UST LAW PRE-WEEK LECTURE

The husband filed a petition in June 2007 to have his wife declared
presumptively dead and made false allegations in court with respect to her
residence. He also falsely claimed that she had been absent for 12 years
and he made sure that there would be no publication of the notice of
hearing of his petition in a newspaper of general circulation. Because of
these, the wife was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose the
husband's petition to declare her presumptively dead. The decree was
issued in July 2007 and the husband remarried in September 2008.

The wife subsequently filed a petition for annulment of judgment declaring

her presumptively dead in November 2008 before the Court of Appeals.
The wife claimed that she and her husband were still living together in the
conjugal dwelling in as late as May 2008 when her husband left them. Her
petition, however, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for being the
wrong remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was
to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.

(1) Is annulment of judgment a remedy available to the wife?

(2) Why is filing an affidavit of reappearance not a suitable remedy?
(1) Is annulment of judgment a remedy available to the wife? Yes,
there was extrinsic fraud here in that the husband resorted to
schemes to prevent the wife from participating in the proceedings.

(2) Why is filing an affidavit of reappearance not a suitable remedy?

Filing an affidavit of reappearance carries with it the admission
that the terminable subsequent marriage was validly contracted
and this, in turn, brings forth legal consequences: children born to
the subsequent marriage are legitimate, the parties to the
subsequent marriage cannot be prosecuted for bigamy, the first
marriage is suspended and as a result, the first spouse will have
no standing to sue for nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of bigamy or receive death benefits that may be due in
relation to the death of the spouse present. To avoid giving
legitimacy to the subsequent marriage, the unjustly declared
absent spouse must remove the basis for the validity of the said
marriage, i.e., the decree of presumptive death. (Santos vs.
Santos, 08 October 2014)
The Wife forged the signature of the Husband on the
promissory note covering the loan she obtained from PNB as
well as on the Real Estate Mortgage that she constituted on
three conjugal parcels of land to secure the same. The
mortgage was foreclosed and the properties were sold to PNB. A
certificate of sale was issued to PNB on September 19, 2017.
On September 22, 2018, the Husband filed a complaint to
annul the real estate mortgage and cancel the certificate of sale.

What is the status of the mortgage?

Who shall be liable for the loan?
What is the status of the mortgage? The mortgage on the conjugal
properties is void under Article 124 because of the absence of the
consent of the husband.

Who shall be liable for the loan? However, the nullity of the mortgage does
not carry with it the non-enforceability of the loan against the conjugal properties
of the spouses and in case of their insufficiency, their separate properties. Under
the guidelines set by the SC in Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, the loan is presumed to have redounded to the benefit of the family since
it was used as additional working capital for the wife's printing business. The
conjugal partnership may therefore be held liable for the loan amount and since
there is a legal presumption to this effect, there is no need to prove actual benefit to
the family. (PNB vs. Reyes, 05 October 2016)
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Capitol) owned a
parcel in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. N-253850 worth P17,547,750.00 and a zonal value of
P249,568,000.00.

This entire parcel was levied by the Quezon City Treasurer on

account of unpaid real estate taxes and sold at a tax
delinquency sale. A Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property
was issued in the buyer’s (Alvarado’s) favor.

A complaint was filed assailing the validity of the tax sale.

Alvarado, the Quezon City Treasurer, the Quezon City Register
of Deeds, and several John and Jane Does who allegedly
participated in the conduct of the levy and sale were impleaded
as defendants.

The individual respondents brought the complaint in their

capacity as "members of Capitol Hills Golf [and] Country Club,
Inc., who were each issued their corresponding Certificates of
Shares of Stocks and/or Member's Identification (ID) Cards."

Are the respondents real parties in interest? Otherwise stated,

should the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action?
Are the respondents real parties in interest? Otherwise stated, should the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action?

The Individual respondents are real parties in interest, who properly pleaded
causes of action.

Under Section 267 of the Local Government Code, the right to assail a tax
delinquency sale is given to “….the delinquent owner of the real property or
the person having legal interest therein…”

Capitol is a juridical entity with its own, distinct personality. Consistent with
Article 46 of the Civil Code, it may "acquire and possess property" such as
the lot put up for a tax delinquency sale. Though having its own
personality, as a golf and country club, Capitol primarily exists for the
utility and benefit of its members. While legal title in its properties is
vested in Capitol, beneficial use redounds to its membership. Apart from
this, proprietary interest in Capitol is secured through club shares.

As members and shareholders, the individual respondents held the right to

use and enjoy, as well as the limited right to possess Capitol's premises and
facilities. Any right of dominion that Capitol held over the parcel was
ultimately for their and other members' benefit. This is enough to give them
legal interest in the property. (Alvarado vs. Ayala Land, Inc., 20 September
2017)
On December 6, 2004, the Debtors obtained a loan in the amount of
P100,000.00 payable anytime from six (6) months to one (1) year and subject
to interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per month, payable on or before
the end of each month. Extrajudicial demand was made on November 16,
2006 while an action to collect was filed on July 24, 2007.

(a) Is the stipulated monetary interest of 10% per month valid?

(b) If the stipulated monetary interest rate is struck down, will it mean that
no monetary interest may be recovered anymore?
(c) What about compensatory interest, will this be due as well?
(d) What will be the rate of compensatory interest?
(e) How much must the debtors pay?
Is the stipulated monetary interest of 10% per month valid? In a plethora of
cases decided by the Supreme Court starting in 2001, it has been held that
stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable and exorbitant. Thus, the stipulated interest of 10% per
month must be struck down.

If the stipulated monetary interest rate is struck down, will it mean that no
monetary interest may be recovered anymore? No, monetary interest may still be
recovered but the legal rate must now be applied as the conventional monetary
interest. At the time the loan was contracted, the prevailing legal rate was 12%
per annum. This will be the rate that will be applied on the principal from the
time the loan was contracted until it is fully paid. It shall not be susceptible to
shifts in rate.

What about compensatory interest? Compensatory interest will also be due on both the principal
and the monetary interest. Accrual of compensatory interest on the principal will be from the time
of demand while that on the monetary interest will be from the time of judicial demand in
accordance with Article 2212.

What will be the rate of compensatory interest? Since this is a loan, it will be 12% per annum
until 30 June 2013 and 6% per annum from 01 July 2013.
How much must the debtors pay?

The debtors must pay the following:

(a) P100,000.00 representing the principal loan obligation;

(b) Monetary interest on the principal loan obligation at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from December 6, 2004 until full payment of the
loan. Even though the legal rate of interest for loans was reduced to 6%
per annum effective July 1, 2013, the rate of interest here would still be
12% per annum throughout.

(c) There should also be compensatory interest on the principal obligation

from the time of extrajudicial demand on November 16, 2006 at the rate of
12% until June 30, 2013 and at the rate of 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until finality of the ruling;

(d) Compensatory interest on the monetary interest as stated in letter (b) at

the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from judicial demand, i.e.,
July 24, 2007, to June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of the ruling; and

(e) Legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum imposed on the
sums due in letters (a), (b), and (c) and (d) from finality of the ruling until
full payment. (Isla vs. Estorga, July 2, 2018)
 March 22, 1999

This is to acknowledge receipt of the Amount of Five

Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos from Mrs. Alma R.
Abella, payable within one (1) year from date hereof with
interest.

Annie C. Abella (sgd.) Romeo M. Abella

(sgd.)

The spouses payees insist that the borrower agreed to pay 2.5% interest
per month on the loan. They point to the checks issued to them by the
borrower which supposedly included payment of monthly interest at the rate of
2.5%.
• Is monetary interest due in this case and if so, at what rate?
• Will the monetary interest due also earn interest and if so, at what
rate?
• Assuming that the checks may be admitted into evidence to prove
that the parties agreed on 2.5% as rate of interest, should this rate be
honoured by the court considering that if is less than the 3% per month
ceiling that is considered unconscionable under prevailing jurisprudence?
Is monetary interest due in this case and if so, at what rate?
Jurisprudence is clear about the applicable interest rate if a written instrument
fails to specify a rate, i.e., the legal rate of interest is to apply. At present, the legal
rate of interest for loans is 6% per annum but this is subject to Nacar’s ruling on
prospective application.

Applying this, the loan obtained by the borrower from the spouses is deemed
subjected to conventional interest at the rate of 12% per annum, the legal rate of
interest at the time the parties executed their agreement. Moreover, should
conventional interest still be due as of July 1, 2013, the rate of 12% per annum
shall persist as the rate of conventional interest. This is because the legal rate of
interest, when applied as conventional interest, shall always be the legal rate at
the time the agreement was executed and shall not be susceptible to shifts in rate.

Will the monetary interest due also earn interest and if so, at what rate?
Apart from respondents' liability for conventional interest at the rate of 12% per
annum, outstanding conventional interest — if any is due from respondents —
shall itself earn legal interest from the time judicial demand was made by
petitioners, i.e., on July 31, 2002, when they filed their Complaint. This is
consistent with Article 2212 of the Civil Code.
Consistent with Nacar, as well as with our ruling in Rivera v. Spouses Chua, the
interest due on conventional interest shall be at the rate of 12% per annum from
July 31, 2002 to June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or starting July 1, 2013, this shall be at
the rate of 6% per annum.
Assuming that the checks may be admitted into evidence to prove that the
parties agreed on 2.5% as rate of interest, should this rate be honoured by the
court considering that if is less than the 3% per month ceiling that is
considered unconscionable under prevailing jurisprudence?

Even if it can be shown that the parties have agreed to monthly interest at the
rate of 2.5%, this is unconscionable.

In determining whether the rate of interest is unconscionable, the mechanical

application of pre-established floors would be wanting. Reasonableness
should be the new standard, i.e., the rate of interest should not facilitate
unjust enrichment at the expense of another. In this case, the imposition of
2.5% monthly or 30% annual interest is not reasonable.

Any deviation from the legal rate of interest must be reasonable and fair. In
cases where the stipulated interest is more than twice the prevailing legal
rate of interest, it is for the creditor to prove that this rate is required by
prevailing market conditions. Here, petitioners have articulated no such
justification. (Spouses Abella vs. Spouses Abella, July 8, 2015)
Joy, an OFW, was illegally dismissed by her employer abroad. She sued her
agency here and prevailed. The agency was ordered to return her placement fee
and pay her salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract.

How much by way of interest should be imposed on the placement fee and the
unpaid salaries if the judgement in her favour became final in 2014 or after
Circular No. 799 has come into effect?

The placement fee will earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum
notwithstanding the existence of Circular No. 799. This is because Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers are
entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12%
per annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannot repeal Republic Act
No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of changing the
interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees from 12% to 6%.

However, the same cannot be said for awards of salary for the unexpired portion
of the employment contract under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are
covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does not provide for a specific
interest rate that should apply. (Sameer Oversees Placement Agency vs. Cabiles,
2014)
The guidelines on the computation of interest laid down in Eastern Shipping as
modified by Nacar provides in part:

Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable

certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is
made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand
is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be
on the amount finally adjudged.

Which court is referred to here? It should be the trial court but in Bernal vs.
Villaflor, G.R. No. 213617, April 18, 2018, the interest on actual damages was
reckoned from the time of the CA Decision because according to the Supreme
Court it was at that point that the amount of damages was reasonably
ascertained given that the same was no longer questioned in petitioner's motion
for reconsideration with the CA, or in his petition for review before the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner filed a petition to declare her husband as presumptively dead
in order to claim death benefits under PD No. 1638. Apparently, a judicial
decree of presumptive death was required by the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office of the AFP as a condition to apply for death benefits. The
Republic, through the OSG, sought the dismissal of the petition.

Should the petition be dismissed? Is the requirement valid?

Courts are without any authority to take cognizance of a petition that only
seeks to have a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.
The only exception to this rule is that provided under Article 41 which
mandates the filing of petition for declaration of presumptive death but
solely for the purpose of remarriage. For this reason, the PVAO has no
authority to require the submission of a decree of presumptive death for
the recovery of death benefits.
Jesmariane Reyes was hit by a van owned by Caravan Travel & Tours and died.
Both Reyes' parents were already deceased. Reyes' paternal grandparents were
also both deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents were
unknown. There was also no record that Reyes had brothers or sisters. It was
under these circumstances that her paternal aunt, Respondent Ermilinda Abejar,
who took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the role of Reyes'
parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her. Respondent
supported Reyes' education and provided for her personal needs. She treated
Reyes as if she were her own daughter.

Respondent then sued Caravan Travel in her capacity as the actual custodian of
Reyes who raised the latter since she was 9 years old. Respondent’s standing to
sue was questioned given that: (a) at most, she only exercised substitute
parental authority over the victim arising from actual custody; and (b) the victim
was already emancipated at the time of the accident.

Should the case be dismissed?

Does it make any difference that Reyes was already 18 years of age at the time of
the accident?
Should the case be dismissed?

No. Respondent has the right to proceed against Caravan Tours on two grounds.

First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason
that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent would have
felt upon the loss of one's child. It is for this injury — as authentic and personal as that of a
natural parent — that respondent seeks to be indemnified.

Second, having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes arising from actual custody,
the Respondent was empowered to do what Reyes’s biological parents could have done under
the circumstances in accordance with Article 233 of the Family Code, and in a long line of
cases, the SC has consistently ruled that the natural parents of victims are allowed to recover
damages for the death of their children

Does it make any difference that Reyes was already 18 years of age at the time of the accident?
While parental authority is terminated upon emancipation, respondent continued to support
and care for Reyes even after she turned 18. Except for the legal technicality of Reyes'
emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained the same. The anguish and damage
caused to respondent by Reyes' death was no different because of Reyes' emancipation.
(Caravan Travel & Tours vs. Abejar, February 10, 2016.)
MAY THE JUDGE BE THE ONE TO NOTARIZE THE AFFIDAVIT OF COHABITATION OF THE
COUPLE HE IS MARRYING?

No. Based on the law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties' affidavit of
cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties' marriage. The judge, as
solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties
having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any
legal impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn statement that
he personally ascertained the parties' qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties'
requirements for marriage which the law imposes on the official who shall solemnize the
said marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot
objectively examine and review the affidavit's statements before performing the
marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the
marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation. (TUPAL vs. ROJO, February 24, 2014.)
Following her divorce by agreement from her Japanese husband, the Petitioner filed a petition for judicial
determination and declaration of capacity to marry. The petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance
of the Report of Divorce, certifying that the divorce issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City,
Saitama Prefecture, has been accepted on December 16, 2009. The Office of the Solicitor General,
however, posits that divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family
Code, which requires that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.”

Is a Divorce by Agreement obtained by a Japanese Husband and his Filipino Spouse the divorce
contemplated in Article 26?

It bears stressing that in this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the burden of this narrow
interpretation. In keeping with the Constitutional provision which advocates gender equality as well as
the Philippines’ being a signatory to the CEDAW (“Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women”), the law must be interpreted in a manner that will not be discriminatory
against women in all matters, i.e., Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts
to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued,
the divorce becomes "validly obtained" and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status
should be given to the Filipino spouse.

In any case, the Solicitor General's argument has already been resolved in Republic v. Manalo, where the
Court held that the letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated
by the alien spouse, still, this interpretation would yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act which is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction.
(RACHO vs. SEIICHI TANAKA, ET AL.,G.R. No. 199515. June 25, 2018.)
Should filiation proceedings first be separately instituted to ascertain a minor child's paternity
for an action for support to prosper?

Filiation must be established for a child to claim support from a putative father. When
"filiation is beyond question, support follows as [a] matter of obligation."
In case of illegitimate filiation, the child should have first been acknowledged by the putative
parent or must have otherwise previously established his or her filiation with the putative
parent.

The recognition of an illegitimate child through a birth certificate, a will, a statement before
a court of record, or in any authentic writing, has been held to be "in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.“ But where the
child's birth certificate made no reference to respondent as the child's father, then filiation
cannot be said to have been established.

An action for compulsory recognition may be filed ahead of an action for support but the
direct filing of an action for support, "where the issue of compulsory recognition may be
integrated and resolved," is an equally valid alternative. Allowing the plaintiffs to establish
the child’s filiation in the proceeding to claim support does not convert the action for
support into one for recognition but merely allows the plaintiffs to prove their cause of
action against the defendant. (ABELLA vs. CABAÑERO[G.R. No. 206647. August 9, 2017.)
After his father's death, Glenn Miller discovered that his purported daughter out of
wedlock, Joan, was staying in their ranch. He also found out that she was using the
surname “Miller” in her birth certificate and this named John Miller, Glenn’s father, as
her dad. The birth certificate did not bear John Miller’s signature acknowledging Joan
as his child. Glenn then filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Joan’s Birth
Certificate under Rule 108. He wanted her to use her mother's surname, Espenida,
instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an acknowledged illegitimate child of John.

Will the petition prosper?

The petition will not prosper. What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is
not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a
misspelling. Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her
surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her
identity, but her successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
emphasized that "legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack[.]" Moreover,
impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint dated for the judicial partition of properties left by the deceased
Josefa. In her Answer, the defendant Pizarro averred that, to her knowledge, she was the only
legitimate and only child of Josefa. To prove their filiation, the plaintiffs presented baptismal
certificates, group pictures and marriage contracts. They also submitted birth certificates that
were only registered after the complaint was filed.

Are the proofs submitted by the Plaintiffs sufficient to establish their filiation?

The evidence submitted by the plaintiffs do not fall under the first paragraph of Article 172 and
are therefore barred under Article 173.

True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation. However, a delayed registration of
birth, made after the death of the putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation. It is for this
reason that it cannot be accorded the same weight as any other birth certificate.

Similarly, the other pieces of evidence presented by the plaintiffs do not constitute admissions of
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent
concerned. They do not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to
Josefa, much less ones pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia's
Baptismal Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth obtained via late
registration all state that Josefa is his mother, Josefa did not participate in making any of them.
The same may be said of the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may have been in the
photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. (ARA vs. PIZARRO, ET. AL., [G.R. No.
187273. February 15, 2017.)
Husband and Wife separated because of husband’s infidelity. Husband executed deed of
assignment giving wife and their children 50% of his pension. Husband retired shortly and for
about three years, 50% of his pension was given to the wife until the AFP stopped giving the
same. Citing Section 31 of PD No. 1638 otherwise known as the AFP Military Personnel
Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, which "provides for the exemption of the monthly
pension of retired military personnel from execution and attachment[,]" the AFP refused to
honor the writ of execution obtained by the wife to enforce their claim on half of the
Husband’s pension.  

May the pension benefits of the Husband be levied upon execution?

Yes. A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, which is the subject of a deed of assignment drawn by him granting support
to his wife and five (5) children. The benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits is a
statutory right that may be waived, especially in order to comply with a husband's duty to
provide support under Article XV of the 1987 Constitution and the Family Code.

When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim
that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits
belongs to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not
infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive support.
(Mabugay-Otamias, et al vs. Republic, G.R. No. 189516, June 8, 2016.)
Petitioner filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City to be
allowed to remove his father's surname "Alanis III“ in his birth certificate and
instead use his mother's maiden name "Ballaho," as it was what he has been
using since childhood.

The Regional Trial Court denied the Petition, holding that allowing him to drop his
last name was to disregard the surname of his natural and legitimate father, in
violation of the Family Code and Civil Code, which provide that legitimate
children shall principally use their fathers' surnames.

May a legitimate child change his surname to that of his mother?

Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together with the State's declared policy to
ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, a legitimate
child is entitled to use the surname of either parent as a last name. While Article
364 of the Civil Code states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the
surname of the father, "principally" does not mean "exclusively" so that there is no
legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname
of its mother to which it is equally entitled. This gives ample room to incorporate
into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women
and men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it.
Union Bank entered into a contract to sell with the Petitioner over a
condominium unit on an as-is-where-is basis, knowing fully well that the
Unit's area, reckoned strictly in accordance with the Condominium Act, did not
total 95 square meters as advertised but only 74.4 square meters. Union Bank
admits that the only way the Unit's area could have amounted to 95 square
meters was if some areas for common use were added to its interior space. It
acknowledged knowing this fact through the efforts of its appraisers and even
conceded that their findings were documented in their reports.

What is the status of the sale? A bank that wrongly advertises the area of a
property acquired through foreclosure because it failed to dutifully ascertain the
property's specifications is grossly negligent as to practically be in bad faith in
offering that property to prospective buyers. By definition, fraud presupposes
bad faith or malicious intent. Any sale made on this account is voidable for
causal fraud. (Poole-Blunden vs. Union Bank)
Can inherited paranoia be a ground to nullify a marriage for psychological
incapacity? Yes. In Tani-Dela Fuente vs. Dela Fuente, the marriage of the
parties was nullified under Article 36 with the root cause of respondent's
paranoid personality disorder was acknowledged as hereditary in nature as
his own father suffered from a similar disorder. (Note: in this same case, the
Supreme Court recognized coercive control as a manifestation of the
husband’s pyschological incapacity. Coercive control is a form of psychological
abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner
through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats,
emotional insults, and economic deprivation.)

What about poor upbringing, is this also a valid root cause for psychological
incapacity? Yes. In Republic vs. Mola Cruz – poor ubringing consisting of
irregular treatment received from the parents (father resorted to corporal
punishment to instill discipline, while her mother tolerated her whims) was
accepted as a valid root cause for the wife’s psychological incapacity which
she exhibited through cold treatment and aggression towards her husband;
sexual infidelity; having sex with her Japanese lover in the marital dwelling
after introducing her husband as her brother.
In 1960, Rigor and Mike occupied two separate but adjacent tracts of land in Mindoro.
Rigor's tract was classified as timber land while Mike's was classified as agricultural land.
Each of them fenced and cultivated his own tract continuously for 30 years. In 1991, the
Government declared the land occupied by Mike as alienable and disposable, and the one
cultivated by Rigor as no longer intended for public use or public service.
Rigor and Mike now come to you today for legal advice in asserting their right of ownership
of their respective lands based on their long possession and occupation since 1960.

(a) What are the legal consequences of the 1991 declarations of the Government respecting the
lands?
(b) Given that, according to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, in relation to Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title must be from June 12, 1945, or earlier, may Mike nonetheless
validly base his assertion of the right of ownership on prescription under the Civil Code?
(c) Does Rigor have legal basis for his application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
based on prescription as defined by the Civil Code given that, like Mike, his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation was not since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and
his tract of land was timber land until the declaration in 1991?
(a) What are the legal consequences of the 1991 declarations of the Government respecting the
lands? The classification of the agricultural land occupied by Mike as alienable and disposable
makes the land susceptible of private ownership through disposition by the government but it
remains to be part of the public domain. The classification of land as alienable and disposable does
not make such property patrimonial. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the timber land
cultivated by Rigor from public use or public service makes it patrimonial property of the
government.

(b) Given that, according to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, in relation to Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title must be from June 12, 1945, or earlier, may Mike nonetheless validly
base his assertion of the right of ownership on prescription under the Civil Code? Even though it
has been declared alienable and disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use
or public service. Without this, prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet
been converted into patrimonial property of the State.

(c) Does Rigor have legal basis for his application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title based
on prescription as defined by the Civil Code given that, like Mike, his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation was not since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and his tract of
land was timber land until the declaration in 1991? With regard to the timber land possessed by
Rigor, the same became patrimonial property following its withdrawal from public use and/or
service pursuant to Article 420 and 421 of the Civil Code. It becomes susceptible of acquisitive
prescription, which, in turn may be the basis of a judicial confirmation of an imperfect title based
on prescription as defined by the Civil Code. The prescriptive period will have to be reckoned from
1991 and given that the property was timber land until its reclassification in 1991, his acquisition
cannot be with just title.
In the absence of a contractual stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission,
is the aggrieved party limited to judicial rescission?

No. Extrajudicial rescission is available even in the absence of stipulation

allowing the same. (Nissan Car Lease Phils., Inc. vs. Lica Management, Inc.,
et al.) When done without prior judicial imprimatur, however, it may still be
subject to a possible court review. The only practical effect of a contractual
stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission is "merely to transfer to the
defaulter the initiative of instituting suit, instead of the rescinder."
Teachings of Tan-Andal vs. Andal, May 11, 2021

(a) The plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. This is a
quantum of proof that requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt
(b) The second Molina guideline is ABANDONED. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion.
(c) Juridical antecedence must still be proven but this may consist of testimony on the spouse's
past experiences that may have led him or her to his psychologically incapacitated state.
(d) The incurability laid down in the third Molina guideline is amended to be in the legal sense,
not the medical sense.
(e) The requirement of gravity is retained but not in the sense that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are excluded.
(f) Not all kinds of failure to meet their obligations to their children will nullify the vinculum
between the spouses. In each case, it must be clearly shown that it is of such grievous nature
that it reflects on the capacity of one of the spouses for marriage.
(g) The persuasive effect of the decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church of the Philippines on nullity cases pending before secular courts is retained.
GOOD LUCK!!!