Philo of Law

FELIXBERTO C. STA.
MARIA
VS.
SALVADOR P. LOPEZ
(Philosophers on Law and

Academic Freedom)
• “the man who searches after both meaning
and fulfillments beyond the ambiguous
fulfillments and frustrations of history exists
in a height of spirit which no historical
process can completely contain. This height
is not irrelevant to the life of the community,
because new richness and a higher
possibility of justice come to the community
from this height of awareness. But the
height is destroyed by any community which
seeks prematurely to cut off this pinnacle of
individuality in the interest of community’s
peace and order. (Dr. Niebuhr)
What is Academic Freedom?
Article XIV, Section 5 (2) of 1987 Philippine Constitution states that “Academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning”
Commissioner Adolf Azcuna said, “Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept

and we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education,
therefore, we will leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of
academic freedom. We just say that it shall be enjoyed in all institutions of
higher learning.”
Four essential freedoms
Who may teach
What may be taught
How it shall be taught
Who may be admitted to study.”

• FACTS:
• Petitioner Felixberto C. Sta. Maria was the Dean,

College of Education, University of the Philippines
(UP), and the respondent Salvador P. Lopez the
Univerity President. Sta. Maria, a professor of
English and Comparative Literature, was elected
Dean of the College of Education on May 5, 1967
by the Board of Regents, on nomination of the
UP President. His appointment as such Dean was
for a five year term, "effective May 16, 1967 until
May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all
the rights and privileges as well as the duties and
obligations attached to the position in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the
University and the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.
• In February 1969, the graduate and
undergraduate students of the UP
College of Education presented to
President Salvador P. Lopez a number of
demands having a bearing on the
general academic program and the
physical plant and services, with a
cluster of special demands. In response,
President Lopez created a committee
which met with Sta. Maria regularly.
• As a result of the dialogues and
recommendations by Sta. Maria to the
president, the students were not appeased. The
students went on to boycott their classes which
infected the other colleges and the newly
installed members of the UP Student Council
voted to support the education students' strike.
Until the day that all academic activity in the
university came to a complete stand still so that
the UP President called a meeting of the faculty
of the College of Education. Those present gave
him a vote of confidence (40 in favor, 7
abstained) to resolve the issue on hand as he
sees fit.
• Armed with the vote of confidence of the
education faculty, President Lopez issued the
transfer order herein challenged, Administrative
Order 77. Theorder, addressed to Dean Sta. Maria
and simultaneously appointed ad interim Professor
Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean of the College
of Education, without additional compensation
Whether or not Dean Sta. Maria can be
transferred without its consent
Whether or not Dean Sta. Maria was

ISSUES actually demoted and not merely
transferred
Whether or not the lack of formal hearing

violated her rights to due process
Whether or not Dean Sta. Maria can be transferred
without its consent
NO. There are transfers which do not amount to

removal. Some such transfers can be effected
without the need for charges being preferred,
without trial or hearing, and even without the
consent of the employee. The clue to such
transfers may be found in the “nature of the
appointment.” Where the appointment does not
indicate a specific station, an employee may be
transferred or reassigned provided the transfer
affects no substantial change in title, rank and
salary.
Whether or not Dean Sta. Maria was actually
demoted and not merely transferred
YES. The transfer of petitioner from his post of Dean, college of

Education, UP, to the Office of respondent UP President as
Special Assistant in charge of public information and relations
was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a
university, being an academic position which requires learning,
ability and scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special
assistant who merely assists the President, as the title
indicates. The special assistant does not make authoritative
decisions. Second. The position of dean is a line position where
the holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name and
responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level
of staff position. Third. The position of dean is created by law,
the university charter, and cannot be abolished even by the
Board of Regents. That of special assistant, upon the other
hand, is not so provided by law; it was a creation of the
university president.
Whether or not the lack of formal hearing violated
her rights to due process
YES. Transfer could be but a ploy to cover

dismissal, and dismissal cannot be justified on
grounds of expediency. Due process is associated
with the sporting idea of fair play; it shuns
oppression and eschews unfair dealing; it obeys
the dictates of justice and is ruled by reason.
As amended, the Civil Service Law provides that “if

the employee believes that there is no justification
for the transfer, he may appeal his case . . . and
pending his appeal and decision thereon, his
transfer shall be held in abeyance.”
• “Due process in the academic community is reliant upon the
process of nationality, it cannot be the same as due process
in the political community as far as the mechanisms of
determining the outcome of rational activity” (Dr. Sidney
Hook)
• the effective pursuit, discovery, publication, and teaching of
the truth. In the political community all men are equal as
citizens not only as participants in and contributors to the
political process, but as voters and decision makers on the
primary level. Not so in the academic community, what
qualifies a man to enjoy equal human or political rights does
not qualify him to teach equally with others or even to study
equally on every level.
• “In a liberal educational regimen, everything is subject to
the rule of reason, and all are equals as questioners and
participants. Whoever interferes with academic due process
whether by violence or threat of violence places himself
outside the academic community and incurs the sanctions
appropriate to the gravity of his offenses from censure to
suspension to expulsion.
PHILOSOPHY ON LAW AND JUSTICE
JORGE B. VARGAS VS. EMILIO RILLORAZA, ET. AL.; G.R.
NO. L-1612; FEBRUARY 26, 1948
Facts
• The constitutionality of Section 14 of the Commonwealth Act No. 682 (People's Court Act) was
challenged in a motion filed by the counsel for the defense.
• Among the grounds in such motion were as follows:
⚬ It provides for qualifications of members of the Supreme Court, other than those provided in
Section 6, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution;
⚬ It authorizes the appointment of members of the Supreme Court who do not possess the
qualifications set forth in Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution;
⚬ It removes from office the members of the Supreme Court by means of a procedure other than
impeachment, contrary to Article IX, of the Constitution;
⚬ It deprives the Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to
confirm or reject appointments to the Supreme Court;
⚬ It creates two Supreme Courts;
⚬ It impairs the rule making power of the Supreme Court, contrary to Section 13, Article VIII, of the
Constitution;
5
NO. L-1612; FEBRUARY 26, 1948
Facts
• Among the grounds in such motion were as follows:
⚬ It is a Bill of Attainder;
⚬ It denies the equal protection of the laws;
⚬ It is an ex post facto legislation;
⚬ It amends the Constitution by a procedure not sanctioned by Article XV of the Constitution; and
⚬ It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the "packing" of the Supreme Court
in certain cases, either by Congress or by the President
• The following are the salient provisions in the 1935 Constitution:

⚬ Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution ordains that the Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and ten associate Justices and may sit either in banc or in two divisions unless
otherwise provided by law;
⚬ Section 5 of the same Article provides that the members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments;
5
NO. L-1612; FEBRUARY 26, 1948
Facts
• The following are the salient provisions in the 1935 Constitution:
⚬ Section 6 of the same Article stipulates that no person may be appointed member of the Supreme
Court unless he has been five years a citizen of the Philippines, is at least 40 years of age, and has
for 10 years or more been a judge of a court of record or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines;
⚬ Section 9 of said Article states that the members of the Supreme Court shall hold office during
good behavior, until they reach the age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office;
⚬ Section 13 of the same Article VIII enunciates that the then existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are thereby repealed as statutes, and are declared rules of court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same, and to the power of Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement them.
5
NO. L-1612; FEBRUARY 26, 1948
Issues
• Whether the Congress had the power to add to the pre-existing grounds of
disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court;
• Whether a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been
duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments pursuant to the constitution, even only as a "designee";
• Whether, by the method of "designation" created by Section 14, a Judge of First

Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the
President under the same section can constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justice" of
the Supreme Court
5
NO. L-1612; FEBRUARY 26, 1948
RULING
• Whether the Congress had the power to add to the pre-existing grounds of
disqualification of a Justice of the Supreme Court:
⚬ No act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution can become a law. The
Court ruled that, in the matter of disqualification of judicial officers, the
legislature may propose to introduce therein, but it must not in any way
contravene the provisions of the constitution;
⚬ The tripartite system, the mutual independence of the three departments
(particularly, the independence of the judiciary) must be upheld;
⚬ Thus, the additional ground for disqualification added by Section 14 of the
assailed law to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the
organic law. 5
NO. L-1612; FEBRUARY 26, 1948
RULING
• Whether a person may act as a Justice of the Supreme Court who has not been
duly appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments pursuant to the constitution, even only as a "designee":
⚬ The Court ruled that no person not so appointed may act as Justice of the
Supreme Court and that the "designation" authorized in Section 14 of the
assailed law cannot be a compliance with the provision requiring that
appointment;
⚬ The Court noted that a Judge of First Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance
or Cadastral Judge does not possess the required constitutional qualifications
of a regular member of the Supreme Court.
5
NO. L-1612; FEBRUARY 26, 1948
RULING
• Whether, by the method of "designation" created by Section 14, a Judge of First

Instance, Judge-at-large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the
President under the same section can constitutionally "sit temporarily as Justice" of
the Supreme Court:
⚬ The Court held that a mere designation under Section 14 of the assailed law
does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of appointment, with the
additional circumstance that as to such designation the Commission on
Appointments is entirely dispensed with;
⚬ Under Sections 4 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, it is clear that the
framers intended the Supreme Court to function through the members who are
defined therein; and by Section 6, they determined who may be appointed such
members. 5
NO. L-1612; FEBRUARY 26, 1948
RULING
• Thus, Section 14 of the People's Court Act was declared unconstitutional.
IN RELATION TO THE PHILOSOPHY ON LAW AND JUSTICE
• The ignorants and retrogrades will never understand it; but it is a fact that in the summit of
his glorious career, Justice Holmes, the greates Judge of modern times, continued reading
Aristotle. To free themselves from the sorrows they feel with the surrounding market of
vulgarity, where pygmys and riffraffs dominate, great minds seek enjoyment in the
company of their kind. Eagles will not be happy in the society of flies and mosquitoes.
5
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
VS.
JULIO POMAR
(Jurists on police
power, the common
good and the general
welfare)
POLICE POWER
“the due regulation and domestic

order of the kingdom, whereby
the inhabitants of a state, like
members of a well-governed
family, are bound to conform
their general behavior to the
rules of propriety, good
neighborhood, and good
manners, and to be decent,
industrious, and offensive in their
respective stations (4 Blackstone’s
Commentaries, 162)
•Jeremy Bentham in his General View of
Public offenses, gives us the following
definition: “Police in general a system of
precaution either for the prevention of
crimes or of families, its business may be
distributed into eight branches:
• Police for the prevention of offenses

• Police for the prevention of
calamities
• Police for the prevention of endemic
discased
• Police for the prevention of charity
• Police for the prevention of interior
communication
• Police for the amusements
• Police for the recent intelligence
• Police for registration
•“The police power is the power
vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the
constitution as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth” (Cooley’s
Constitutional limitations)
•Julio Pomar, the manager and person -
in – charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a
tobacco factory pertaining to La
Campania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized
to transact business in Manila,
employed Macaria Fajardo as cigar –
maker. She was granted a vacation
leave beginning July 16, 1923 by reason
of pregnancy. On October 26, 1923 a
case was filed against defendant Pomar
for failing to pay Fajardo her regular
wages corresponding to 30 days before
and 30 days after her delivery and
confinement, in accordance with the
provision of Act. 3071
• “ Section 13 - Every person, firm or corporation owning or
managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description
shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer
who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and
another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the
employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause,
under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages
equivalent to the total of two months counted from the day of
her discharge.”. The judge found the defendant guilty of the
alleged offense. From that sentence, the defendant appealed
contending that his act did not constitute any offense because
such provision of the Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not Act No.

3071 is unconstitutional
• RULING:
• Yes, Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional. Such Act

violates the right to enter into a lawful contract.
The right to enter into lawful contracts
constitutes one of the liberties provided by the
constitution for the people of the State. Being
such a right, it should not therefore be
arbitrarily interfered with. Even though it has
been contended that Act No. 3071 is within the
police power of the State, such power cannot
be exercised in violation to the Constitution
which is the fundamental and supreme law of
the land
•The Supreme Court declared Section
13 of Act No. 3071 to be
unconstitutional for being violative or
restrictive of the right of the people to
freely enter into contracts for their
affairs. It has been decided several
times, that the right to contract about
one's affairs is a part of the liberty of
the individual, protected by the "due
process of law" clause of the
constitution. The contracting parties
may establish any agreements, terms,
and conditions they may deem
advisable, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals or public policy
• The police power of the state is a growing and
expanding power. As civilization develops and
public conscience becomes awakened, the police
power may be extended, as has been
demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment
with reference to the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow
faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor
transcend or violate the express inhibition of the
people’s law – the constitution. If the people
desire to have the police power extended and
applied to conditions and things prohibited by
the organic law, they must first amend that law. It
will also be noted from an examination of said
section 13, that it takes no account of contracts
for the employment of women by the day nor by
the piece. The law is equally applicable to each
case. It will hardly be contended that the person,
firm or corporation owning or managing a
factory, shop or place of labor, who employs
women by the day
CYBERLIBEL, PROOF OF TRUTH AND RESTRICTIONS TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET. AL. VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET.
AL.; G.R. NO. 203335; FEBRUARY 18, 2014
FACTS
• The constitutionality of several provisions of Republic Act No. 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012, was assailed in the present petitions.
• Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that
regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission, as follows:
⚬ Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

⚬ Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
⚬ Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
⚬ Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
⚬ Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
⚬ Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
⚬ Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
⚬ Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
⚬ Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
⚬ Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
5
AL.; G.R. NO. 203335; FEBRUARY 18, 2014
FACTS
• Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law
that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission, as follows:
⚬ Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
⚬ Section 8 on Penalties;
⚬ Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
⚬ Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
⚬ Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
⚬ Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
⚬ Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
⚬ Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
⚬ Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
⚬ Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
⚬ Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions. 5
AL.; G.R. NO. 203335; FEBRUARY 18, 2014
RULING
• The Court ruled in this wise:
⚬ VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
￭ Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of

unsolicited commercial communications;
￭ Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data
in real-time; and
￭ Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of
Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data. 5
AL.; G.R. NO. 203335; FEBRUARY 18, 2014
RULING

￭ Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of
unsolicited commercial communications:
• The Court ruled that to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited
ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
• Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is
not accorded the same level of protection as that given to
other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is 5
nonetheless entitled to protection;

• Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
AL.; G.R. NO. 203335; FEBRUARY 18, 2014
RULING

￭ Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data
in real-time:
• The assailed provision empowers law enforcement authorities
"with due cause" to collect or record by technical or electronic
means traffic data in real-time;
• However, the Court struck this provision as void as the phrase
"with due cause" fails to hint at the meaning it intends. The
phrase does not even bother to relate the collection of data to 5
the probable commission of a particular crime.

AL.; G.R. NO. 203335; FEBRUARY 18, 2014
RULING

￭ Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of
Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data:
• The Court held that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom of
expression and the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures as the assailed provision operates as a restriction on
the freedom of expression over cyberspace;
• Section 19 disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to
determine the validity of restrictions on speech and merely 5
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in

violation of any provision of the cybercrime law.
AL.; G.R. NO. 203335; FEBRUARY 18, 2014
RULING
￭ Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with
respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and
￭ Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of

cybercrimes as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-
related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3)
on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.
￭ ALL OTHER PROVISIONS ARE DECLARED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL.

AL.; G.R. NO. 203335; FEBRUARY 18, 2014
RULING
• With regard to cyberlibel, the Court ruled that there must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even
extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice;
• Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a

crime, shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made
against Government employees with respect to facts related to the
discharge of their official duties;
5
CHERYLL S. SANTOS
VS.
ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE
WESTGROVE
(Public and Secular morality as

prevailing norm of conduct)
•The morality referred in the law is
public and necessarily secular, not
religious. Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public
moral disputes may be resolved only on
grounds articulated in secular terms.
•Example:
•“Compelled Religion
•Expansive Religious freedom therefore

requires that government be neutral in
matters of Religion: Governmental
reliance upon religious justification is
consistent with this policy of Neutrality.
•Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was
hired by St. Scholastica’s College
Westgrove, a Catholic educational
institution, as a non-teaching
personnel. She engaged in pre-
marital sexual relations, got pregnant
out of wedlock, married the father of
her child, and was dismissed by
SSCW. In a letter, the petitioner
explained that her pregnancy out of
wedlock does not amount to serious
misconduct or conduct unbecoming
of an employee. She averred that she
is unaware of any school policy
stating that being pregnant out of
wedlock is considered as a serious
misconduct and, thus, a ground for
dismissal. Further, the petitioner
requested a copy of SSW’s policy and
guidelines so that she may better
respond to the charge against her.
•On June 2, 2004, Sr.
Quiambao informed the
petitioner that, pending the
promulgation of a “Support
Staff Handbook,” SSCW follows
the 1992 Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools
on the cases for termination of
employments; that Section 94
of the 1992 MRPS cites
“disrgraceful or immoral
conduct” as a ground for
dismissal in addition to the
just causes for termination of
employment provided under
Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Issues:
Does the petitioner’s conduct

constitute a ground for dismissal?
Case History:
On Feb. 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner, that
there was a valid ground for the dismissal because it is considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct. On Feb.
28, 2007, the NLRC issued a resolution which affirmed the LA Decision dated Feb. 28, 2006, pointing out that the
termination of the employment of the personnel of private schools is governed by the 1992 MRPS, which cites
“disgraceful or immoral conduct” as a just cause for dismissal, in addition to the grounds for termination of
employment provided for under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. On Sept. 24, 2008, the CA denied the petition for
certiorari filed by the petitioner. The CA held that it is the provisions of the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code
which governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools.
•The court ruled that St. Scholastica’s College
Westgrove as guilty of illegal dismissal. The labor
tribunals concluded that the petitioner’s
pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is “disgraceful
and immoral” considering that she is employed
in a Catholic educational institution. In arriving
at such conclusion, the labor tribunals merely
assessed the fact of the petitioner's pregnancy
vis-à-vis the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the same. However, the court found
no substantial evidence to support the
aforementioned conclusion arrived at by the
labor tribunals. The fact of the petitioner’s
pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not
enough to characterize the petitioner’s conduct
as disgraceful or immoral. There must be
substantial evidence to establish that premarital
sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy
out of wedlock, are indeed considered
disgraceful or immoral. The morality referred to
in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious. “Religious teachings as expressed in
public debate may influence the civil public
order but public moral disputes may be resolved
only on grounds articulable in secular terms.”
EQUAL PROTECTION COMPATIBLE WITH REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; G.R.

NO. 211833; APRIL 7, 2015
FACTS
• Petitioner Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva filed a petition before the

Supreme Court to assail the constitutionality of the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) policy, requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts;
• Petitioner was appointed as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial

Court, a first-level court, in September 2012. The following year, he applied
for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the several Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) in Tagum City, Davao City, and Agusan del Sur. 5

NO. 211833; APRIL 7, 2015
FACTS
• Unfortunately, the JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination

sent a letter informing the petitioner that he was not included in the list of
candidates for the said RTC stations;
• Undaunted, the petitioner sent a letter to the JBC asking for
reconsideration and protesting his non-inclusion in the list which was duly
noted by the JBC en banc;
• However, petitioner's non-inclusion in the list of applicants was upheld due
to the JBC's policy of opening the chance for promotion to incumbent
judges of second-level courts who have served in their current position for 5
at least five years. Since petitioner has been a judge for only more than a
year, he was excluded from the list.

NO. 211833; APRIL 7, 2015
ISSUE
• Does the JBC's policy of requiring five years of service as judges of

first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level
courts violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution?
5

NO. 211833; APRIL 7, 2015
RULING
• No. The JBC's policy of requiring five years of service as judges of

first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-
level courts does not violate the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution;
• The Court ruled that the said policy is valid and constitutional. It
does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on
reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence
of the applicants.
5
• The Court held that the adoption of the five-year requirement
policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.

NO. 211833; APRIL 7, 2015
RULING
• EQUAL PROTECTION
⚬ The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require
the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification;
⚬ The Court has previously affirmed that if a law neither burdens a

fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification 5
stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.

NO. 211833; APRIL 7, 2015
RULING
• EQUAL PROTECTION
⚬ Here, the classification created by the challenged JBC policy satisfies
the rational basis test;
⚬ The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between
lower court judges with five year experience and those with less than
five years of experience, and that the classification enshrined in the
assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose;
⚬ Five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that
determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge; thus, it cannot 5
be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made

without any basis.
JUSTA G. GUIDO
VS.
RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION
(Equal Distribution of Wealth Violates the
Right to Private property)
• “Social justice does not
champion division of property or
equality of economic status; what
it and the Constitution do
guaranty are equality of
opportunity, equality of political
rights, equality before the law,
equality between values given
and received on the basis of
efforts exerted in their
production”.
•Justa Guido, owner of the land being
expropriated by the Rural Progress Administration
(RPA), filed a petition for prohibition to prevent
RPA and Judge Oscar Castelo from proceeding
with the expropriation. Guido alleged, among
others, that the land sought to be expropriated is
commercial and therefore excluded within the
purview of the provisions of Act 539.
Commonwealth Act No. 539 authorized the
President of the Philippines to acquire private
lands or any interest therein through purchaser or
farms for resale at a reasonable price. The
National Assembly approved this enactment on
the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which provides that the Congress
may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals.
Issue:
Whether or not the

expropriation of Guido’s
land is in conformity to
the principle of Social
Justice.
•NO. Hand in hand with the principle that no one shall
be deprived of his property without due process of law,
herein invoked, and that "the promotion of social justice
to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the state," is a
declaration, with which the former should be reconciled,
that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to
secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in
the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components
freedom and along with these freedoms are included
economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within
reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving
the way for the breaking up of existing large estates,
trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant
evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or
undermine the property right or to advocate equal
distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in excess
of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another.
•The promotion of social justice ordained by the
Constitution does not supply paramount basis for
untrammeled expropriation of private land by the
Rural Progress Administration or any other
government instrumentality. Social justice does
not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution do
guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of
political rights, equality before the law, equality
between values given and received on the basis of
efforts exerted in their production. As applied to
metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation
to housing problems, it is a command to devise,
among other social measures, ways and means for
the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and
house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without
ventilation. light and sanitation facilities, and for
the construction in their place of decent dwellings
for the poor and the destitute. As will presently be
shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas
bears direct relation to public safety health, and/or
morals, and is legal.
•In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates,
trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole
town, or a large section of a town or city, bears direct
relation to the public welfare. The size of the land
expropriated, the large number of people benefited,
and the extent of social and economic reform secured
by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with
public interest and public use. The expropriation in
such cases tends to abolish economic slavery,
feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to
community prosperity and contentment and public
peace and order. The condemnation of a small
property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their
families does not inure to the benefit of the public to
a degree sufficient to give the use public character.
The expropriation proceedings at bar have been
instituted for the economic relief of a few families
devoid of any consideration of public health, public
peace and order, or other public advantage. It suffices
to say for the purpose of this decision that the case
under consideration is far wanting in those elements
which make for public convenience or public use.
•The protection against deprivation of
property without due process for
public use without just compensation
occupies the forefront positions in the
Bill for private use relives the owner of
his property without due process of
law. And the prohibition that “private
property should not be taken for
public use without just compensation”.
Article III of the constitution forbids
necessary implication the
appropriation of private property uses
•Social justice does not champion division of property or
equality of economic status; what it and the
constitution do guarantee are equality of opportunity,
equality of political rights, equality before the law,
equality between values given and received on the
basis of efforts exerted in their production.
TRAGEDY OF COMMONS
PRYCE CORPORATION VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CHINA

BANKING CORPORATION; G.R. NO. 172302; FEBRUARY 4, 2008
FACTS
• Petitioner Pryce Corporation was engaged in the real estate business

operating primarily in Mindanao. It had financial interests in the
development of memorial parks, hotel operations, and industrial gases
production;
• Due to the 1997 financial crisis, the petitioner incurred heavy losses.
Consequently, petitioner defaulted on its obligations amounting to
hundreds of millions of pesos from the years 2001 to 2003;
• On 2004, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting
as Commercial Court, a petition for rehabilitation. Among others, it 5
prayed for the appointment of a Rehabilitation Receiver and the staying

of the enforcement of all claims against it.
TRAGEDY OF COMMONS

FACTS
• Petitioner also prayed that its proposed Rehabilitation Plan be approved;

• Subsequently, the RTC issued a "Stay Order" directing that: (i) all claims
against petitioner be deferred; (ii) the initial hearing of the petition for
rehabilitation be set on September 1, 2004; and (iii) all creditors and
interested parties should file their respective comments/oppositions to
the petition;
• The RTC also appointed a Rehabilitation Receiver for petitioner;
• However, the petition for rehabilitation was met with opposition by the
petitioner's bank-creditors namely the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the 5
Land Bank of the Philippines, and the China Banking Corporation.

TRAGEDY OF COMMONS

FACTS
• Consequently, the original Rehabilitation Plan was amended which

recommended the following:
⚬ Payment of all bank loans and long-term commercial papers through
dacion en pago of petitioner's real estate assets;
⚬ Payment of all non-bank, trade and other payables amounting to at
least PHP 500,000 each through a dacion of memorial park lots; and
⚬ Payment in cash over a three-year period, without interest, of all
non-bank, trade and other payables amounting to less than PHP
500,000 each. 5
TRAGEDY OF COMMONS

FACTS
• The RTC issued an Order approving the Amended Rehabilitation Plan

and found petitioner eligible to be placed in a state of corporate
rehabilitation;
• Aggrieved, the respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals and alleged that in approving the Amended Rehabilitation Plan,
the RTC impaired the obligation of contracts, voided contractual
stipulation, and contravened the "avowed policy of the State" to
maintain a competitive financial system;
• The appellate court rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and 5
reversed the assailed Orders of the RTC.

TRAGEDY OF COMMONS

ISSUE
• Did the appellate court err in denying the petition for rehabilitation of
petitioner?
RULING
• No. The Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court and ordered
the records of the case be remanded to the RTC to conduct a hearing for
the reception of evidence;
• Section 6 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation

5
provides that the petition must be "sufficient in form and substance";
TRAGEDY OF COMMONS

RULING
• In RCBC vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court ruled that under
Section 6(c) of P.D. No. 902-A, receivers may be appointed whenever: (1)
necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants; and/or
(2) protect the interest of the investing public and creditors;
5
• The Court noted that the situations contemplated in the instances

mentioned above are serious in nature. There must also exist a clear and
imminent danger of losing the corporate assets if a receiver is not
appointed;
TRAGEDY OF COMMONS

RULING
• In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the appellate court in
that the petition for rehabilitation does not allege that there is a clear
and imminent danger that the petitioner will lose its corporate assets is a
receiver is not appointed;
5
• Thus, in appointing the Rehabilitation Receiver, the only basis of the

lower court was its finding that "the petition is sufficient in form and
substance" but it did not specify any reason or ground to sustain such
finding.
TRAGEDY OF COMMONS

RULING
• The "tragedy of the commons" is an economic problem of overconsumption,

underinvestment, and ultimately depletion of a common pool resource.
• This being said, if governments would not intervene in free enterprise through
the introduction of laws that would ease the economic burdens of financially-
distressed corporations, it would prove to be chaotic as the latter would 5
continue to operate at a loss while still being granted credit facilities by lending
institutions;
• Thus, corporate rehabilitation is preferred for addressing social costs. Allowing
corporations room to get back on their feet will retain, if not, increase
employment opportunities for the market as a whole.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
VS
INTERPORT RESOURCES
CORPORATION
(Market must be fair to be Free)

•The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of
Agreement with GHB (Ganda Holdings Berhad). Under said
memorandum of agreement, IRC acquired 100% of the
entire capital stock of GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.)
which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine
power generating barge. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB
55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC. On the side, IRC
would acquire 67% of the entire capital of PRCI (Philippine
Racing Club).
It is alleged herein that a press release announcing the
approval of the agreement was sent to the Philippine Stock
Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile
machine of the SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC
received reports that the IRC failed to make timely public
disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its
directors, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material
insider information. For this reason, the SEC required the
directors to appear before the SEC to explain the alleged
failure to disclose material information as required by the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. Unsatisfied with the
explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC
violated the Rules in connection with the then Old
Securities Act when it failed to make timely disclosures of
its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC found that
the directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC
shares in violation of the Revised Securities Act.
•Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the
SEC to investigate on said matter since according to PD
902-A, jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred upon
the PED (Prosecution and Enforcement Department) of the
SEC – however, this issue is already moot since pending the
disposition of the case, the Securities Regulation Code was
passed thereby effectively repealing PD 902-A and
abolishing the PED. They also contended that their right to
due process was violated when the SEC required them to
appear before the SEC to show cause why sanctions should
not be imposed upon them since such requirement shifted
the burden of proof to respondents. The case reached the
CA and said court ruled in favor of the respondents and
effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or
administrative cases against respondents. In its resolution,
the CA stated that since there are no rules and regulations
implementing the rules regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDER
TRADING OR ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED
SECURITIES ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file
any suit against respondents. The CA, therefore, prohibited
the SEC from taking cognizance or initiating any action
against the respondents for the alleged violations of the
Revised Securities Act.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the SEC has 2.) Whether or not their
authority to file suit against right to due process was
respondents for violations of violated when the SEC
the RSA.
denied the parties of their
right to cross examination.
• The Revised Securities Act does not require
the enactment of implementing rules to make
it binding and effective. The provisions of the
RSA are sufficiently clear and complete by
themselves. The requirements are specifically
set out and the acts which are enjoined are
determinable. To tule that absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an
act of Congress would empower
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative
will by delaying the implementing rules.
Where the statute contains sufficient
standards and an unmistakable intent (as in
this case, the RSA) there should be no
impediment as to its implementation. - The
court does not discern any vagueness or
ambiguity in the RSA such that the acts
proscribed and/or required would not be
understood by a person of ordinary
intelligence.
•The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's
misuse of nonpublic and undisclosed information is the
gravamen of illegal conduct and that the intent of the law is
the protection of investors against fraud committed when
an insider, using secret information, takes advantage of an
uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose
material information to the other party or abstain from
trading the shares of his corporation. This duty to disclose or
abstain is based on 2 factors: 1) the existence of a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly to
information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone and
• 2) the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing.
•Respondent contends that the terms "material fact",

"reasonable person", "nature and reliability" and "generally
available" are vaguely used in the RSA because under the
provision of the said law what is required to be disclosed is a
fact of special significance, meaning: 1. a material fact which
would be likely to affect the market price of a security or; 2.
one which a reasonable person would consider especially
important in determining his course of action with regard to
the shares of stock
• As to "nature and reliability" the proper adjudicative
body would be able to determine if facts of a certain
nature and reliability can influence a reasonable
person's decision to retain, buy or sell securities and
thereafter explain and justify its factual findings in its
decision since the same must be viewed in connection
with the particular circumstances of a case. As to
"generally available", the court held also that such is a
matter which may be adjudged given the particular
circumstances of the case. The standards of which
cannot remain at a standstill.
• Investigations by the SEC is a requisite before a
criminal case may be referred to the DOJ since the SEC
is an administrative agency with the special
competence to do so. According to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and
expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact
• The security market when
active and vibrant is an
effective engine of economic
growth. It is more able to
channel capital as it tend to
favor start-up and venture
capital companies. To remain
attractive to investors
however, the stock market
should be fair and orderly.
The securities
market is imbued
with public interest
and as such it is
1. to protect
regulated.
Specifically, the investors
reasons given for
securities
regulation are 3. to ensure that
stock prices
2. to supply the
conform to the
informational
fundamental value
needs of investors
of the companies
traded
4. to allow
5. to foster
shareholders to
economic
gain greater
growth,
control over their
innovation and
corporate
access to capital
managers
•A free market that is not a
fair market is not truly
free, even if left
unshackled by the state as
it would in fact be
shackled by the
uninhibited greed of only
the largest players
NEGLIGENCE, INTENT, MOTIVE AND MALICE
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. NO.

151258; FEBRUARY 1, 2012
FACTS
• In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila

University School of Law were introduced as neophytes to join the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity ("Aquila Fraternity"). They were briefed that
they would receive physical beatings during the initiation rites which
were scheduled to last for three days; 5
• Thereafter, the neophytes were brought to Almeda Compound in
Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation;
• When the neophytes arrived at Almeda Compound, the initiation rites
immediately begun which consisted of brutal exercises where physical
blows were inflicted upon the neophytes. All neophytes survived their
first day of initiation;

151258; FEBRUARY 1, 2012
FACTS
• On the second day of the rites, the neophytes were subjected to the
same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day;
• When the initiation rites for the second day officially ended, the accused
non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon ("Dizon") and
Artemio Villareal ("Villareal") demanded that the rites be reopened; 5
• Nelson Victorino ("Victorino"), the head of initiation rites, initially refused
but eventually caved in due to the insistence of the Dizon and Villareal;
• The neophytes were then subjected to "paddling" wherein one
neophyte, Lenny, complained of intense pain and difficulty in breathing;

151258; FEBRUARY 1, 2012
FACTS
• While sleeping at the carport, the neophytes were awakened by Lenny's

shivering. Some fraternity members ignored Lenny's rumblings but later
on, they realized that Lenny was turning cold;
• When Lenny's condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital where Lenny was declared dead on arrival; 5
• Thereafter, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans -
26 Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and nine (9) Aquilans in
Criminal Case No. C-38340;
• The 26 Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried
wherein the trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide;

151258; FEBRUARY 1, 2012
FACTS
• On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC findings of conspiracy
among the 26 accused and resolved to modify the criminal liability of
each accused according to individual participation;
• Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt; 5
• Four of the accused-appellants, namely Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug, were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries; and
• Two of the accused-appellants, namely Dizon and Villareal, were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under the
Revised Penal Code

151258; FEBRUARY 1, 2012
ISSUE
• Did the appellate court err when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries?
RULING
5
• Yes. The Court modified the appellate court's decision and found Tecson,
Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon guilty beyong reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code

151258; FEBRUARY 1, 2012
RULING
• The Court adopts and reinstates the finding of the trial court, in part, in
that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
Villa;
• In a number of cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the mere infliction of
physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person 5
automatically liable for an intentional felony;
• The threshold question is whether the accused's initial acts of inflicting
physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi
amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code;
• The Court also noted that the rituals during the initiation rites were
performed with Lenny's consent;

151258; FEBRUARY 1, 2012
RULING
• Thus, the Court was constrained to rule against the trial court's finding
of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being
no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to
inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases,
considering the contextual background of Lenny's death, the unique 5
nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.

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FELIXBERTO C. STA.

(Philosophers on Law and

Commissioner Adolf Azcuna said, “Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept

Who may teach

What may be taught

How it shall be taught

Who may be admitted to study.”

• Petitioner Felixberto C. Sta. Maria was the Dean,

Whether or not Dean Sta. Maria was

Whether or not the lack of formal hearing

NO. There are transfers which do not amount to

YES. The transfer of petitioner from his post of Dean, college of

YES. Transfer could be but a ploy to cover

As amended, the Civil Service Law provides that “if

• The following are the salient provisions in the 1935 Constitution:

• Whether, by the method of "designation" created by Section 14, a Judge of First

• Whether, by the method of "designation" created by Section 14, a Judge of First

• Thus, Section 14 of the People's Court Act was declared unconstitutional.

IN RELATION TO THE PHILOSOPHY ON LAW AND JUSTICE

“the due regulation and domestic

• Police for the prevention of offenses

• Whether or not Act No.

• Yes, Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional. Such Act

⚬ Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

• The Court ruled in this wise:

⚬ VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

￭ Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of

• The Court ruled in this wise:

nonetheless entitled to protection;

• The Court ruled in this wise:

the probable commission of a particular crime.

• The Court ruled in this wise:

requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in

￭ Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of

￭ ALL OTHER PROVISIONS ARE DECLARED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL.

• Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a

(Public and Secular morality as

•Expansive Religious freedom therefore

Does the petitioner’s conduct

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; G.R.

• Petitioner Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva filed a petition before the

• Petitioner was appointed as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; G.R.

• Unfortunately, the JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; G.R.

• Does the JBC's policy of requiring five years of service as judges of

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; G.R.

• No. The JBC's policy of requiring five years of service as judges of

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; G.R.

⚬ The Court has previously affirmed that if a law neither burdens a

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL; G.R.

be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made

Whether or not the

PRYCE CORPORATION VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CHINA

• Petitioner Pryce Corporation was engaged in the real estate business

prayed for the appointment of a Rehabilitation Receiver and the staying

PRYCE CORPORATION VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CHINA

• Petitioner also prayed that its proposed Rehabilitation Plan be approved;