Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2022 Intro To Process and Plant Safety New
2022 Intro To Process and Plant Safety New
Introduction to
Process and Plant Safety
Explosions
Toxic release
Safety relieve was lifted due to the raise in pressure inside of the tank,
which released 30 tons MIC within 45-60 minutes to the atmosphere.
• Contributing factors:
Class Characteristics
Class I-A liquids Flash points below 22.8°C and
boiling points below 37.8°C
Class I-B liquids Flash points below 22.8°C and
boiling points at or above
37.8°C
Class I-C liquids Flash points at or above 22.8°C
and boiling points below
37.8°C
Safety characteristics – flammable
and combustible fluids
• Classification of flammable liquids
Class Characteristics
Class II liquids Flash points above 37.8°C and
boiling points below 60°C
Class IIIA liquids Flash points at or above 60°C
and below 93.4°C
Class IIIB liquids Flash points at or above 93.4°C
Minimum or Autoignition temperature
(MIT or AIT)
• is the lowest temperature, at which a fuel-air mixture of the most
easily ignitable composition can just be stimulated to burn with a
visible flame. It is also often used to establish the maximum
temperature of hot surfaces in the plant
test apparatus: using erlenmeyer flask
Without flame Ignites for short time period and 2 Tartaric acid
propagation extinguishes
Ignites with local burning 3 lactose
• Oxygen balance
is used to indicate the degree to which an explosive can be
oxidized. The OB% gives estimation about the amount of
available oxygen for the oxidation reaction.
OB%
Positive result:
smoke, spark,
deflagration, flame or
fire at <= 40 Nm
Explosion sensitive
Explosion testing: friction test
Positive result:
smoke, spark,
deflagration, flame or
fire at friction <= 360 N
Explosion sensitive
Explosion testing: “Koenen” test
Plate opening:
1 – 20 mm
Temperature:
700 – 800°C
Positive result:
Explosion (when the
steel coarse is broken
into at least 3 pieces), at
plate openings > 2 mm
Explosion sensitive
Explosion triangle
• Requirements for an
explosion to occur:
– Fuel concentration in a mixture
with oxidation agent must be
between certain range
– Oxidation agent (eg. Oxygen)
must be available at a certain
amount
– An ignition source that has an
energy of at least equal to the
MIE must be available
• Primary protection
primarily, it is always desired to avoid the presence of flammable
atmosphere (fuel/air mixture) at any condition.
This can be achieved by either keeping the concentration of the fuel
too low or too high in the system, so that explosion is impossible to
occur. Important means: Inerting the system
• Secondary protection
the secondary protection would be to avoid possible ignition
source: grounding, use of safety shoes
• Tertiary protection
is also called the mechanical protection. This can include physical
modification of the plant to be explosion proof.
Inertisation
l%
Ine
Vo
explosion is possible
rt
in
in
n
Fuel line
Vo
yge
l%
Ox
Oxygen line
Inert gas:
Nitrogen, argon,
Explosion zone
flue gas
LFL UFL
Fuel in Vol%
N2
O2
N2
Fuel
Oxygen Fuel
Construct a 3-component diagram of Methane-Nitrogen-Oxygen
system, with the following conditions:
• Zone 20
A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of
combustible dust in air is present continuously, or for long periods or
frequently.
• Zone 21
A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of
combustible dust in air is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.
• Zone 22
A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of
combustible dust in air is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does
occur, will persist for a short period only.
Thermal analysis of thermal decomposition
• Thermal analysis studies the changes in properties of different materials
with change in temperature
• Many materials decompose when heated, eg. Calcium carbonate into CaO
and CO2
• Temperature programmed
temperature will be increased with constant rate. This type
of DTA/DSC is used as standard screening test
• Isothermal
the temperature will be held constant during the whole
test
Types of DTA/DSC –
temperature programming
• Temperature programmed
- the most commonly applied method in DTA/DSC
- delivers important information with high precision
- the heat rate used: 1 K/min to 10 K/min
Results:
• the amount of energy involved during the whole transformation
process, and the enthalpy of transition
• The temperature range where the transformation process can
take place
• The temperature, at which the maximum heat capacity can be
observed
Types of DTA/DSC –
temperature programming
Types of DTA/DSC –
temperature programming
• The shift of heat flow
peaks is influenced by the
reaction rate or kinetics
• For most reactions
(reactions with normal
peaks shift), the peak
temperature will move 10
K with an increase in heat
rate of a factor 2 or 3.
• And will move 40 K with
an increase in heat rate of
a factor 10.
Types of DTA/DSC –
temperature programming
100 K - Rule
“in DTA/DSC for materials with normal shift of heat-flow peaks, the
peak temperature will shift 40 K when the heat rate increased with
a factor of 10, or he gradient of d(ln HR)/dT will be = 0.057 K-1. “
“ at heat rate of 10 K/min, the operating temperature should be at
least 100 K below the ONSET temperature
Types of DTA/DSC –
temperature programming
Example
Temperatur [°C]
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 850
0,00
-0,20
-0,40
-0,60
dQ/dt [W]
-0,80
-1,00
-1,20
-1,40
Types of DTA/DSC –
isothermal
• Isothermal DTA/DSC
- the temperature is held at a constant value throughout the test
Results:
• Total energy involved in the whole process of transition
• The form of peaks helps determining the information concerning reaction
kinetic
• Estimation of TMR (time to reach the maximum reaction rate)
-1.0E-05
T iso=110°C
-2.0E-05
T iso=120°C
-3.0E-05
-4.0E-05 T iso=130°C
dQ/dt [W]
-5.0E-05
-6.0E-05
-7.0E-05
-8.0E-05 T iso=140°C
-9.0E-05
-1.0E-04
-1.1E-04
Types of DTA/DSC –
isothermal
• TMR (time to reach the maximum reaction rate)
Assumptions:
• Reaction is a simple reaction from A to B, which is carried out
in the batch reactor
• Formal kinetics of zero order
(Approach to Arrhenius)
r : reaction rate
Heat production rate:
Heat Explosion Theory
Tools for assessing normal operations
T Frank-Kamenetzkii
Model
Model for solid bulk
materials
Semenov Model
Gases and low
viscosity Newtonian
liquid
Wall
Centre of PLACE
reaction mass
70
Heat Explosion Theory
Assumptions:
• Reaction is a simple reaction from A to B, which is carried out in the
batch reactor
• Formal kinetics of zero-th order
(Arrhenius Equation)
r : reaction rate
71
Heat Explosion Theory
Heat dissipation through the wall:
72
Heat Explosion Theory
Semenov-diagram
73
Heat Explosion Theory
Semenov-diagram : effect of
Semenov-diagram
75
Cooling
Failure
Scenario -
GYGAX
4 : Process temperature
4 + 2 + 3 : Maximum temperature of
decomposition reaction
78
Adiabatic Temperature Increase
→ shows the exothermal effect of a reaction
Value range:
∆Tad = 10 K (mild exothermic reaction) – 400 K (strongly exothermic reaction)
∆Tad >= 1600 K (Polymerization and Decomposition)
Recommended limit:
∆Tad < 50 K → process reliable/safe
79
Damköhler Number (Da)
→ provides a measure to analyze the reaction rate
Da =
Controlled-dosed semi-batch
Slow batch process processes, continuous processes
with high dwell times
80
Stanton Number (St)
→ Characterization of cooling capacity
St =
Assumptions :
Value range :
St = 3 - 5 industrial scale reactor
St = 15 - 20 laboratory scale reactor
81
Thermal Characteristic of Chemical Reaction –
Dimensionless Adiabatic Temperature Increase
Value range:
B = 3 – 5 (process can be safely controlled)
B = 6 – 15 (requires bigger attention)
B > 15 (process is uncontrollable)
82
Models Of Reactors
Ideal model of reactor for continuous operation
Reactants
and solvent
Reaction mixture
Reactants
and solvent Reaction mixture
83
Ideal Models Of Reactors
Ideal model of reactor for dis- or semi-continuous operation
Dosed
components
All the components
involved in the
reaction were fed at
the beginning Components
fed initially
BR : Batch Reactor
SBR : Semi Batch Reactor
Reaction time
Dosing time
84
Heat Explosion Theory
Assessment criterion:
safe process
B = 3…5 (3…5) .
Only slow batch processes are safelywith
controlled
85
Criticality classes – Stoessel Theory
Temperature
Classes
Crtiticality
a : Tprocess c : Adiabatic
Decomposition Temperature 24
86
b : MTSR d : MTT (max tolerable temperature)
OPERATION OF A BATCH REACTOR
The safe operation of
cooled batch reactor
88
The safe operation of
cooled batch reactor
inner temperature
inner temperature
inner temperature
Schematically illustrated:
temperature vs time profiles
for different BR operating
modes
coolant temperature
90
The safe normal operation of the
cooled batch reactor - isoperibolic
• Batch processes which are to be carried out
isoperibolically,
91
The safe normal operation of the
cooled batch reactor - isoperibolic
𝐷𝑎 𝑀
Adequate cooling : ≤ 0.7
𝑆𝑡
𝑇 𝑀 =𝑇 𝐶 +0.4 ∆ 𝑇 𝑎𝑑 B>6
MTSR: MTSR =
92
The safe normal operation of the cooled
batch reactor - isothermal
𝑇 𝑖𝑠𝑜 −𝑇 𝐾 𝐷𝑎
Adequate cooling : =
∆ 𝑇 𝑎𝑑 𝑆𝑡
𝑅 .𝑇 2𝑖𝑠𝑜
Maximum temperature : 𝑇 𝑖𝑠𝑜 −𝑇 𝐾 <
𝐸
93
OPERATION OF A SEMI-BATCH
REACTOR
The safe operation of
cooled semi-batch reactor
95
The safe operation of cooled semi-batch reactors
inner temperature
inner temperature
𝑈 . 𝐴. 𝜏 𝐷
𝑇 𝑑𝑜𝑠𝑒 + 𝑇𝐾
𝑉 𝐷 . 𝜌 . 𝑐𝑃
𝑇 0= Mixing temperature of SBR
𝑈 . 𝐴 . 𝜏𝐷
1+
𝑉 𝐷 . 𝜌 . 𝑐𝑃
97
The safe normal operation of the cooled
semi-batch reactor
• The Damköhler number (Da) and the Stanton number (St)
are to be referred to the final volume!
( −𝑉 𝐴 ) . 𝑘 ( 𝑇 0 ) .𝑛 𝐵𝑂 . 𝜏 𝐷 𝑈 . 𝐴 .𝜏 𝐷
𝐷𝑎
2. 𝑂𝑟𝑑
= 𝑆𝑡=
𝑆𝐵𝑅
(𝑉 ¿ ¿ 𝐷+𝑉 𝑂 )¿ (𝑉 ¿ ¿ 𝐷+𝑉 𝑂 ). 𝜌 . 𝑐 𝑃 ¿
(1+ 𝜀)
𝑇 𝑑𝑜𝑠𝑒 + 𝑆𝑡 .𝑇 𝐾
𝜀
Reference temperature for SBR: 𝑇 0=
(1+ 𝜀 )
1+ 𝑆𝑡
𝜀
𝑉𝐷
𝜀= volume increase factor
𝑉0
98
The safe normal operation of the cooled
semi-batch reactor
1.45 𝐷𝑎( 𝑇 0) 𝑘∞ ∙ 𝑒
− 𝐸/ 𝑅𝑇 0
∙𝑛 𝐵 0 ∙ 𝜏 𝐷
≥1 𝐷𝑎(𝑇𝑜) =
𝑉 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
Safe cooling : 𝜀
+𝑆𝑡
1+ 𝜀
∆ 𝑇 𝑎𝑑
Maximum temperature :
𝑇 𝑀 =𝑇 𝑜 + isoperbol
𝜀
+𝑆𝑡
1+𝜀
𝑇 𝑀 =𝑇 𝑖𝑠𝑜 isotherm
99
The safe normal operation of the cooled
semi-batch reactor
Maximum temperature of the synthesis reaction:
𝐷𝑎 (𝑇 𝑖𝑠𝑜) 1
≤
𝑆𝑡 𝐵(𝑇 𝑖𝑠𝑜 )
100
SAFETY ANALYSIS METHODS
PHASE
Start
• What-if analysis
• What-if analysis
• Safety checklists
Is quite similar to what-if analysis, with the questions are set in form
of yes/no questions.
Questions must be made by experienced people that have been an
expert in conducting hazard analysis.
Still, checklists are not comprehensive if the range of questions listed
are incomplete and overlook the obvious possible hazards.
Checklists are normally used in combination with other safety
methods.
Qualitative safety analysis
• HAZOP studies
• HAZOP studies
• HAZOP studies
The strength of HAZOP lies in its systematic. It breaks the system down
systematically, so that significant hazards at every process node can be
identified.
The team involved is very multidisciplinary that involves operational
experiences as well as lessons learned from other incidents from
different perspectives.
Drawbacks are among others: sometimes it is difficult to discover the
interconnection between process nodes
In some cases, hazards that are not related to guide-words might be
overlooked. The analysis is very time consuming. And it requires trained
people to be able to achieve reliable results.
Intro to risk analysis
Definition of risk:
“risk is the potential that an action or activity will lead to a
loss.”
R = risk
R=S.P S = severity of the outcome
P = probability of the event
Intro to risk analysis
S R=S.P
k R = risk
Ris
S = severity of the outcome
P = probability of the event
Dangerous
properties
handling
Material
l
r ity ntia
ve te
Se Po
Hazardous
amount
potential
Review on probability theory
• Reliability (R)
a component will fail after a certain period of time.
http://www.weibull.com
• Many components follow the pattern of typical bathtub failure rate curve
• The failure rate is highest when the component is new or very old
Interaction between process units
• Parallel:
in parallel, the failure probability is calculated by multiplying the
probabilities for the individual components.
• Parallel connection
• Redundancy
- redundancy: two or more identical components are connected
in parallel, connected to separated power source
- diversity redundancy: redundancy with components having
different measurement principles
• Enhancement of redundancy
- stand-by
- voting system
Reliability enhancement
• Enhancement of redundancy
- stand-by
• Common-mode failure
the presence of common-mode failure can cause serious effect
on the reliability of high-integrity systems.
common mode failure can be modeled to be in series with the
redundant components.
the ratio of the common-mode failure to the total failure
probability is called the β-ratio:
HR = [time -1]
D = [time -1] HR = D . FDT
FDT = dimensionless
Quality evaluation of safety concept
FDT = f (µ,T)
µ = failure rate (number of faults per unit time)
T = the regular time interval of checks and maintenance
So that,
Quality evaluation of safety concept
Aim:
FDT ↓ , through µ ↓ and/or T ↓
Quality evaluation of safety concept
Quantitative safety
analysis methods will
provide the number of
Demand (D)
Quantitative safety analysis
• The frequency of
technological failures has
started to diminish, the
role of HF has become
more apparent
• Overestimation of human
capability to adapt
• Unawareness of the
importance of interaction
between many factors
Paradigm shift about causes of accidents
Engineering and
hardware improvements
Number of Accidents
Human Factor
Time
What is Human Factors?
Management Operator
Systems (Human)
Accident
Goals of Human Factors (HF)
Cost of accidents
LWC (lost workdays cases) 27,000 €
Fatality 750,000 €
• Lessons learned:
1. Permit to work (PTW) system.
2. Communication problem during shift turnover.
3. Insufficient procedure to operate safety system, in this case the
fire pump that had been switched to manual due to the presence
of divers around the platform.
4. Insufficient design of the separating wall of the new module for
gas processing, which was fireproof but not explosion proof.
5. Maintenance problems referring to corrosion.
6. Insufficient emergency response training for personnel, especially
for the new platform.
7. Inadequate design of evacuation line and facility
Performance influencing factors (PIFs)
Insufficient Design and Management system Operator failure
Accidents
Design insufficiency
Methods for Human Factors analysis
• Identification on P&ID
Methods for Human Factors analysis
• Bar-graph method
Methods for Human Factors analysis
• Enhancement of operator actions analysis
• Normal Operation
Distance Operator Workload
Reactor 2
Level 2
1 2 4
Reactor 1
Level 1
Time
Methods for Human Factors analysis
• Enhancement of operator actions analysis
• Abnormal Operation
Distance
3
Reactor 1 Level 2
1 2
Reactor 2 Level 1
Error 1
Consequence 1
Corrective actions
Detection
Error 2
Consequence 2
Time
New method: PITOPA
(Process Industry Tool for Operator Actions Analysis)
Task Analysis
Checklist
No No further
Safety-relevant
task? analysis
Yes
Operator Actions
PIFs Evaluation
Analysis
Questionnaire
Identification of
improvement potentials
Catalogue of improvement
suggestions