Lecture 2 Popper

September 15, 2004

Philosophy of science

Some biographical facts

Born in Vienna, 1902. Interacted with logical positivists, but was never a member of the Vienna Circle. Before the World War II, emigrated to New Zealand. After the war became Professor at the London School of Economics. Main works: The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945 The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1959 (1934) Conjectures and Refutations, 1963 Objective Knowledge, 1972 Died in 1994.

September 15, 2004

Philosophy of science

The positivists main problem

1. 2. 3. The main problem of logical positivists was to justify science on their own terms. Here is their predicament: Scientific statements are based on observation. The content of scientific statements goes beyond what has been observed in the past. If the content of a statement goes beyond what has been observed in the past, mere observation cannot show that this statement is true. (Humes inductive skepticism) Scientific statements are not based on observation. (From 2 and 3) It seems that the set consisting of statements 1, 2 and 3 is inconsistent. Or is it? Popper accepted 1, 2 and 3, but he rejected 4!
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4.

The role of observation

Take the relation between a given scientific statement All swans are white and relevant observations. However many observations of white swans, it will never be enough to prove that All swans are white is true. And even worse, if Hume is right, no number of observations of white swans will ever be enough to prove that All swans are white is true. How then can Popper claim that the statements like All swans are white are based on observation? His answer: indeed, observations can never verify scientific statements (show that they are true), but they can falsify them (show that they are false)!

September 15, 2004

Philosophy of science

Falsificationism
There is a logical asymmetry between theoretical statements (T) and observation statements (O). 1. There is no road from observation to theory: O 1, O 2, O 3 T (Wrong! Fallacy!) 2. There is a road from theory to observation: T O ~O ~T We can derive a prediction from a theory, something that should be observed if the theory is true (T O). If we do not observe it (~O), then it follows by deductive logic that the theory must be false (~T). We cannot prove theories but we can refute them.

September 15, 2004

Philosophy of science

Falsificationism (2)
Poppers main idea: Scientists are actually not trying to prove their theories. They are trying to expose their theories to falsification. Great scientific theories are those that were very risky, that made bold predictions, and that were in a big danger of being refuted. The example that impressed Popper most was Einsteins theory of relativity. Einstein predicted that light will bend when passing near the sun. Moreover, Einstein gave directions about how his theory could be tested. He clearly described what should be observed during the suns eclipse, and suggested that his theory is false if the observation was not like that.

September 15, 2004

Philosophy of science

The bending of light (according to Einstein)

September 15, 2004

Philosophy of science

Will Einstein be refuted?

September 15, 2004

Philosophy of science

The demarcation criterion

Einsteins theory was not refuted, although it could easily have been. This is what makes it a great science. Science is distinguished from non-science by the fact that it does not avoid the risk of refutation. It is falsifiable. Pseudo-science (theory falsely presented as science) is characterized by Falsifiable theories "prohibit" or "exclude" some situations, and it is precisely because of this that they say something interesting. Being unfalsifiable is a bad thing because if a theory doesn't exclude some states of affairs then it doesn't say so much about the world, and it is empty, boring or trivial.

September 15, 2004

Philosophy of science

Pseudoscience
Pseudoscience, according to Popper, is not meaningless. It is just unfalsifiable. Pseudoscientific statements run no risk of being shown to be false. They are true, no matter what is observed. This is precisely what makes them useless. Example: Alfred Adlers theory of the inferiority complex. Popper: Once, in 1919, I reported to Adler a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. "Because of my thousandfold experience," he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: "And with this new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one-fold."

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Philosophy of science

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Prediction: true vs. false

If the prediction is false (we observe the event opposite of what the theory predicted) the theory is refuted. This negative result is not useless because we have now eliminated one wrong theory. If the prediction is true, the theory has passed the test but it should not be concluded that it is true. It should be tested again and again, by always deriving some new predictions to see if they will be observed. The progress of science consists in trial and error, and any theory that is not yet refuted should be regarded as a hypothesis that may also soon be falsified. A theory that has passed many tests is corroborated, which tells us only something about its past (and nothing about it chances of passing the tests in the future).
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Degrees of falsifiability
There are degrees of falsifiability. Theories that are more falsifiable are better. For example, "All metals expand when heated" is more falsifiable than "Copper and iron expand when heated" because it is easier to falsify the first than the second. Any piece of iron or copper that does not expand when heated falsifies both hypothesis, but the first hypothesis can also be falsified with other non-expanding metals. More falsifiable theories are better because they say more about the world (they are more informative). On the other hand, if we have two theories that are equally falsifiable and only one of them is falsified, the unfalsified theory is better because it passed the test while the other did not.
September 15, 2004 Philosophy of science 12