CASE STUDY :

THE FALL OF SINGAPORE

SYNDICATE 4A
 AIM

 Identifying the Japanese intent on invasion of Singapore.

 Analysing the significant factors that caused the fall of Singapore.
 Explaining the opportunities and challenges faced by both Japanese
and British Allied Forces.
 Defining the Joint Warfare execution during the operation.

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 SCOPE
 Introduction
 Operational overview
 Joint Warfare Analysis
 Most Significant Factors That Caused The Operation To Be Success/Failures
 What Were The Particular Challenges Faced And Opportunities Exploited From A Joint
Warfare Perspective?
 How Well Synchronize Were The Action Between Land, Air And Maritime Environments?
 To What Extent Is The Case Study Illustrative Of Contemporary Joint Warfare Doctrine?
 Lesson Learnt
 Conclusion
 References
 Question & Answer

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 INTRODUCTION

Who: Lieutenant-General Arthur Ernest Percival

General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command, (1941-1942)

Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita,

Imperial Japanese Army General, Command of 25th army (1941 - 1942)

What: The Empire of Japan invade the British stronghold in Singapore

Where: Singapore

When: 8 – 15 Feb 1942

Why: After being imposed a trade embargo due to its Chinese campaigns, Japan had to
look for an alternative source of supplies for its war against the allies in the Pacific War.
As a result Japan invaded Malaya

Outcome: The Japanese successfully capture Singapore after the British surrender. It is
consider one of the greatest defeats in the history of British Army
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OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW
8 Dec 1941
The Japanese landed at Northwest Malaya

10 De 1941
Japanese aircraft sink British vassle Prince of wales
and Repulse

11 – 12 Dec 1941
Battle of Jitra

19 Dec 1941
The Fall of Penang

7 Jan 1942
Battle of Slim River

11 Jan 1942
Kuala Lumpur

17 Jan 1942
Battle of Gemas

31 Jan 1942
The Japanese reached Johor
 OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW

31 Jan 7 Feb 8 Feb 9 Feb 10 Feb 11 Feb 13 Feb 15 Feb

The Japanese
The The 18th and 5th Div Tengah The The core of
The Fall of The British
Japanese Japanese landed from Airfield was Japanese Singapore
Bukit Timah surrender
capture Imperial Northwest of in the hand continued Island firmly
Hill and the Singapore to
Johor Guards DIv Singapore of the advance to in the hands
Tragedy at the
The British attack Pulau The Japanese invading Bukit Timah of the
Sleepy Japanese
withdraw to Ubin Imperial Guards Japanese Village Japanese
Valley.
Singapore DIv attack Pulau Imperial Army
Ubin.
JOINT WARFARE
ANALYSIS

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MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTORS THAT
CAUSED THE OPERATION TO BE
SUCCESS/FAILURES

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NO SIGNIFICANT FACTORS JAPAN SUCCESS BRITISH FAILURE
Aggressive leadership is a force Yamashita's bold and decisive In contrast, Percival's timid and
multiplier leadership was instrumental in indecisive leadership produced the
1 keeping his forces constantly opposite effects.
advancing toward their ultimate
objective
Defend only what is defendable Percival's desire to protect everything
2 and worth defending. had the end result of protecting nothing.

Acquire the best possible Accurate intelligence allowed underestimated their enemy. Their
knowledge of the enemy thorough knowledge and preparation intelligence was poor. They fatally
through intelligence. of the battlefield, which minimized dispersed their forces. Their training
3 Japanese casualties. was inferior. They had no tanks, nor
enough aircraft. And their leadership
was uninspired.

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NO SIGNIFICANT FACTORS
Recognize and incorporate the
4 unique environmental aspects
of the battlefield into planning
5 The 25th Army was able to respond to unforeseen
Military objectives are best
achieved through flexible and
dynamic application of force
at the decisive point
6 General Yamashita had serious logistic concerns
logistic support is vital to
virtually every campaign
JAPAN SUCCESS
Yamashita combined the use of intelligence and
the environment to crush the Allies.
situations and overcome difficulties through
innovative responses. This flexibility during their
blitzkrieg- like advance, and their attack of points
vital to the defending force, made their march
through Malaya unstoppable.
that, given minor changes, could have cost him.
By staying focused on the operational and
strategic objectives, Yamashita did not get bogged
down in tactical details and problems.
BRITISH FAILURE
Percival have a poor intelligence, his
armies lack of training. The terrain of
every battlefield offers potential
advantages for exploitation of the
enemy. Planners must ensure they use
climate, terrain, and other
environmental characteristics to their
best advantage.
unity of purpose and understanding of
the objectives was missing on the
British side of the front line.
British have a lot of logistics but un
able to defend it
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 WHAT WERE THE PARTICULAR
CHALLENGES FACED AND OPPORTUNITIES
EXPLOITED FROM A JOINT WARFARE
PERSPECTIVE?

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 BRITISH-LED ALLIES

Japanese
30,000 troops
OPPORTUNITIES CHALLENGES
LAND

 Military Base in Singapore  Lack foresight in planning

 Impregnable naval base
 Underground bunkers
 More personnel than the enemy
 Have 3 components of warfare
AIR
 Poor terrain appreciation
 Poor flow of information
 Untrained soldiers
 Lack of air support
 Poor defense preparation
 Late reinforcement
MARITIME
British Allied
85,000 troops
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 JAPAN

OPPORTUNITIES CHALLENGES

 Taking advantage of the terrain

 Lack of resupply and resources
 Mobile and dynamic forces
 Time constraint
 Internal conflict within British-
 No naval assets
allied forces
 Lack of ammunition
 Trained soldier
 More jet fighter than British
 No POW during Malaya
campaign
 British abandoned their airfield
in Singapore

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HOW WELL SYNCHRONIZE WERE THE
ACTION BETWEEN LAND, AIR AND
MARITIME ENVIRONMENTS?

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 The Synchronisation of the Japanese Attack
Method What Outcome Analysis
8 Dec 1941 – the first air raid on Singapore at • Weaken the British force
Chinatown and Raffles Square and air attacks to
• Air attack has
neutralise Tengah and Seletar air bases
significant effects
• The important
Air
measure towards
10 Dec 1941 – attack British’s two main • Japan sunk both battleships battle winning
Battleships – the Prince of Wales and Repulse
off the cost of Kuantan

Sea 8 Dec 1941 – the Japanese land in Singaora • The start of the Japanese land • The deception
and Patani and Kota Bahru attack

8 jan 1942 – Penetrate the outer lines of • The starting of the Japanese
defence at Kuala Lumpur, Malaya conquered
15 Jan 1942 – Muar captured • The extend of its power
• The last capture of Malaya and
fight against British at Malaya
• Japan land attack
8 Feb 1942 – land in northwest Singapore • The Beginning of the fall of
Land has been easier due
Singapore
to the contribution of
11 Feb 1942 – attacks Indian, Chinese and • The stronghold of Singapore has Air and Sea attack
British troops along Choa Chu Kang and Bukit been compromised
Timah Roads
14 Feb 1942 – Bukit Chandu captured • The end of the attack
15 Feb 1942 – Japan Won • The fall of Singapore to Japan
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 The Synchronisation of the British defence

Method What Outcome Analysis

8 Feb 1942 – the deployment of • Failed to defend Japanese air

Hurricane plane to fight against attack
Air Japanese air power

Sea The deployment of two Battleships • attacked by the Japanese Air

• Not well synchronised
- The Prince of Wales and Force
• No support from air and sea
Repulse

Land The allied forces of British, • Significant by number

Australia, India and Dalforce • Overly strerched

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TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE CASE STUDY
ILLUSTRATIVE OF CONTEMPORARY
JOINT WARFARE DOCTRINE?

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 JOINT WARFARE DOCTRINE

SHAPING DECISIVE

OPERATIONAL
FRAMEWORK

SUSTAINMENT PROTECTION

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 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
SHAPING

JAPAN

 Complete air and sea dominance.

 Occupation of Malaya covers
550 miles in 55 days prior to
Singapore invasion.
 Utilising Johor Palace tower as
OP to oversee Singapore.
 Utilising their sappers as ‘human
bridge’ for infantry crossing.

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 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
SHAPING
 Complete air and naval
dominance.
 Occupation of Malaya covers
550 miles in 55 days prior to
Singapore invasion.
 Utilising Johor Palace tower as
OP to oversee Singapore.
 Utilising their sappers as ‘human
bridge’ on for infantry crossing.
BRITISH-LED ALLIED FORCES
 Destroying the Johore-Singapore
Causeway Bridge.
 ‘Pace Popular Mythology’
 Stretching of 70-mile coastal line
of defence facing north east of
the island.
 Deploying Australian, Indian and
Chinese troops to the north west
as forward line of defence.
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 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
DECISIVE

JAPAN

 Combination of insurgency
asymmetrical warfare.
 Racial arrogance
 Battlefield domination.
 Misconceptions on enemy
 Air power and light tanks
strength.
superiority.
 Lack of awareness and
 Mass amphibious assault from
knowledge.
the Imperial Japanese Forces.
 Nil flank protections from air,
 Inflicting the morale and COG.
naval and land assets.

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 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
DECISIVE

JAPAN BRITISH-LED ALLIED FORCES

 Combination of insurgency
asymmetrical warfare.
 Racial arrogance
 Battlefield domination.
 Misconceptions on enemy
 Air power and light tanks
strength.
superiority.
 Lack of awareness and
 Mass amphibious assault from
knowledge.
the Imperial Japanese Forces.
 Nil flank protections from air,
 Inflicting the morale and COG.
naval and land assets.

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 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
SUSTAINMENT
JAPAN
 Lack of sustainment but
equipped with battle hardened
troops and improvised
capabilities.
BRITISH-LED ALLIED FORCES
 Inappropriate and cumbersome
combat uniforms for jungle
warfare.
 No training and climatisation
period for the reinforcement
troops.
 Poor IPB on adversary
capabilities and tactical
knowledge.
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 OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
PROTECTION
JAPAN
 Equipped with 200 tanks and 500
modern combat aircrafts.
 Regroup in the jungle and
created the hideouts.
BRITISH-LED ALLIED FORCES
 23 tanks from Indian Armour
Squadron.
 Inadequate in armoured warfare.
 Lack of anti-aircraft defense
system.
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 LESSON LEARNT

 Combination of speed and savagery.

 Targeting critical infrastructures to breakdown opposition morale.
 Element of surprise and clever deception.
 Tactical knowledge on battlefield.
 Poor British leadership vs effective Japanese leadership.
 Lack of coordination between civilians and military.
 The importance of Information Operations before and during a battle.
 Well prepared on training and climatisation.
 Psychological Operation to influence civilians.

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 CONCLUSION
 IPB, Intelligence, Planning and Training together with troops’ will to
fight play a vital KEY in any mission success.

 The Fall of Singapore is a clear example of how Joint Warfare and the
use of the principle of war can influence the rhythm and outcome of
the battle.

 The bigger force doesn’t necessarily win. The British surrendered to a

force barely one-third their size. Their lack of air and naval support,
low morale and poor senior leadership negated their overwhelming
advantage in numbers.

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 REFERENCES
Corfield J. and Corfield R., The Fall of Singapore, Singapore, Talisman Publishing, 2012.

'Cronology of the japanese invasion in Singapore 1942’, All Things Bukit Brown, 12 Feb 2014,
http://bukitbrown.com/main/?p=8731, accessed 14 November 2018.

David H.L., ‘The Fall of Malaya: Japanese Blitzkrieg on Singapore’, Warfare History Network,
21 August 2018, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/the-fall-of-malaya-japanese-blitzkrieg-
on-singapore/, accessed 14 November 2018.

‘Fall of Singapore’, Kokoda Historical, http://kokodahistorical.com.au/history/fall-of-Singapore,

accessed 14 November 2018.

F.Glueckstein, ‘Churchill and the Fall of Singapore’, International Churchill Society, 2015,
https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-169/churchill-and-the-fall-of-
singapore/, accessed 14 November 2018.

Trueman C.N., ‘The Fall of Singapore’, The History Learning Site, 11 November 2018,
https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/the-pacific-war-1941-to-1945/the-fall-of-
singapore/, accessed 14 November 2018. 27
QUESTION & ANSWER

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