INTERGOVERNMENTALISM (2)

THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

DAVID PUTNAM
Two-level game theory (1988)

Preceding ideas in the 1960s/1970s:

Richard Neustadt, Jack Snyder, James Rosenau, Wolfram Hanrieder, Graham Allison contesting the unilateral
approach of Realism: foreign affairs are not built exclusively on military, political and economic capabilities
Robert Keohane calls for “building better theories of home affairs, of decision-making processes and of the use
of information, so that the gap between the domestic milieu and the foreign affairs is systematically filled.”
1988, David PUTNAM, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” : the processes
occurring internally influence significantly the international behavior of a State
Putnam studies the G7 reunions of 1976-1979 and focuses on the interference between internal dynamics of
politics and choices made in foreign affairs
DAVID PUTNAM
Two-level game theory (1988)

The role of the NEGOTIATIONS in achieving a win-set

During negotiations, the negotiations will be conflicting with at least a few of the political actors on national level
Ergo: negotiations will be held both with national and international actors, trying to integrate their interests as
close as possible (make the national actors accept/integrate the international, stand in front of the international
with national back-up)
Win-set
1. If lack of agreement is not costly on a national level, more difficult it will be to negotiate internationally
2. More a state is authoritarian, more successful it will be in achieving negotiations (less internal actors)
3. Need for a successful transposition of internal acceptance to international level (“cannot go further”)
DAVID PUTNAM
Two-level game theory (1988)

At the European Union level:

(1) Shaping the common position of the EU in global affairs (“supranational intergovernmentalism” via the
European Commission, the European Council, member States)
(2) The opposition between European actors within the EU institutions
(3) Development of EU’s common position based on interaction with 3 rd parties, globally [quandary: the EU’s
commercial policy: single voice, but slow and painful outcome: why? A: negotiations mandate/proxy]
ANDREW MORAVCSIK
Liberal Intergovernmentalism (1993)

He follows the ideas of Hoffmann and of Keohane; timing : post-1992/Maastricht

• Tries to demonstrate that international choices are determined by the choices of national actors;
• Focuses on social and economic interactions that lead to integration;
• Considers integration as a rational process where members States try to diminish the costs of mutual
transactions and optimize gains
• Why would nation States give up prerogatives not only in economy, but also internal policies, and build a
hybrid structure, half way between a State and an international organization ? A: integration is the result of a
strategic calculation of European countries based on economic interests & options of their elites (“rational
choice”)
ANDREW MORAVCSIK
Liberal Intergovernmentalism (1993)

Fundamental actors of international affairs are individuals & rational, private groups; the State is only their proxy
at international level, a defender of economic interests and of those of the civil society;
Interdependency and cognitive proximity (= knowing the preferences of the others) impacts on international
options;
European institutions were created in order to maximize efficiency of exchanges and the autonomy of the
national political actors involved in integration;
Exchanges are conceived as a confrontation between national interests;
Therefore, the State is the single actor representing national interests.
ANDREW MORAVCSIK
Liberal Intergovernmentalism (1993)

THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, 1998

Analysis of 5 key moments of European integration: Treaty of Rome, the Common Market of 1958-1969, the
monetary integration (1969-1989), the European Single Act and the Treaty of Maastricht : integration was
determined by economic reasons, with States being their main driver
States react to power; because of asymmetric interdependency, institutions were created in order to make sure
transactions are bringing a maximum of benefits to all parties involved
Geopolitics and idealism influenced integration only marginally; economic boom, new markets and expansion
governed the choices made by the European states
ANDREW MORAVCSIK
Liberal Intergovernmentalism (1993)

THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, 1998

Every moment of integration counts 3 steps:

(1) Creation of national preferences [internal process] : these are fluctuating, while a State’s depend on a more
stabile political environment; that is why the State – unitary and rational – is the best instrument used in order
to secure the interests internationally, with maximum efficiency, single-voiced, and the least of costs for the
national society
(2) Interstate negotiations: derive from the diversity of interests of the member States; negotiations ensue, at
both supranational (State/EU institutions) and intergovernmental (inter-State); while it is considered that the
1st type acts like a moderator on the 2nd, Moravcsik states the opposite, because States are determinant and
more powerful (“political entrepreneurs”), even if this creates inequality among; mechanisms of decision-
making and behavior shape negotiations; double pressure (national & international)
(3) The choice of supranational institutions : federalist view (supranational institutions are reserved to States
only) vs neofunctionalist view (States use them for very complex technicalities and sectorial policies) vs the
“credible commitment”
ANDREW MORAVCSIK
Liberal Intergovernmentalism (1993)

THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, 1998

Credible commitment : focus is placed on the need for political coordination. Delegation of power and
prerogatives is a mean to engage governments without them keeping a unilateral control of decision-making,
costs for non-cooperation and non-decision becoming consequently higher.
Commitment to institutions depends on circumstances (5 moments discussed by Moravcsik), but overall it is
determined by economic choices, not ideological, with no correlation to the technical or legal complexity of an
area of integration; ergo: the EU is a set of institutions destined to facilitate collective action of member States in
terms of cost efficiency; institutions engage everyone and make sure parties are committed
State sovereignty is still preserved in the veto, limiting the autonomy range of the EU institutions