Ketidakpastian Parameter Geoteknik

dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Resiko

pada Proyek Infrastruktur di Indonesia

by:
Prof. Ir. Chaidir Anwar Makarim, MSE., Ph.D 
Abstract: Since last decade, Forensic Geotechnical
Practice in Indonesia had gained National and
International recognition through its involvement in
solving construction disputes with: Contractors,
International Insurances, Government,
Developers/Owners, and/or other Private Sectors.
PERCENTAGE OF CONSTRUCTION CASES
SOLVED IN BANI
Et cetera Energy and Transportation Insurance
4.6% Mineral 2.5% 1.7%
Resource Construction
7.5% 30.8%
Agency
3.8%

Leasing
20.8%
Trading
15.0%
Investation
6.7%
Registered Arbitration Case in BANI
Period of 2009-2013 (Source : BANI, 2014)
 International
18%

Domestic
82%

Domestic vs International Arbitration Case in BANI

Period of 2009-2013 (Source : BANI, 2014)
 60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Arbitration Cases Solved Through Hybrid Arbitration

(Source : BANI, 2014)
 > 180 days < 90 days
20% 26%

150 - 180 days

19%
90 - 150 days
35%

Recorded Time of Disputed Cases Solved in BANI

(Source : BANI, 2014)
The growing number of construction cases solved by non-litigation

institution in 2014 is estimated of more than 100 million USD which

was believed still increasees by 10-20% each year. Between the

period of 2009-2013 itself more than 30% Arbitration Case were

Construction Dispute Cases solved through Indonesia BANI

Arbitration Center. This bring the consequences on the needs of

Certified Expert Witness, Forensic Expert, Knowledge of

Alternative Dispute Resolution, Legal Aspect of National &

International Construction Contract and most of all good

knowledge and practice in delivering engineering case position

(posita) before a court.

Related law to construction, Litigation, and
Arbitration in Indonesia is well explained in Law No.
18 and No. 30 Year of 1999, where "penilai ahli"
(Expert Witness plus) Code of Practice, Ethics and
Forensic Investigation Procedures were similar to the
international standard which explain that Indonesia
is friendly to International/Foreign Expert practice.
 Uncertainty and Risk in Foundation
Design
“the only certainty is that nothing is certain”. –Pliny
the Elder (23 AD-79 AD)

“Uncertainties have always been an inherent part

of soil mechanics and its applications,” (Peck,
1985). This statement was not likely to have
surprised the engineers of 1985 and should not
surprise those of the twenty-first century.
 Foundation engineers have been dealing with
uncertainty and risk since the dawn of geotechnical
engineering early in the twentieth century. As christian
points out in his 2004 Terzaghi Lecture (Christian,
2004), there are four ways of dealing with uncertainty:
ignoring it, being conservative, using the observational
method, or quantifying it.
Ignoring uncertainty is a recipe for disaster and
no competent engineer would follow this path.
Geotechnical engineers have traditionally used a
combination of conservatism and the
observational method (Peck, 1969) to manage
uncertainty and risk.
 Quantification of geotechnical risk is only just
beginning to enter into the standard of care of
geotechnical engineering and only for large and
difficult projects. In contrast structural engineers
have been applying and improving risk mitigation
techniques based on quantifying uncertainty for
many decades, and most structural design codes
are now based, in part, on some level of
quantification of risk and reliability.
 The differences in structural and geotechnical
approaches to risk management reflect
differences in the nature of these two
disciplines. Since foundation engineering is a
melding of these two disciplines, the foundation
engineering must understand how each
discipline manages risk in order to manage the
risks in foundation engineering.
 Histogram and the corresponding normal distribution of unconfined
compressive strength of sandstone sampled at the Confederation Bridge Site,
Canada (data from Becker et al., 1998)
Histogram and the corresponding normal distribution of dry unit
weight of a compacted soil at a road site in Los Alamos, New
Mexico (data from Petit, 1967).
 What exactly is risk?
Risk is a combination of probability of some loss and the cost of
that loss.

Probability of failure, Pƒ. The reliability, R, is simply the

complement of the probability of failure.

Since risk includes both the cost of failure and the probability of
failure, we will define risk as the product of the probability of
failure and cost of failure.
 CASE-1
FLOOD INCIDENT IN A
DIVERSION TUNNEL OF A
DAM
 Location and Background
Diversion Tunnel is located below the spillway at an elevation of + 164.00 meter,
construction type selected in this section is circular reinforced concrete lined,
reinforced with rock bolts and steel ribs on the body of diversion tunnel. The
Tunnel + 550 meter length and 10 meter of diameter. Diversion tunnel is
expected to drain the water discharge plan for 3200 m3/second. Dam project is
the result of cooperation of four governmental contractors in Indonesia.
This case position is related to a construction
claim of flood incident and roof collapsed in a
diversion tunnel that both of them took place in
year 2010, at Dam Project-Java. The successful
Novum are found in both of cases. In the flood
incident, the successful Novum was : the
extreme climate anomaly of La Nina caused
the increasing rainfall intensity, and
eventually impact to water entered the diversion
tunnel and causing extensive damage.
 The Cause of Flood
Debit of the river in November 2010 was at the optimum level. This was the
result of extreme climate Anomaly as explained below.

“……La Nina is known to be associated with high rainfall intensity in southern

and western pacific regions including Indonesia. Rainfall in October 2010
(Anomaly) will continue to be higher than its monthly average in most parts of
Indonesia. High rainfall intensity (≥ 200 mm/month) is expected in Sumatra,
Kalimantan, Java, Banten and Papua. In fact, the areas proof to floods is in
Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan (World Food Programme/ WFP and Lapan,
Bulletin No. 45, October 14th, 2010).”
 Chronology of The Flood Incident

Existing conditions of river at The Outlet & Plunge Cofferdam Collapsing by left side of The Plunge
Pool area (Project Report, 2012). Pool (Project Report, 2012).

Incident happened because of the failure of the Water Plunge Pool

Embankment which was believed caused by Flood coming from the
river. The flood overtopping the embankment at location-A, then
direct the high current water into the plunge pool excavation which
finally entering the Diversion Tunnel at location-B.
Peak of incident occurred when Embankment failed to handle
overtopped water turbulence in the plunge pool and followed by
strong water currents went to inside of the Diversion Tunnel
which later causing extensive damage on construction as well as
on material and equipment/ tools.

Material Damage caused by flood (Project Report, 2012)

In 2010, Java island affected due to the floods that is big enough and almost
experienced by most of the territory. Following is data area that is experiencing the
impact of the floods island java version of LAPAN (Lembaga Pengindraan Jauh dan
Antariksa Nasional) :

Figure 7. Province and Districs prone to flood in Java in October 2010

(Source: http://lapanrs.com/lapannew/simba/WFP_Oct_2010.pdf).

These all means that extreme weather in 2010 created floods in the area near the dam.
Rainfall records from BMKG Climate Station at the upstream of River showed that
during the month of November rainfall was almost comes daily. It is obvious that data of
rainfall volume from the 3-station was almost at its highest level in a year as shown in
Figure 9.
 STA-1

ST
STA

A-
-3

2
Location of Rainfall Station (Project Report, 2012).

Extreme rainfall data at the river (BMKG, 2010)

The total volume/year and average monthly rainfall/year is shown below, these graphical
diagram show that the total rainfall and average rainfall in 2010 is in its highest level since
year 2005.

Data of Total amount of extreme rainfall at the river Data of Monthly Average Amount of Rainfall by Six
(BMKG, 2010) Years Period Behind (BMKG, 2010)

Total volume of rainfall in 2010 which was at the highest 6-years is 2679 mm/year
(Station No.1), 6239 mm/year (Station No.2) and 6871 mm/year (Station No.3). The
average monthly rainfall showed also the same maximum level i.e. 223 mm/month/year
(STA-1), 520 mm/month/year (STA-2) and 573 mm/month/year (STA-3).
Those numbers is the highest within the last 6-years, as monitored by BMKG, which is >
50% higher than what was recorded before. This season of the year was also known as
the extreme rainy season or the year of La Nina.
 CONCLUSIONS OF CASE-1
• The flood incident took place on 2010 that had
caused damage in Diversion Tunnel is due to
maximum increase of water level from the river,
followed by failure of dam embankment
protecting water plunge pool project.
• Increased river water level was due to the
extreme season of La Nina phenomenon which is
an anomaly of a highly unpredicted weather
change.
• This forensic investigation result is an alternative
possible cause of the flood. The new thing about
this response is that it was never mentioned
before in the earlier report that there was ‘La
Nina’ in flood incident. This should be considered
as possible “Novum” to the disputed case.

CASE RESULT
Claim of Case-1 was 100% granted in 2014 by the claimed party since
the "novum" referred to the definition of the standard of word
"unforeseen" and "unpredicted" that is stated in the insurance contract.
 CASE-2
TUNNEL ROOF COLLAPSE CAUSED
BY SIMULTANEOUS BLASTING
The location and background of Case-2 is the same
with Case-1 where, in roof collapsed, the
successful Novum of the first rejected claim was :
First, the presence of simultaneous blasting
carried out by another party, at the surface of
spillway that was not revealed in the response
report. Secondly, the precense of sheared zone in
Breccia Layer, that could potentially trigger roof
collapse in diversion tunnel was highlighted. The
incident was the collapse of the roof / cave-in tunnel
with indication caused by blasting activities carried out
at the surface of the spillway excavation by another
party. The model will analyse the displacement in roof
diversion tunnel caused by explosion load.
Cave-in occured at 3 (three) location, the position will be named cave-in 1,
cave-in 2, & cave-in 3. As shown on figure below, Cave-in 1 located right
underneath shear zone-1 while cave-in 2 & cave-in 3 is located not directly
underneath but next or close to shear zone-2.
 The Event of the Tunnel Collapsed
As reported, works on the excavation site was supported with shotcrete protection and
wiremesh, strengthened by rock bolt and steel support system. Summary and highlights
of the events in the construction works are as follows:
1. January 11th, at 08.00 AM until 05.00 PM face Drilling for explosives pit in the tunnel
was conducted
2. January 11th, at 06.00 PM until 07.00 AM (January 12th, 2010) four sets of steel ribs
were installed from Sta. C +199.00 to Sta. C +202.00 with distance between steel ribs
is at 1.00 meter.
3. January 12th, at 08.00 PM until 11.35 AM, explosive ignition on tunnel face at Sta.C
+209.621 was carried out.
4. January 12th, at 11.45 AM, blasting on tunnel face at Sta. C +209.621 with average
drilling of 2.00 meter was carried out.
5. January 12th, following blasting works, ventilating process (which requires 45 - 60
minutes) was carried out.
6. January 12th, at 01.00 PM following the ventilating process, mucking activities were
carried out by using heavy equipment such as excavator and dump truck.
7. January 12th, at 01.40 PM, indication of possible rock fall (small size up to cobbles)
was anticipated by information sharing between the operator of excavator and dump
truck driver.
8. January 12th, at 02.00 PM, boulder sized rock fell at left side (direction clockwise at
10-11) exactly at the bucket excavator and was noticed by the operator. However
since operator’s view was blocked by the dump truck, the operator jumped out of
the excavator cabin, as seen on Figure below. (TechSol, 2011)

View Looking Away From The Inlet Portal of
the First Tunnel Collapse at Station C
+193.00 until +209.00 on January 12th 2010
(TechSol, 2011)
Close Up View Of The First Tunnel Collapse
at Station C +193.00 until +209.00 on
January 12th 2010. Note Blocky Nature Of
The Rock, Deformed Steel Ribs And Failed
Shotcrete Lining From The Adjacent Tunnel
Section (TechSol, 2011)

9. January 12th, at 02.05 PM, heavy rocks fell when the operator of excavator was out
looking for tools. The rear section of the excavator was damaged by the falling rock.
10. January, 11th until 12th, due to the tunnel roof collapse debris of approximately 500-
600 m3 damaged the already installed steel ribs, breaking fall steel ribs and pushing
other 16 sets of steel rib in an incline position. Despite this there were no casualties.
 Material Explosives in Blasting
Type of explosive material used in this project (Dahana, 2012)
TECHNICAL PROPERTIES
Classification Blasting Agent
Type of Explosion Non Cap Sensitivites
Priming Cast Booster
Catridges Emulsion Explosives
NG Based Explosives /
Dynamites

Water Resistence Poor

Density of Bulk (gr/cc) 0.8 – 0.84
Critical Diameter Barehole (inch) 1.5
VOD (m/s) in 25” diameter cofinef Barehole 3000 - 3300
Relative Weight Strength to Blasting Gelatin (%) 55
 Sketch Point and Documentation of Blasting

The depth of the explosion was 5 meter. The explosives were

placed every 2 meter distance in the x-axis and 3 meter
distance in the y-axis, as shown by figure below.

Figure 12. Sketch of Point for Drillling and Blasting Figure 13. Simultaneous Blasting on Spill Way
(Project Report, 2012). (Project Report, 2012)
 Classification of Soil and Rock
Based on the results of the soil investigation, the classification parameters and their ratings
for rock mass is used in this model for analysis. Relevant to this investigation are the rock
parameters stated for Weathered Claystone, Tuff Breccia, Volcanic Breccia, as shown on
Table 2 and Figure 14.

Rock Parameter (Project Report, 2012)

Weathered Claystone Tuff Breccia Volcanic Breccia

γ = 15 KN/m3 γ = 20 KN/m3 γ = 21 KN/m3

c’= 30 KN/m2 c’= 40 KN/m2 c’= 45 KN/m2

φ= 12 º φ = 18 º φ = 22 º

Front View in Cave-In

(Geoforensik M.P., 2012)
 Blasting Load in Finite Element Method

Blasting Load can be implemented in Finite Element Method (FEM) and described as
Dynamic Load. As we have discussed in previous chapters, explosions load placed
on one point is equivalent to 77 kg or 215000 KN. In this cased explosion placed in 16
points, but in FEM we just only put 12 points and we got temporary conculsion that in
12 points with blasting load equivalent to 77 kg in each points, give the result
displacement due to blasting on tunnel roof is 2.20 meter, as Figure 15 and 16.

Front View in Cave-In With Dynamic Load Explosion. Displacement in Roof Tunnel Cave-In Caused By Dynamic
(Geoforensik M.P., 2012) Load Explosion. (Geoforensik M.P., 2012)
 Vibration Criteria
In blasting work it is necessary to have a review of the standards vibration
that occurs due to explosion. It should be noted that, this typical safe
vibration did not represent multiple or repeated vibration as it was
experienced in the tunnel case. Not to mention, blasting occurred in a
Sheared Zone Rock tunnel as well. It is also understood that the variation
in vibration limit is something that could not be as exact as 1,2, or 3 as
shown by the following on Table 3 International Standards Vibration
Frequency should also be considered.

Standards of Vibrations Limit for MAJOR Damages in Structure/Concrete Building

DIN 4150 10 – 40 mm/s
SWISS 30 – 40 mm/s
J.F. WISS (1981) (Langefor, Sweden; 6 in/s – 6.5 in/s ( >165 mm/s) (Major Damages)
Edwards, Canada; Bumines, USA)
USBM, USA (Nicholls, etc, 1971) 165 mm/s (Major Damages)
Kementrian Lingkungan Hidup, 1996 PPV > 40mm/s, frequency <50 Hz
 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 3 shows relationship between rock Elastic Modulus and Displacement
which could be used as a model to explain when the roof was potentially
collapsed. The parameter used is referred exactly as what had been used by
Techsol. The graph shows that most probably collapsed about to start at
Displacement ≥ 26cm where nonlinearity of graph was shown clearly.

Relationship between rock Elastic Modulus and Displacement

Further analysis in location of cave-in II (with forepolling and fair-good
rock) had shown that Displacement should be < 26cm (with heavy rain
increases as rain/water intrudes in the process). Simultaneous Blasting
and La Nina occurrence at that time should also be included in analysis,
besides the fact that location of cave-in II was not exactly at the Shear
Zone area.
Figure below shows clearly the effect of simultaneous blasting (in
percentage) at both cave in location (II and III) vs displacement. The result
explain why at both places collapsed were dominantly caused by
simultaneous blasting.
100
90
80
Displacement (cm)

70 53
60
50
40 22
30 26
15
20
10 5
0 3.77 Cave-in III

100 Cave-in II
50
Simultaneous Blasting Percentage
20 (%)
case is ±2 years.
mediation in an arbitration case (Hybrid Arbitration). Time spent on this
The claim for Case-2 was granted partially in 2014 (>50%) through
CASE RESULT
• A model analysis of simultaneous dynamic blasting
analysis using Midas GTS 2010 shows excessive
displacement 2.20 meter on tunnel roof, which is
considered as sign of failure.
• Vibration derived from blasting carried out by the
third party could likely be the cause or triggering
factor of the collapsed of the tunnel roof (or
weakened the rock mass integrity) as proven by
model simulation. The vibration due to the
blasting conducted within the radius of + 60.00
meter was considered as an external factor that
has some influence on the tunnel roof stability.
• The new thing about this response is that it was
never mentioned before in the earlier report that
there was simultaneous or multiple blasting works
took place in roof collapes. This should be
considered as possible “Novum” to the disputed
case.
CONCLUSIONS OF CASE-2
 CASE-3
SUDDEN WIDE SPREAD DAMAGE
CAUSED BY HIGHLY EXPANSIVE
(VERY SOFT) SOIL
 CASE-3
The Main Point disclosed in this report is the “New Findings” of a
highly Expansive Soil which was found at least up to depth 11.50
m below the ground surface, supporting the hotel building
construction since it was built in 1992 in Indonesia. This highly
expansive behavior of the soil was geotechnically hidden in the alluvial
silty clay type of soil, shown by its high Plasticity Index, or PI = 47.46
% - 49.86 % as reported from soil investigation in year 2004 and 2007.
It is internationally known that soil with PI > 35 % is categorized as
highly expansive or having very high swelling (or shrinkage)
potentials. Furthermore, the same soil was run through mineral and
chemical analysis and proven to contain montmorillonite
minerals (in all 3 samples) consistently more than 22.20 % - 22.84 %,
Swelling potentials 12.50 % - 18.33 %, and Shrinkage potential 11.68
% - 12.16 %.
The sudden construction damaged was reported to the insurance in year
2003 – where data from closest station to the site released by The Institute
of Meteorology and Geophysics was reported as the year of the smallest
rainfall average in 10 (ten) years and known as the El-Nino triggered Long
Drought Season. Agricultural data also highlighted the time as causing the
maximum harvest failure area, again in 10 (ten) years. For Expansive Soil,
long and unusual drought season like this will create deeper active zone
which will lower its support to construction by shrinking or creating void
area in the soil.

Progressively deepening active zone in expansive soil during long drought season
 EL-NINO
This unusual Long Drought Season will trigger expansive soils to develop void
due to shrinkage, or lateral as well as vertical understressed that will produce
cracks, frame/roof tilts, differential settlement or even slope failure. Almost all
reported construction damage in the area reflects these phenomena.
As this extreme long drought season brought disaster to the agriculture or rice
field plantation, the department of agriculture also published the sudden
increases of harvest failure are affected by El-Nino drought cycles (Bulletin
PLA, 2005) as shown on figures below.

Rice Field Area Affected by Drought Seasons (1995 – 2004)

(bulletin PLA, 2005)
Average Rainfall
Rice Field Area Affected By Drought Seasons
(Institute of Meteorology and Geophysics, 2007)
(1995-2004)
Average Rainfall 6 0 0 ,0 0 0

Dro ug ht Affected Area

350 50 0 ,0 0 0
Harves t Failure Area
300 Average
Rainfall (m m )

250 Rainfall 4 0 0 ,0 0 0
Area (Ha)

200
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
150
100 2 0 0 ,0 0 0
50
0 10 0 ,0 0 0

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Years 0
19 9 5 19 9 6 19 9 7 19 9 8 19 9 9 2 00 0 2001 2002 2003 2004

Year
 The Highly Expansive (Very Soft) Soil

• Geological mapping of expansive soil in Java Island (more than 90 % is

highly expansive), where the city contributes almost 88 % of its land,
and published/unpublished reports and/or courts settlement in
Indonesia and in USA, supporting the case is also attached.

• Finally, the fact that the construction had already in operation since
1992, although it was built on intermittently soft-medium-stiff soil,
does not justify that soft soil as the cause of the damage. One thing is
because the soil is not that “soft”, as shown by cohesion c avg = 0.34 -
0.473 kg/cm2 (cohesion of soft soil’s is expected ≤ 0.250 kg/cm 2) and
compression index, Cc = 0.36 – 0.485 (compression index of soft soil
is expected >1.0). Another important thing is because settlement of
soft soil occurred in a long-slow-gradual manner. This behavior is valid
only for long term settlement-induced damage, where so far it was
not the complaint of the owner.
 Soil Description and N-SPT Values
Borehole Density/
Depth (m) Soil Description N-SPT
No. Consistencies
BH-1 00.00-02.50 Clay and silt trace sand, brown. 5 Medium
  02.50-23.00 Clay and silt trace sand, grey. 4-11 Soft to Stiff
BH-2 00.00-00.50 Demolition Material. - -
  00.50-02.00 Clay and silt trace sand, brown. 4 Soft
  02.00-09.30 Clay and silt little sand, grey. 4-7 Medium
  09.30-10.00 Clay and silt trace sand, greyish brown. - -
  10.00-20.00 Clay and silt trace sand, grey. 8-11 Stiff
Clay and silt little sand contains demolition
BH-3 00.00-00.50 material, brown. - -
  00.50-04.50 Clay and silt trace sand, yellowish brown 5-9 Medium to Stiff
Clay and silt trace sand cemented at-9 m
  04.50-10.50 depths, grey 2-12 Medium to Stiff
Clay and silt trace sand contains
BH-4 00.00-00.50 demolition material, brown - -
  00.50-04.50 Clay and silt trace sand, yellowish brown 7-11 Medium to Stiff
  04.50-10.50 Clay and silt trace sand, grey 6-10 Medium to Stiff
Clay and silt little sand contains organic
BH-5 00.00-00.50 material, brown - -
  00.50-02.00 Clay and silt trace sand, yellowish brown 2 Soft
  02.00-10.50 Clay and silt trace sand, grey 2-4 Soft
BH-6 00.00-04.00 Clay and silt trace sand, brown 4-5 Medium
  02.00-10.50 Clay and silt trace sand, grey 5-9 Medium to Stiff
 Laboratory Test Results (physical parameter):
Borehole USCS PL PI
Depth (m) LL % Wc % γt t/m^3 Gs
No. Classf. % %
BH-1 02.00-02.50 CH 73 33 40 56 1.64 2.56
05.00-05.50 CH 73 27 46 40 1.75 2.57
08.00-08.50 CH 76 34 42 42 1.74 2.58
11.00-11.50 CH 116 36 80 47 1.73 2.62
BH-2 02.00-02.50 CH 61 29 32 57 1.63 2.56
05.00-05.50 CH 76 33 43 50 1.68 2.58
08.00-08.50 CH 77 34 43 49 1.7 2.60
11.00-11.50 CH 100 39 61 42 1.75 2.56
BH-3 02.00-02.50 CH 90 37 53 46 1.73 2.62
05.00-05.50 CH 101 41 60 51 1.68 2.56
08.00-08.50 CH 100 40 60 48 1.72 2.63
09.50-10.00 CH 64 25 39 41 1.77 2.60
BH-4 02.00-02.50 CH 59 27 32 42 1.76 2.58
05.00-05.50 CH 68 29 39 49 1.7 2.60
08.00-08.50 CH 82 30 52 45 1.74 2.61
09.50-10.00 CH 87 35 52 43 1.76 2.60
BH-5 02.00-02.50 CH 86 36 50 59 1.62 2.55
05.00-05.50 CH 82 35 47 55 1.65 2.56
08.00-08.50 CH 89 37 52 58 1.63 2.56
09.50-10.00 CH 85 36 49 53 1.67 2.60
BH-6 02.00-02.50 CH 65 28 37 52 1.68 2.60
05.00-05.50 CH 63 27 36 50 1.69 2.59
08.00-08.50 CH 88 36 52 48 1.71 2.60
09.50-10.00 CH 75 33 42 44 1.74 2.58
 Now, it is obvious this Expansive behavior were “hidden” in
the so called alluvial type of soil. This means 2 (two) potential
problems with the soil should be expected i.e.:
• Long term settlement in a function of time (soft soils), or
• Sudden heave and void creation during extreme wet or long
drought season (Expansive Soils).
Soil Properties of Expansive Soil from the Site
Results
Properties
1.00 - 1.50 m 1.50 - 2.00 m 2.50 - 3.00 m
Liquid Limit (LL) 96.00% 94.00% 82.00%
Plastic Limit (PL) 33.00% 29.00% 36.00%
Plasticity Index (PI) 63.00% 65.00% 46.00%
Water Content (wc) 44.10% 39.10% 36.40%
Wet Density (γm) 1.78 t/m^3 1.79 t/m^3 1.77 t/m^3
Specific Gravity (Gs) 2.79 2.52 2.36
Void Ratio (e) 1.25 0.94 0.78
 X-Ray Diffraction Test
Chemical and Mineral Test Results of Sample = BH-2 (1.20 – 2.00 m)
No. Kind of Test Test Method Result
Chemical Analysis    
weight in %    
SiO2 SNI 15-0449-1989 57.97
Al2O3 SNI 15-4936-1998 14.95
Fe2O3 SNI 15-2173-1989 2.09
1 TiO2 SNI 15-0449-1989 0.22
CaO SNI 15-1569-1989 9.16
MgO SNI 15-1569-1990 2.42
Na2O SNI 15-0449-1989 0.72
K2O SNI 15-0449-1989 1.10
Lost in ignition SNI 15-0449-1989 11.37
Mineral Analysis, X-Ray Diffraction Halloysite = 36.67
weight in % Unit Calcite = 6.70
2     Feldspar = 23.27
    Montmorillonite = 22.60
    Alpha Quartz = 10.76
3 Swelling Potential (%) Volumetry 12.50
4 Shrinkage Potential (%) SNI 15-0255-1989 12.13
As also shown on figure below, a typical result of X-ray Diffraction test
confirm the presence of the montmorillonite which causes the soil to
expand and shrink during extreme long wet and drought season.

Results of X-ray Diffraction Test BH-2 at depth 1.20 -2.00 m

 An early results of a geological based research on Expansive soils
in Java Island shows distribution of Expansive soils in East Java.

The Mapping of Expansive Soil

This figure shows that the city’s soil areas contribute 66 - 100 % of Expansive
Soils. The city is known among Geotechnical practitioner as area of where the
most Expansive Soils or where construction failure caused by Expansive Soils
is not uncommon.
Map sheet location of east - java. (Makarim & Paulus, A.P., 2008).
DAMAGE
REPORTS
 Shrinkage Based Failure (void
formation) on Retaining Wall

Void underneath wall cracks and

drainage failure
 Cracks at the Swimming Pool Area

Cracks Inside Swimming Pool Floor

 Crack of retaining walls

Disconnection on the wooden roof

frames
Massive longitudinal cracks
along all walk ways

Extensive damages of pool sides aprons

 Cracks and separation on building walls

Shrinkage based failure on retaining wall

Cracks at Tennis Court Facility

Internal deformation based failure of

the river retaining walls
 Slope Model
Consistent with its finding of soft soil in the area and after interpretation
based on reduction of soil parameters reported by local soil investigation
company and insurance consultant, concludes that slopes are in marginal
slope of stability. Their results are presented in Table 13 compared with PT.
Protech results with modest variation of reduction of cohesion/soil strength
but still below the original value of soil cohesion. (legal report document).

Results of Slope/W Analysis

Safety factor (SF)
Location Insurance Protech
SF Protech Protech Protech
Consultant Ca = 0.65
Ca Ca = 0.43 Co Ca = 0.5 Co
Ca Co
Room 100-113 1.090 1.372 1.442 1.513 1.655
Boiler House 1.104 1.192 1.252 1.312 1.432
Public Road 1.079 1.112 1.215 1.317 1.521
Old Lobby 1.335 1.189 1.412 1.570 1.861
PT. Protech results in the table earlier shows that slope stability should
not have been the real cause of the failure problem. The soft soil was
not that soft as show on the laboratory report of both parties, but the
expansive soil containing montmorillonite is in its highest level of
“shrink” and “swell” behaviour.
Variations of modulus of elasticity, E, is used to simulate the void. The
results show a sudden difference of more than 100 % compared to
typical long term soft soil settlement. One of plaxis model of old hotel
lobby is shown on figure below.

Plaxis Model of the Old Hotel Lobby

 Table below shows that “Sudden Deformation” caused unusually bigger
and faster deformation than a natural one.
SETTLEMENT (cm)
NO LOCATION SOIL PROPERTIES TRIAL ANALYSIS DRAWINGS GWL (m)
E original E~0
1 Old Lobby BH 04 slice D-D -1
    Data reported     4.046  18.704
    E full       18.678
    E 500 upper layer       7.567
    E500 lower layer       7.197
2 Pool side BH 05 slice B-B -0.5
Data reported 5.491 11.435
    E full 1 layer       6.819
    E full 2 layer       11.44
    E 1 layer       10.05
    E 1 layer above GWL       8.444
    E 2 layer       10.65
3 Corridor BH 03 slice G-G -1.4
    Data reported     5.177  30.11
    E500 full 1 layer       8.675
    E500 full 2 layer       72.819
    E 500 part -1       9.003
    E 500 part -2       12.91
4 Tennis court BH 05 slice J-J 1
Data reported 5.347 19.176
    E full 2 layer       18.632
    E full 1 layer       6.66
    E 500 part-1 layer       5.597
    E 500 part-2 layer       7.166
 Slope Stability Analysis
The followings result of analysis and model simulation used conventional
method of Slope/W program for slope factor of safety and MIDAS GTS
(MIDAS, 2010) for sudden and excessive cracks/settlement triggered by
shrinkage of expansive soils, in 2-D and 3-D FEM of analysis.

2-D Model (Without Void) : 2-D Model (With Void at Top Slope) :
The following is results of a 2-D FEM Model The following is results of a 2-D FEM Model

2-D Model (With Void) :

The following is results of a 2-D FEM Model 2-D Model (Shrink) :

Maximum displacement = 20 cm
Results : Maximum displacement = 81.00 cm
 3-D Model (Without Void) 3-D Model (With Void at Top Slope) :

Results : Maximum displacement = 18.00 cm 3-D Model (Shrink) :

3-D Model (With Void)

Results : Maximum displacement = 21.00 cm

Slope displacement and safety factor in 2-D and 3-D with/ without void.

In general, it can be concluded that void created in slope during long drought
season could trigger instability or a decrease in slope safety factor.
 CONCLUSIONS CASE-3

Expansive soil in Indonesia, especially in this place

had been known by practitioners as the cause of
extensive damages in construction.

Weather and meteorological as well as agricultural

data is the time suggested that in this case, sudden
extensive construction failures is triggered by the El-
Nino driven long drought season. Long drought
season is suspected to mobilize deeper active zone
of Expansive Soil, which in return trigger extreme
void formation in soil.

CASE RESULT
After 4-years of negotiation, claim of this case was 100%
granted by insurance.
Chemical and Mineral Test Results of Sample = BH-2 (1. 20 – 2. 00
m), Case-3 Project.
 PETA GEOLOGI TANAH EKSPANSIF
Peta untuk kota Jawa Barat
Peta untuk kota Jawa Tengah
Peta untuk kota Jawa timur
Terima Kasih