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FIM Lecture 6-Market Efficiency - Complete
FIM Lecture 6-Market Efficiency - Complete
Market Efficiency –
Are financial markets efficient?
lecture 6
By
ysaudagar@iba.edu.pk
M. Yousuf Saudagar
1
preview – expectations theory
• Throughout our discussion of how financial markets work, you’ll notice
that the subject of expectations will keep cropping up.
• Expectations of returns, risk, and liquidity are central elements in the
demand for assets.
• Expectations of inflation have a major impact on bond prices and interest
rates.
• Expectations about the likelihood of default are the most important
factor that determines the risk structure of interest rates.
• Expectations of future interest rates play a central role in determining the
term structure of interest rates.
• Not only are expectations critical in understanding behavior in financial
markets, but they are also central to our understanding of how financial
institutions operate.
• To understand how expectations are formed so that we can understand
how securities prices move over time, we look at the Efficient Market
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Hypothesis (EMH).
Today’s learning objectives
• In this chapter we’ll examine basic reasoning behind the efficient
market hypothesis (EMH) in order to explain some puzzling features
of the operation and behavior of financial markets.
• Why changes in stock prices are unpredictable and why listening to a
stock broker’s hot tips may not be a good idea.
• Theoretically, the EMH should be a powerful tool for analyzing
behavior in financial markets.
• But to establish that it is in reality a useful tool, we’ll compare the
theory with data.
• Does the empirical evidence support the theory?
• Though mixed, the available evidence indicates that this theory is a
good starting point for analyzing expectations.
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The Efficient Market Hypothesis
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EXAMPLE - The Efficient Market Hypothesis
Suppose Microsoft share had a closing price yesterday of $90, but new
information was announced after the market closed that caused a
revision in the forecast of the price for next year to go to $120.
If annual equilibrium return on MS is 15%, what does the efficient
market hypothesis indicate the price will be today when market opens?
(Assume MS pays no dividends.)
= ?
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Rationale Behind the Hypothesis
• To see why the efficient market hypothesis makes sense, we use concept
of arbitrage, in which market participants (arbitrageurs) eliminate
unexploited profit opportunities, meaning returns on a security that are
larger than what is justified by the characteristics of that security.
• To see how arbitrage leads to the efficient market hypothesis, suppose
that, the normal return on a security of Exxon-Mobil common stock, is
10% annually, and its current price Pt is lower than the optimal forecast
of tomorrow’s price so that the optimal forecast of the return at an
annual rate is greater than the equilibrium return of 10%. We are now
able to predict that, on average, Exxon-Mobil’s return would be
abnormally high, so there is an unexpected profit opportunity.
• Knowing that you can earn such an abnormally high rate of return on
Exxon-Mobil because Rof > R*, you would buy more, which would in turn
drive up its current price relative to the expected future price , thereby
lowering Rof. (r= D/P)
• When the current price had risen sufficiently so that Rof equals R* and
the efficient market condition is satisfied, the buying of Exxon-Mobil 10will
stop, and the unexploited profit opportunity will have disappeared.
Rationale Behind the Hypothesis
• Similarly, a security for which the optimal forecast of the return is 5%
while the equilibrium return is 10% (Rof < R*) would be a poor
investment because, it earns less than the equilibrium return. You would
sell the security and drive down its current price until Rof rose to the
level of R* & efficient market condition is again satisfied.
• In efficient market, all unexploited profit opportunities will be
eliminated.
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Evidence in Favor of Market
Efficiency
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Performance of Investment Analysts & mutual funds
• We have seen that one implication of the efficient market
hypothesis is that when purchasing a security, you cannot expect to
earn an abnormally high return, a return greater than the
equilibrium return. This implies, ‘it is impossible to beat the market’.
• Many studies shed light on whether investment advisers and mutual
funds, who charge steep commissions, beat the market.
• One test that has been performed is to take recommendations for
buy & sell of selected stocks from a group of advisers & compare the
performance of these with the market as a whole.
• Advisers’ choices have even been compared to group of stocks
chosen by putting a copy of financial page of the newspaper on a
dartboard and throwing darts. Did the advisers win? To their
embarrassment, the dartboard beat them as often as they beat the
dartboard.
• Furthermore, even when the comparison included only advisers who
had been successful in the past in predicting the stock market, the
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Performance of Investment Analysts & mutual funds
• Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, mutual funds are also
not found to beat the market.
• Mutual funds not only do not outperform the market on average, but
when they are separated into groups according to whether they had
the highest or lowest profits in a chosen period, the mutual funds that
did well in the 1st period did not beat the market in the 2nd period.
• The conclusion from the study of investment advisers and mutual
fund performance is this:
• Having performed well in the past does not indicate that an
investment adviser or a mutual fund will perform well in the future.
• This is not pleasing news to investment advisers, but it is exactly what
the efficient market hypothesis predicts.
• It says that some advisers will be lucky and some will be unlucky.
Being lucky does not mean that a forecaster actually has the ability to
beat the market. (An exception that proves the rule is discussed in15 the
An Exception That Proves the Rule: Raj Rajaratnam & Galleon
• The efficient market hypothesis indicates that investment advisers
should not have the ability to beat the market.
• Yet that is exactly what Raj Rajaratnam and his Galleon Group were
able to do until 2009, when he was charged by the SEC with making
unfair profits (estimated $60 Mln) by trading on inside information.
• He made millions in profits for himself and his clients by investing in
the stocks of firms on which he received inside information—from
Rajat Gupta & Anil Kumar of McKinsey and Company, Robert
Moffat of IBM & Rajiv Goel & Roomy Khan of Intel Capital—about
outside investments and other activities at specific firms.
• Rajaratnam was convicted in May 2011 of insider trading and was
sentenced to 11 years in prison and a fine of $150 million.
• If the stock market is efficient, can the SEC legitimately claim that
Rajaratnam was able to beat the market?
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An Exception That Proves the Rule: Raj Rajaratnam & Galleon
• The answer is yes.
• Rajaratnam and Galleon Group’s ability to make millions year after
year in the 2000s is an exception that proves the rule that financial
analysts cannot continually outperform the market.
• It supports the efficient markets claim that only information
unavailable to the market enables an investor to do so.
• Rajaratnam profited from knowing about inside information before
the rest of the market
• This information was known to him but unavailable to the market.
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Do Stock Prices Reflect Publicly Available information
• The efficient market hypothesis predicts that stock prices will reflect
all publicly available information.
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Random Walk - Behavior of Stock Prices
• The term random walk describes the movements of a variable whose
future changes cannot be predicted (are random) because, given
today’s value, the variable is just as likely to fall as to rise.
• Rules for when to buy and sell stocks are then established on the
basis of the patterns that emerge.
27
Excessive Volatility
• A closely related phenomenon to market overreaction is that the
stock market appears to display excessive volatility; that is,
fluctuations in stock prices may be much greater than is warranted
by fluctuations in their fundamental value.
• That is, stocks with low returns today tend to have high
returns in the future, and vice versa.
• Hence stocks that have done poorly in the past are more likely
to do well in the future because mean reversion indicates that
there will be a predictable positive change in the future price,
suggesting that stock prices are not a random walk.
• Instead, on average stock prices continue to rise for some time after
the announcement of unexpectedly high profits, and they continue
to fall after surprisingly low profit announcements.
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Overview of the Evidence on the Efficient Market Hypothesis
• The debate on the efficient market hypothesis is far from over.
• The evidence seems to suggest that the efficient market hypothesis
may be a reasonable starting point for evaluating behavior in
financial markets.
• However, there do seem to be important violations of market
efficiency that suggest that the EMH may not be the whole story and
so may not be generalizable to all behavior in financial markets.
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Practical Guide to Investing in the Stock Market
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Efficient Markets Prescription for the Investor
• What does the efficient market hypothesis recommend for investing
in the stock market?
• It tells us that hot tips, technical analysis, and investment advisers’
published recommendations—all of which make use of publicly
available information—cannot help an investor outperform the
market.
• Indeed, it indicates that anyone without better information than
other market participants cannot expect to beat the market.
• So what is an investor to do?
• The efficient market hypothesis leads to the conclusion that such an
investor (and almost all of us fit into this category) should not try to
outguess the market by constantly buying and selling securities.
• This process does nothing but boost the income of brokers, who
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earn commissions on each trade1
Efficient Markets Prescription for the Investor
• Instead, the investor should pursue a “buy and hold” strategy—
purchase stocks and hold them for long periods of time.
• This will lead to the same returns, on average, but the investor’s net
profits will be higher because fewer brokerage commissions will
have to be paid.
• It is frequently a sensible strategy for a small investor, whose costs
of managing a portfolio may be high relative to its size, to buy into a
mutual fund rather than individual stocks. However, investor should
not buy the one with high management fees but rather should
purchase a no-load mutual fund.
• As we have seen, the evidence indicates that it will not be easy to
beat the prescription suggested here, although some of the
anomalies to the efficient market hypothesis suggest that an
extremely clever investor may be able to outperform a buy-and-
hold strategy. 40
Stronger Version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
• Many financial economists take the EMH one step further. Not only do
they define an efficient market as one in which expectations are
optimal forecasts using all available information, but they also add the
condition that an efficient market is one in which prices reflect the true
fundamental (intrinsic) value of the securities. Thus, in an efficient
market, all prices are always correct and reflect market fundamentals.
• Stronger view of market efficiency has several important implications:
1. In an efficient capital market, one investment is as good as other
because the securities’ prices are correct.
2. A security’s price reflects all available information about intrinsic
value of the security.
3. Security prices can be used by managers to assess their cost of
capital accurately & make the correct decisions about whether a
specific investment is worth making or not.
• This version of market efficiency is a basic tenet of much analysis in
finance field. 41
Stronger Version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
• The efficient market hypothesis may be misnamed, however.
• It does not imply the stronger view of market efficiency but rather
just that prices in markets like the stock market are unpredictable.
• Indeed, as the following application suggests, the existence of market
crashes and bubbles, in which the prices of assets rise well above
their fundamental values, casts serious doubt on the stronger view
that financial markets are efficient but provides less of an argument
against the basic lessons of the efficient market hypothesis.
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What Do Stock Market Crashes Tell Us About the EMH?
• On October 19, 1987, dubbed “Black Monday,” the Dow Jones
Industrial Average declined more than 20%, the largest one-day
decline in U.S. history.
• The collapse of the high-tech companies’ share prices from their
peaks in March 2000 caused the heavily tech-laden NASDAQ index
to fall from about 5,000 in March 2000 to about 1,500 in 2001 and
2002, for a decline of well over 60%.
• These stock market crashes have caused many economists to question
the validity of the efficient market hypothesis.
• They do not believe that an efficient market could have produced
such massive swings in share prices.
• To what degree should these stock market crashes make us doubt
the validity of the efficient market hypothesis?
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What Do Stock Market Crashes Tell Us About the EMH?
• Nothing in the efficient market hypothesis rules out large changes
in stock prices.
• A large change in stock prices can result from new information that
produces a dramatic decline in optimal forecasts of the future
valuation of firms.
• However, economists are hard pressed to come up with fundamental
changes in the economy that can explain the Black Monday & Tech
Crashes.
• One lesson from these crashes is that factors other than market
fundamentals probably have an effect on asset prices.
• Indeed, there exist good reasons to believe that there are impediments
to financial markets working well.
• Hence these crashes have convinced many economists that the
stronger version of the efficient market hypothesis, which states that
asset prices reflect the true fundamental (intrinsic) value of securities,
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is incorrect.
What Do Stock Market Crashes Tell Us About the EMH?
• They attribute a large role in determination of asset prices to market
psychology and to the institutional structure of the marketplace.
• However, nothing in this view contradicts the basic reasoning behind
the weaker version of the efficient market hypothesis—that market
participants eliminate unexploited profit opportunities.
• Even though stock market prices may not always solely reflect market
fundamentals, as long as stock market crashes are unpredictable,
the basic lessons of the efficient market hypothesis hold.
• However, other economists believe that market crashes and
bubbles suggest that unexploited profit opportunities may exist
and that the efficient market hypothesis might be fundamentally
flawed.
• The controversy over the efficient market hypothesis continues.
45
Behavioral Finance
• Doubts about the efficient market hypothesis, particularly after the
stock market crash of 1987, have led to a new field of study,
behavioral finance, which applies concepts from other social
sciences, such as anthropology, sociology, and particularly
psychology, to understand the behavior of securities prices.
• As we have seen, the efficient market hypothesis assumes that
unexploited profit opportunities are eliminated by “smart money.”
• But can smart money dominate ordinary investors so that financial
markets are efficient?
• Specifically, the efficient market hypothesis suggests that smart
money sells when a stock price goes up irrationally, with the result
that the stock falls back down to what is justified by fundamentals.
• However, for this to occur, smart money must be able to engage in
short sales, in which they borrow stock from brokers and then sell it
in the market, with the hope that they earn a profit by buying the
stock back again (“covering the short”) after it has fallen in price. 46
Behavioral Finance & short sale
• However, work by psychologists suggests that people are subject to
loss aversion: That is, they are more unhappy when they suffer
losses than they are happy from making gains.
• Short sales can result in losses way in excess of an investor’s initial
investment if the stock price climbs sharply above the price at which
the short sale is made (and these losses have the possibility of being
unlimited if the stock price climbs to astronomical heights).
• Loss aversion can thus explain an important phenomenon: Very
little short selling actually takes place.
• Short selling is also constrained by rules because it seems unsavory
that someone make money from another person’s misfortune.
• The fact that there is so little short selling can explain why stock
prices sometimes get overvalued.
• Not enough short selling can take place by smart money to drive
stock prices back down to their fundamental value. 47
Behavioral Finance – overconfidence
• Psychologists have also found that people tend to be overconfident
in their own judgments (everyone believes they are above average).
As a result, investors tend to believe they are smarter than others.
• This explains why securities markets have so much trading volume,
something that the efficient market hypothesis does not predict.
• Overconfidence and social contamination provide an explanation for
stock market bubbles. When stock prices go up, investors attribute
their profits to their intelligence and talk up the stock market. Word-
of-mouth enthusiasm & media then produce an environment in
which even more investors think stock prices will rise in the future.
• The result is then a so-called positive feedback loop in which prices
continue to rise, producing a speculative bubble, which finally
crashes when prices get too far out of line with fundamentals.
• Though young, behavioral finance holds out hope that we might be
able to explain some features of securities markets’ behavior that are
not well explained by the efficient market hypothesis. 48
Problem
• A company just announced a 3-for-1 stock split. Prior to the split, the
company had a market value of $5 B with 100 M shares outstanding.
Assuming that the split conveys no new information about the
company, what is the:
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Problem
• Solution:
a) Value of the company: Prior to the split, each share was worth
$5B/100, or $50/share. If the split conveys no new information,
the market value of the company does not change & shall remain
at $5 B.
b) Number of shares outstanding: With split, every share becomes
three so 300 M shares are outstanding.
c) The new price/share is $5B/300M = $16.67/share.
d) The actual price $17.00/share appears high and be viewed two
ways:
1. It’s possible that markets are inefficient—some type of anomaly
has occurred, and it’s not clear if the market will correct itself.
2. Investors may believe (possibly incorrectly) that the price 50
is
expected to increase & that’s why the firm splitted the stock.
problem
• If the public expects a corporation to lose $5 a share this
quarter and it actually loses $4, which is still the largest
loss in the history of the company, what does the efficient
market hypothesis say will happen to the price of the stock
when the $4 loss is announced?