Chapter Two

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM

CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal
liability:

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

To appreciate the justifying circumstance of performance of duty, the following requisites

must concur:

1.) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office; and
2.) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of due performance of duty or lawful exercise of right or office.
(People v. Oanis, G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943)
People v. Oanis, G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943

On December 24, 1938, defendant-appellant, Alberto Galanta, Corporal of the Philippine

Constabulary, received instructions from Major Guido, thru Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, to arrest an escaped convict in the
name of Anselmo Balagtas. Captain Monsod likewise called the other defendant-appellant, Antonio
Z. Oanis, Chief of Police, and gave him the same instructions. Monsod divided them into two
groups. Oanis and Galanta, and Private Fernandez went to the house of a specific Irene, a bailarina,
who was alleged to be with Balagtas. Upon arrival at the house where the said Irene was
supposedly living, they approached someone named Brigida Mallare and Oanis inquired from her.
She indicated the place where Irene was, and also said that Irene at such moment was with her
paramour. Defendants went to the room of Irene, and upon seeing a man with her, who was
sleeping with his back towards the door. They fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers and
it turned out later that the man they killed was not the notorious criminal but an innocent man named
Serapio Tecson. Defendants were sentenced, after due trial by the lower court, guilty of homicide
through reckless imprudence to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to
two years and two months of prision correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P1,000.
 Issues:
1. Whether or not the appellants, Oanis and Galanta, were criminally liable for
the death of Serapio Tecson?
2. Whether or not the appellants will be entitled to mitigating circumstances?
 

Held:
1. Yes, the defendants were criminally liable for the death of the victim who has been mistakenly
thought to be the notorious criminal. The defendants had the opportunity to verify the victim’s
identity since he was asleep during the time he was shot and killed. The defendants could have
avoided killing an innocent person had they been inquisitive prior to the commission of their act.
The defendants acted negligently in the performance of their duty, thus, mistake of fact is not a
defense.
 
2. Yes, the appellants were entitled to mitigating circumstances. As provided in Article 11, number 5,
of the Revised Penal Code, a person do not incur criminal liability who acts in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites for a circumstance to be taken as
justifying: (1) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right;
and (2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance
of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, the crime committed is not
wholly excusable because only the first requisite was met. The defendants have committed the
crime while in the performance of their duty as peace officers since they have been instructed by
their superiors to arrest Balagtas, the notorious criminal. However, the defendants have acted
beyond the instructions given to them, which is only to arrest Balagtas and get him dead or alive
only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
 
Therefore, the second requisite is wanting since the crime they committed does not
constitute a necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Thus, as per Article 69 of
the Revised Penal Code, a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable.
Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly
excusable. - A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the
several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may
be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption
present or lacking.
 Exercise of right
The exercise of his right to suspend payments should not render the accused liable under
B.P. Blg 22. The rule on justifying circumstance of exercise of right under the Revised Penal
Code was supplementarily applied to B.P. Blg 22
(Sycip, Jr v. CA and People, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000, under P.D. Np. 957)

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 957 July 12, 1976

REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISION LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS, PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF
 
Section 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or
condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or
developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further
payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying
with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including
amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal
rate.
While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, it is difficult to see
how conviction of the accused in this case will protect the sanctity of the financial system.
Moreover, protection must also be afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No.
957. A statute must be construed in relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate ends
and purposes intended by the legislature.  

Courts will not strictly follow the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of
legislature and when ends are inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.  More so, when it
will mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be reconciled and given
due effect.
Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the
Revised Penal Code, but the Code is supplementary to such a law.  We find nothing in the
text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would prevent the Revised Penal Code from supplementing it.
Following Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner's exercise of a right of the
buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges against him.

Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges against him under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

OBEDIENCE TO A LAWFUL ORDER

Three requisites must concur before defense under Article 11 (6) can prosper:
1. order has been issued by a superior;
2. such order must be for a lawful purpose; and
3. means used by subordinate to carry out such order is lawful

ORDER ISSUED BY A SUPERIOR OFFICER

Court issued warrant of arrest against an accused. In implementing the warrant, the police
officer may use reasonable force necessary for its due execution.
The act of government authorities in obedience to lawful order of a superior officer is also
justified under the circumstance of performance of duty

Order from a Japanese imperial army during the occupation cannot be considered as superior
officer within the concept of justifying circumstance of obedience to an order (People v Manayao,
G.R. No. L-322, July 28, 1947)
People v Manayao, G.R. No. L-322, July 28, 1947
 
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable that appellant
acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability,
because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for Japan as a member
of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code
compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal
order. The construction contended for by appellant could entail in its potentialities even the
destruction of this Republic

But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance
with the applicable legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment
to be inflicted, and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an
indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower
court's decision, and the costs. 
LAWFUL ORDER

In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be a compliance with a lawful order, and that superior acted
within the scope of his authority. In sum, his duty to obey his superior should not be opposed to his higher
positive duty to obey the law prohibiting him to commit a crime.

Order to torture a criminal suspect is not lawful, and thus, obedience to such order is not justifying
circumstance. (People v Margen, G.R. No. L-2681, March 30, 1950

Obedience to an order of a superior give rise to exemption from criminal liability only when the
order is for some lawful purpose (art. 11, par. 6, Revised Penal Code). Sergeant Margen's order to
have the deceased tortured was not that did not give the sergeant the right to take the law in his
own hands and have the offender subjected to inhuman punishment. The order was illegal, and
appellant was not bound to obey it.

Having taken direct part in the unlawful acts which resulted in the death of the deceased and
nothing having been proved which would exempt him from criminal liability, appellant must be held
as coprincipal of the crime of murder charged in the information. 
Exception:
The accused must be aware of the illegality of the order by the superior. If the illegality of the order is not
patent and the accused honestly believed that the order was issued for lawful purpose, act done in obedience
of said order is justified under the principle of “ignorantia facti excusat” in relation to Article 11(6)
(People v Beronilla, G.R. No. L-444, February 28, 1955)

People v Beronilla, G.R. No. L-444, February 28, 1955

L – 4445 | February 28, 1955 | J. JBL Reyes
Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior
Facts:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto Adriatico file an appeal from the
judgement of the Abra CFI, which convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the elected
mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found to be aiding the enemy.

Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who
was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating as
guerilla unit in Abra. Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a memorandum which
authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or
abetting the enemy.
 Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in Bangued, he was placed under
custody and tried and sentenced to death by the jury based on various complaints made by the
residents. Beronilla reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying “…I can only compliment you for
your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case.”
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and jury, were indicted for the
murder of Borjal. Soon after, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which
granted amnesty to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla and others were convicted on
the grounds that the crime was made on purely personal motives and that the crime was committed
after the expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.
 
Issue: W/N the defendant-appellants’ actions are covered by justifying circumstances for obedience to
lawful order of superior
 
Held:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as military subordinates, they could
not question and obeyed in good faith without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest, prosecution and trial of Borjal was
done in pursuant to express orders of superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla
received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area commander, which called attention to the
illegality of Borjal’s conviction and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not have dared
to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not show malice on their part because of the
conduct of the trial, defense through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of
illegality and death sentence review sent to the superior officers.
Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus non facit reum, nisi mens
rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of to be innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty
Proclamation No. 8 inspite of contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were
contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because if there are “any reasonable
doubt as to whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the
accused.”
Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.
 
Thank you and God bless