERT DOLLAR CO.

GR NO. L-29721 MARCH 27, 1929

TOPIC: [COMMON CARRIAGE OF GOODS- LIABILITY AND PRESUMPTION

OF NEGLIGENCE- ARTS. 1733, 1734, 1735]
[Lao, Dominic Austin A.]
 FACTS OF THE CASE
-Plaintiff Mirasol alleges that he is the owner and consignee of two cases of books, shipped in good order
and condition at New York, U.S.A., on board the defendant, The Robert Dollar Co’s steamship President
Garfield, for transport and delivery to the plaintiff in the City of Manila, all freight charges paid. That the
two cases arrived in Manila in bad order and damaged condition, resulting in the total loss of one case and a
partial loss of the other and defendant has refused and neglected to pay.

-Among the contentions of Robert Dollar Co. are that the damage to plaintiff's merchandise was not caused
through the negligence of the vessel, its master, agent, officers, crew, tackle or appurtenances, nor by reason
of the vessel being unseaworthy or improperly manned, "but that such damage resulted from faults or errors
in navigation or in the management of said vessel and that the defendant, as agreed upon in the bill of lading
signed by the the plaintiff , cannot be held liable for any loss of, or damage to, any of said merchandise
resulting from any of the following causes: Acts of God, perils of the sea or other waters, and that plaintiff's
damage was caused by "Acts of God" or "perils of the sea.”
FACTS OF THE CASE

-The defendant alleges that the damage was caused by sea water and that the bill of
lading exempts defendant from liability for that cause. That damage by "sea water" is a
shipper's risk, and that defendant is not liable. As a result of the trial upon such issues,
the lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff from which both parties appealed.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not The Robert Dollar Co., as common carrier, may be

held liable for the damages caused to Mirasol’s consigned property.

RULING
Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not The Robert Dollar Co., as common
carrier, may be held liable for the damages caused to
Mirasol’s consigned property.
-YES. The court held that the defendant having received the two boxes in
good condition, its legal duty was to deliver them to the plaintiff in the
same condition in which it received them. From the time of their delivery
to the defendant in New York until they are delivered to the plaintiff in
Manila, the boxes were under the control and supervision of the defendant
and beyond the control of the plaintiff. The defendant having admitted that
the boxes were damaged while in transit and in its possession, the burden
of proof then shifted, and it devolved upon the defendant to both allege
and prove that the damage was caused by reason of some fact which
exempted it from liability.
-As to how the boxes were damaged, when or where, was a matter
peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant and in
the very nature of things could not be in the knowledge of the plaintiff. To
require the plaintiff to prove as to when and how the damage was caused
would force him to call and rely upon the employees of the defendant's
ship, which in legal effect would be to say that he could not recover any
damage for any reason. The court ruled that this was not what the law
stated.
 ISSUE(S)
Whether or not The Robert Dollar Co., as common
RULING carrier, may be held liable for the damages caused to
Mirasol’s consigned property.

-Shippers who are forced to ship goods on an ocean

liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and
Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
when goods are delivered on board ship in good order
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to
and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the
any of the following causes only:
shipper in bad order and condition, it then devolves
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the
calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
goods were damaged by the reason of some fact which
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; legally exempts him from liability; otherwise, the
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the shipper would be left without any redress, no matter
containers; what may have caused the damage. The fact that the
(5) Order or act of competent public authority. cases were damaged by "sea water," standing alone
and within itself, is not evidence that they were
Article 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, damaged by force majeure or for a cause beyond the
4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or defendant's control.
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.
END OF THE CASE
 Tan Chiong
Vs
Inchausti

TOPIC: [COMMON CARRIAGE OF GOODS- EXCEPTION FROM LIABILITY- NATURAL DISASTER-

ARTS. 1734(1), 1739, 1740; ARTICLE 361 CODE OF COMMERCE]
DELAVIN, SHERY
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Ynchausti and Co. received from Ong Bien Sip in Manila 205 bundles of goods to be
conveyed by YC's steamer to Gubat in Sorsogon, and there to be transhipped to
another vessel belonging to YC and transported to Catarman, in Samar. As the
lorcha Pilar, which was to transport the goods to Catarman was not yet in Gubat when
the cargo arrived, the cargo was stored in YC's warehouse.
Several days later, the lorcha arrived and the goods were loaded. However,
as the lorcha was being towed, a storm arose, drove the lorcha to the shore and
wrecked it, scattering the goods on the beach. YC's laborers proceeded to gather up
the goods. As it was impossible to preserve the goods, they were sold at a public
auction. Plaintiff filed an action for damages for P 20,000. LC decided that plaintiff
was entitled only to P 14,642.63.
ISSUE(S)

(1)Whether the carrier is relieved from liability due to force majeure?

(2) Whether the carrier is liable for the loss of the cargo and for
failure to deliver the same at the place of destination?

RULING
(1) Yes. It is a proven fact that the loss or damage to the
goods shipped on the said lorcha was due to the force
majeure which caused the wreck of the said craft. Accdg. to
Art. 361 of the Code of Commerce, merchandise shall be
transported at the risk and venture of the shipper, unless the
contrary be expressly stipulated. No such stipulation appears
of record, therefore, all damages and impairment suffered by
the goods in transportation, by reason of accident, force
majeure, or by virtue of the nature or defect of the articles, are
for the account and risk of the shipper. The carrier is exempt
from liability if he is able to prove, as he did prove, that the
loss or destruction of the merchandise was due to accident
and force majeure and not to fraud, fault or negligence on the
part of the captain or owner of the ship -- that the loss was a
result of the stranding of Pilar because of the hurricane that
overtook it.
ISSUE(S)
(1) Whether the carrier is relieved from liability due to force majeure?
(2) WON the carrier is liable for the loss of the cargo and for failure to deliver
the same at the place of destination. NO.
(2) No.The record bears no proof that said loss caused by the
destruction of Pilar occurred through the carelessness or negligence of
the defendant, its agents or patron of the lorcha. The defendant as well
as its agents and patron had a natural interest in preserving the craft --
an interest equal to that of the plaintiff. The record discloses that Pilar
was manned by an experienced patron and a sufficient number of
crewmen plus the fact that it was fully equipped. The crewmen took all
the precautions that any diligent man should have taken whose duty it
was to save the boat and its cargo, and by the instinct of self-
preservation of their lives. Considering, therefore, the conduct of the
men of the defendant Pilar and of its agents during the disaster, the
defendant has not incurred any liability whatsoever for the loss of the
goods, inasmuch as such loss was the result of a fortuitous event or
force majeure, and there was no negligence or lack of care or diligence
on the part of the defendant or its agents.
Loss of a ship and of its cargo, in a wreck due to accident or
force majeure must, as a general rule, fall upon their respective owners,
except in cases where the wrecking or stranding of the vessel occurred
through malice, carelessness or lack of skill on the part of the captain or
because the vessel put to sea is insufficiently repaired and prepared.
(Art. 841, Code of Commerce)
 Martini
vs
Macondray

TOPIC: [COMMON CARRIAGE OF GOODS- EXCEPTION FROM LIABILITY- NATURAL DISASTER-

ARTS. 1734(1), 1739, 1740; ARTICLE 361 CODE OF COMMERCE]

DELAVIN, SHERY
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Martini shipped on board the Easter, owned by the Australian Steamship Co. represented in the Philippines by
Macondray, 219 cases of chemicals for Kobe, Japan. Upon arrival in Kobe, it was discovered that the shipment was
damaged by rain and sea water. Martini claims that it was the ship's duty to stow the cargo in the hold and not to
place it on the deck exposed to the elements. Macondray denied any responsibility on the ground that the contract of
affreightment clearly states that the cargo was to be carried on deck at shipper's risk as evidenced by the words "on
deck at shipper's risk" stamped on the bill of lading.
Ordinarily, when a shipper wishes to avail of space on board a ship, he first obtains a shipping order from the
ship owner. This shipping order is authority for the ship's officers to accept the shipper's cargo. When signed by the
ship's mate, this would constitute the mate's receipt showing that the cargo has been taken aboard. The shipper
would then present this receipt to the agent of the ship's company who would then issue the bill of lading. However, in
this case, the shipper obtained the bill of lading without first presenting the mate's receipt (so as to expedite the
negotiation of the bill with the banks). By doing so, the shipper entered into a written guaranty, binding himself to abide
by the terms of the mate's receipt which in this case obtained a stipulation that the cargo shall be shipped on or under
the deck at the option of the ship and at shipper's risk.
In this case, plaintiff protested the arrangement but when the defendant informed them that the cargo could be
discharged if they were dissatisfied, plaintiff did not order its discharge. The CFI ruled for Martini.
ISSUE(S)

(1) Whether plaintiff consented to having the cargo carried on

deck?
(2) Whether defendant was negligent and thus liable for the
damage to the cargo?

RULING
(1) Yes.While Martini would have greatly preferred for the cargo to be
carried under the hatches, they nevertheless consented for it to go on
deck. Codina, an EE of Martini, if attentive to the interests of his
company, must have known from the tenor of the guaranty which he
signed that defendant had reserved the right to carry the cargo on deck.
The bill of lading plainly showed that the cargo would be so carried. The
plaintiff was duly notified as to the manner by which was the cargo was
to be shipped. They only protested after the bill had been negotiated at
the bank and even when there was time to stop the shipment, they
failed to give the necessary instructions thereby manifesting
acquiescence.
In every contract of affreightment, losses by dangers of the seas
are excepted from the risk which the carrier takes upon himself whether
the exception is expressed in contract or not. The exception is made by
law and falls within the general principle that no one is responsible for
fortuitous events. But then this general law is subject to the exception
that when the inevitable accident is preceded by fault of the carrier,
without which it would not have happened, then he becomes
responsible for it.
ISSUE(S)
: (1) Whether plaintiff consented to having the cargo carried on deck?
(2) Whether defendant was negligent and thus liable for the damage to the
cargo?
(2) No.The carrier is responsible for safe and proper storage of the cargo, and
there is no doubt that by the general maritime law he is bound to secure the
cargo safely under deck. If he carries the goods on deck without the consent
of the shipper and the goods are damaged or lost in consequence of being
exposed, the carrier cannot protect himself by showing that they were
damaged or lost by the dangers of the sea. When the shipper consents to his
goods being carried on deck, he takes the risk upon himself.
If goods shipped are found to have been damaged, the burden of
proof is on the carrier to show that the damage was due to fortuitous events.
But, even if the damage is caused by one of the excepted causes, the carrier
is still responsible if the injury might have been avoided by the exercise of
reasonable skill and attention on their part. However, in this case, where the
shipper consented to the conditions of carriage, the burden of proof is shifted
to the shipper.
As there is no allegation or proof of negligence on the part of the
carrier in protecting the cargo from rain or sea water and as the complaint
clearly indicates that the damage was due to it being kept on deck, and such
manner of carriage having been consented to by the plaintiff, the defendant is
absolved. It is not permissible for the court, in the absence of any allegation
or proof of negligence, to attribute negligence to the ship's employees in the
matter of protecting the goods from rains and storms.
EASTERN SHIPPING vs. IAC

150 SCRA 463 MAY 29, 1987

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

TOPIC: NATURAL DISASTER

[RAVAL, PATRICK Q.]
 FACTS OF THE CASE
Eastern Shipping Lines Inc shipped uncoated 7-wire stress relieved wire strand for
prestressed concrete were shipped on board the vessel "Japri Venture,". Upon
arrival at the port of Manila, it discharged the cargo to the custody of the
defendant E. Razon, Inc. from whom the consignee's customs broker received it for
delivery to the consignee's warehouse. First Nationwide Assurance, indemnified
the consignee in the amount of P171,923.00 for damage and loss to the insured
cargo, whereupon the former was subrogated for the latter. The insurer now seeks
to recover from the defendants what ithas indemnified the consignee. The
petitioner protested alleging that it should not be held liable to
answer for damages for the event that caused the rusting of the goods was due to
the “encountered very rough seas and stormy weather” classified as force majeure,
hence relieving them of any liability.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not Eastern Shipping was negligent and

should be held liable for the payment of damages.
 ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Eastern Shipping was negligent and
RULING should be held liable for the payment of damages.

- YES. The heavy seas and rains referred to in the master’s report were not
caso fortuito, but normal occurrences that an ocean going vessel, particularly
in the month of September which, in our area, is a month of rains and heavy
seas would encounter as a matter of routine. They are not unforeseen nor
unforeseeable. These are conditions that ocean-going vessels would
encounter and provide for, in the ordinary course of voyage.
- The rain water (not sea water) found its way into Japri Venture is a clear
indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of the ship’s
hatches so that rain water would not find its way into the cargo,
 ISSUE(S)
Whether or not Eastern Shipping was negligent and
RULING should be held liable for the payment of damages.

- Since Easter has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the

presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and
the carrier must present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary
diligence required in Art. 1733 to escape liability.
- The SC held that the presumption that the cargo was in apparent
good condition when it was delivered by the vessel to the arrastre
operation by the clean tally sheets has been overturned. The evidence is
clear to the effect that the damage to the cargo was suffered while
aboard petitioner’s vessel.
END OF THE CASE
 ASIG LIGHTERAGE VS CA

409 SCRA 340 AUGUST 19, 2003

PUNO, J.:

TOPIC: NATURAL DISASTER

[RAVAL, PATRICK Q.]
 FACTS OF THE CASE
- Wheat in bulk, was shipped by Marubeni American Corporation of Portland,
Oregon on board the vessel M/V NEO for delivery to the consignee, General Milling
Corporation in Manila. The shipment was insured by the private respondent
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. against loss or damage.
- The carrying vessel arrived in Manila and the cargo was transferred to the
custody of the petitioner Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. The petitioner was
contracted by the consignee as carrier to deliver the cargo to consignee's
warehouse. 900 metric tons of the shipment was loaded on barge PSTSI III for
delivery to consignee.
- The cargo did not reach its destination. It appears that the transport of said
cargo was suspended due to a warning of an incoming typhoon.
 FACTS OF THE CASE
- Asia lighterage proceeded to pull the barge to Engineering Island off
Baseco to seek shelter from the approaching typhoon. A few days after, the
barge developed a list because of a hole it sustained after hitting an unseen
protuberance underneath the water. The barge was then towed to ISLOFF
terminal before it finally headed towards the consignee's wharf. Upon
reaching the Sta. Mesa spillways, the barge again ran around due to strong
current.
- To avoid the complete sinking of the barge, a portion of the goods was
transferred to three other barges. The next day, the towing bits of the barge
broke. It sank completely, resulting in the total loss of the remaining cargo.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not the weather disturbance which caused the sinking of the
vessel was a fortuitous event.
 ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the weather disturbance which caused the sinking
RULING of the vessel M/V Central Bohol was a fortuitous event.

- No. The Court cannot categorize the weather condition at the time as a "storm" within
the absolutory causes enumerated in the law. Significantly, no typhoon was observed
within the Philippine area of responsibility during that period
- Even if the weather encountered by the ship is to be deemed a natural disaster under
Article 1739 of the Civil Code, petitioner failed to show that such natural disaster or
calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss. Human agency must be entirely
excluded from the cause of injury or loss. In other words, the damaging effects blamed on
the event or phenomenon must not have been caused, contributed to, or worsened by
the presence of human participation. The defense of fortuitous event or natural disaster
cannot be successfully made when the injury could have been avoided by human
precaution.
 ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the weather disturbance which caused the sinking
RULING of the vessel M/V Central Bohol was a fortuitous event.

Hence, if a common carrier fails to exercise due diligence or that ordinary

care that the circumstances of the particular case demand, to prevent or
minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the natural
disaster, the carrier shall be deemed to have been negligent. The loss or
injury is not, in a legal sense, due to a natural disaster under Article 1734(1).
END OF THE CASE
 GOVERNMENT vs YNCHAUSTI

G.R. No. 14191 40 Phil 219 SEPTEMBER 29, 1919

TOPIC: [COMMON CARRIAGE OF GOODS- Character of Goods

[Roxas, Marie Antoinette C.]
 FACTS OF THE CASE

Plaintiff shipped cargo of roofing tiles from Manila to Iloilo on a vessel

belonging to the defendant. The tiles were delivered by the defendant
to the consignee of the plaintiff in Iloilo. Upon delivery it was found
that some of the tiles had been damaged. Plaintiff moved to recover
the sum amount of P200 equivalent to the damages but the lower
court rendered judgment against it and in favor of defendant
absolving the latter from all liability.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not defendant may be held liable

 ISSUE(S)
Whether or not The Defendant may be held liable?
RULING

NO. Finding as we do that the tiles in question were shipped at the owner’s risk, under the law in
this jurisdiction, the carrier is only liable where the evidence shows that he was guilty of some
negligence and that the damages claimed were the result of such negligence. Here, the plaintiff
offered no proof whatever to show negligence on the part of the defendant.

The defendant herein proved, and the plaintiff did not attempt to dispute, that the tiles in question
were of a brittle and fragile nature and that they were delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant
without any packing or protective covering. The defendant also offered proof to show that there
was no negligence on its part, by showing that the tiles were loaded, stowed, and discharged in a
careful and diligent manner. In this jurisdiction there is no presumption of negligence on the part of
the carriers in case like the present. The plaintiff, not having proved negligence on the part of the
defendant, is not entitled to recover damages.
END OF THE CASE