This document discusses principles and recommendations from the SEC Code of Corporate Governance related to strengthening internal control systems and risk management frameworks. It outlines 8 expected learning outcomes related to ensuring integrity, transparency and proper governance. It discusses increasing focus on non-financial and sustainability reporting, promoting cost-efficient access to relevant information, and strengthening internal controls and enterprise risk management.
This document discusses principles and recommendations from the SEC Code of Corporate Governance related to strengthening internal control systems and risk management frameworks. It outlines 8 expected learning outcomes related to ensuring integrity, transparency and proper governance. It discusses increasing focus on non-financial and sustainability reporting, promoting cost-efficient access to relevant information, and strengthening internal controls and enterprise risk management.
This document discusses principles and recommendations from the SEC Code of Corporate Governance related to strengthening internal control systems and risk management frameworks. It outlines 8 expected learning outcomes related to ensuring integrity, transparency and proper governance. It discusses increasing focus on non-financial and sustainability reporting, promoting cost-efficient access to relevant information, and strengthening internal controls and enterprise risk management.
This document discusses principles and recommendations from the SEC Code of Corporate Governance related to strengthening internal control systems and risk management frameworks. It outlines 8 expected learning outcomes related to ensuring integrity, transparency and proper governance. It discusses increasing focus on non-financial and sustainability reporting, promoting cost-efficient access to relevant information, and strengthening internal controls and enterprise risk management.
GOVERNANCE, continued Expected Learning Outcomes 1. Understand how the ethical behavior of the board can be strengthened. 2. Describe how the company disclosure policies and procedures can be enhanced. 3. Appreciate how the external auditor’s independence can be strengthened and how audit quality can be enhanced. 4. Understand how a company could increase focus on non- financial and sustainability reporting. 5. Explain how a company can promote a comprehensive and cost-efficient access to relevant information. SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 2 Expected Learning Outcomes 6. Understand how integrity, transparency and proper governance of a company could be ensured through effective internal control system and enterprise risk management framework. 7. Describe briefly how a synergic relationship with shareholders could be cultivated and promoted. 8. Explain how the rights of stakeholders could be respected and how to institute effective redress for the violation of their rights.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 3
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
INCREASING FOCUS ON NON-FINANCIAL
AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING Principle 10 “essential and relevant”
• The company should ensure that material and
reportable non-financial and sustainability issues are disclosed. Sustainability o Ability to be maintained at a certain level. o Ability to exist constantly. Sustainability reporting o Includes voluntary corporate disclosures about sustainability initiatives, plans and associated outcomes. SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 5 Recommendation 10.1 • The Board should have a clear and focused policy on the disclosure of non-financial information, with emphasis on the management of economic, environmental, social and governance (EESG) issues of its business, which underpin sustainability. Companies should adopt a globally recognized standard/framework in reporting sustainability and non-financial issues. SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 6 Explanation • Disclosure to all shareholders and other stakeholders of: Company’s strategic (long-term goals) Operational objectives (short-term goals) Impact of a wide range of sustainability issues. • Can be made through
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 7
Points to Remember 1. Disclosure of non-financial information - Whatever needs to be disclosed except financial report or statements. 2. Management of EESG issues. - Ex: reports and updates on climate change, energy and reduction of energy consumption, water consumption, greenhouse gas emissions report in relation to sustainability. 3. There must be a disclosure of company’s strategic goals and impact of sustainability issues. - On the sustainability report, indicated are the impacts and risks plus the management approach towards those. SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 8 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
11. PROMOTING A COMPREHENSIVE
AND COST-EFFICIENT ACCESS TO RELEVANT INFORMATION Principle 11
• The company should maintain a comprehensive
and cost-efficient communication channel for disseminating relevant information. This channel is crucial for informed decision-making by investors, stakeholders and other interested users.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 10
Recommendation 11.1
• The company should include media and
analysts’ briefings as channels of communication to ensure the timely and accurate dissemination of public, material and relevant information to its shareholders and other investors.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 11
Example
• Company’s websites containing updated
information relevant to investor’s decision making such as: Downloadable financial statements report Articles of Incorporation Notices and Minutes of Annual Stockholder Meetings
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 12
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
"INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM AND
RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK"
12. STRENGTENING THE INTERRNAL CONTROL
SYSTEM AND ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK. Internal Control
• Internal control is a process, effected by an
entity's board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance: That information is reliable, accurate and timely. Of compliance with applicable laws, regulations, contracts, policies and procedures.
Insert Running Title 14
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
• (ERM) is a methodology that looks at risk
management strategically from the perspective of the entire firm or organization. It is a top- down strategy that aims to identify, assess, and prepare for potential losses, dangers, hazards, and other potentials for harm that may interfere with an organization's operations and objectives and/or lead to losses. Insert Running Title 15 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
12. STREGTHENING THE INTERNAL
CONTROL AND ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK Principle 12
• To ensure the integrity, transparency and
proper governance in the conduct of its affairs, the company should have a strong and effective internal control system and enterprise risk management framework.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 17
Recommendation 12.1
• The Company should have an adequate and
effective internal control system and an enterprise risk management framework in the conduct of its business, taking into account its size, risk profile and complexity of operations.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 18
Recommendation 12.2
• The Company should have in place an
independent internal audit function that provides an independent and objective assurance, and consulting services designed to add value and improve the company’s operations.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 19
Functions of an Internal Audit a. Provides independent risk-based assurance service to the Board, Audit Committee and Management, focusing on reviewing the effectiveness of the governance and control processes in i. Promoting the right values and ethics, ii. Ensuring effective performance management and accounting in the organization, iii. Communicating risk and control information, iv. Coordinating the activities and information among the Board, external and internal auditors, and Management;
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 20
Functions of an Internal Audit
b. Performs regular and special audit as contained in the annual
audit plan and/or based on the company’s risk assessment; c. Performs consulting and advisory services related to governance and control as appropriate for the organization; d. Performs compliance audit of relevant laws, rules and regulations, contractual obligations and other commitments, which could have a significant impact on the organization; e. Reviews, audits and assesses the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control system of all areas of the company;
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 21
Functions of an Internal Audit
f. Evaluates operations or programs to ascertain whether results are
consistent with established objectives and goals, and whether the operations or programs are being carried out as planned; g. Evaluates specific operations at the request of the Board of Management, as appropriate; and h. Monitors and evaluates governance processes.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 22
Recommendation 12.3 • Subject to company’s size, risk profile and complexity of operations, it should have a qualified Chief Audit Executive (CAE) appointed by the Board. CAE shall oversee and be responsible for the internal audit activity of the organization, including that portion that is outsourced to a third party service provider. In case of a fully outsourced internal audit activity, a qualified independent executive or senior management personnel should be assigned the responsibility for managing the fully outsourced internal audit activity.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 23
functionally to administratively to the CEO Audit Committee
directly reports to
CAE
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 24
Functions of Chief Audit Executive a. Periodically reviews the internal audit charter and presents it to senior management and the Board Audit Committee for approval; b. Establishes a risk-based internal audit plan, including policies and procedures, to determine the priorities of the internal audit activity, consistent with the organization’s goals; c. Communicates the internal audit activity’s plans, resource requirements and impact of resource limitations, as well as significant interim changes, to senior management and the Audit Committee for review and approval;
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 25
Functions of Chief Audit Executive
d. Spearheads the performance of the internal audit activity to
ensure it adds value to the organization; e. Reports periodically to the Audit Committee on the internal audit activity’s performance relative to its plan; and f. Present findings and recommendations to the Audit Committee and gives advice to senior management and the Board on how to improve internal processes.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 26
Recommendation 12.1
• The Company should have an adequate and
effective internal control system and enterprise risk management framework in the conduct of its business, taking into account its size, risk profile, and complexity ofcoperations.
Insert Running Title 27
Recommendation 12.2
• The Company should have in place an
independent internal audit function that provides an independent and objectives assurance and consulting services designed to add value and improve the company's operations.
Insert Running Title 28
Recommendation 12.3
• Subject to a company's size, risk profile and
complexity of operations, it should have a qualified Chief Audit Executive (CAE) appointed by the Board. The CAE shall oversee and be responsible for the internal audit activity of the organization, including that portion that is outsourced internal audit third party service provider. Insert Running Title 29 Recommendation 12.4
• Subject to its size, risk profile and complexity of
operations, the company should have a separate risk management function to identify, assess and monitor key risk exposures.
Insert Running Title 30
Recommendation 12.5
• In managing the company's Risk Management
System, the company should have a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) who is the ultimate champion of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and has adequate authority, stature , resources and support to fulfill responsibilities, subject to a company's size, risk profile and complexity of operations. Insert Running Title 31 Points to Remember 1. Effective Internal Control System 2. Effective Enterprise Risk Management Framework 3. Company size, risk profile and complexity of operations 4. Functions of n independent or separate internal audit 5. Chief Audit Executive – responsibilities and functions 6. Risk Management Function – Chief Risk officer and functions • Examples: Frequency of review of internal control system Attestation that they have internal audit Information about key risk currently facing & how they manage it.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 32
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
CULTIVATING THE SYNERGY
RELATIONSHIP WITH SHAREHOLDER 13. PROMOTING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS Recommendation 13.1
• The Board should ensure that shareholders
rights are disclosed in the Manual on Corporate and on the company's website.
Insert Running Title 34
Recommendation 13.2
• The Board should encourage active shareholder
participation by sending the Notice of Annual amd Special Shareholders' Meeting with sufficient and relevant information at least 28 days before the meeting.
Insert Running Title 35
Recommendation 13.3 • The Board should encourage active shareholder participation by making the result of the votes taken during the most recent Annual or Special Shareholders' Meeting publicly available the next working day. In addition, the Minutes of the Annual and Special Shareholders' Meeting shoukd be available on the company website within five business days from the end of the meeting. Insert Running Title 36 Recommendation 13.4
• The board should make available, at the option
of the shareholder, an alternative dispute mechanism to resolve intra-corporate disputes in an amicable and effective manner. This should be included in the company’s Manual on Corporate Governance.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 37
Recommendation 13.5
• The board should establish an Investor
relations Office (IRO) to ensure constant engagement with its shareholders. The IRO should be present at every shareholders’ meeting.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 38
DUTIES TO STAKEHOLDERS
14. RESPECTING RIGHTS OF STAKEHOLDERS
AND EFFECTIVE REDRESS FOR VIOLATION OF STAKEHOLDER’S RIGHTS
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 39
Recommendation 14.1
The Board should identify the company’s
various stakeholders and promote cooperation between them and the company in creating wealth, growth and sustainability.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 40
Recommendation 14.2
• The Board should establish clear policies and
programs to provide a mechanism on the fair treatment and protection of stakeholders.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 41
Recommendation 14.3
The Board should adopt a transparent
framework and process that allow stakeholders to communicate with the company and to obtain redress for violation of their rights.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 42
Principle
• The rights of stakeholders established by law, by
contractual relations and through voluntary commitments must be respected. Where stakeholders’ rights and/or interest are at stake, the stakeholders should have opportunity to obtain prompt effective redress for the violation of their rights.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 43
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
15. ENCOURAGING EMPLOYEE’S
PARTICIPATION Principle
• A mechanism for employee participation should
be developed to create a symbiotic environment, realize the company’s goals and participate in its corporate governance processes.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 45
Recommendation 15.1 • The board should establish policies, programs, and procedures that will encourage employees to actively participate in the realization of company’s goals and governance. • Establishment of policies and programs covering (1) health, safety, and welfare (2) training and development (3) reward/compensation for employees. • Recognizing firm specific skills and potential contribution.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 46
Recommendation 15.2
• The board should set the tone and make a
stand against corrupt practices. They should also disseminate the policies and programs to employees through trainings to embed them in company’s culture.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 47
Recommendation 15.3
• The board should establish a suitable
framework for whistleblowing that allows employees to freely communicate their concerns about unethical practices without fear of retaliation.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 48
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
16 ENCOURAGING SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY Principle
• The company should be socially responsible in
all its dealings with the communities where it operates. It should ensure that its interactions serve its environment and stakeholders in a positive and progressive manner that is fully supportive of its comprehensive and balanced development. SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 50 Recommendation 16.1
• The company should:
Recognize and place an importance on the interdependence between business and society. Promote mutually beneficial relationship. Contribute to the advancement of the society.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 51
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
UPDATES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Updates on Corporate Governance
• February 7, 2021
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 53
Updates on Corporate Governance
•February 15, 2021
SM Companies receive 10 top awards on corporate governance. SM Investments Corp. (SMIC) and its subsidiaries clinched 10 awards for scoring high in the recently concluded 2019 Asean Corporate Governance Scorecard (ACGS) assessments. China Bank and SM Prime were named under top 20 Asean Publicly Listed Companies. China Bank was recognized among the top 3 Publicly Listed Companies per country.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance, Continued 54
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MINDANAO
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS CASE 2: SHELL CASE STUDY
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 56
HISTORY
• In what became known as the Royal Dutch case. In 2004, Shell
overstated its oil reserves. This resulted in a loss of confidence in the group, a $17 million fine by the Financial Services Authority and the retirement of both its chairman Sir Phillip Watts and its exploration director, Walter van der Vijver. Expostulating that he was sick and tired of lying. van der Vijver, the firm's head of exploration and production, told Sir Phillip Watts in November 2003 that he had enough of covering up for shortfalls in the firm's reserves and that he wished to do this no longer. Watts, accordingly, replaced him.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 57
• Van der Vijver's outburst was over the overly aggressive and inaccurately optimistic recordings that he had been stimulated to record in the financial statements. However, Watt's zealous overbooking caught up with him. In January of that year, questions compelled Shell to reclassify a huge fifth of its 'proved' reserves. This suspicious action caused investigations to be carried out that unrobed the corruption and both men were forced out of the company.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 58
• Inquiries also showed that, despite strict accounting laws that may easily intimidate companies form deception, Shell's ambition proved too much for them. Deflated profits made them inflate reserves in order to retain the services of their investors and to attract further shareholders. • A consequent lawsuit in 2007 resulted in Shell having to pay $450 million to non-American shareholders (Treanor, 2009). Shell briefly suffered for its errors, but, once again, managed to climb out of its mess to regain some of its original reputation.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 59
DISCUSSION QUESTION 1
TO WHAT EXTENT THE EVENT FACING SHELL
IN 2004 CAUSED BY HUMAN FAILINGS OR STRUCTURAL (ORGANIZATIONAL) FAILINGS?
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 60
Answer - The 2004 Shell issue of overbooking reserves was more due to human failings, although structural (organizational) failings also have its fair share to the occurrence of the scandal as well. The company also acknowledge the need to change their complex organizational structure. They have misled their investors for years when they overestimated their oil and gas reserves from 2002 and 2003. Furthermore, their internal control system was weak that is why even when the executives have been aware of the occurrence of the dilemma much earlier, it was not solved because they do not know what to do. Their top management heads behaved unethically instead of addressing and resolving the issue. It could have been detected earlier if only they have internal auditors who would review their records and operations. They also did not follow the SEC regulations, but it was a good thing that they publicized the issue because it is their shareholder’s right to be informed about their non-financial and sustainability issues as these influence their decision-making. However, it was a bit late and have already caused bigger issues as to their integrity and sustainability.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 61
DISCUSSION QUESTION 2
DISCUSS THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES FACING THE
MEMBERS OF THE PARENT COMPANIES IN ATTEMPTING TO MONITOR AND CONTROL THE ACTIVITIES OF MANAGEMENT.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 62
Answer - Since Royal Dutch/Shell have a complex organizational structure and they also failed to follow strict compliance of SEC regulations, ideally, the parent companies have a long way to go in attempting to monitor and control the activities of their management. This is where the importance of having an effective control system and enterprise risk management framework come to place. An internal audit is necessary to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal operations and compliance audit would be of big help to the company. They also need to change their organizational structure to provide for a balanced and well- structured flow of tasks and responsibility so that each activities of the management are properly monitored.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 63
DISCUSSION QUESTION 3
IS IT DESIRABLE THAT OIL COMPANIES SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO EXERCISE DISCRETION OVER HOW THEY BOOK OIL AND RESERVES?
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 64
Answer - Under Principle 10 of the SEC Code of Corporate Governance, The company should ensure that the material and reportable non-financial and sustainability issues are disclosed. Since, Shell is an Oil Company, their booking of reserves is of most important to ensure their sustainability. Therefore, a discretion would be a violation to the rights of their shareholders and other stakeholders. They should be allowed to know about information which influence how they decide about their investments.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 65
DISCUSSION QUESTION 4
SINCE THE MARKET WILL SOONER OR LATER
DETERMINE IF RESERVES HAVE BEEN OVERSTATED, DOES IT MATTER THAT OVERBOOKING CAN TAKE PLACE?
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 66
Answer - Of course, it is. This type of information must be reported on a timely basis because this shows if the company are able to maintain its business in the future. Just like what happened to Shell, overbooking have misled their investors by thinking that their investments are secured because Shell still have a lot of reserves to use in their future operations but it was, in fact, still subject to future circumstances that losing those reserves is possible.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 67
DISCUSSION QUESTION 5
WHY MIGHT THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT OF A LARGE
QUOTED COMPANY BE SENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS OF LARGE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS SUCH AS CALPERS?
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 68
Answer - Large institutional investors like Calpers plays a huge influence in corporate management because they are entitled to exercise the voting rights in a company. They can actively engage in corporate governance to enhance the value of investee firms. Hence, their concerns are very appealing to the senior management.
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 69
DISCUSSION QUESTION 6
WHICH STAKEHOLDERS WERE MOST AFFECTED BY
THE EVENTS AT SHELL IN 2004?
SEC Code of Corporate Governance 70
Answer - Stakeholders who were mostly affected by the 2004 Shell issue were the investors who were misguided by the overestimated information.