Presentism and Questioning of Its

Compatibility with Special Relativity

Theory
Gozde Tutuncuoglu, Mahmut Tosun, Mete Karagozlu
Materials Science Engineering MSc

Project SHS 1st Year Master

Supervised by Matthias Egg
Prof. Michael Esfeld

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 Outline
1. Introduction

- Time
- Presentism , Eternalism & The Growing Universe Theory
- Special Relativity
- Minkowski Space

2. Special Relativity & Presentism

2.1. Contradiction Between Special Relativity & Presentism

2.2 Possibility of Adjusting Presentism in Special Relativity Setting

3. Conclusion

4. Bibliography
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 Time
According to McTaggart

“time involves change. . . there could be no time if

nothing changed”(p. 457, McTaggart, 1908)

Events that happen through time can be analyzed as two

groups; A series and B series.

A series: The events which are classified whether in past,

present or future

B series: The events which are classified in terms of being

earlier or later than a reference point. 3
 A Series
We need A series to define time !
But every event has been past and present and will be future, thus
they share characteristics of all past, present and future.

“Thus all the three incompatible terms are predicable of each event
which is obviously inconsistent with their being incompatible, and
inconsistent with their producing change.”(p.467, McTaggart,1908)

So that;
“the A series cannot be true of reality. And, since time involves the A
series, it follows that time cannot be true of reality.“ (p.468,
McTaggart,1908)

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 Other Views of A Theorists
Presentism: Only things being there at the present instant exist: the past has
ceased to exist and the future does not yet exist. (Dieks, 2006)

Eternalism: All things in past, present and the future are equally real. “…past
and future objects and times are just as real as currently existing ones. Just
as distant places are no less real for being spatially distant, distant times are
no less real for being temporally distant” (Sider, 2001, p. 11)

The Growing Universe Theory: As time flows, number of existing elements

will increase and the universe would happen to be increased in size. So that
“according to the growing-universe or growing-block theory, the past and
present are both real, but the future is not real because the future is
indeterminate or merely potential.”
(Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010)

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 Theory of Special Relativity
Postulations of Special Relativity:

1. The speed of light is the same for all observers, no matter what their relative
speeds.

2. The laws of physics are the same in any inertial (non-accelerated) frame of
reference.

• Consider a spacecraft fires a laser beam to another one which is travelling

toward it at c/2. No matter what, light would still travel at c not 3/2c.

• Einstein realized that "either the measurement of the distance must be

smaller than expected, or the time taken must be greater than expected, or
both."

• The answer is both: space and time are relative concepts which are shaped
by unvarying speed of light: time dilation, length contraction
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 Minkowski Space
• In Euclidean space, distance between two points is sufficent for measuring
seperation.

• In Minkowski space, separation is calculated by the interval between two

events in which the temporal separation is taken into account besides the
spatial separation:

• Considering value of s2 three intervals are defined:

1. Space-like
2. Time-like
3. Light-like

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 Minkowski Space
1. Space-like: s2 > 0
All of the events must be spatially separated in
all reference frames

2. Time-like: s2 < 0
Enough time passes between two events for
leading a cause-effect relationship.

3. Light-like: s2 = 0
Boundary between space-like and time-like
separation.

Points in the space-like separations are not eligible to affect or to be affected by the
origin point.
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 Contradictions Between SRT &
Presentism
• Putnam’s assumptions (1967)

1- I-now am real
2- At least one other observer is real, and it is possible for this other observer to be
in motion relative to me.
3- If it is the case that all and only the things that stand in a certain relation R
to
me-now are real, and you now are also real, then it is also the case that all and
only the things that stand in the relation R to you-now are real.(p.240,
Putnam,1967)

R defines restricted physical relation, independent of the choice of a coordinate

system, definable in a tenseless sense with fundamental notions of physics.

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 If we take R relation as the relation simultaneity …

• Assumptions of Putnam hold in pre-relativistic setting.

• However if the things are moving with relative speeds close to

c, their planes of simultaenity will be different so transivity
assumption does not hold;

Stein argues with Putnam saying there is no relativistically

invariant notion of simultaneity. The appearance of paradox only
confirms that the space-time of Einstein and Minkowski is quite
different from Prerelativistic space-time

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 Adjusting Presentism in Special Relativity
• Hinchliff supposes an event E with a space-like separation from O and not
simultaneous with us at O but rather an earlier event.

• Introduce observer A at O who is in motion with us but at rest in the inertial

frame: A is real for us.

• According to presentism, E is real for us since it is simultaneous with O in A`s

intertial frame.

• If E is real for A and A is real for us, then E is real for us too: E is both real and
unreal for us now at O.

• This contradiction includes 2 assumptions:

– Transivity principle: If E is real for A and A is real for us, then E is real for us too

– Relativitzed presentism: Real events for an observer are the events simultaneous with the
observer in the observer`s frame of reference.

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 Compatibility of Presentism and Special
Relativity Theory
Different Models;
Point Presentism
The present is identified with the here-now.

A world line is extended from O to O’ as

time propagates & E happens to be in past
light cone of O’

But it was not never present for O !

Eichman (2007)
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Cone Presentism
Rather than just here-now point, surface of the past light cone
with respect to here-now point is regarded as present.

Points which are light like

seperated from here-now => Real

Points which are time-like

separated from here-now => Past
(Not real)

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Effect of Relative Simultaneity
Although some events occurred in the past could be still observed ,they are still
not in present according to Cone Presentism. For instance: The cosmic microwave
background radiation (CMBR)
Because observer and the origin of the radiation are not in simultaneity but the
origin is at spatiotemporal interval zero from the observer . => Relative
simultaneity 13
Achronality

“if two events, X and Y , are present for E, then neither should be in the absolute past
or future of the other”(S582, Hinchliff, 2000)
Violation of achronality in cone
presentism according to Savitt;

According to cone presentism

X and Y are present for E so they
should not be in the absolute past
or future of the other but X and Y
have different t coordinates while
both being on the past light cone of
E. (Savitt, 1998) )
Eichman (2007)

In Minkowski spacetime where temporal intervals are not invariant features

of the manifold, presentism should be understood not as a view about time,
but as a view about spacetime. ( S582, Hinchliff, 2000)
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 Conclusion
- After the foundation of the special relativity theory and the
creation of the Minkowski Space Time, presentism is also
interpreted again.
- The debate between Putnam and Stein outlines the
contradiction between presentism and special relativity
theory, rather than proposing an adjustment theory for
presentism.
- It is apparent that the classical view of presentism is not
working in a relativistic setting but with more effort and
research, we suppose that presentism can be adjusted to be
valid in the relativistic setting too as it has been demonstrated
with Hinchliff’s work.
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 References
• McTaggart, J. M. E. (1908), „The unreality of
time‟, Mind 17, 457–74.
• Putnam, H. (1967), „Time and physical geometry‟, Journal of Philosophy 64, 240–7.
• Eichman, Peter (2007) Relativistic Challenges to Presentism retrieved from
http://grim.ath.cx/papers/phil551/relativity.pdf
• Dieks, Dennis (2006), The Ontology of Spacetime Elsevier, Oxford
• Savitt, Steve (1998), "There Is No Time Like the Present (in Minkowski Spacetime)",
Symposium on The Prospects for Presentism in Spacetime Theories
• Hinchliff, M. (2000), A defense of presentism in a relativistic setting‟, Philosophy of
Science 67, S575–86.
• Hinchliff, M. (1996), „Puzzle of Change, Philosophical Perspectives 10, Metaphysics
Nâus 30 Supp. Info
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Special_Relativity/Spacetime (1)
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