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Wage Determination, The Allocation of Labor and Alternative Pay Schemes in Labor Market
Wage Determination, The Allocation of Labor and Alternative Pay Schemes in Labor Market
Wage Determination, The Allocation of Labor and Alternative Pay Schemes in Labor Market
Definition of Wages:.
According to J. R. Urner “A wage is a
price, it is the price paid by the
employer to the worker on account of
labor performed”.
“It is also the price paid by an
entrepreneur to the worker, employed
for productive purposes”.
The workers and the unions stress
wages as income.
Types of Wages:
Wage rate
curves, market supply curves S
are usually positively sloped
over normal wage ranges.
Wage rate
S
• The equilibrium wage rate W0
and level of employment Q0 Wes
occur at the intersection of labor
supply and demand.
W0
• An excess demand of Q2- Q1
would occur at a wage rate of Wed
Wed.
D
• An excess supply of Q2- Q1
would occur at a wage rate of
Wes.
Q1 Q0 Q2 Quantity of
Labor
Hours
Labor Supply Determinants
●
Other wage rates
●
If wages in other occupations rise (fall), then
labor supply will fall (rise).
●
Nonwage income
●
If nonwage income rises (falls), then labor
supply will fall (rise).
●
Preferences for work versus leisure
●
If preferences for work increase (decrease),
then labor supply will increase (decrease).
Labor Supply Determinants
●
Nonwage aspects of job
●
If the nonwage aspects of a job improve
(worsen), then labor supply will increase
(decrease).
●
Number of qualified suppliers
●
An increase (decrease) in the number of
qualified workers will increase (decrease)
labor supply.
Labor Demand Determinants
●
Product demand
●
Changes in product demand that
increase (decrease) the product price,
will increase (decrease) labor demand.
●
Productivity
●
An increase (decrease) in productivity
will increase (decrease) labor demand,
assuming that it does not cause an offset
in the product price.
Labor Demand Determinants
●
Prices of other resources
●
For gross substitutes, an increase
(decrease) in the price of a substitute
input will increase (decrease) labor
demand.
●
For gross complements, an increase
(decrease) in the price of a complement
input will decrease (increase) labor
demand.
Labor Demand Determinants
●
Prices of other resources
●
For pure complements, an increase
(decrease) in the price of a complement
input will decrease (increase) labor
demand.
●
Number of employers
●
An increase (decrease) in the number of
employers will increase (decrease) labor
demand.
Changes in Labor Demand
Wage rate
• Assume that the productivity S
of workers rises due to
computer innovations.
W1
• This will raise the marginal W0
product and thus shift the
labor demand curve to the
right (D0 to D1). D1
D0
• The equilibrium wage rate
will rise to W1 and equilibrium
quantity will rise to Q1.
Q 0 Q1 Quantity of
Labor Hours
Changes in Labor Supply
Wage rate
S0
• Assume that the number of
working-age immigrants S1
increases substantially.
Q 0 Q1 Quantity of
Labor Hours
Wage and Employment for a Perfectly
Competitive Firm
●
A monopsony is a labor market where a
single firm is the sole hirer of a particular
type of labor.
●
A monopsonist has control over the wage rate
workers are paid by hiring more or less labor.
Monopsony
• A monopsonist faces an upward sloping labor supply curve. It has to
pay a higher wage to get more workers.
• The total wage cost (TWC) to the firm is calculated as the number of
units of labor times the wage rate.
• The firm maximizes profits by hiring at MRP = MWC at 3 units.
• The marginal wage cost (MWC) is the additional cost of hiring the last
worker.
Units of (VMP)
Labor TWC MWC MRP
(L) Wage (3) (4) (5)
(2)
(1)
1 $1.00 1 1 $7
2 $2.00 $4 $ 3 $6
3 $3.00 $9 $ 5 $ 5
4 $4.00 $16 $ 7 $ 4
5 $5.00 $25 $ 9 $ 3
6 $6.00 $36 $11 $ 2
7 $7.00 $42 $6 $1
Wage and Employment
for a Monopsonist
• The firm’s MWC lies above Wage rate MWC
the SL.
• The monopsonist equates its SL=PL
MRP with its MWC at point a
and hires QM units of labor. a
• To attract these workers, it
need only pay WM. WC c
• The firm thus pays a lower WM b
wage (WM rather than WC) and
hires fewer units of labor (QM
instead of QC) than firms in a DL=MRP=VMP
competitive labor market.
• An efficiency loss of abc Q M QC
results. Quantity of
Labor Hours
5.Unions and Wage Determination
Wu
Wc
Wm
DL=MRP=VMP
Q1 Qc
4. Wage Determination:
Delayed Supply
Responses
Cobweb Model
• The market for highly trained
professionals such as nurses
has delayed supply responses Wage rate S
to changes in demand and
wage rates. W1
• Because the quantity of labor
supplied is temporarily fixed at W2
Q0, the wage rate rises to W1 W0
when demand changes from D0
to D1.
• At wage rate W1, Q1 nurses D1
are attracted to the profession.
• With supply fixed at Q1, the D0
wage rate falls to W2.
• With this wage rate, the
quantity of nurses falls over
time to Q2. Q0 Q2 Q1 Quantity of
• The cycle repeats until
equilibrium is achieved at the Labor Hours
intersection of S and D.
Evidence
●
Some evidence exists for cobweb
adjustments in markets such as
lawyers and engineers.
●
Critics argue that:
●
Students make choices on the basis of
the lifetime earnings stream rather than
starting salaries.
●
Students make a forecast of the long-run
outcome of a change in demand or
supply and make the right choice.
Payment schemes:
Economics of Fringe
Benefits
Fringe benefits include :
1. Public or legally mandated ( social security,
unemployment compensation , worker’s
compensation,etc)
2. Private or non mandatory-( private pension, medical
and dental insurance , sick leave, paid vocations,
etc)
Composition of total compensation varies greatly by
industry .
Fringe benefits proportion of employees is larger in
1. High paying industries
2. Good producing industries than service industries
3. Transportation and public utilities than retail trade
2. Theory of Optimal
Fringe Benefits
Worker Indifference Map
Wages
• An isoprofit curve (WF) shows
the combinations of wages and
fringe benefits that yield the
same amount of profits.
W
• We assume that competition
will yield a normal profit.
Wages
• The optimal combination of
wages and fringe benefits is at
B, where the isoprofit curve is
tangent to the highest attainable
indifference curve (I2).
• Here the firm will provide W0
wages and F0 fringe benefits. W
A
• Points A and C are also B
attainable combinations of W0 I3
wages and fringe benefits, but I2
they yield less total utility C I1
since they are on a lower
indifference curve (I1).
F0 F Fringe
Benefits
Fringe Benefit Growth
F0 F1 F F’ Fringe
Benefits
Causes of Fringe Benefit Growth
●
Tax advantages to employers
●
Fringe benefits reduce the taxes the
employers pay.
– Employers pay half of the Social Security
tax.
– If employers substitute fringe benefits for
wages, their taxes will be reduced.
●
The Social Security tax rate and base
have increased over time.
– This rotated out the isoprofit curve and
increased fringe benefits.
Causes of Fringe Benefit Growth
●
Economies of scale
●
There are significant scale
economies in the provision of
fringe benefits.
●
Firms have grown in size over
time and lowered the per unit
cost of fringe benefits.
– This rotated out the isoprofit curve
and increased fringe benefits.
Causes of Fringe Benefit Growth
●
Efficiency considerations
●
Employers prefer to have lower
turnover to protect their training
investments and reduce recruiting
costs.
– Fringe benefits such as pensions reduce
worker turnover.
●
Over time, training by firms have
increased and so firms have had
increased incentive to use fringe
benefits to reduce turnover.
Principal-Agent Problem
●
The principal-agent problem occurs
when agents (workers) pursue some of
their own objectives which are in conflict
with the goals of the principals (firms).
●
Workers can increase their leisure by
shirking (working slowly or taking
unapproved breaks) on the job.
– The profits of the firm will be lowered.
●
Firms have a profit incentive to reduce
principal-agent problems.
Pay for performance
Piece Rates
o Piece rates are compensation paid in
proportion to the number of units of output.
●
Piece rates limit the amount of shirking.
●
Drawbacks
●
May be difficult to set rate.
●
They increase income variability and so firms
will have to pay a premium.
●
Difficult to use where team production is
employed.
●
Workers may decrease quality.
Commissions
and Royalties
Annual Income
• If a worker is paid by the
hour, the worker will choose
point A with an annual income
equal to Y1with L1 hours of I2
leisure. I1
• An equivalent annual salary
of Y1, the worker can get to a
higher indifference curve I2 by W
increasing hours of leisure to L2.
• The worker can get this A B
higher level of utility by Y1
shirking.
• The firm can overcome this
incentive problem by offering
future raises or promotions to 0 L1 L2 L Leisure
those who consume L1 hours or
less of leisure.
Bonuses
●
Firms may reduce shirking by
monitoring the efforts of workers.
●
Monitoring workers is costly in
some cases.
●
Babysitters, security guards,
managers
●
One solution is to pay an above-
market wage.
Wage-Productivity Dependency
●
A higher wage may increase worker
productivity by:
●
Increasing employee work effort
●
Improving worker capabilities
●
Increasing the proportion of skilled workers in
the workforce
●
An efficiency wage is one that minimizes an
employer’s wage cost per effective unit of
labor employed.
●
The marginal benefit of a higher wage equals
the marginal cost of the higher wage.
Efficiency Wage Theories
●
Shirking model
●
Paying an above-market wage will increase
the relative wage of the job.
– This raises the opportunity cost of being terminated
for shirking.
– Workers increase their effort (productivity) in
response to this higher opportunity cost.
●
Labor turnover model
●
Firms increase wage to reduce turnover.
– The lower turnover increases productivity since
more experienced workers don’t quit as often.
Non-Clearing Markets
Wo MRPL
employme
Em EC
Effect of mandated wage on
monopsony
o what would happen if some nonmarket force were to
compel the firm to pay a particular wage rate that
was higher than the one it was paying.
o Would the firm’s desired level of employment
decline?
o The monopsonistic firm for short run response
initially equates MRPL and MWCL at point A and
chooses to hire E0 workers, which requires it to pay a
wage of W0 as indicated in the following figure
Effect of minimum wage in
monopsony market
Wage/MWC M
Marginal Wage Cost
E S
Supply of labor
W’ A
Wm B C D
W0
MRPL = marginal revenue product
E0 Em E1 employment
Cont. …
o Suppose now that a mandated wage of Wm is set. This mandate
prevents the firm from paying a wage less than Wm and
effectively creates a horizontal portion (BD) in the labor supply
curve facing the firm (which is now BDS).
MWCL above its current level (W’m ) and cause the profit-maximizing
causing a substitution of labor for capital in the long run. While the
firm’s MWCL have fallen, however, labor’s average cost has increased.
before; thus, profits will decline. If this latter (scale) effect is large